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AN

IMPARTIAL REPORT

OF THE

DEBATES

THAT OCCUR IN THE

TWO HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT,

In the Courſe of the Fourth Seſſion of the Eighteenth Parliament of Great Britain, called to meet at Weſtminſter, on Tueſday the 24th of September, 1799.

WITH

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE RESPECTIVE SPEAKERS,

AND

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

INCLUDING COPIES OF ALL

STATE PAPERS, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, &c.

By WILLIAM WOODFALL,

AND ASSISTANTS.

VOL. I.

BEING THE SEVENTH SESSION OF DEBATES WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED BY THE REPORTER.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE REPORTER,

By T. Gillet, Salisbury-Square,

AND PUBLISHED BY T. CHAPMAN, NO. 154, FLEET-STREET; T. WOODFALL, NO. 104, DRURY-LANE; T. BELLAMY, KING-STREET, COVENT-GARDEN; J. ST. JOHN, WEST END OF EXETER CHANGE; AND H. D. SYMONDS, PATERNOSTER-ROW.

Of whom may be had,

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CONTENTS

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OF

Woodfall's Parliamentary Reports:

Being the fourth Seſſion of the Eighteenth Parliament of Great-Britain, Aſſembled September 24, 1799.

Page

Reporter's Addreſs to the Public 1

HOUSE OF LORDS.

King's Speech on opening the Seſſion - - - 1
Marquis of Buckingham - 3
Lord Amherſt - 7
—— Romney - - 14
—— Grenville - - 15

War in Myſore.

Lord Grenville - 27, 65, 93

Thanks to General Abercrombie, &c.

Lord Grenville - - 65

Thanks to Admiral Mitchell, &c.

Earl Spencer - - - 67, 68
Lord Hood - - 69
—— Grenville - - 70

Militia Reduction Bill.

Lord Grenville 100, 117, 131, 132
Earl Fitzwilliam ib.
Lord Holland 101, 120, 130, 132
Earl of Weſtmoreland 107, 116
—— Carnarvon 109, 116
—— Hardwicke - 116

Motion for Peace.

Lord Holland - 139, 150
—— Grenville - - 147
Proteſt of Earl Carnarvon, Earl Fitzwilliam, and the Earl of Buckinghamſhire on the Militia Bill 155

Page

His Majeſty's Meſſage, relative to Overtures of Peace from the Enemy.

Lord Grenville 163, 170, 178, 217
Duke of Norfolk - 163
—— Bedford - 198, 107
Earl of Carliſle 107, 217, 231
Lord Boringdon ib.
—— Romney - - 214
—— Holland - - 218
Earl of Carnarvon - - 225
—— Liverpool - - 229
Lord Grantley - - 231

Dutch Expedition.

Lord Holland - 379, 396, 399
—— Rawdon (Earl of Moira) 390, 400
Earl Spencer - - 391
Lord Mulgrave - - 392, 398
—— King - - 393
—— Clifton (Earl of Darnley) 395, 400
—— Chancellor - - 396
—— Grenville - - 400

His Majeſty's Meſſage on German Alliances, and ſubſidiary Treaties.

Lord Grenville 407, 419, 429
—— Holland - 420, 429
Duke of Montroſe - 428

Motion for a Committee on the Scarcity of Grain.

Lord Auckland - - 415
—— Holland - - 417

Bread

Page

Bread Regulation Bill.

Earl of Liverpool - - 479

Scarcity of Corn.

Archbishop of Canterbury - 494
Lord Clifton (Earl of Darnley) 496, 498, 502, 504
Earl of Liverpool - - 497
Lord Auckland - - 498
Earl of Suffolk - - 503
Lord Hobart - - ib.
—— Romney - - ib.
Bishop of Durham - - 504
Lord Chancellor - - 505

Motion for Peace.

Earl Stanhope - - 507, 526
Lord Chancellor - - 525

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

On King's Speech.

Mr. Shaw Lefevre - 15, 21
Colonel Elford - - 18
Mr. Jolliffe - - 20
Mr. Secretary Dundas (notice) ib.
Chancellor of the Exchequer 21

Call of the House.

Mr. W. Plumer - 21, 26, 27
Mr. Jones - - 23
Mr. Buxton - - ib.
Chancellor of the Exchequer 24, 26, 27
Mr. Tierney - - 25

Vote of Thanks to Admiral Mitchell, Sir Sidney Smith, &c.

Mr. Secretary Dundas 28, 32

Militia Reduction.

Secretary Dundas 32, 46, 60, 78, 79
Mr. Tierny - 35, 61, 78
Secretary at War - 43, 54
Mr. Sheridan - - 47
Chancellor of the Exchequer 48, 61
Mr. Nicholls - - 53
Mr. Jones - - 60
Mr Addington - - 61
Mr. Wellett - - 7
Mr. Martin - - 80
Address of Commons, and his Majesty's Answer - - 5

Page

Petition from Merchants of Liverpool.

Colonel Gascoyne 56, 63, 80
Speaker - - 57, 58
Chancellor of the Exchequer 58, 83
Mr. Buxton ib.
Mr. Tierney - - 81, 86
Mr. Bryan Edwards - 85
Mr. Manning - - 86
Mr. Dent - - 87
Colonel York - - ib.
Mr. Nicholls - - 88
Sir William Pulteney - - ib.

Petition from the Merchants of Grenada, &c.

Mr. Lushington - 59, 64, 89
Speaker - - ib.
Chancellor of the Exchequer ib.
Sir William Young 126, 135

Army Estimates.

Secretary at War - 63, 72
Mr. Tierney - - 72, 76
Chancellor of the Exchequer 75, 77

Corn.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 91, 474
Lord Hawkesbury - - 467
Mr. Hobhouse - - 472
Mr. Addington - - ib.
Mr. Wilberforce Bird - 474
Mr. Douglass - - 475
Sir William Young - - ib.
Mr. Wilberforce - - ib.
Mr. Buxton - - 478
Master of the Rolls - - ib.

Late Earl Howe.

Mr. Secretary Dundas - 91

War in India.

Mr. Secretary Dundas - 120

Bill to enable his Majesty to call Parliament together during an Adjournment.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 127, 137
Mr. Tierney - - 137
Mr. Jones - - 138

Russian Troops.

Mr. Tierney - - 128

Page

On Exchequer Bills.

Mr. Tierney - - 134
Chancellor of the Exchequer 134

State of Public Records.

Mr. Abbot - - 138
Chancellor of the Exchequer 139

On receiving Petitions for private Bills.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 156, 158, 162
Mr. Tierney - 156, 160, 161
The Speaker 157, 159, 160, 163
Mr. Secretary Dundas 160

Anſwers to the Vote of Thanks from the Duke of York, Admiral Lord Duncan, and Admiral Mitchell - 164

Expedition to Holland.

Mr. Sheridan - - 166

Call of the Houſe.

Mr. Tierney - - 164

Overtures of the French Government.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 167
Mr. Tierney - - ib.

His Majeſty's Meſſage.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 174
Mr. Tierney - - 174, 236
Mr. Jones - - 174
Maſter of the Rolls 175, 176, 238
Mr. Long - 178, 235, 237
Lord Belgrave - 237
Mr. Hobhouſe - - ib.
Mr. Percival - - 238
Mr. Secretary Dundas - 240
Mr. Whitbread - - 274
Mr. Canning - - 253
Mr. Erſkine - - 274
Chancellor of the Exchequer 278
Mr. Fox - - 287

Motion for advances to Government by the Bank.

Mr. Tierney - - 168
Chancellor of the Exchequer ib.

Page

On Public Accounts.

Mr. Abbot - - 217, 238
Mr. Wallace - - ib.

Supplies.

Mr. Nicholls - - 308
Mr. Bryan Edwards - 312
Mr. Hobhouſe - - 312
Lord Hawkeſbury - - 318

Dutch Expedition.

Mr. Sheridan - 326, 366
Mr. Secretary Dundas - 337
Mr. Bouverie - - 352
Mr. Tierney - - ib.
Mr. Percival - - 361
Mr. M. A. Taylor 364, 369
Mr. H. Addington - 365
Sir James Murray Pulteney ib.
Colonel Hope - - 366

Meſſage in Prevention of the Plague.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 371

Renewal of the Habeas Corpus ſuſpenſion Act.

Attorney General - 372

Labouring Poor.

Mr. Whitbread 373, 376, 378
Chancellor of the Exchequer 375
Sir William Young - 377
Mr. Buxton - - ib.
Mr. Lefevre - - ib.
Mr. Elliſon - - ib. 378
Mr. Wilberforce - ib. 378

Committee of Supply.

Mr. Wallace - - 402
Mr. Harriſon - - 403
Mr. Burdon - - ib.
Mr. Tierney - - 404
Chancellor of the Exchequer ib.
Mr. W. Smith - 406
Mr. Baker - - ib

Army Extraordinaries.

Secretary at War - 406
Chancellor of the Exchequer - 536

Suſpenſion of the Habeas Corpus Act.

Attorney General 409, 482, 484
Mr. Jones - - ib.

Mr.

Page

Mr. Buxton - - ib. 493
Mr. Sheridan ib. 423, 414, 487, 493
Sir Francis Burdett - 411
Mr. Canning - - - 412
Mr. Speaker - - 413, 414
Chancellor of the Exchequer 414
Mr. Jolliffe - - 482
Mr. H. Lafcelles - - ib.
Mr. Hobhouſe - - ib.
Mr. Sturges - - 483
Sir Francis Burdett - 484
Mr. Martin - - 486
Mr. Tierney - - ib.
Sir Gregory Page Turner 487
Lord Belgrave - - ib.
Mr. Elliſon - - - 491
Mr. Canning - - ib.

Imperial Loan.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 432, 433, 440
Mr. Hobhouſe - - ib.
Mr. Tierney - ib. 436, 447
Mr. Nicholls - 436, 456
Mr. Jolliffe - - 436

Page

Mr. W. Bouverie - - 436
Mr. Wilberforce - - 449
Mr. Sheridan - - ib.
Secretary at War - - 457
Sir William Pultenay - 458

Public Records.

Mr. Abbot - - 460
Maſter of the Rolls - 466

Stale Bread Bill.

Lord Hawkeſbury -- 470
Mr. Nicholls - ib.

Subſtitutes for Corn.

Mr. Wilberforce - - 486, 482
Lord Hawkeſbury - 481
Mr. Buxton -- - ib.
Mr. Burdon - ib.
Chancellor of the Exchequer ib.

Bank Charter.

Chancellor of the Exchequer 534
Mr. S. Thornton - - 534
Appendix.

TO THE PUBLICK.

DURING the very ſhort period that has elapſed ſince the Reporter laſt ſubmitted his ſentiments upon the poſture of publick affairs, a variety of events have taken place, which have given a new aſpect to the war, and rather induce a hope that Europe will find repoſe and experience the reſtoration of tranquillity, at a much earlier day than appeared to be probable at the commencement of the year. In Africa and Aſia, the ſucceſſes of the Britiſh arms have been unparalleled, both in reſpect to brilliancy and importance. Indeed when we contemplate all the circumſtances of the expulſion of the French party from the court of Hydrabad, accompliſhed by Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, who with the co-operation of the Nizam's cavalry, ſurrounded the camp of the French army, diſarmed all the ſepoys, and ſecured the perſons of all the French officers in the camp; and when we reflect on the capture of Seringapatam, the vigilance of the Adminiſtration at home, and the precaution which induced them early to ſuſpect the deſigns of Tippoo Sultaun in conjunction with the French Republick, and to appriſe the Governor General and Council of Bengal of their apprehenſions, the effectual means they immediately carried into execution

to prevent the danger, with the wiſe conduct of the Governor General in India, and the active exertions of the army under that able and victorious commander, General Harris, we are loſt in admiration at ſuch a wonderful combination of foreſight, prudence, exertion, and ſucceſsful effort, all directed to the ſame object in parts of the globe far diſtant from each other. By the death of Tippoo, who evidently fell a ſacrifice to his own perfidy, the Eaſt India Company are relieved from the conſtant apprehenſions of the treacherous deſigns of their bittereſt foe in Aſia, and their poſſeſſions and territories in Indoſtan are placed upon a much more ſafe footing, than that on which they have ſtood ever ſince the memorable campaigns of Lord Clive and Sir Eyre Coote. The acquiſition of the Myſore Country is moſt invaluable, and the proper uſe of it, will effectually ſecure the peace, proſperity and happineſs of the myriads who inhabit the diſtricts of the immenſe ſpace that compoſes the Carnatic, and ſpreads from the coaſt of Coromandel to the coaſt of Malabar. Whoever has read the papers tranſmitted to the Eaſt India Directors, and to the India Board, which have been laid before Parliament*, will admit the juſtice of this eulogium, and find it difficult to decide, whether moſt praiſe be due to the Governor General of Bengal for his ſagâcity, his perſeverance, and his firmneſs, or to the ardent zeal of the forces which atchieved that glorious work, that ſo well entitles them to the honour-

* Vide Appendix.

able

able diſtinction beſtowed upon them by Lord Mornington of " the *incomparable* army of India."

On the weſtern ſide of Aſia, the Britiſh arms have been exerted under the command of Sir William Sidney Smith, in a manner not leſs uſeful and glorious. With a ſmall and limited force, that gallant officer has been able not only to keep the boaſted conqueror of Italy at bay for two months, when ſat down with a powerful army before an ill fortified and weakly garriſoned town in Syria, but at length compelled him to raiſe the ſiege and retire under circumſtances of utter diſcomfiture, diſgrace and calamity. So brilliant an exploit is ſcarcely to be paralleled in the hiſtory of the world, and it plainly proves, that whether exerted in little or at large, by a ſmall force or a great one, Britiſh ſkill and courage will ſurmount every difficulty, and make the proudeſt conquerors of the age bow to their ſuperiority. Let any man who knows any thing of the imbecillity of the Turkiſh Government, of the total ignorance of its armies of modern tactics, and of their utter incapacity to oppoſe a regular European force of magnitude, and they will inſtantly perceive that the merit and the honour of having humbled the lofty pride of Buonaparte, reduced his ranks to the mere ſkeleton of an army, and relieved Egypt and Syria from the ſevereſt plague that ever viſited both countries, belong ſolely to Sir Sidney Smith. To that meritorious, ſpirited and judicious officer we have to aſcribe the reſcue of

St. John D'Acre from the all-graſping dominion of French republicaniſm, and to him alone is due the exalted praiſe of having almoſt annihilated the ſquadrons under the command of Buonaparte, who, if he yet ſurvives, may be conſidered as a wretched wanderer through the deſart, a dreadful example of the miſerable fate that is the ſure conſequence of the mad ambition of thoſe who wantonly and unprovoked carry the ravages of war into the peaceful fields of their unguarded allies, and which ſooner or later falls on the impious and the profane.

In Europe the ſcene has been wonderfully changed; the greater part of Italy which had been ſo rapidly overrun by Buonaparte, and made the ſubject of the moſt unqualified rapine, extortion, and injuſtice, has been entirely recovered from the fell gripe of its French republican robbers, and within a few months ſo ſucceſsfully have the combined forces of Auſtrians and Ruſſians carried on their operations in reſiſtance to the armies of Joubert, Macdonald, Moreau, and Championnet, that in different engagements each has either been defeated with great loſs, or obliged to retire under circumſtances of eſſential diſadvantage. In Switzerland, the ſucceſs of the campaign has been more ſhifting and various. In its commencement the Archduke apparently carried all before him, but latterly the French have gained ſome ground. The ſcene of action is, however, now changed, and we are to look to another part of the

Con-

Continent as the ſeat of the war. The events to take place there are yet in the pregnant womb of time.

With regard to the expedition to Holland, on which Britiſh expectation hangs with ſuch anxiety, in the onſet our ſucceſs has been as diſtinguiſhed and as great, as the fondeſt hopes of our countrymen could deſire. No ſooner had we landed, an operation effected in the face of an enemy well prepared for reſiſtance, than we repelled that enemy, and obtained poſſeſſion of the ſtrongeſt fort and arſenal on the coaſt of Holland. Almoſt immediately afterwards, by the good conduct of Vice-Admiral Mitchell, the fleet under his command were brought into ſuch a ſtation as to awe the whole of the Dutch ſquadron into an immediate ſurrender, without the firing of a ſingle gun. This acquiſition alone is ample recompence for all the charge of the Expedition, but ſtill more important objects may poſſibly be attained. It is true, that in the action of the 19th, through the raſh impetuoſity of our Allies, we miſſed our aim, and many men's lives were ſacrificed; but the glorious victory ſince obtained over the united forces of the Batavians and French, and the important capture of Alkmaar, afford us the happieſt preſage of the future enterprizes of our army, and prove that although the enemy have been conſiderably re-inforced, we have no occaſion to be diſmayed. It is an undoubted fact that the majority of the Dutch are heartily ſick of their fraternization

nization with the French Republick, and eagerly pant for a ſafe opportunity of returning to their former government; but while the robbers have their piſtols at their heads, they dare not avow their attachment to their ancient ally, and, politically ſpeaking, their beſt friend. We muſt carve the way to their return with the ſword, and thus enable them to ſhake off the galling yoke of French Republicaniſm, every principle of which is founded in the direſt deſpotiſm, under the proſtituted name of liberty.

The active, earneſt, and ardent zeal with which the Emperor of Ruſſia has entered into the alliance with Auſtria and Great Britain; and the undaunted ſpirit on every occaſion diſplayed by the Ruſſian forces, afford the moſt lively proſpect of a deciſive termination of a campaign, commenced in the moſt auſpicious manner, and already attended with many brilliant and important ſucceſſes. If, therefore, the Allies adhere ſtrictly to their avowed object, (the delivery of the States of Europe which the French Republick have ſeized upon, and held in bonds of the moſt abject ſlavery, and their reſtoration to their natural independence and weight in the ſcale of nations,) it is almoſt impoſſible but that the glorious end will be attained. The deluſion which the French Republick firſt practiſed on ſurrounding States, and the falſe glare of freedom with which they dazzled their neighbours, are no more; the maſk is torn away from the Gorgon face of the hideous

hideous monſter, and the horrid features of the Meduſa's head are expoſed to the deteſtation and ridicule of all who dare honeſtly avow their opinions. Let us, therefore, indulge the fond hope, that the French themſelves will imitate our anceſtors in their conduct at the Reſtoration, and riſe as one man to overthrow the tyranny of their republican rulers. Conqueſts by the Allies may tend materially to accelerate the approach of this much to be deſired event, but the ultimate effort muſt be the work of the French people.

The Britiſh Parliament has been aſſembled at an unuſually early ſeaſon, for the ſake of legiſlating a meaſure calculated to ſtrengthen the arms of the Executive Government, and the little oppoſition that has been made to it, proves the confidence that the people of England repoſe in an Adminiſtration, which has evidently ſhewn the moſt unvaried attention to the publick intereſts, and has been more than ordinarily ſucceſsful during a war the moſt critical and dangerous of any the country was ever engaged in. May Providence in its wiſdom bring it to a fortunate and ſafe concluſion, and make it the certain means of diffuſing the bleſſings of peace throughout the world!

Queen-ſtreet, Weſtminſter,
Oct. 8, 1799.

WOODFALL'S
PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS.

BEING THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE EIGHTEENTH PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

TUESDAY, SEPT. 24.

HIS Majeſty went in his uſual ſtate to the Houſe of Lords, and being ſeated on the Throne, ſent Sir Francis Molyneux, Uſher of the Black Rod, to the Houſe of Commons, to ſummon that Houſe to attend at the Bar. The Commons came immediately, when his Majeſty opened the Seſſion with the following moſt gracious Speech from the Throne:

My Lords and Gentlemen,

I have called you together at this unuſual ſeaſon, in order to recommend it to you to conſider of the propriety of enabling Me, without delay, to avail Myſelf, to a farther extenſion of the voluntary ſervices of the militia, at a moment when an increaſe of our active force abroad may be productive of the moſt important and beneficial conſequences.

We have ſeen the happy effects of the meaſure which you adopted on this ſubject in the laſt ſeſſion; and the forces which I was thereby enabled to employ, have already diſplayed, in the face of the enemy, a courage, diſcipline and ſteadineſs worthy of the character of Britiſh ſoldiers.

In the ſhort interval ſince the cloſe of the laſt ſeſſion, our ſituation and proſpects have, under the bleſſing of Providence, improved beyond the moſt ſanguine expectation. The abilities and valour of the commanders and troops of the combined Imperial armies, have continued to be eminently diſplayed: The deliverance of Italy may now be conſidered as ſecured by the reſult of a campaign equal in ſplendour and ſucceſs to any of the moſt brilliant recorded in hiſtory. And I have had the heartfelt ſatisfaction of ſeeing the valour of My fleets and armies ſucceſsfully employed to the aſſiſtance of My allies, to the ſupport of Our juſt cauſe, and to the advancement of the moſt important intereſts of the Britiſh empire.

The kingdom of Naples has been reſcued from the French yoke, and reſtored to the dominion of its lawful Sovereign; and My former connections with that Power have been renewed.

The French expedition to Egypt has continued to be productive of calamity and diſgrace to our enemies; while its ultimate views againſt our Eaſtern Poſſeſſions have been utterly confounded. The deſperate attempt which they have lately made to extricate themſelves from their difficulties, has been defeated by the courage of the Turkiſh forces, directed by the ſkill, and animated by the heroiſm of a Britiſh officer with a ſmall portion of My naval force under his command: and the overthrow of that reſtleſs and perfidious power, who, inſtigated by the artifices, and deluded by the promiſes of the French, had entered into their ambitious and deſtructive projects in India, has placed the Britiſh intereſts in that quarter in a ſtate of ſolid and permanent ſecurity.

The vigilance, deciſion, and wiſdom of the Governor General in Council, on this great and important occaſion, and the tried abilities and valour of the commanders, officers, and troops employed under his direction, are entitled to My higheſt praiſe.

There is, I truſt, every reaſon to expect that the effort which I am making for the deliverance of the United Provinces will prove ſucceſsful. The Britiſh arms have reſcued from the poſſeſſion of the enemy the principal port and naval arſenal of the Dutch Republic; and although we have to regret the loſs of many brave men in a ſubſequent attack againſt the enemy, whoſe poſition enabled them to obſtruct our progreſs, I have the ſtrongeſt ground to expect that the ſkill of My Generals, and the determined reſolution and intrepidity of My troops, and thoſe of My allies, will ſoon ſurmount every obſtacle; and that the fleet which, under the uſurped dominion of France, was deſtined to co-operate in the invaſion of theſe iſlands, may ſpeedily, I truſt, under its ancient ſtandard, partake in the glory of reſtoring the religion, liberty and independence of thoſe provinces, ſo long in intimate union and alliance with this country.

While you rejoice with Me in the events, which added ſo much luſtre to the Britiſh character, you will, I am perſuaded, as cordially join in the ſentiments ſo juſtly due to the conduct of My good and faithful ally the Emperor of Ruſſia. To his magnanimity and wiſdom, directing to ſo many quarters of Europe the force of his extenſive and powerful empire, We are in a great degree indebted for the ſucceſs of our own efforts, as well as for the rapid and favourable change in the general ſituation of affairs. I have directed copies to be laid before you of thoſe engagements, which have conſolidated and cemented a connection ſo conſonant to the permanent intereſts of My empire, and ſo important at the preſent moment to every part of the civilized world.

Gentlemen of the Houſe of Commons,

The ample ſupplies which you have granted to Me in the courſe of the laſt

laſt ſeſſion, will, I truſt, ſo nearly provide for the exigencies of the public ſervice, even on the extenſive ſcale which our preſent operations require, as to enable Me, without further aid, to continue thoſe exertions to the cloſe of the preſent year; but, in order to afford you the convenience of a longer receſs, I recommend it to you to conſider of providing for the expence which will be neceſſary in the early part of the enſuing year; and with this view, I have ordered the proper eſtimates to be laid before you.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

In purſuance of your recommendation, I judged it proper to communicate to My two Houſes of Parliament in Ireland, at the cloſe of their laſt ſeſſion, the ſentiments which you had expreſſed to Me reſpecting an incorporating Union with that Kingdom.

The experience of every day confirms Me in the perſuaſion, that ſignal benefits would be derived to both countries from that important meaſure; and I truſt that the diſpoſition of My Parliament there, will be found to correſpond with that which you have manifeſted for the accompliſhment of a work which would tend ſo much to add to the ſecurity and happineſs of all My Iriſh ſubjects, and to conſolidate the ſtrength and proſperity of the empire.

As ſoon as his Majeſty had retired, and prayers were over, the Duke of Marlborough took the oaths and his ſeat; after which, Lord Eldon was introduced between Lord Grenville and Lord Walſingham, and was ſworn, and then ſeated on the Barons' Bench with the uſual ceremonies.

The King's ſpeech was read by the Lord Chancellor, and afterwards by the clerk at the table.

The Marquis of *Buckingham* then roſe, and prefaced his motion for an addreſs to the throne in a very able and maſterly ſpeech. The Marquis ſaid, it was not his intention to treſpaſs long on the time of their Lordſhips, but that he would endeavour to compreſs his ſentiments into as ſhort a ſpace as poſſible. He conſidered the ſpeech they had juſt heard from the throne as a high compliment to that invaluable conſtitutional force (the militia of this kingdom) with which he eſtimated it a great honour to have been ſo many years cloſely connected, having ſerved in it from his earlieſt manhood. He ſpoke of it in terms of the warmeſt praiſe, for the excellent conduct, exact diſcipline, ſteady valour, and unſhaken loyalty which, during the preſſure of a war altogether unprecedented in point of difficulty and danger, it had manifeſted for the general welfare, by voluntarily offering to ſerve either at home or abroad, as the public exigency might require,

He ſaid, parliamentary faith was to be conſidered as the corner-ſtone of the militia inſtitution; and he hoped that legiſlative pledge would, in all times and under all circumſtances, be religiouſly adhered to. In reſpect to the meaſure hinted at in the ſpeech from the throne as the cauſe of thus calling together the Parliament at an unuſual ſeaſon, and which probably would ſhortly be ſubmitted to the Houſe for its conſideration, he truſted that no attempt would be made to violate the ſacred pledge to which he had alluded; and he aſſured their Lordſhips that, if he entertained the leaſt idea that ſuch an attack on the ſolemn compact on which the militia was inſtituted had been meditated, he would have been the laſt man living who would have ſtood up on the preſent occaſion, and moved an addreſs, grounded upon the ſpeech with which his Majeſty had opened the ſeſſion. He had lived too long and too much with the militia not to know their high ſpirit, active efforts, and eager zeal to dare every difficulty and danger in the ſervice of their country; and he hoped every noble Lord preſent would participate with him in his feelings on the ſubject. At the ſame time he knew the jealouſy entertained by the militia in reſpect to any thing like a violation of the principles on which they were inſtituted, and therefore he flattered himſelf that the utmoſt impartiality would be exerciſed, and that thoſe who had been firſt in their voluntary offers of ſervice abroad, would be firſt preferred and ſelected. He adverted to the ancient formation of the militia, and the expreſs terms on which that invaluable force had been called forth, and ſaid, nothing but the imperious neceſſity of the extraordinary war in which the country was engaged, owing to the uncommon means reſorted to by the inveterate enemy of religion, order, morality, and civil ſubordination, to enforce its unjuſtifiable ambition, could warrant the ſmalleſt departure from the original militia ſyſtem, and he hoped when Providence in its wiſdom ſhould reſtore tranquillity to Europe, the militia would be brought back to its firſt principles, and confined within the ſhape and ſervice for which it was originally deſigned.

When he looked round and contemplated the events of the preſent year; when he ſaw the brilliant ſucceſs which had attended our arms in almoſt every quarter of the globe, and particularly in a quarter where it was leaſt to be expected; he could not help conſidering theſe as advantages very ſhort of thoſe which Providence had in ſtore for us. In conſequence of ſome of the events which had taken

place

place within the preſent year; in conſequence of the liberation of a large army which had been kept up in the country; and the liberation of a large fleet which it had been neceſſary to keep conſtantly ſtationed in the Northern ſeas; many of thoſe proviſions which Parliament had adopted for the defence of the coaſts were no longer neceſſary. Under the preſent circumſtances, therefore, it would be wiſe in Parliament to entruſt the defence of the country to the original militia, who were fully competent to that object; and to that moſt invaluable body of men, of whom he could not ſpeak with too much praiſe, the Volunteer Corps of this country. Beſides reducing the preſent militia eſtabliſhment to its original ſtandard, at which it would be amply ſufficient for all the purpoſes of internal defence, noble Lords would ſee the wiſdom and expediency of adding to the number of our troops who were at preſent in Holland, ſo as to enable them to reſtore to the United Provinces their ancient conſtitution, their religion, liberty, and laws. If it was wiſe to diſembody ſo much of the militia force of the country as was not neceſſary, it would be alſo wiſe to take thoſe men into the regular forces who ſhould make a voluntary tender of their ſervices, in order that they might be employed abroad with honour to themſelves, and with benefit to their country. He was afraid he had detained the Houſe too long on a ſubject, concerning which he felt a very great degree of anxiety. With reſpect to the other parts of his Majeſty's ſpeech, he had little more to add to the animated detail that was contained in it. He would, however, beg leave to call their Lordſhips' attention to ſome of the principal circumſtances which were connected with the preſent war, and the preſent ſtate of the belligerent powers. And firſt, he muſt take notice of the wanton impiety, the injuſtice, cruelty, and flagitious barbarity of the French nation; together with the fate that had attended every act of their's undertaken upon thoſe principles. Every one had beheld that which was called the all-conquering army, with the arrogant conqueror at the head of it. Every one might have obſerved the mad ambition with which he was actuated; the extenſive plans of conqueſt which he had projected, and the impious perfidy with which he invaded a country that was not at war with France. Yet this man, who was called the conqueror and the hero, was defeated and fruſtated in all his attempts, from the celebrated battle of Aboukir, to the remarkable ſiege of Acre. He was ſeen ſitting down before an inconſiderable and ill-fortified town, which he regularly beſieged

beſieged with his army; and was afterwards ſeen to retreat, loaded with diſgrace, and compleatly defeated by a handful of Britiſh ſailors, who, on that occaſion were converted into ſoldiers; and by the few Turks whom the preſence of our ſmall naval force, and the exertions of that able and gallant officer who commanded the expedition, inſpired with a degree of courage which otherwiſe they never would have diſplayed. When all theſe wonderful events were ſeen to take place, the mind of man muſt be loſt in aſtoniſhment, while it contemplated the awful diſpoſitions of Providence; and beheld wickedneſs, impiety, and treachery recoil upon themſelves, and meet that fate which they ſo juſtly merited. After pointedly adverting to the leading circumſtances of the progreſs of Buonaparte till he came to ſit down before Acre, and ſhewing that in every ſtep he aggregated violations of the *jus gentium*, and added the moſt extreme injuſtice to the moſt extravagant inhoſpitality, he took occaſion to pay Sir Sydney Smith a handſome compliment for his gallantry, his ſpirit, and his ſucceſs, with a ſmall force oppoſed to the confident and vain-glorious conqueror of Italy, at the head of an army habituated to victory. The Marquis truſted that in due time the country would do juſtice to the gallant officer who had rendered the common cauſe of Europe ſuch eſſential ſervice.

He would next call the attention of their Lordſhips to the fate of that perfidious enemy, the bittereſt foe of Great Britain, in Aſia, whoſe pride had been humbled in the duſt, and whoſe capital was lately taken by our incomparable army in India. He did not know which to admire moſt, the ſteady courage with which the aſſault was conducted, or the humanity of the officers of the troops who atchieved ſuch a brilliant and important victory, in their attention to the defenceleſs part of Tippoo Saib's houſehold. Both they and the ſoldiers were entitled to the higheſt praiſes of the country; and it gave him, the Marquis ſaid, additional ſatisfaction, when he recollected that it was owing to the wiſdom, prudence, and magnanimity of the Governor General, with whom he had for many years had the honour and happineſs to live in habits of the utmoſt intimacy. He ſpoke of Lord Mornington's conciliatory manners, and diſtinguiſhed talents, with the conviction of truth, and the ardour of friendſhip. After having detained the Houſe ſo long with a recapitulation of thoſe ſervices which threw a luſtre on the Britiſh character, that was never known in any former period of our hiſtory, he would, he ſaid, treſpaſs a little longer on their Lord-

Lordſhips' attention, by adverting to the beſt and moſt powerful of our allies. It was with infinite ſatisfaction and pleaſure he beheld the late aſtoniſhing and gigantic efforts of the Emperor of Ruſſia. and it was with ſtill greater ſatisfaction he conſidered that to the wiſdom, energy, magnanimity, and, above all, the fidelity of that illuſtrious Prince, Europe might, in a conſiderable degree, be indebted for her deliverance. It was his wiſdom and energy that ſerved to inſpire the falling powers of the Continent; and to put a ſtop to the fatal policy of thoſe Courts that would have concluded a peace with a perfidious enemy, which would only prepare the way more ſurely for their own deſtruction. It was to his wiſdom and his exertions, that the Ottoman Empire was indebted for the ſecurity it now enjoyed; and in ſhort, it was theſe exertions that ſaved Europe from that rapid ſcene of deſolation with which ſhe was threatened. There were many other parts of his Majeſty's ſpeech on which he could enlarge with peculiar pleaſure, and from which he could hold out flattering proſpects to the country; but he would not treſpaſs on their Lordſhips' time by alluding to any other part than that which related to the ſiſter kingdom.

Having paſſed ſome years of his life in Ireland, though he could not preſume to ſtate himſelf to be a competent judge, he might nevertheleſs lay claim to the character of an obſerver, not inattentive to what paſſed before him, or to the manners, characters, and intereſts of the Iriſh people. He ſaw with regret the many wounds that the ſiſter kingdom had ſuffered within the two laſt centuries, from her own internal weakneſs, and he was convinced that an union between the two countries was the only ſalutary balm that could heal thoſe wounds. He ſaw with pleaſure the good ſenſe of the Iriſh people returning, and he hoped, that ſo wiſe and beneficial a meaſure would ſoon take place with the concurrent approbation and conſent of both kingdoms. In ſhort, he could ſtate it as a fact, which he had learned from the firſt ſources of information, that moſt ranks of people in Ireland, particularly the peaſantry and all the lower orders, looked up at this moment to an Union as the only means of bettering their condition, and of raiſing them from that ſtate of abject miſery, ignorance, and poverty in which they were ſunk. His Lordſhip concluded with moving an addreſs in anſwer to his Majeſty's ſpeech.

Lord *Amherſt* ſaid, my Lords: The ſpeech of the noble Mover of this Addreſs has added to the difficulty and embar-

raſſy

raſſment which I naturally feel in obtruding myſelf for the firſt time upon your Lordſhips' attention. The weight and importance which belongs to every thing that comes from a perſon of his conſequence in this country, would of itſelf be ſufficient to intimidate me when I am to follow him upon an occaſion of ſuch magnitude. But in addition to this conſideration, the manner in which he has anticipated almoſt all the topics ſuggeſted by the ſpeech from the Throne, upon which I ſhould have felt it my duty to trouble your Lordſhips very ſhortly, has left me little excuſe for troubling you at all; and it is ſome comfort to me, that in proportion as he has increaſed the difficulty, in the ſame proportion he has diminiſhed the neceſſity of my treſpaſſing upon your patience.

Upon thoſe particular points, which form the main ground of the reaſons for the preſent calling of Parliament; points upon which the noble Marquis's particular ſituation enable him to ſpeak with ſo much information and authority, I ſhall not preſume to offer any thing in addition to his arguments. Certainly no man is better qualified to ſpeak of the importance of the ſervice, which the militia of this country has rendered to the empire at large, of the zeal and alacrity with which theſe ſervices have been offered, than one who was among the firſt to bring forward and give animation and effect to that alacrity and zeal, and who has borne ſo large a ſhare in thoſe ſervices for which they are entitled to the thanks of their country. Certainly no man can be leſs ſuſpected of a deſign to degrade or ſacrifice that diſtinguiſhed branch of the public defence, than one who has laboured ſo earneſtly and ſo ſucceſsfully to bring it to the pitch of credit and glory at which it now ſtands.

Leaving, therefore, to your Lordſhips' judgment the conſideration of the meaſure as it affects the militia itſelf, I hope to be forgiven if I endeavour to obviate ſuch general objections as it is impoſſible, in the common intercourſe of ſociety, not to have heard ſtated; all which, however, appear ſuſceptible of eaſy, and as it ſtrikes me, ſatisfactory anſwers.

And firſt, with reſpect to the general ſtate of the defence and means of this country, and the alledged inconſiſtency of this meaſure of offenſive operation, with the limited ſcale of military exertion, and with that of our annual expenditure. Undoubtedly the firſt and moſt eſſential object is, to be able to hold out ſo long as France ſhall continue what ſhe is in power

power and in enmity to this country, and in general hoſtility to all the other governments of the world. Undoubtedly the only certain method of ſecuring this ability is to limit our exertions to ſuch a point, that even if the whole world ſhould fail us, and if we ſhould be left again, as heretofore we have been left, to fight the battles of the world and our own alone, we ſhould be able to ſtand the conteſt for any undefined period.

But though this be certain, and though it be indiſpenſible that we ſhould not exhauſt our means ſo as to run the riſque of falling below this point at any time; and though the *duration* of our efforts be much more to be conſidered than this poſitive force at any particular moment, yet it does not follow, the end of all theſe efforts being the ſurviving the preſent inordinate power and ambition of France, that if the ſame end can be accompliſhed by ſo doing, we ſhould not take any reaſonable chance of ſhortening the period of our duration by any extraordinary temporary effort. When circumſtances appeared to open a ſudden proſpect of more vigorous exertion on the part of the powers of the continent; when the oppreſſions of the people whom France had over-ran, appeared ready to rouſe a proper ſpirit of oppoſition to the oppreſſors; when in the interior of France herſelf were diſcovered evident ſymptoms of debility and diſtraction, it would have been a narrow and pedantic adherence to ſyſtem, which ſhould have forbidden our improving to the utmoſt a moment apparently ſo propitious; and it would have been an ill-judged economy, which ſhould have grudged a temporary exertion beyond the ſcale of our ſettled ſyſtem, for the chance of accompliſhing the end of that ſyſtem ſo much the ſooner. Not that the exertion could in its nature be ſo long and laſting as to alter the complexion of our ſyſtem, or diſable us at any time from recurring to it.

Another objection, not unfrequently ſtarted, is the general impolicy of Great Britain ever interfering in continental war. If by this objection be meant only that Great Britain can never have an intereſt in undertaking foreign conqueſts, for the ſake of acquiring territory and dominion on the continent, nothing can be more true.

If it be meant that this country can never have its intereſts ſo implicated with thoſe of other powers as to feel itſelf eſſentially concerned in the ſucceſs of one or other power, and in the preſervation or the reſtoration of the balance of Europe, all hiſtory, eſpecially all the hiſtory of the good

times of this country, plainly proves the contrary of ſuch an aſſertion . . . . . .

It muſt be intended then to aſſert, that whatever be our intereſt in the wars of the continent, our phyſical ſituation prevents us from ever taking part in them. . . . . .

No doubt phyſical circumſtances muſt, to a certain degree, limit the exertions of every country. But who ſhall draw the line where the power of exertion ends? Who, for inſtance, if he had been called upon at the beginning of the preſent war, to eſtimate the efforts and the ſacrifices which this country could make in the courſe of it, would not have been ſtartled at the idea of one half of what actually has been done and borne chearfully? What if two years ago, when the funding ſyſtem was ſhaking under us, we had liſtened to the prophecies of thoſe who told us it muſt inevitably fall, and that we could ſubſtitute nothing in its room? and yet, who would forego the now tried and aſcertained advantage of a ſyſtem of finance, which nothing, perhaps, but the preſſure of the times would have led us to try, and nothing but the ſpirit of the nation, riſing in proportion to the preſſure, would have enabled to ſucceed. What if, when at the ſame period the threat of invaſion impended, we had acquieſced in the ſtatement, true undoubtedly to a certain degree, that we were without an army, and that we had not the means of internal defence? Yet look round our coaſt now, and find if you can the ſpot where an invading enemy could hope to make an impreſſion; where he would not be met by a portion of an army, for its ſpirit equalled perhaps by few, and excelled by none of the powers of the continent.

Who is there among the political economiſts of this or any former age, that if it had been foretold to them, that after having ſubdued and trampled into ſubmiſſion, or awed into fear, the greater part of Europe, France, rich in population, gigantic in power, elated with a ſeries of conqueſts almoſt undiſputed, and enriched with the wealth of plundered kingdoms, ſhould fit out an expedition with the choiceſt of her troops, the moſt ſkilful of her generals, the whole ſtrength of her marine, and ſhould bend this expedition againſt the territories of a power mighty in name and ſize, but feeble and defenceleſs from want of exertion: who if they had been told, that againſt this formidable armament none of the nations apparently moſt intereſted, ſhould beſtir themſelves; that it ſhould proceed unmoleſted to the execu-

tion

tion of its enterprize, with half the world if not favouring, at leaſt afraid to oppoſe them: who if they had been told, that from an iſland in a diſtant ocean, containing not one third of the population of the country which fitted out the enterprize, not one-tenth of the population of the empire againſt which it was ſent, and of the kingdoms and ſtates intereſted in preventing its ſucceſs, but which were ſtanding around in torpid and hopeleſs admiration of the plans deſtined for their own ruin; that from this iſland ſhould come the ſtroke which ſhould lay proſtrate the pride and hopes of this great enterprize; that the ſpirit of this petty iſland ſhould go forth to blaſt it in its outſet, ſhould purſue it in its progreſs, check it at every turn, and ultimately extinguiſh and overwhelm it; who, of the grave calculators of population and phyſical ſtrength, would not have ſaid that the event was in itſelf utterly out of nature; that the attempt would be frantic and fruitleſs; and that for a country ſo ſituated as this is, to ſtretch its arm ſo far, would be to exhauſt its ſtrength in the effort without end or meaning? And yet what is the whole hiſtory of the diſcomfiture of this wanton and flagitious enterprize of the French, from the memorable battle of Aboukir to the almoſt incredible events of the ſiege of Acre, but a ſeries of proofs of the proweſs and ſtrength of this country! a ſtrength not proportioned to the calculable powers of phyſical ability; a proweſs which has placed the name and character of this comparatively ſmall and inſignificant part of the world on a pinnacle of glory, to which the greateſt, and the proudeſt and moſt powerful empires of the world look up with wonder and admiration!

What if in addition to the obvious and immediate objects of an enterprize, in itſelf ſo gigantic and tremendous as that of Buonaparte, one of its effects was to be, to cut off one of the great ſources of our national power, by inſtigating the native powers of India to avail themſelves of its co-operation to overthrow the empire of this country in the Eaſt! Would not this afford to the ſtatiſtical examiner of the poſſible efforts of this iſland, an additional ground for diſtruſting the poſſibility of our ſtanding the conteſt? And what would be his aſtoniſhment when he heard, that within the ſame year in which ſo ſplendid a ſeries of victories had enabled us to confound the pride and power of our enemy in Europe; in the ſame year, but within the period of a ſingle campaign, of a few weeks, the army of this country, (poor in exertion and powerleſs as it might be ſuppoſed) had not ſaved only

the empire of which we were in poſſeſſion; not repelled only the attacks made upon them; but carried war into the heart of the dominions of the aggreſſor, and reduced and finally extinguiſhed his power and name for ever?

What if in addition to this picture were to be preſented to the view of the philoſopher, who was meaſuring poſſible atchievements by population and phyſical ſtrength, the whole courſe of the Mediterranean campaign; the ſalvation of Naples; and finally what has actually been atchieved by the ſpirit of our troops in Holland. Is there any one of theſe things leſs apparently beyond our ſtrength than the further efforts which it is now propoſed to make? is there any ground from this ſtatement to decline theſe further efforts, from the fear of their being more than we can hope to accompliſh?

But it will be aſked, are we then to be led aſide from the ſober and ſafe ſyſtem of our own national ſecurity by a deſire of military glory? My Lords, I confeſs that for my own part, I find it impoſſible to contemplate all that has been done by the arms of England abroad; to look at empires ſaved; at kingdoms reſtored; at hoſtile fleets and armies ſwept from the face of the globe; at the ſupport of friendly, and the extermination of hoſtile powers; and all this atchieved, as it has been in many inſtances, by the ſingle arm of Great Britain. Or turning from this proſpect to look at the proud and inſpiriting array of armies, embattled for the defence of our Sovereign and our country, without feeling, I hope, a juſt and blameleſs pride in the military ſtrength and glory of Great Britain; without feeling it a matter of ſelf-congratulation, that the calumny which not many years ago was ſo common in the mouth of our vaunting enemy, which often was almoſt tacitly admitted by ourſelves, the imputation that our commercial proſperity had depreſſed and overlaid our martial ſpirit, ſtands refuted in the face of the world; and what is of more real importance, in our own conſcious feelings: without rejoicing, that the Britiſh character is not ſo ſoftened and enervated by the unexampled bleſſings we ſo pre-eminently enjoy, but that we have ſtill the ſenſe to know that by the ſame virtue and valour which originally won them to us, by theſe alone can they ſecurely be maintained; that though the ſteady and ſettled courſe of juſtice and law, the arts of peaceful induſtry and flouriſhing commerce make war almoſt unknown to us as a profeſſion, we have nevertheleſs not forgotten, that the ſpirit to defend

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is eſſential in exact proportion to the value of what is to be defended. But though it is impoſſible to expreſs theſe feelings of proud and honeſt ſatisfaction, it is by no means by the impulſe of military glory alone that we could be juſtified in engaging in a new mode of war, unleſs the object of our continental expeditions were preciſely the ſame with that which animates exertions in all other parts of the ſyſtem, that is, the upholding the independence of this country, and ſo far as the common intereſts of this country and others go together, the liberties and independence of Europe.

I know that there is another prejudice ſtrong againſt all continental operations whatever, that they link us too cloſely with continental powers; that they render us dependent on the fidelity of allies, to whom we look for co-operation; and that ſuch a plan of action once entered upon leads to indefinite and complicated engagements in which the intereſts of Great Britain are not unfrequently neglected. Not to truſt too far to foreign powers, where they have an obvious intereſt in deceiving, or a manifeſt temptation to betray, is certainly a matter of no doubtful policy. But ſurely it is no leſs unwiſe, on the other hand, to reject all co-operation which may be uſeful ſo far as it goes, becauſe it may not go throughout by the ſame road, or to the ſame end to which our views are directed.

But if ever there was a caſe of continental operation in which this caution would not apply, and in which ſuſpicion would ſeem to be miſplaced, it is the preſent, where the conteſt is for an object confeſſedly touching Great Britain more nearly than any other continental object, the liberation of our old ally from the yoke of our inveterate enemy, where in the courſe of our preſent ſucceſs, ſo far as it has gone, we have already effected an object ſo purely Britiſh, and ſo great in its extent, that in former times it would have been conſidered alone as the great and marking feature of a campaign, or even of a war, the capture of the Dutch fleet; and where the ally co-operating with us, beſides being that power which from the unexampled magnanimity and liberality of its conduct has beſt deſerved to be exempted from all ſuſpicion of ſelfiſh, much more of treacherous diſpoſitions; beſides being that power to which one-third of that part of Europe which France had ſubjugated already owes its deliverance, is that which has perhaps the leaſt viſible intereſt of any of the powers whom we could have aſſociated in our enterprize, except ſo far as every power, and every nation,

nation, and every ſovereign, and every man in civilized Europe, has a common and mutual intereſt in the ſucceſs of every meaſure which tends to the diminution of the dominion of French power, of the influence of French principles, and the operation and terror of French arms.

For an object, therefore, in its general nature ſo eſſentially intereſting to this country, touching at once ſo nearly its honor and its power, for an object already ſo ſplendidly begun, and which a vigorous perſeverance may bring at no great diſtance of time to a ſucceſsful iſſue, we can have no ſcruple in uſing our beſt endeavours to give every additional ſtrength to the arms of the country, and every ſupport which they deſerve to thoſe who have ſo gallantly opened the career of glory to their countrymen; and it cannot be entertained as any material objection to reſorting to voluntary zeal for the augmentation of force which is now in queſtion, that to zeal of the ſame deſcription we are indebted for the preſervation of the internal peace of this kingdom; that voluntary zeal has ſaved Ireland to this kingdom and to herſelf; and I doubt not that the ſame zeal, if permitted to exert itſelf, will reſtore Holland to her alliance with this empire, in reſtoring her to her rank among the nations of the world.

My Lords, impreſſed with theſe ſentiments, I beg leave to ſecond the addreſs as moved by the noble Marquis.

Lord *Romney* ſaid, he roſe merely to ſay, that though he heartily agreed with every word uttered by the two noble Lords who moved and ſeconded the addreſs, he begged to lay in his claim hereafter to object to the bill in queſtion relative to the militia. He ſaid, he conſidered the militia as an inſtitution interwoven with the conſtitution; the ſupplementary militia he regarded as the creature of the preſent war. He had been a friend, and he might ſay a zealous friend, of the militia during the many years that he ſat in the other houſe of parliament, and he was ſorry to have witneſſed that in paſſing a militia bill a few years ſince, in an unguarded moment, the word *perpetual* was allowed to be inſerted to fill up the clauſe. He did not approve of any military force being voted perpetual, and, therefore, he wiſhed to lay in his claim to object to the bill which would neceſſarily be brought in on the ſubject alluded to in his Majeſty's ſpeech; at the ſame time he begged the Houſe to underſtand, that in every other part of the addreſs he cordially concurred, but he would not attempt to follow the noble Lords who had already ſpoken, as he was perſuaded he ſhould diſgrace himſelf, if he offered a ſyl-

a ſyllable on the ſubject, after ſuch eloquent ſpeeches as their Lordſhips had heard.

The queſtion was then put on the motion for the addreſs, and carried *nemine diſſentiente*. A committee was inſtantly appointed to draw it up, who ſoon returned with it, when it was agreed to, and ordered to be preſented at St. James's the next day.

Lord *Grenville* moved, "That all the letters, &c. that had paſſed between the Governor General in India, and his Majeſty's Miniſters, within a given period, be laid before the Houſe." His Lordſhip ſaid he moved for theſe papers in order to ground a motion on them at a future day, reſpecting the Governor General, the officers and ſoldiers who ſerved at the ſtorming of Seringapatam.

The Houſe then adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, SEPT. 24.

The *Speaker* and the Houſe having been called to the Houſe of Peers to hear a ſpeech from the throne, and having returned, the Speaker informed the Houſe that he had cauſed a new writ to be iſſued for the election of a member to ſerve in Parliament for Boroughbridge, in the county of York, in the room of Sir John Scott, now Lord Eldon.

The ſeſſion being opened by the reading of a bill for preventing clandeſtine outlawries in the uſual form,

The *Speaker* ſaid, he and the Members of that Houſe had been in the Houſe of Peers, where his Majeſty delivered a gracious ſpeech, of which, to prevent miſtakes, he had obtained a copy. He then read the ſpeech.

Mr. *Shaw Lefevre* ſaid, that however inadequate he might be to enumerate the gallant actions of the brave troops employed by ſea and land in his Majeſty's ſervice; however inadequate he might be to do juſtice even to his own feelings of the ſenſe of the importance of the ſervice of ſuch a force, yet he could not help offering himſelf to the Houſe on the preſent occaſion. He, in common with the other members of the Houſe, had the ſatisfaction of reflecting on a ſeries of exploits ſo gallant, and atchievements ſo glorious, that they needed no eloquence to deſcribe, or panegyric to increaſe their importance; and this conſideration afforded him an apology for calling on the Houſe for its attention. He need not ſay much on the conduct of the forces that were employed againſt the common enemy; their actions carried with

with them their own eulogium; they ſpoke their own praiſe to this country, to Europe, and to the world at large, and that in a manner which was much beyond the power of words to convey. Indeed, ſuch was the general merit of all the forces, that it was difficult to ſelect any particular branch of their ſervice as an object of peculiar admiration, or as that which was entitled to the greateſt applauſe of the world, or the particular thanks of this country. The noble ſpirit of the Emperor, ſeconded by the gallant conduct of General Suwarrow, had merited great praiſe, and to it was chiefly to be aſcribed the deliverance of a great part of the ſouth of Europe from the degrading yoke of the French republic. Great as this atchievement was, it was equalled, if not ſurpaſſed, by a ſeries of victories of our own—the total defeat, the final overthrow, and entire deſtruction of Tippoo Sultaun. That reſtleſs and perfidious Prince, who was joined with the common enemy in views and wiſhes moſt hoſtile towards the Britiſh Empire and every other regular government in Europe, and who, with them, had our extirpation in view, was a circumſtance the moſt glorious to the Britiſh name, as well as intereſt; for in that particular the effort was excluſively our own, and it had placed our intereſt in that quarter on a ſolid and permanent foundation. Much praiſe was due to the Governor and Council there, as well as to the military; but this was a point on which he ſhould not dwell at preſent. Such were our ſucceſſes in the Eaſt: but our good fortune was not confined to that quarter, it was equalled by events which had happened nearer to our own country. Every one who heard him would eaſily anticipate what he was alluding to—he meant the efforts lately made upon the continent againſt the force of the French republic, who are now almoſt every where in Europe feeling the miſery of their condition, as the juſt effect of the ſyſtem which they have followed, and the fate of the cauſe in which they have engaged. But now it was time to call the attention of the Houſe to our grand efforts againſt the Batavian Republic, diſgracefully attached as it had been to the intereſt of the French. The naval ſkill of the gallant Admiral Mitchell ſtood not in need of praiſe, but his actions commanded it: upon a recent occaſion we all felt how much we were indebted to that brave officer for the capture of a large fleet that was deſtined to join the common enemy in the deſperate endeavour of invading this country. Our gallant army too in that country deſerved our higheſt praiſe. We had now the entire dominion of

of the Texel. Ought we not, under all theſe circumſtances, by every means in our power, to increaſe our force in that quarter? A meaſure was adopted laſt year, the good effects of which the Britiſh Empire at large had already felt. Our gallant militia had been too long confined within the pale of ſelf defence; and it was highly flattering to this force, as well as conſoling to their country, that they have by their conduct equalled the fondeſt hopes of their countrymen; and it was highly to their honour that they had manifeſted not only a readineſs, but an ardour, to ſerve their country in any quarter of the globe. Let us conſider the beneficial effect of thus employing the militia; that effect we had already ſome experience of in conſequence of that admirable bill of laſt year, which enabled his Majeſty to avail himſelf of the ſervices of the militia in a manner which, without ſuch bill, could not be done. Another bill alſo, upon the ſame principle, excellent in its kind, had paſſed laſt ſeſſion, which was to reduce the number of the militia, and to increaſe the regular force. We had ſeen beneficial effects from theſe meaſures; ought we not then to improve upon them?—When he conſidered the military force of this country, and the probable neceſſity for the uſe of it in a defenſive way ſo much diminiſhed, and the neceſſity of its being employed offenſively ſo much increaſed, he owned he thought it was quite unneceſſary for us to have, at this time, more than the original number of militia force for the internal ſafety of this country, which number, he believed, was about 30,000. If he was right upon that idea, why not convert all above that number into active regular force (with their own free conſent) for the purpoſe of ſupporting the cauſe in which we are engaged. Such a force would be very uſeful for ſuch purpoſe; and as to their power, it had been tried, and they had conducted themſelves with a diſcipline and a courage that was not unworthy of the moſt choice veteran troops in the Britiſh army. But in caſe a meaſure of this kind ſhould meet, as he truſted it would, with the concurrence of Parliament, it would be neceſſary for a very conſiderable force to be put immediately into active ſervice.

Before he ſat down he muſt be allowed to congratulate this country on its preſent ſituation, a ſituation of late very much improved: this was plain to every one who would take the trouble to examine it. Our revenue flouriſhed, our commerce was extended beyond all precedent; the enjoyment of the bleſſings which ſuch a condition of ſociety produced,

ought to induce us to continue in the courſe and keep on the line of conduct which had produced it. Such had been the wiſdom and vigour of Parliament, ſuch the ſolid good ſenſe of the people, that we were ſtill the envy of ſurrounding nations. The cauſe of our proſperity was to be found in our attachment to our country, our loyalty to our king, and our devotion to our God. May that God proſper the efforts of our fleets and armies, to protect and preſerve ſuch bleſſings! He then moved an humble addreſs to his Majeſty in the uſual form of an echo of the ſpeech from the throne, &c.

Colonel *Elford* ſeconded the motion, the following are the heads of his ſpeech. He obſerved that his honourable Friend had gone ſo ably over moſt of the topics that called for particular attention, that little remained to be ſaid upon the ſubject; but he ſhould beg attention while he delivered a few ſentiments; and, as he never roſe in that Houſe to ſpeak without feeling much embarraſſment, and wiſhed to be correct in what he ſaid, he ſhould have occaſion to refer to notes.

The firſt duty of that Houſe, in his opinion, in conſidering the ſubject before it, was not to conſider whether any inconveniencies would ariſe out of the meaſure immediately under conſideration, but to ſtate the balance between good and evil; upon that view of the matter he thought the plan of converting part of the militia into active force was a very wiſe one. It was not a matter of mere ſpeculation, we had experience of its effect; we had tried it in Ireland, and the advantages were almoſt indeſcribably great; indeed, it was not a wonder that it ſhould be ſo—the diſcipline and bravery, as well as other military qualities of the militia, were admirable; they were the terror of thoſe whom they came to oppoſe; they had ſome advantages over regular troops as to the impreſſion their preſence gave to the enemy, for they come not like regular troops, in the bare execution of a duty in which they either may or may not feel an intereſt, but which duty they will perform, merely becauſe they are bound to perform it—no; they come in no ſuch doubtful character; for, by their appearance, the enemy is aſſured that they are volunteers hearty in the cauſe, and appear in it only becauſe they are hearty in it. This totally does away all hope on the part of the enemy, and all fear on their own part of diviſion and diſſention, or coolneſs or indifference to the cauſe in which they are engaged; this, therefore, was the cauſe which produced the beneficial effects which we had witneſſed from

from the arrival of the militia force in Ireland; and it is to that military force that we are chiefly indebted for the ſuppreſſion of the late unnatural rebellion in that kingdom.

The Dutch fleet, they all knew, had ſurrendered, and if that ſhould be all that eventually we ſhould have from the expedition, he ſhould think we were amply rewarded for all our trouble; but we had reaſon to expect great ſucceſſes in Holland in the courſe of the preſent enterpriſe. The only queſtion for us to conſider was, whether in this enterpriſe there are likely to happen any evils that will over-balance the advantages to be derived from it? Upon that ſubject he was of opinion that none of the evils we have to dread in the courſe of this enterpriſe are comparable to the obvious advantages to be derived from it. In the progreſs of events the danger of the invaſion of this country had gone off, and all apprehenſion of it had ſubſided; there was therefore no neceſſity for ſo large a force as we poſſeſſed in this country at preſent remaining merely for the defence of our coaſt. Therefore as there is no neceſſity for ſuch a force here, and as there is a neceſſity for it elſewhere, it ſeems an obvious meaſure of policy to agree to this addreſs; but it might be ſaid that the meaſure was unprecedented. He was as much attached to the militia and the conſtitutional force of the kingdom as any man; but he did not think he was betraying the truſt repoſed in him when he was voting for reducing that force, under the preſent circumſtances, to its original ſize, the more eſpecially when he reflected how uſefully they might be employed in the ſervice of their country abroad; and no man ſhould be unwilling to make exertion wherever he could be employed moſt uſefully for his country, for the purpoſe of obtaining an honourable peace.

He took a view of the preſent ſituation of this country; a very favourable one it appeared to him to be, and that, the reſult of the wiſdom of the adminiſtration. Thoſe who doubted the happineſs of our condition, he adviſed to look at the condition of other countries. They would do well, he ſaid, to compare the tranquillity and order of Great Britain, with the anarchy and confuſion of other countries, and then he believed there would be no difficulty in perceiving our ſuperiority over every other ſtate upon the face of the globe; we were now engaged in an honourable ſtruggle, and our object, was to regain the liberty of a large portion of our fellow-beings; our cauſe was that of the promotion of the happineſs of a large portion of mankind, and he truſted,

that Providence that had for ſome time paſt favoured our efforts, would continue its bleſſings, and lead us through our difficulties to a happy termination of them.

He adverted to the negociations for peace between this country and France. Our ſincere efforts to bring about that bleſſing, he ſaid, had been baffled by the perfidy of our enemies: We were therefore compelled to employ force to accompliſh that which conciliation could not effect; however great the evil might be attending the failure of our negociation for peace, it had one good effect, that of uniting all deſcriptions of people in this country againſt the common enemy of all ſocial order and comfort.

Mr. *Jolliffe* ſaid he had but little to offer on the ſubject, but could not avoid troubling the Houſe with a few words. He very heartily joined in congratulating his country on her ſucceſſes, and no one could be more proud than he was of the victories which his country had a right to boaſt of. He joined moſt heartily not only in praiſes to the officers of the army and navy, but he thought commendations and thanks were due as well to thoſe who planned as thoſe who executed the meaſures. On the ſubject of annihilating the new militia regiments, he muſt however offer a few words. He had ſaid before, and he would repeat, that every man who received the pay of his country ought to ſerve that country wherever thoſe ſervices could be uſeful, and therefore if by the ſame rule the militia were compelled to ſerve abroad, he, as a militia officer, could have no objection. But he thought it a very ungrateful return to thoſe gentlemen who had dedicated their time to the ſervice of their country, who had expended conſiderable ſums in forming their regiments to be not only an ornament, but an honour to their country, that they ſhould now be rendered the commanders of mere recruiting parties, and drillers of new men to be enliſted into the line. Were the new militia regiments allowed to volunteer in corps, or were they to be ordered abroad as the line are, he was ſure there was ſcarce an officer in the ſervice who would not gladly go wherever he might be thought uſeful. But who would in future raiſe regiments, if as ſoon as the men were raiſed, the regiments were to be aboliſhed, their men taken from them, and the officers diſmiſſed? At preſent he would trouble them with no more, but when the bill was brought in, he ſhould offer his opinion at large.

The addreſs being agreed to,

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* gave notice that he ſhould very ſoon move

move the thanks of the Houſe to ſeveral diſtinguiſhed officers, and alſo to a great civil officer in India, Lord Mornington. This he intended to do in a particular way, not only to expreſs high approbation of the conduct of that noble Lord, but alſo to ſhew that we were forced into the war in India, after every juſt and honourable effort on our part to avoid it: to ſhew this moſt clearly, he moved for copies of the correſpondence of Lord Mornington in India, &c. during his Preſidency, &c. &c.

Ordered to be laid before the Houſe. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 25.

At one o'clock the Houſe met, when Lord Leiceſter informed their Lordſhips that his Majeſty would be pleaſed to receive their Addreſs at two o'clock.

The Houſe then went up with the Addreſs.

Several private Petitions and Scotch Appeals were preſented. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 25.

A new writ was iſſued for the election of a Member to ſerve in Parliament for the Shire of Edinburgh, in the room of Robert Dundas, Eſq. who, ſince his election, has accepted the place of Clerk and Keeper of the General Regiſter of Seaſins, &c. in Scotland.

The four grand Committees of Trade, Privileges, Religion, and Courts of Juſtice, were appointed.

The uſual Standing Orders were alſo read and agreed to.

Mr. *Shaw Lefevre* then brought up the Addreſs to his Majeſty as agreed to by the Committee. The Addreſs, after being read a firſt and ſecond time, was agreed to and ordered to be preſented by the whole Houſe. Such Members as were of his Majeſty's Privy Council, were ordered to wait upon his Majeſty to know when he would be pleaſed to receive the Addreſs.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved that his Majeſty's moſt gracious Speech be taken into conſideration the next day. Agreed to.

CALL OF THE HOUSE.

Mr. *W. Plumer* roſe to expreſs his idea of the propriety of enforcing a Call of the Houſe. He ſaid, that he was in his place

place the preceding day when the very important buſineſs the Houſe had to proceed upon was opened in his Majeſty's moſt gracious ſpeech. He really did expect from the nature and novelty of the buſineſs that was to be diſcuſſed, that the right hon. Gentleman himſelf (Mr. Pitt) or ſome of his friends, would have riſen to move for a Call; but as it now appeared that neither the right hon. Gentleman nor his friends ſeemed diſpoſed to make any ſuch motion, he felt it his duty to impoſe the taſk upon himſelf. In ſo doing, he was not actuated by any particular deſire to oppoſe the bill which ſeemed to ſtand forward as the moſt preſſing buſineſs; on the contrary, he was far from being an enemy to a bill which was to reduce the militia to its original number. But if its object were (as he feared it was) to procure a freſh recruit of men for the ſervice in Holland, then he would begin to entertain even ſerious doubts of the propriety of the meaſure. Viewing it in that light, it was a meaſure of the higheſt importance, and of the moſt delicate conſideration; and as ſuch, in his humble opinion, it ſhould not be proceeded upon without a Call of the Houſe. To move a Call of the Houſe, he was well aware, was far from being a popular meaſure. This he had always obſerved; but his feelings and his duty, under the preſent aſpect of affairs, ſuggeſted and enforced the propriety of it, and to theſe he unreluctantly yielded, though he was not conſcious that any Member in the Houſe would riſe to ſecond him. It was far from his nature to be forward to give trouble to any ſet of gentlemen; but however hard it might appear, when ſuch momentous buſineſs and ſuch ponderous intereſts were to come under diſcuſſion, he thought it the duty of every member to be preſent in his place: for his part, had his reſidence been in the remoteſt corner of the Kingdom, he would not upon any account have omitted attending his parliamentary duty on ſuch an occaſion. The object of this precipitate meaſure might ſtill be ſomewhat doubtful: but if it was to forward a continental war, he could be no zealous friend to it. A continental war was never viewed in a very favourable light by this country; and if a plan was adopted of again ſending a large body of men to Holland, in his mind it would be to the credit and the comfort of the Miniſter to ſolicit and obtain the ſanction of as great a number of the country gentlemen as he poſſibly could collect. This at leaſt was the opinion which reſulted from his feelings at the preſent conjuncture of affairs, a conjuncture upon which the ſentiments of the Repreſentatives of the People,

People, as fully as they could be collected, ſhould by all means be procured. Under that impreſſion he would therefore move, that the Houſe be called over on Thurſday fortnight. He would conclude with obſerving, that the delay ſuch a motion might occaſion to the meaſure which was ſo preſſing to be brought forward, ſhould be no material objection to its adoption; for all buſineſs of ſuch acknowledged importance ſhould be cautiouſly and maturely proceeded upon.

Mr. *Jones* ſaid, that he felt the abſolute neceſſity of the meaſure propoſed by his hon. Friend, and though he was ſenſible it was one by no means of a pleaſant nature, yet the arguments that were urged in its favour had with him ſo much weight that he moſt cordially concurred in it, and moſt readily ſeconded the motion.

Mr. *Buxton* obſerved, that however arduous might appear the preſent ſituation of public affairs, and however anxious the conſequent impreſſion of the public mind, yet the queſtion which was now ſo prominently brought forward was far from being of a novel nature, for it was amply and minutely agitated and diſcuſſed laſt ſeſſion. The benefits that had ariſen from its adoption were univerſally acknowledged to be great, nay, ſignal beyond expectation; if, then, there was no Call of the Houſe when the meaſure was firſt originated, and when it had all its novelty to attract examination and provoke cenſure, he could not ſee the neceſſity of a Call at preſent, when its merits had ſo clearly been aſcertained. For his part he felt no ſmall degree of ſatisfaction in obſerving the numerous attendance of the preceding day. In his eyes ſuch an attendance completely proved the ſolicitous attention of the country to the tranſaction of public affairs and the forwarding of the public intereſt: but ſome attention ſhould alſo be paid to, or ſome allowance made for, the duties and affairs which at this ſeaſon naturally detained gentlemen in their country reſidences. He would therefore again repeat that, as there was nothing novel in the meaſure which occaſioned this rather early meeting of Parliament, neither could he diſcover any thing which preſcribed the enforcing of a Call of the Houſe. As a continental war had been mentioned, he would only obſerve, that to ſuch wars, as they were generally underſtood, he was ſo far from being a friend, that he ſhould be ſorry to ſee any ſuch renewed. But the preſent war in no ſhape partook of the nature of a continental war in its more received acceptation. The object of the preſent war was not to protect or ſecure the intereſts of any continental connexion; its

real

real object was, the ſafety and ſecurity of this country and the reſtoration of Holland to her former government and independence, without which this country could never be ſecure or ſafe. In no light, therefore, could the reaſons adduced for the motion ſubſtantiate its neceſſity, he thought it his duty, therefore, and was determined to divide the Houſe upon it.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that he was ſure the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Plumer) could not have ſeriouſly conſidered the nature and tendency of his motion, or the degree of inconvenience which muſt ariſe from it both to the buſineſs of individuals and of the public. It was evidently liable to more objections than he ſeemed to be aware of. Whenever his Majeſty ſhould think proper to avail himſelf of the privilege lately inveſted in him of calling together Parliament at a ſhorter time than uſual, when the urgency of buſineſs might ſo require it, if motions of this ſort were to be entertained and acted on, would not the Houſe be then ſtepping forward in contradiction to its own recorded deciſions, to interpoſe delay, and thereby counteract the great benefit which was expected to be derived from the extraordinary degree of diſpatch which the power ſo veſted in his Majeſty, was ſo evidently calculated to produce? Beſides, where could be the neceſſity of enforcing a Call of the Houſe, when the very time and manner in which Parliament had now been called, were a ſummons of ſuch a nature, as muſt plainly indicate the conſideration of very important buſineſs, and therefore ſhould operate in every reſpect, as if a Call of the Houſe had been propoſed and agreed to? It was for this reaſon natural to expect a full attendance, and the more ſo, as ſince the meeting of Parliament had been announced, it was generally underſtood that its attention was to be called to the preciſe meaſure, for the diſcuſſion of which a Call is now judged ſo indiſpenſably neceſſary. The attendance of the preceding day was alſo as full as any that appeared laſt ſeſſion, and ſurely as full as when this very important meaſure, which now produces ſo much anxiety, was firſt brought under diſcuſſion. The ſame meaſure, with all its novelty, was however then diſcuſſed and diſpoſed of, without having recourſe to a Call of the Houſe, which could have no effect in bringing together thoſe who felt it their duty, and acted upon it, to attend; though, perhaps, it might be expected that gentlemen of a different deſcription might not be prevailed on to appear in their places, unleſs ſome very peremptory meaſure like that

that now propoſed, was reſorted to, in order to gain the advantage of their attendance.

Mr. *Tierney* roſe, he ſaid, moſt cordially to ſupport the motion of his honourable Friend. It was his intention, indeed, to have made a ſimilar motion himſelf, if no other Gentleman ſhould undertake it, but he had reſolved to wait a few days in order to ſee if it might not be made by another diſcription of perſons, he meant ſome of the country gentlemen. His wiſhes and expectations he had now the happineſs to ſee realized. As to the objections ſo emphatically urged againſt it, they were all compriſed in one, namely, the fruſtrating of the advantages of calling together Parliament within fourteen days, if any further delay was to take place. But where were the diſadvantages that could reſult from weighing the preſent ſtate of affairs more maturely? As far as he could underſtand, there was no oppoſition meditated againſt the bill in queſtion. The bill might go on through the uſual ſtages and within the uſual time, which bills of importance are wont to conſume; this could not be much leſs than fourteen days, except the right honorable Gentleman was inclined to preſs it forward with that kind of celerity which has ſo often marked the progreſs of bills of equal importance. It did not appear that the right hon. Gentleman looked directly to the real objection which might be ſtarted againſt the meaſure. The real queſtion in his opinion was, not whether further drafts ſhould be made from the militia, but what ſhould be their deſtination after being ſo drafted? The right hon. Gentleman ſeemed moreover to have loſt ſight of what had happened ſince that meaſure was firſt embraced. The expedition to Holland had ſince been embarked in, and to that expedition he had in a great meaſure looked with much ſatisfaction, and ready he was, ſincerely, to pay his mite of thanks to the contrivers and conductors of it, as far as it went to attack and take poſſeſſion of the Dutch fleet. So far it was well planned and ably executed, and as ſuch it was highly entitled to credit and approbation. But ſince that atchievement things had aſſumed a new, and far other aſpect. We then had crippled Holland in the only limb and energy which ſhe could wield to the annoyance or injury of this country: that was indeed gaining a moſt important point. But what now were our views? This was what he dreaded, and he dreaded it the more, when he recollected the laſt words of the preceding ſeſſion; they ſtill rung in his ears, and reminded him that the object

we were aiming at was the overthrow of the exiſting government in France. How our ſucceſſes in Holland could promote ſuch an object he was rather at a loſs to diſcover; but where one of the French Directors to be conſulted upon the probability of its ſucceſs, he imagined the Director would ſay: "Let England waſte her ſtrength in the dykes of Holland, but let France attack her enemies out of her own territories." Ought it not then to be a deſirable object to obtain the full ſenſe of Parliament upon the very extravagant way (not to give it any other epithet) in which we are now going on? The right hon. Gentleman ſays there had been the preceding day a full attendance, and as full as was uſual laſt ſeſſion on the moſt important buſineſs. If this be true it was ſurely a diſgrace, at leaſt very little to the credit of the Houſe. The number preſent the preceding day did not amount to 200. This was not one half of the Houſe; and 150 or 200 members he muſt look upon as a very ſmall proportion of the Houſe of Commons. He ought more particularly to be allowed to ſay ſo, when it was recollected that the ordinary attendance was uſually compoſed of gentlemen who, from their public ſituation, reſided near town; but in ſo ſaying he meant no reflection upon theſe Gentlemen. If, however, there was a man ſo callous as to have read the preceding night's Gazette, and ſtill think that Parliament was called upon to ſend more men to Holland, and that with a full and mature deliberation, he at leaſt ſhould not diſcharge his duty if he did not ſupport the preſent motion; not with a view to impede or retard the progreſs of public buſineſs, but to give Miniſters a fair opportunity of obtaining the ſentiments and the ſanction of the country reſpecting the precarious and perilous meaſures they ſeemed ſo obſtinately bent upon purſuing.

Mr. *Plumer* obſerved, that if the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) meant to apply to him the imputation of not attending his parliamentary duty, he was conſcious that ſuch an imputation could not juſtly attach upon him. He was a Member of an opulent county; and he always held it his duty, and endeavoured to fulfil it, punctually to attend in his place—not, indeed, as a party man, but as an independent member of Parliament.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* could not help obſerving, that it was rather ſurprizing that the hon. Gentleman ſhould expreſs any doubt that ſuch an imputation could attach to him; for, in the firſt place, the hon. Gentleman had ſaid, that

that he attended punctually to his parliamentary duty, and that he would ſtill do ſo though he ſhould reſide at the moſt diſtant corner of the kingdom. A little candour would alſo diſpoſe him to think that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could intend no ſuch imputation, as he was ready to bear witneſs himſelf to that punctuality.

Mr. *Plumer* expreſſed himſelf ſatisfied with that explanation; but could not, however, ſee why he ſhould be lumped with any ſet of Gentlemen to whom the Chancellor of the Exchequer might have thought proper to allude, as neglectful of their parliamentary duty, merely, perhaps, becauſe he ſat on the oppoſition ſide of the Houſe, and that he was rather deficient in obſequiouſneſs to the opinions and meaſures of men in power.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* remarked that the hon. Gentleman's own feelings muſt have diſcovered to him ſomething very unpleaſant in being lumped with Gentlemen to whom the objection might juſtly apply; but it was not his intention to confound him with them.

After a few words more in explanation from Mr. *Plumer*, the Houſe divided on the queſtion for a call; when there appeared,

For it - 4 Againſt it 93

The Houſe then adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26.

The India papers relative to the war in the Myſore, were preſented and ordered to be printed.

Lord *Grenville* ſaid, that on Wedneſday, he intended to move the thanks of the Houſe to Lord Mornington, and the officers, to whom the country was indebted for the important ſucceſſes in the Eaſt; he then likewiſe intended to move the thanks of the Houſe to our other naval and military officers.

Lord *Grenville* laid before the Houſe copies of two conventions with the Emperor of Ruſſia, dated, the firſt in December, 1798, and the other in June, 1799, and a copy of a treaty with the King of the Two Sicilies, in December, 1798.

Adjourned to Wedneſday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26.

The *Speaker* informed the Houſe that his Majeſty had been waited upon with the addreſs, to which his Majeſty had returned a gracious anſwer.

VOTE OF THANKS TO ADMIRAL MITCHELL, SIR SIDNEY SMITH, &c.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* ſaid, that on the firſt day of the preſent ſeſſion he gave notice that he ſhould move the thanks of the Houſe to ſeveral diſtinguiſhed officers for their ſervices; at the ſame time ſome of the ſervice to which he alluded, although highly important, he meant in India, was of a nature which made it his wiſh that the Houſe ſhould be fully poſſeſſed of the grounds on which he ſhould make his motion, which could not be the caſe until the papers he had moved for and ordered had been peruſed by the Houſe. The ſervice to which he alluded was brilliant, but he did not wiſh to make any motion upon it until the Houſe and the public had full information upon the ſubject. He ſhould therefore confine himſelf at preſent to the conduct of the officers and men employed in the ſervice on the coaſt of Holland, and that of the conduct of a gallant officer, who his Majeſty had graciouſly noticed in his ſpeech from the throne, and which was alſo mentioned in the addreſs of the Houſe: he meant Sir Sidney Smith. With regard to the ſervice which had been performed on the coaſt of Holland, the Houſe knew only part of that matter; and firſt, with regard to the conduct of Admiral Mitchell, and of the army that landed on the coaſt of Holland, he had to obſerve, that the only information which the public could have upon that ſubject was, what they derived from the common channel of communication; the greater part of the real merit, and eſpecially that of Admiral Mitchell, was unknown to the public, and, for a while, could only be known to thoſe who planned and conducted it, and thoſe who performed the operation.

The armament deſtined for Holland, ſailed from hence with very fair weather, which continued for two or three days; but early on the morning of the third day there aroſe a very heavy, and, for the time of the year, a very uncommon ſtorm. In this ſtorm this gallant Admiral had the conduct of an armament of two hundred tranſports of various deſcriptions, ſubject to no military diſcipline from the nature of things;

things; and in this condition that Admiral conducted the whole of this mass for ten or twelve days; he kept them together, immense as they were, and brought them in safety to their place of landing, an event that could not have taken place, but from consummate skill, unremitting perseverance, and great exertion. The world at large did not know any of the particulars of this officer's very extraordinary merit.

With regard to the land forces, they had to encounter dangers and difficulties that were unforeseen; the general object of the expedition was pretty well known; but the particulars of that expedition it was the duty of those who planned it to keep as secret as possible; few of this country, and none, he believed, of the enemy, knew the point to which it was directed; and the length of time which the armament was at sea had increased the difficulties tenfold, and therefore so much more the merit of those who executed the plan; the length of time in which the armament was at sea, being about ten days, hovering about the coast of Holland; had afforded the inhabitants and troops there to collect and accumulate, which they did in vast numbers, and threw much difficulty in the way of our landing; all these dangers and difficulties our forces surmounted; they were then comparatively very few, but they accomplished their purpose with a bravery and heroism that was seldom equalled, but never excelled, by any troops upon the globe.

He would not detain the House with the detail of points with which it was familiar, such as the taking of the fleet which was arranged in hostile array, nor should he dwell long on the importance of this part of the service; it was sufficient to say that we had captured a very considerable fleet which was destined to act hostilely against this country, and co-operate with the inveterate enemy and ancient rival of this country; by which we afforded to the Dutch an opportunity of returning to that friendship and alliance which for more than a century past had rendered that people most essential service, and invited them to return to that affectionate connexion which it was so much their interest to renew and preserve entire.

He did not see any reason for saying more on that head of the subject. He had stated the nature of the service, the merit of the officers and men employed, and he had hinted at the value of the accomplishment;—he flattered himself he should meet the unanimous concurrence of the House in the motion he now submitted, which was

"That

"That the thanks of this Houſe be given to Sir *Ralph Abercromby*, Knight of the moſt honourable Order of the Bath, for the diſtinguiſhed gallantry and ability with which he effected his landing on the *Dutch* coaſt, and eſtabliſhed his poſition in the face of a powerful enemy, and by ſecuring the command of the principal fort and naval arſenal of the *Dutch* Republic, afforded to his Majeſty's fleet the means of reſcuing from the power of the French the naval force in the *Texel*." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That the thanks of this Houſe be given to Lieutentant General Sir *James Pulteney*, Baronet, Major Generals *Francis D'Oyley*, *Eyre Coote*, *Harry Burrard*, and *John Moore*, and to the ſeveral officers of the army, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir *Ralph Abercromby*, for their late gallant conduct, and meritorious exertions, in effecting a landing on the *Dutch* coaſt, and eſtabliſhing a poſition in the face of a powerful enemy, thereby ſecuring the command of the principal fort and naval arſenal of the *Dutch* Republic, and affording to his Majeſty's fleet the means of reſcuing from the power of the *French* the naval force in the *Texel*." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That this Houſe doth highly approve of, and acknowledge, the ſervices of the non-commiſſioned officers and private ſoldiers of the army ſerving under the command of Lieutenant General Sir *Ralph Abercromby*, at the attack of the *Helder*, on the coaſt of *Holland*; and that the ſame be ſignified to them by the commanders of the ſeveral corps, who are deſired to thank them for their gallant behaviour." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That Mr. Speaker do communicate the ſaid reſolutions to his Royal Highneſs Field Marſhal the Duke of *York*, Captain General of his Majeſty's forces, and Commander in Chief of the Allied Army in *Holland*; and that his Royal Highneſs be requeſted by Mr. Speaker to ſignify the ſame to the general officers referred to therein." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That the thanks of this Houſe be given to Vice Admiral *Andrew Mitchell*, for the diſtinguiſhed ſkill and perſeverance with which in ſpite of great and unforeſeen difficulties, he kept collected, and conducted to the coaſt of *Holland*, the numerous fleet under his command; for the zeal and readineſs with which he co-operated with the land forces in their deſcent upon the coaſt of *Holland*; and for the prompitude and ability by which he reſcued the naval force of the *Dutch* Republic from the power of the *French*." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That

"That the thanks of this Houſe be given to the ſeveral captains and officers in the fleet under the command of Vice Admiral *Mitchell*, for their able ſupport of, and co-operation with the land forces, and for their meritorious and ſucceſsful exertions, in reſcuing from the power of the *French* the naval force in the *Texel*." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That this Houſe doth highly approve of, and acknowledge the ſervice of, the ſeamen and marines on board the ſhips under the command of Vice Admiral *Mitchell* in the aſſiſtance they afforded to the land forces in their deſcent upon the coaſt of *Holland*, and for the ſteadineſs and zeal they manifeſted in purſuit of the *Dutch* fleet in the *Zuyder Sea*; and that the officers commanding the ſeveral ſhips do ſignify the ſame to their reſpective crews, and do thank them for their good behaviour." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That Mr. Speaker do communicate the ſaid reſolutions to Admiral Lord Viſcount *Duncan*, and that his Lordſhip be requeſted by Mr. Speaker to ſignify the ſame to the Vice Admiral, captains, and other officers referred to therein." Ordered *nem. con.*

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* then ſaid that he felt himſelf at a loſs to expreſs the feeling he had of the merit of the conduct of a reſpectable officer, who was now the ſubject of conſideration. It was impoſſible for any man to be placed in a ſituation of more delicacy or difficulty than that officer was, with a ſmall remnant of force, to come off not only in ſafety, but in triumph, was really a ſurpriſing matter. A twelvemonth had not elapſed ſince this country felt ſome apprehenſion on account of the probable deſtination of the French army in Egypt, an apprehenſion that was much allayed by the memorable and moſt glorious victory of Lord Nelſon. The power of that army had been ſtill much further reduced by the efforts of Sir Sidney Smith, who, with a handful of men, ſurpriſed a whole nation, who were his ſpectators, with the brilliancy of his triumph, conteſting for ſixty days with an enterpriſing and intrepid general at the head of his whole army. This conduct of Sir Sidney Smith was ſo ſurpriſing to him, he ſaid, that he hardly knew how to ſpeak of it; he had not recovered from the aſtoniſhment which the account of the action had thrown him into. He had looked at it over and over again, and no view he had been enabled to take of it had quite recovered him from the ſurprize and amazement which the account of the matter gave him. However, ſo it was,

was, and the merit of Sir Sidney Smith was now the object of conſideration, to praiſe or eſteem which too highly was quite impoſſible. He had heard that Sir Sidney Smith, who had his difficulties, had ſometimes been lightly ſpoken of by ſome perſons; whoever they were, they were inconſiderate, and they might be left now to their inward ſhame if they did not recant; be that as might, the Houſe, he was confident, agreed with him, that the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith for heroiſm and intrepidity, and active exertion, was never ſurpaſſed on any occaſion. He was glad of the opportunity he had to ſay this. He then moved,

"That the thanks of this Houſe be given to Captain Sir *William Sidney Smith*, for the conſpicuous ſkill and heroiſm by which he animated and directed the efforts of the *Turkiſh* forces, and of the ſmall number of *Britiſh* officers and ſeamen under his command, in their long and ſucceſsful defence of *Saint John D'Acre*, on the coaſt of *Syria*, againſt the formidable and deſperate attack of the *French* army under the command of General *Buonaparte*."

"That the thanks of this Houſe be given to the officers belonging to the ſhips under the command of Captain Sir *William Sidney Smith*, for the great bravery, and unremited exertions, which they manifeſted, both on ſhore and on board the ſhips, in the ſucceſsful defence of *Saint John D'Acre*, on the coaſt of *Syria*, againſt the formidable and deſperate attack of the *French* army under the command of General *Buonaparte*; and that Sir *William Sidney Smith* do ſignify the ſame to them." Ordered *nem. con.*

"That this Houſe doth highly approve of, and acknowledge the ſervices of ſeamen and marines belonging to the ſhips under the command of Captain Sir *William Sidney Smith*, in the glorious defence of *Saint John D'Acre*, againſt the formidable and deſperate attack of the *French* army under the command of General *Buonaparte*; and that Sir *William Sidney Smith* do ſignify the ſame to the crews of the reſpective ſhips, and do thank them for their behaviour." Ordered *nem. con.*

That Mr. Speaker do ſignify the ſaid reſolutions to Captain Sir *William Sidney Smith*.

MILITIA.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* then called the attention of the Houſe to a motion, which, he ſaid, was for leave to introduce

duce a bill, the nature and object of which he would endeavour to make as plain as poſſible. The principle of the meaſure was not new, becauſe in the courſe of the laſt ſeſſion of parliament it came forward and was diſcuſſed; and in the opening it he entered upon the matter more at length than he ſhould do now. The circumſtances to which he referred at that time juſtified him in ſaying the meaſure was fit to be tried, and the experience we had of its effects, juſtified him in ſaying it ought now to be followed up. The meaſure he was now about to propoſe was not in any degree to leſſen the force of this country, but to take a great part of that which was not wanted for internal defence, or for operations at home, to that place where it was wanted, for vigorous operations abroad. Although he did not mean to ſay much, yet he thought it was proper to ſay ſomething upon the meaſure which he was now going to propoſe, and this he did to obviate ſome objections which might poſſibly be urged againſt it.

He wiſhed it to be well underſtood that he was not going to propoſe the leſſening any part of the force of this country when he was calling on the Houſe to agree to this meaſure; for when he was propoſing to take away ſome of the force that had hitherto been kept within the circle of the Iſland, and to be employed elſewhere for the intereſt of the Iſland, he was not providing the leſs for its ſafety or ſecurity than if that force had remained; and he had yet to learn how this was leſſening our ſafety.

The object of the bill for which he was going to move for leave to introduce, was not new to the Houſe. The ſubject was alluded to laſt year. He talked of the neceſſity of employing Britiſh forces out of this country. He took no pains to conceal that in all probability it was the coaſt of Holland they ought to be engaged in. He ſtated, that from old habits and eſtabliſhed connexions, and well underſtood intereſts, there were places in which it was expedient that ſome Britiſh force ſhould at leaſt partake in any enterprize that might be ſet on foot, and that it was not the intereſt of this country that they ſhould be taken from the hand of the common enemy without the co-operation of the Britiſh troops. It was impoſſible for any thinking perſon to doubt that Holland was the place he meant, at the time he threw out theſe general hints. He did not, indeed, ſtate the particular place on the coaſt of Holland where the operation ought to commence, there were good reaſons why he ſhould not; but he ſaid, that

the map of Europe furniſhed us room to act upon from the Texel to the Mediterranean.

The motion which he was about to ſubmit was, properly ſpeaking, to enlarge the defenſive force of this country; it was for the eſtabliſhment of an additional active force to be employed at the diſcretion of his Majeſty, in any part of Europe, inſtead of continuing here in a ſtate of inactivity under the name of a defenſive force. He had already ſtated that he wiſhed not to diminiſh the force of the country; but he wiſhed the force we already had to be employed in ſuch a manner as the wiſdom of his Majeſty's Council ſhould think fit to employ them. No man was more diſpoſed than he was to regard the militia force as the conſtitutional bulwark of this country: it was a force which the feelings of the people had wiſhed for, and the wiſdom of parliament had adopted. It was not the purport of the bill he was going to propoſe, in any reſpect to diminiſh the force and ſtrength of that bulwark as it had been originally erected by the wiſdom of parliament, and foſtered by the affectionate care of the people, but it was merely to reduce it to that ſtandard. The ſupplementary militia of the country was brought forward when the country was threatened with invaſion; when that was the avowed intention of the enemy; and when there was a comparatively very ſmall force in this country for its defence. It was therefore thought neceſſary to make a large addition to the old militia. The parliamentary proviſion that was made upon that occaſion had the beſt effect, and for ſome time, the neceſſity of a large eſtabliſhment of military force for home defence, had been gradually wearing away, partly by the enemy's diſtreſs, partly by the late ſucceſs of his Majeſty's arms both by ſea and land, and partly alſo by the loyalty of the people of this country, and from their zeal and ardour for the ſupport of law, order, and religion. Under theſe circumſtances, and when he adverted to the ſituation of affairs, when he adverted to the proſpect which had already opened, and was ſtill opening to our view, he could not help thinking that our zeal and ardour would be called further forward; and that the meaſure he propoſed, which was intended to give ſcope to that zeal and ardour, would be readily adopted; and that he ſhould have leave to bring in the bill without entering into the detail of it at this time. He ſhould ſtate ſimply that the object of his motion was to introduce, for the ſanction of the legiſlature, a bill for the reduction of the internal

ternal force of the country, and for increaſing the active external force. His object was not to encroach on the old eſtabliſhed conſtitutional force of the country, which was properly conſidered as the bulwark of our liberties, but to bring that to its original ſtandard, and employ the reſt in more active ſervice for the intereſt of this country. He then moved, 'That leave be given to bring in a bill for enabling his Majeſty to accept of the ſervices of an additional number of militia, under certain reſtrictions."

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, he did not riſe to oppoſe the meaſure of enabling his Majeſty to avail himſelf of the ſervice of any part of the militia as an active force. Indeed, if the propoſition of the right hon. Gentleman had gone the length of propoſing that the whole of the militia, both old and new, ſhould be made ſubject to a call for active ſervice, he did not know that he ſhould, under the preſent circumſtances and condition of affairs, and alſo under certain reſtrictions, oppoſe ſuch a meaſure; for, to ſay the truth, although no man reſpected the militia as a pure conſtitutional body of defence more than he did, yet, while he reflected on what within theſe three years had taken place, his attachment, although not his reſpect, was weakened with regard to that body; he alluded to the invitation of the militia of this country to ſerve in Ireland. But he ſhould be much miſunderſtood if it was thought that he intended or wiſhed to withhold his praiſe from the officers or men who ſerved in Ireland; the way in which he conſidered the matter was this—that as the militia was originally intended for mere home defence, the nature of their ſervice was altered when they went out of the country for any purpoſe, be that purpoſe what it might; and without pretending to inſinuate that the militia did not do themſelves great credit, and their country great ſervice in Ireland, yet he muſt be allowed to ſay, that they had changed the nature of the purpoſe for which they were eſtabliſhed, and that by this ſort of practice they may become a ſtanding army in the hands of the Crown; and the condition of all the officers of the militia was now become totally different from that which uſed to be the condition of a militia officer in former times, and they were all expoſed to an inconvenience which no militia officer formerly looked for. Upon theſe grounds, proteſting all thought of uttering a ſyllable that was diſreſpectful towards the militia, or that tended to call in queſtion the merit of its ſervice, and viewing things conſtitutionally, he

ſhould ſay, that the militia was now rather an object of jealouſy than confidence, and he ſhould be glad to have it voted annually, like all other military force.

Upon this meaſure he confeſſed he was rather embarraſſed; he did not ſay the meaſure was a bad one, but his objection to it was, that the intention of government was to apply this force in a way that was ſimilar to the force which they had raiſed already. If the right hon. Gentleman were to give him the leaſt hint that this force was not to be ſent to France or Holland, or the Netherlands, but that they ſhould fairly have the option, he ſhould have nothing to ſay; but he was afraid, indeed he could not conceal from himſelf, that the purpoſe was already ſettled; he could not conceal from himſelf, nor doubt, what was to be the application of the force. Here came his embarraſſment: he had rather not diſcuſs the matter. It was an unpleaſant taſk to him, but he could not help it; he had no choice left him; he muſt diſcuſs or ſeem to aſſent to it. He thought that Adminiſtration ſhould take the meaſure on themſelves, and not call for the ſanction of Parliament. Here was his difficulty; but he was anxious not to be miſunderſtood. He wanted it to be known that he gave not his ſanction, either directly or indirectly, upon the diſpoſal of this force. He had peruſed that which was given out, and which was underſtood to be the ſubſtance of the bill which the right hon. Gentleman had moved for leave to bring in, and he knew not how to aſſent to it. He could not conceal from himſelf the deſtination of the force in queſtion. Was it not now become a time for this country to begin to think ſeriouſly on what it was to waſte Engliſh blood? When Miniſters, by this and other meaſures, admitted that the old mode of recruiting the army was at an end, was it too much to ſay that the Houſe of Commons ought to pauſe before an army, originally deſtined for internal defence, ſhould be turned into an army to act offenſively for the purpoſes of ambition? He did not want to faſten any particular word on the right hon. Gentleman who moved this, but it was not too much to ſay it was clear from his ſpeech that he meant the force upon which this bill applied, to be employed for the purpoſes of ambition? Was it too much for the Houſe of Commons to pauſe before they ſent men abroad under ſuch circumſtances, and for ſuch a purpoſe, eſpecially when we knew that under the old ſyſtem of recruiting the army men could not be got? Was it not worth while for the

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Legiſlature to conſider that not only the men cannot be raiſed at all under the old ſyſtem of recruiting, but that when they are raiſed by this new method the mode of paying them by the old funding ſyſtem is at an end? We had now a new ſyſtem of finance, and a new mode of raiſing men for the army. He put this point before the Houſe, not for the purpoſe of cauſing deſpair, but to call on the Houſe to conſider what it was deſired to do; to weigh the matter ſeriouſly, and think of the circumſtances of the country before they agreed to go on with projects of diſtant expeditions. We had heard lately of thanking Providence for our good fortune: we ought not in words merely to ſay we thank Providence, but we ought to ſhew our thankfulneſs by our actions. We ought to ſhew we feel the goodneſs of Providence towards us, and be prudent in reality, as well as grateful in expreſſions. Was not the ſituation of this country ſuch as the beſt friend of Adminiſtration would admit to be in a great meaſure owing to good fortune, and ſuch as we had not ſome time ago reaſon to expect? If that be ſo, and indeed he was much deceived if it was not ſo, and indeed the right hon. Gentleman himſelf ſaid he had not yet recovered from his aſtoniſhment upon one point, was it too much to ſay that our fortune may not always be quite ſo good as it has lately been; for the very expreſſion of good implied there was ſuch a thing as bad fortune? Good fortune had indeed been abundantly ſhowered upon us; but was it, therefore, no time to conſider what it is we are about to do? Gentlemen talked of the improvement of the ſtate of this country by reſcuing Holland from the hands of France. Here he begged he might not be miſunderſtood. The meaſure by which the Dutch fleet was captured was well planned; it deſerved to be applauded, and gentlemen were welcome to enjoy the applauſe which was beſtowed upon them for it, and in which he heartily joined. But what was the ſituation of Holland now? They had now no fleet to act hoſtilely againſt us. Their colonies are in our poſſeſſion, and their trade is, to all intents and purpoſes, annihilated. What then remained but the ſoil and canals, and the number of their people? Did any man mean to ſay that France could draw any further reſources from Holland to contend with us? Holland was exhauſted not only of money, but alſo of the means of acquiring money; men ſhe never had, except for marine purpoſes. Why then, he would aſk, what advantage can France derive

derive in its character of enemy to us by retaining Holland? He would anſwer, none; and he would go farther, and ſay, that England will find by retaining Holland they retain a place where Engliſhmen will find their grave.

From the experience we had already of the diſpoſition of the inhabitants ſince the landing was firſt effected, we had ſufficient reaſon to conclude, that they had no inclination to co-operate in reſcuing themſelves from the yoke of France. [Here was a cry of hear! hear! from the oppoſite bench.] He was glad to find from this exclamation, that there was a hope of co-operation, but certainly from the period when the fleet ſurrendered, there had been no manifeſtations of a favourable temper of the people of Holland which were known to the public. Perhaps, indeed, Miniſters had private information upon the ſubject to which others had not acceſs; yet, he was inclined to doubt the accuracy of their intelligence, and the fidelity of the reporters from whom they derived their information reſpecting the feelings and the wiſhes of thoſe whom we had embarked in the undertaking to deliver. This doubt was ſuggeſted by a review of the events which had taken place ſince our landing. We ſaw, that when our army had been near a month in the country, powerful to protect and defend thoſe who ſhould rally round its ſtandard, few Dutchmen had joined our cauſe. We had ſeen an obſtinate reſiſtance oppoſed to our progreſs; we had ſeen in the laſt attempt to penetrate into the country 1500 Engliſh troops fall, and a much greater proportion of our allies: after the lapſe of a month; after ſevere encounters, we ſtill occupied the poſitions we held at the commencement of the enterprize. Is this, then, an expedition which, however valuable, the object can be juſtified by the proſpect of ultimate ſucceſs? Yet, when even the attainment of it would be attended with ſo little advantage to the object of the war, is it an occaſion when a Britiſh Parliament ſhould ſanction meaſures that muſt involve ſuch a waſte of blood and treaſure?

Before pledging ourſelves to a conduct that might be attended with ſo many evils, and which was compenſated by ſo little benefit, we ſhould pauſe a little and reflect upon conſequences. Gentlemen ſhould conſider the burden that would be entailed upon us at the end of the ſeventh year of the war. After we had been ſo prodigal of our exertions, after we had done ſo much upon our element, after the ſe-

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curity of our own country was placed upon the moſt ſolid baſis, ought we to riſk all we have gained, all the advantages we poſſeſs, by plunging into a continental war, to be proſecuted by our own force. The number of troops already upon the continent was beyond what this country had been in uſe to employ in that manner, and now it was propoſed to ſend an additional body of 26,000 men, which, with the 22,000 already in Holland, would amount to an army of 48,000 Britiſh troops. We ſhould we thus heap up new and enormous burdens upon ourſelves? Had we not taken our full ſhare and proportion of the taſk of delivering Europe and reſiſting France? We had no leſs than 45,000 Ruſſian troops into our pay, to be employed on the Continent. Should Parliament, in the circumſtances in which we now ſtood, aſſembled on a fortnight's notice, without any well-founded hope of beneficial enterprize or ultimate ſucceſs, ſanction ſuch a thing as the eſtabliſhment of an army in our pay, on the Continent, of nearly 100,000 men? Was not the 45,000 Ruſſians in our pay an ample quota for this country to furniſh for the deliverance of Europe? It was time to think a little of our own intereſts after being ſo prodigal of our concern and our efforts for others. He did not mean to ſay that we ſhould ſue for peace. Peace was a thing he ſhould never think of mentioning as long as he ſaw the right honourable Gentlemen and his friends on the oppoſite bench. If obliged to renounce the hope of peace, however, he could not help wiſhing to ſee the war carried on in a different manner. Was it not enough that we ſent 45,000 Ruſſians to fight continental battles, while we contributed our naval exertions in the common cauſe? With an expenditure amounting laſt year to 60 millions, 35 of which were for the purpoſes of war, could a Britiſh Parliament juſtify itſelf to its conſtituents for ſanctioning a mode of war ſo foreign from our means, ſo unnatural to our ſituation? Ought we to give any ſort of approbation to a principle which embarked us in ſo boundleſs a career of continental war? Let Miniſters, if they think proper, employ the military force of the nation in the way they may deem moſt beneficial. They did it with their reſponſibility. Here, however, there was a manifeſt attempt to render Parliament a party to the plans of the Executive Government, and to obtain its ſanction to their ſchemes. There was no encouragement to proceed in the enterpriſe we had begun. It was involving ourſelves in

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an obſtinate conflict, in which the certain waſte of blood and expence was not juſtified by the hopes of ſucceſs nor compenſated by the proſpect of advantage.

Were the object of the war preciſely aſcertained, it would be more eaſy to appreciate the meaſures which were to be adopted, by comparing them with the end to be attained.—If we were ſtruggling to annoy France, it might be ſaid that our campaign in Holland was calculated for that purpoſe. But it was almoſt avowed by many gentlemen that we were engaged in a conteſt for the overthrow of the Republican government of France. How this object was to be promoted by our war on the continent he was at a loſs to gueſs. He could not exactly ſee how the cauſe of Monarchy in France could be advanced by our killing Dutchmen in Holland. *(A laugh from the Treaſury Bench.)* He did not think that he had ſaid any thing calculated to excite the riſible faculties of the right honourable Gentlemen oppoſite. Indeed he thought that they were not in a temper of mind ſo prone to mirth. He thought that from the laſt accounts received from Holland they would have been but little inclined to gaiety;—ſure he was that the country at large was not diſpoſed to laugh at this ſubject. He was convinced even that the opinions he entertained on this matter coincided with many who ſupported the right honourable Gentleman, and that they met the ideas, though they may not decide the votes of many of his friends. If the queſtion then was of the means of deſtroying the particular form of a government, how did our exertions in Holland tend to promote ſuch a plan? Unleſs the five Directors of France could be ſecured, and a vaſt majority of the people were to declare in favour of Monarchy, how was the cauſe likely to ſucceed? That this was the real object of the war, however, was evident from a variety of circumſtances. It was avowed by the Emperor of Ruſſia in a document he had ſeen, the declaration of war againſt Spain, a paper which had appeared in all the foreign gazettes, and he imagined was ſufficiently authentic to warrant his obſervations. In that declaration the Emperor of Ruſſia ſtates that *he and his Allies* were engaged in a war for the expreſs purpoſe of overturning the government of France, and reſtoring the Monarchy. This expreſſion deſerves very ſerious conſideration, when the nature of our connections with the Emperor of Ruſſia were taken into view. In the ſpeech from the throne, at the concluſion of laſt

laſt ſeſſion, his Majeſty ſtated that he acted moſt cordially with the Emperor of Ruſſia, and it was evident that this was the Ally whoſe views and conduct were moſt congenial to thoſe of Miniſters. The Emperor of Ruſſia diſtinctly avowed the reſtoration of Monarchy to be the object of the war. Could the right honourable Gentleman hire any other potentate to concur in the avowal? The Emperor of Germany has refuſed to pledge himſelf to any ſuch deſign. His views were evidently directed to his own aggrandiſement. Every battle that he fought, every drop of blood he expended, was intended to ſecure ſome territorial acquiſition. Would the Miniſter ſay that there was any concert between him and any other court in Europe, beſides that of Ruſſia, for endeavouring to effect the overthrow of the French Republic? Whether it was a government that one ſhould wiſh to ſee overthrown was a different queſtion. Now the object was to be conſidered in relation to the means by which it was to be purſued, and the chance of ſucceſs. A right honourable Gentleman had ſometimes inſinuated that he had a lurking fondneſs for a Republican form of government. If the right honourable Gentleman did think ſo he little knew his (Mr. Tierney's) ſentiments; but as to the overthrow of the French Republic, was it a project which England and Ruſſia were likely to accompliſh? Was it in any degree promoted by all the victories which had graced the campaign? What return of order, of religion, of legitimate government had we yet ſeen riſing from all the exploits of which we ſo juſtly boaſted? He ſaw, with pleaſure indeed, the power of France circumſcribed; with pleaſure he ſhould ſee her confined to her ancient limits; but even in the proſecution of an end ſo juſt and deſirable as that of confining the power of France, it would be neceſſary to calculate, whether we might not ſuffer more by the attempt to apply a remedy than by the very evil which exiſted; but now, however, what proſpect was there of reſtoring the Monarchy of France; what proof was there that an end ſo diſintereſted was ever in contemplation? Was Switzerland yet reſtored to its ancient government? On the contrary, has it not been held as a conqueſt, and that from France to Auſtria it has merely ſhifted hands. Has the King of Sardinia yet aſcended his recovered throne, and his delivered territories? What matters it to him that loſes a crown, whether it is purloined by Emperors or Directories? Has that which has been

reſcued from the uſurper been reſtored to the lawful owner? There is not the leaſt proof, not the leaſt diſpoſition. We ſee bravery diſplayed by the combatants, but victory does not contribute to the overthrow of the French Monarchy. The deſign was avowed in terms that could ſcarce be miſunderſtood but a few months ago, and what effect has it produced in France? During a peace with the Emperor of Germany, which, to France, without commerce to annoy, or colonies to defend, was almoſt a peace with all the world, the Directory diſtinguiſhed themſelves by every ſpecies of miſrule at home, and by the eſtabliſhment of oppreſſive republics around them. The French Republic was rendered odious to the world, and tyrannical to its own ſubjects. Defeat, diſgrace, and diſunion were the conſequences. Yet, no ſooner was the reſtoration of the Monarchy avowed than energy revived, the ſpirit of the nation was rouſed, the armies were recruited, and the tide of ſucceſs began in ſome degree to turn in favour of the Republic. He did not ſay that Miniſters were imprudent in making the avowal; they were reduced to the dilemma of injuring their cauſe, as much by their ſilence as by their declaration. On the one hand they were obliged to hold a language calculated to encourage their partizans in France, or diſcourage them by their ſilence; and, on the other, they furniſhed the Republicans with topics calculated to promote their cauſe and to animate their friends.

With reſpect to the bill itſelf, he had little objection to it. He was not averſe to ſee the ſupplementary militia reduced and the expence it occaſioned ſaved. It was the *employment* of the force that it was the object of the bill to procure which he could not ſanction. He did not wiſh that the exertions of government ſhould be crippled, but he could not vote for enabling them to carry on a cruſade againſt France. Gentlemen, he obſerved, were diſpleaſed with the word *cruſade*, but he wiſhed to know what was a cruſade but the employment of a large army in the purſuit of ſome extravagant object. Let the right honourable Gentleman ſhew that the object was not extravagant before he rejected the epithet by which it was characterized. Connecting, therefore, the application of the diſpoſable force to be obtained with the meaſure propoſed, he was bound to give it his negative. He knew that his oppoſition would be of little avail; yet he felt himſelf bound to enter his proteſt againſt the intended application of the blood and treaſure of the country. Having

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obeyed the dictates of his conſcience and fulfilled his duty by that proteſt, it was not his intention to trouble the Houſe with any further animadverſions upon the bill itſelf in its progreſs.

The *Secretary at War* ſaid, that the honourable gentleman had put a wrong interpretation upon the nature of the bill and the object to which the ſanction of Parliament was required. Certainly no man who gave his vote for the bill in any degree pledged himſelf to approve the application of the force which would be placed at the diſpoſal of the Executive Government. When the militia force was made diſpoſable, it muſt be diſpoſed of juſt like every other part of the military force of the country at the reſponſibility of miniſters. Any member might ſupport the bill who might not approve the application of the force.

There was likewiſe another inference drawn by the honourable gentleman, which was perfectly unwarranted. He had ſaid that this meaſure aroſe from the difficulty of procuring men. It was true that this was the caſe, but not in the way in which it might be interpreted. This difficulty did not ariſe from any waſte of lives, from any decay of population; it aroſe ſimply from this circumſtance, that the population of this country had not encreaſed (and he believed it had encreaſed) in ſuch a degree, even in the preſent proſperous ſtate of the nation, as to furniſh two diſtinct armies, one for defence, another for offence. We could not have a ſufficient diſpoſable force, if ſo great a part of our military ſtrength was limited to mere defence. As to the advantages of encreaſing our diſpoſable force, he conceived they were undeniable. They retained all the benefits of a defenſive force, with the additional one of being fitted for offence, if expedient. How indeed could we menace or annoy the enemy without ſuch a body of troops? Without at all quitting the country they were more uſeful as a diſpoſable force than when confined to the purpoſes of defence, becauſe they kept the enemy in awe, and compelled them to divide their attention and their troops for their own defence.

As to a ſyſtem of purely defenſive war which the honourable gentleman ſeemed to recommend, he conceived it to be the moſt unfortunate ſituation in which a nation could be placed. The moſt effectual means of defence, both for individuals and for nations, was to attack the enemy. By mere defence a nation is expoſed to the danger of being hurt

without any chance of injuring an adverſary. In fact, a war ſo conducted could, muſt be endleſs. Unleſs, therefore, the honourable gentleman profeſſing ſo earneſt a deſire for peace, wiſhed to doom the nation to defenceleſs warfare, he muſt admit of ſuch offenſive operations as promiſe to lead to ſome termination of the conteſt.

But the honourable gentleman ſays, "Why not leave Europe to itſelf; have we not done enough? He ſeemed to think it a matter of mere calculation and contribution, and to be regulated by no more enlarged principles and views. Even in this illiberal view of the queſtion, he was recommending a wretched œconomy. It was, to uſe a vulgar expreſſion, *cabbaging out of our own coat*. If we cut ſhort our ſphere of operations we contracted our own means of defence. The exertions we made upon a great ſcale were the beſt calculated to promote our own ſecurity. If we *cribbed* from our own means of exertion, we ſhould be guilty of the worſt policy, even for the attainment of that ſelfiſh object to which the honourable gentleman would confine our attention. But we have the command of the ſeas! What was this however to the general cauſe of Europe? If the enemy choſe to keep in their ports, what could the moſt conſummate naval ſkill contribute to the advancement of the ſecurity of Europe? Could we be ſafe while ſuch a Republic as that eſtabliſhed in France continued to exiſt? It had ever been his opinion that there was no ſafety for this country or for Europe, with ſuch a power in the midſt of it. What could the naval force of this country, reſtricted as the honourable gentleman would have it, to the annoyance of the enemy, or the protection of our allies? What could that gallant officer, Sir Sidney Smith, on whom the Houſe had beſtowed ſo juſt a tribute of its admiration of his conduct, have done, had he remained on board his ſhips? What might not have been the conſequences of that expedition of Buonaparte, ſo directly aimed againſt the intereſts of this country; if the generous devotion of a naval officer had not prompted him to the moſt active and various efforts to baffle the deſigns of the enemy? What might have been the ſituation of the Ottoman Empire? Who could ſay that after its overthrow Vienna might not again have been threatened by the ſame commander? Such extraordinary efforts as thoſe of Sir Sidney it was impoſſible to expect always. They were of a ſuperior kind. They proved, however, the advantage of offenſive

ſive operations, and the inadequacy of a mere defenſive ſyſtem.

No man, he was ſure, who took a wide view of things, could maintain that becauſe this was an iſland, we ought to ſeparate the cauſe of Europe from our own. Our fate was involved in that of ſurrounding nations; our intereſts and our proſperity were connected with their ſtate. In extending a liberal regard to the other countries of Europe; in contributing to their defence, we beſt promoted our own; by maintaining their freedom, by co-operating to their deliverance, we employed the ſureſt means of advancing our own greatneſs, guarding our own ſecurity, and confirming our own independence. If France, animated by the principles which diſtinguiſh her Republican Government, was ſuffered to retain the dominion ſhe lately poſſeſſed, all the means of defence of which we could boaſt would be imperfect for our ſafety.

As to the immediate meaſure he hoped he had ſatisfied the hon. Gentleman, that it was quite diſtinct from the application that might be made of the force. But the hon. Gentleman ſays, that it is not the reduction of the French power, but the overthrow of the exiſting Government which is the avowed object of the war. The hon. Gentleman alluded to what was ſaid in former debates. All that was ſaid then, however, was, that the reduction of the power of France was but one object. He was ready to repeat, that he did not think this country, or Europe, could be ſafe while a government like that of France remains. He wiſhed to be underſtood to puſh this principle as far as any man, but at the ſame time, he never did pledge himſelf abſolutely to the object of reſtoring the Monarchy of France. Conſidering the reſtoration of Monarchy on every account a conſummation devoutly to be wiſhed, he could not ſay, that we muſt at all events purſue that object. In fact it might be a thing altogether impracticable. If the great majority of the people were evidently againſt Monarchy, it could not be re-eſtabliſhed, and in ſuch a caſe it perhaps was doubtful whether the attempt ought to be made. This opinion he entertained, at leaſt as conſiſtently, he believed, as the hon. Gentleman and his Friends, for he was thoroughly convinced of the impoſſibility of eſtabliſhing any form of government againſt the manners, habits and ſentiments of a people. The queſtion however was, whether France did wiſh for a Monarchy? He was quite perſuaded that the majority of France were

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for that form of government. The hon. Gentleman ſeemed to think that the majority of the French were attached to the exiſting government; but ſurely it was eaſy to comprehend that a majority might be governed by the minority, and ſuch he was convinced was the ſituation of France at the preſent moment.

The hon. Gentleman obſerved that it was inſinuated by him (Mr. Windham) that he had a fondneſs for a Republican Government. This was not exactly the caſe. He had ſaid that there were Gentleman who wiſhed that the French Republic might maintain itſelf. He had heard the ſentiment avowed by ſome of the hon. Gentleman's friends, and imagined that he participated in it with them. He wiſhed that Gentleman would explain why they indulged ſuch a wiſh. Was it for the ſake of France? If not for the ſake of France (for they inveigh againſt the French Government) but upon Engliſh principles and Engliſh feelings, they ought to deprecate the Republic, and wiſh for a Monarchical Government, as that which muſt for a long ſeries of years be unable (he laid no ſtreſs on the diſpoſition) to annoy neighbouring Powers, and to diſturb our ſecurity. Upon Engliſh principles and Engliſh feelings, then, he did wiſh for the reſtoration of Monarchy in France; but he by no means ſaid that we muſt go on till that object is attained. It would be fruitleſs to make the attempt without the co-peration of a great body in France, but whether that was to be obtained was the queſtion. He was convinced that the diſpoſition did exiſt, and wanted only that opportunity of diſplaying itſelf which it was ſo deſirable to afford.

This much he had thought is neceſſary to ſay, as the topics, though not connected with the ſubject before the Houſe, had been ſo largely inſiſted on by the hon. Gentleman. With regard to the bill propoſed to be introduced, he had already ſhewn that thoſe who approved it in itſelf, were by no means engaged to approve the application of the force which it might place at the diſpoſal of the Executive Government.

Mr. *Tierney* explained, and ſaid, that as the preamble of the bill ſo clearly connected the application of the force, with the legiſlative meaſure rendering the Militia diſpoſable, it was impoſſible to approve the bill without ſanctioning the application of the force.

Mr. *Dundas* denied that the bill was a pledge, that the forces to be obtained were to be ſent to Holland. They might be ſent there or any where elſe within the agrement,

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at the reſponſibility of Adminiſtration. At the ſame time, he begged not to be underſtood to inſinuate, that the forces ſent to Holland, or any forces to be ſent, were not employed highly to the honour and advantage of the country.

Mr. *Sheridan* ſaid, that in the preſent doubtful ſtate of our affairs in Holland, and as freſh advices might every moment be expected, he was unwilling to ſay any thing upon that ſubject. He heard with regret, however, one ſentiment uttered by his hon. Friend, he meant the obſervation, that he has no objection to put the Militia on the footing of the army. For his part he lamented the change which had taken place in the Militia ſyſtem, and thought that the earlieſt opportunity ſhould be embraced of reſtoring to that conſtitutional body the confidence they ought to have in their ſituation, by reſtricting them to the purpoſes for which they were originally intended.

With reſpect to the object, the right hon. Gentleman had ſaid, that monarchy could not be reſtored in France without the concurrence of the people of France. Apply that principle, then, to the war in Holland. On the part of this country it was not a war for territory. What diſpoſition, then, was there in the inhabitants to ſecond our operation for their deliverance? Since the ſurrender of the fleet there had been no ſymptons of co-operation. The Dutch fleet was obtained in a manner which he thought of dangerous example. It was by a mutiny of the crews. He knew not by what means this diſpoſition had been raiſed. Certain it was, that the fleet had been ſurrendered by a mutiny of the crews refuſing to fight a ſuperior naval force of this country. This being the caſe, there was a great difference between the ſituation of the ſailors and the people; and, as the example of the ſurrender of the fleet had not been followed by the people, it was fair to preſume that they were not favourable to our cauſe. This was a matter on which Miniſters ought to have information. Unleſs the people were willing to co-operate, the enterpriſe could not ſucceed—nor ought it to have been attempted.

The expedition it was well known, had been ſome time in contemplation, and when it was reſolved upon there might be hopes entertained of the co-operation of Pruſſia. If, however, it ſhould appear that Pruſſia perſiſted in neutralitry, while co-operaton was conſidered as a *ſine qua non*, and the people were ill inclined to our cauſe, the chance of ultimate ſucceſs was removed. He truſted therefore, that if this

this was the caſe, no falſe feeling of pride would induce Miniſters to perſevere in the fruitleſs attempt of conquering Holland by force. At any rate he hoped that the Houſe, who were not parties to the expedition, nor actuated by the ſame feeling of pride, would not ſupport Adminiſtration in their obſtinacy.

Theſe obſervations he had thrown out on the topics which had been intruduced; but he ſhould take a future opportunity to deliver his ſentiments more fully upon the principle of the bill.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, although it was not my intention to have troubled the Houſe in the preſent ſtage of the bill, ſome things dropped both from the hon. Gentleman who juſt ſat down, and the hon. Gentleman who ſpoke before him on the ſame ſide, on which I beg leave to make a few remarks. The hon. Gentleman who juſt ſat down ſtated two points as eſſential to be conſidered in judging of the propriety of at all undertaking the Expedition to Holland, or the expediency of perſeverving in it. Theſe were the neutrality of the King of Pruſſia, and the diſpoſition of the people of Holland. With regard to the firſt I think it right to ſtate that it had not the ſmalleſt influence in determining the enterprize. The Expedition to Holland was totally independent of any co-operation whatever on the part of the King of Pruſſia, and it was adopted by his Majeſty's Miniſters under ſuch auſpices as to juſtify a ſanguine hope, that it would be attended with ultimate and complete ſucceſs; that the event of it muſt depend upon the diſpoſition of the inhabitants, to ſecond the efforts made to reſcue them from the degrading oppreſſion under which they groan, is undoubtedly true; but not in the ſame degree that the principle muſt obtain in relation to France. The favourable ſentiment of the inhabitants, is one of the circumſtances on which the expectation of prevailing over the uſurped dominion of the French Government in Holland is founded; be the event of the expedition however what it may, the hon. Gentleman has no reaſon to ſuppoſe that his Majeſty's Miniſters have any cauſe for the feelings of repentant diſappointment or of mortified pride. If, contrary to all that I hope, all I believe, all that I know of the favourable ſituation of the enterpriſe, the attempt to reſcue Holland from the tyranny of France, and to reſtore its legitimate Government, ſhould ultimately fail, its authors will have abundant matter, not merely of conſolation, but of triumph. They could

could boaſt of an object fully adequate to juſtify the deſign and to compenſate the ſacrifices of the execution, has already been atchieved. Is it not an object of importance to the intereſts and to the ſecurity of this country, to have tranſferred from the ſcale of our enemies force to our own, ſo great a portion of the naval force of Holland? Is it of no importance if we cannot ſecure a friend to have diſarmed an enemy? Is it of no importance to this country to have ſtript the French Republic of an inſtrument, by which they might have aſſailed the ſafety of our own ſhores, and gained, in the worſt event, a new bulwark to our national ſecurity both in the increaſe of our ſtrength and in the impotence of our adverſary? Come what may, theſe are claims to the thanks of the country which cannot be ſhaken; they are proofs of ſucceſsful enterpriſe which leave no room for regret; they are alone ſufficient to juſtify all that the Bill aſſerts of the advantages derived from the former application of the Militia forces, and they will warrant an extention of the principle, in order to procure the means of exerting freſh efforts and realiſing additional ſucceſs.

The hon. Gentleman aſſerts that there has been a want of co-operation with our forces by land. This is an opinion in which I cannot coincide. As to the information which Miniſters poſſeſs upon the ſubject, the hon. Gentleman knows too well what belongs to the duty of the Executive Servants of the Crown to imagine that this is a place in which it can be explained. But without requiring confidential information to diſcloſe what are the grounds to hope for co-operation, we can draw from human nature itſelf the moſt ſolid aſſurance of favour and ſupport to our cauſe. We know that there can be no country which has ever taſted French oppreſſion, which has ever been linked in French fraternity, that does not long to ſhake off the galling chain. Though men may want the courage or the opportunity to fight in the ranks of their deliverers, they muſt ſigh and pant for deliverance. Unleſs the Dutch have loſt not only that character for which they were peculiarly diſtinguiſhed, but unleſs they have loſt the features of human nature itſelf, we muſt find allies, if not in their arms, in their hearts, in their affections, in their hopes, in their prayers.

But it is not true that ſince the ſurrender of the fleet we have received no marks of co-operation. The poſition which our army occupies does not admit of a general afflux of the well affected to the expedition, becauſe its approach is neceſſarily

ceſſarily confined. Yet even within our lines, I know from the moſt unqueſtionable authority, that we have had the moſt hearty and rapturous teſtimonies of joy and concurrence. You have only to open the road to a more extenſive communication with the country to receive the moſt general proofs of welcome and co-operation. Why then ſhould you allow your hopes to be daſhed becauſe you have not atchieved in a few weeks what would be the ſource of unmeaſurable glory and advantage to accompliſh in ſeveral months.

The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Tierney) ſaid that he is not inclined to deſpond himſelf, or to excite deſpondency in others. I do not ſay that it is the ſentiment which the hon. Gentleman wiſhes to cheriſh or to inſpire. If, however, the hon. Gentleman were deſirous to daſh the hopes and to alarm the apprehenſions of the nation; if he were deſirous to damp the generous ardour for the common cauſe of Europe and humanity, to condemn us to the impoſſibility of further effort, to blight all our proſpects of national triumph and of final ſecurity, his topics could not have been more happily ſelected. Why elſe would he have introduced the remarks he made on the new mode of recruiting the army and the new ſyſtem of finance? Why does he only refer to topics and preſent views fitted only to enervate our courage, to damp our perſeverance, or to alarm our fears. The difficulty of recruiting our armies is not the effect of a decaying population. The ſpirit which burns to engage the enemies of the country, and to contribute moſt efficaciouſly to its defence, is locked up, and you but let it looſe to recruit your army. You have only to render a uſeleſs defenſive force, active and diſpoſable, to procure a force powerful as the utmoſt wants of the moſt vigorous ſervice can require. This it is, however, which has been repreſented as a difficulty ariſing from ſcarcity of military reſources, and from national debility!

As to the new ſyſtem of finance to which the hon. Gentleman alludes, what is it but that after ſeven years of war, after the exertions which the unparalleled nature of the conteſt has required, you have reſorted to a mode of raiſing the ſupplies by which your national credit is raiſed and ſupported to a pitch unprecedented at the very commencement of former wars; by which your reſources for future efforts are prolonged; by which your trade is increaſed, your proſperity conſolidated? I beg pardon for having detained the Houſe ſo long with theſe obſervations, but few things touch me ſo ſenſibly as when a colouring is attempted to be given to objects

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that when exhibited to the public, tends to depreciate our hopes, to relax our exertions, to diſincline us from the courſe which duty as well as intereſt prompt us to purſue; to ſhrink from the conteſt in which we are engaged; to deſert the career when we have almoſt reached the goal, and to deſpair of that good which is almoſt attained. The Bill was then brought in and read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day. Adjourned.

The humble Addreſs of the Houſe of Commons to the King:

Moſt Gracious Sovereign,

We, your Majeſty's moſt dutiful and loyal ſubjects, the Commons of Great Britain, in Parliament aſſembled, beg leave to return your Majeſty the thanks of this Houſe for your moſt gracious ſpeech from the throne; and to aſſure your Majeſty, that we ſhall proceed, without delay, to conſider of the propriety of enabling your Majeſty to avail yourſelf, to a further extent of the voluntary ſervices of the militia, at a moment when we are ſatisfied an encreaſe of our active force abroad may be productive of the moſt important and beneficial conſequences.

We have ſeen the happy effects of the meaſure adopted on this ſubject in the laſt ſeſſion; and we reflect with pride that the forces which your Majeſty was thereby enabled to employ have already diſplayed in the face of the enemy a courage, diſcipline, and ſteadineſs, worthy of the character of Britiſh ſoldiers.

It is with the utmoſt ſatisfaction we have obſerved the rapid improvement of our ſituation and proſpects, which, under the bleſſing of Providence, has taken place in the ſhort interval ſince the laſt ſeſſion; and we cordially congratulate your Majeſty on the continued diſplay of the abilities and valour of the commanders and troops of the combined Imperial armies, which [illegible] the deliverance of Italy by the reſult of a campaign equal in ſplendour and ſucceſs to any the moſt brilliant recorded in hiſtory; and we warmly participate with your Majeſty in the ſatisfaction which muſt be excited in every Britiſh heart by ſeeing your fleets and armies ſucceſsfully employed to the aſſiſtance of your allies, to the ſupport of our juſt cauſe, and to the advancement of the moſt important intereſts of the Britiſh empire.

Among the happy effects of thoſe exertions, we rejoice to obſerve the reſtoration of the kingdom of Naples to the dominion of its lawful Sovereign, and the renewal of your Majeſty's former connections with that power.

We have witneſſed, with joy and exultation, the glorious exploits which have rendered the French expedition to Egypt productive of freſh calamity and diſgrace to our enemies, and which have fruſtrated their ultimate views againſt our Eaſtern Poſſeſſions; and we cannot forbear to expreſs our juſt ſenſe of the courage of the Turkiſh forces, and our warmeſt admiration of the ſkill and heroiſm of a Britiſh officer, by whoſe efforts, with a ſmall portion of your Majeſty's naval force under his command, the deſperate attempt of the enemy was defeated. While we rejoice in the additional ſecurity which the Britiſh intereſts in India have derived from the overthrow of that reſtleſs and perfidious power, who, inſtigated by the artifices, and deluded by the promiſes, of the French, had entered into their ambitious and deſtructive projects, we join with your Majeſty in affording the higheſt praiſe to the vigilance, deciſion, and wiſdom, of the Governor General in Council, and to the tried abilities and valour of the commanders, officers, and troops, employed under his direction on this great and important occaſion.

We truſt that there is every reaſon to expect that the effort which your Majeſty is making for the deliverance of the United Provinces will prove ſucceſsful, and will, notwithſtanding the reſiſtance which the enemy has been enabled to oppoſe, ſpeedily ſurmount every obſtacle; and we have already abundant reaſon to rejoice in the firſt ſucceſs of the Britiſh arms, which has reſcued from the poſſeſſion of the enemy the principal portion of naval arſenal of the Dutch Republic, and has opened the pleaſing proſpect that the fleet which, under the uſurped dominion of France, was deſtined to cooperate in the invaſion of theſe iſlands, may ſhortly, under its ancient ſtandard, partake of the glory of reſtoring the religion, liberty, and independence, of thoſe Provinces, ſo long in intimate union and alliance with this country.

Rejoicing with your Majeſty in events which add ſo much luſtre to the Britiſh character, we cordially join in the ſentiments ſo juſtly due to the conduct of your Majeſty's good and faithful ally the Emperor of Ruſſia, to whoſe magnanimity and wiſdom, directing to ſo many quarters of Europe the force of his extenſive and powerful empire, we are in a great degree indebted for the ſucceſs of our own efforts, as well for the rapid and favourable change in the general ſituation of affairs. We acknowledge your Majeſty's goodneſs in having directed copies to be laid before us of thoſe engagements, which have conſolidated and cemented a connection ſo conſonant to the permanent intereſts of your Majeſty's empire, and ſo important at the preſent moment to every part of the civilized world.

It gives us pleaſure to learn that the ample ſupplies, which were granted to your Majeſty in the courſe of the laſt ſeſſion, will ſo nearly provide for the exigencies of the public ſervice, even on the extenſive ſcale which our preſent

ſent operations require, as to enable your Majeſty without further aid to continue thoſe exertions to the cloſe of the preſent year; and we will, without delay, conſider of providing for the expence which will be neceſſary for the early part of the year, the proper eſtimates for which your Majeſty has ordered to be laid before us.

We beg to return your Majeſty our ſincere thanks for having, in purſuance of our recommendation, judged it proper to communicate to your two Houſes of Parliament in Ireland, at the cloſe of their laſt ſeſſion, the ſentiments which we had expreſſed to your Majeſty reſpecting an incorporating Union with that Kingdom; we continue to be ſatisfied that ſignal benefit would be derived to both countries from that important meaſure; and we truſt that the diſpoſition of your Parliament there will be found to correſpond with that which we have manifeſted for the accompliſhment of a work which would tend ſo much to add to the ſecurity and happineſs of all your Majeſty's Iriſh ſubjects, and to conſolidate the ſtrength and proſperity of the empire.

Mr. *Speaker* reported to the Houſe, that the Houſe attended his Majeſty with their Addreſs; to which his Majeſty was pleaſed to give the following moſt gracious Anſwer:

Gentlemen,

I return you my particular thanks for this dutiful Addreſs.

I receive with the higheſt ſatisfaction your congratulations on the happy improvement of our affairs, which I ſhall ever principally aſcribe, under the bleſſing of Providence, to the wiſdom, perſeverance, and ſpirit of my Parliament, guiding and animating the efforts of a brave and loyal people, in ſupport of their deareſt intereſts.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

FRIDAY, SEPT. 27.

The hon. Mr. Scott (ſon to Lord Eldon) took the oaths and his ſeat.

Mr. [illegible] brought up the Report of the Committee on the Expiring Laws.

MILITIA.

On the motion of Mr. *Dundas*, the bill to enable his Majeſty to raiſe recruits from the Militia regiments, was read a ſecond time, and on moving for the commitment of it,

Mr. *Nicholls* roſe. He ſaid he did not mean to object to the meaſure. The placing a force at the diſpoſal of the Executive Government met his approbation, and he would not even oppoſe a continental war. While it was unavoidable to continue the war, it muſt be politic and prudent to make every

every exertion to maintain the character and ſecure the intereſts of the country: but no man would deny that continued war muſt be productive of calamity. The ſooner therefore peace was reſtored, the better for the country. There were but two means by which, in his opinion, the war was to be terminated. By the good ſenſe and integrity of his Majeſty's Miniſters. He truſted Miniſters would have the integrity and the good ſenſe to terminate the war the moment the impolicy of perſevering in it became obvious to them. As to the right hon. Secretary, who brought in the preſent bill, he never had ſpoken of him in that Houſe, or out of it, but with reſpect. He always gave him credit for too much good ſenſe and candour, not to believe that he would in a manly manner renounce the war whenever he ſhould be brought to think it unwiſe to continue to carry it on. And he entertained the ſame ſentiments with reſpect to the readineſs of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to deſiſt from purſuing a career that would be calamitous to the country. But he believed there were others on the oppoſite ſide of the Houſe who cheriſhed quite different views. A right hon. Secretary (Windham) had on more occaſions than one ſpoken of the *bellum internecinum*, while the Republican form continued to be the Government in France. He was happy, however, to learn, that on a very recent occaſion (alluding to the debate of laſt night) even that right hon. Gentleman had changed his opinions a little, and continued no longer to avow ſuch repugnance to peace. [Mr. Nicholls entered into an account of converſations which he had had, when in France ſome time in 1787, with the Abbé Reynal, reſpecting the internal ſituation of that country, but the Speaker ſaid this was not regular, and called the hon. Gentleman to order.]

Mr. *Nicholls* explained. His object was, to ſtate the reaſon why he did not oppoſe the bill, but to ſhew alſo that the internal ſituation of France, in the worſt times, was even ſuch as ought to deter the powers of Europe from attempting to ſubjugate it by arms.

The *Secretary at War* obſerved, that the forms of the Houſe rendered his ſituation delicate in riſing to make any reply to the hon. Gentleman, who had introduced into his ſpeech things ſo very irregular, that one would imagine ſuch obſervations were made becauſe they could not be anſwered without irregularity. Men would at different times entertain different ſentiments on the ſame ſubject; but he could aſſure

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the Houſe, his ſentiments of the war continued unaltered. It was very poſſible that the ſentiments he delivered laſt night were very different from thoſe the hon. Gentleman and his friends in general imputed to him. This inconſiſtency was, however, their own. His ſentiments were always conſiſtent. Mr. Windham (feeling that he could not purſue this converſation without violating the forms of the Houſe) concluded by obſerving, that if he could have gone on to reply, he would be able to ſhew, that the ſenſe in which he uſed *bellum internecinum* was very different from the interpretation put upon it by the hon. Gentleman. He had however the terror of the forms of the Houſe hanging over his head, and would therefore only add, that his preſent opinions were not oppoſite to any he ever entertained or avowed.

Mr. *Nicholls* explained.

The bill was ordered to be committed on Monday next.

SUPPLY.

On the motion of the *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, the Houſe in a Committee voted a Supply to his Majeſty.

Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

SATURDAY, SEPT. 28.

The Houſe reſolved itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe upon the expiring Laws. Several reſolutions were agreed to for continuing certain Acts of Parliament about to expire.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the Report of the Committee of Supply. The reſolution that a ſupply ſhould be granted to his Majeſty, was read a firſt and ſecond time, and agreed to; and it was moved that the Houſe ſhould reſolve into a Committee on the ſame on Monday next.

Mr. *Wallace* moved there ſhould be laid before the Houſe eſtimates of the charges of the ordinaries and extraordinaries of the Navy for the months of January and February 1800. He alſo gave notice that he ſhould on Monday move the Vote for the Seamen from the 1ſt month of the year 1800.

Mr. *Long* moved the eſtimate of the charges for Guards and Garriſons from 25th of December, 1799, to 24th February, 1800. He alſo moved the eſtimates of charges for Officers of Ordnance from the ſame period, and that an Addreſs ſhould be preſented to his Majeſty, praying him to give direction that the above eſtimates might be laid before the Houſe.

Houſe. He next moved there ſhould be laid before the Houſe an account of Exchequer Bills iſſued in conſequence of the laſt Loan for Three Millions.

This account was immediately after preſented to the Houſe by a perſon from the Exchequer Office, and ordered to be laid upon the table. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MONDAY, SEPT. 30.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* ſaid, he held a petition of a nature that called for the attention of the Houſe in an extraordinary degree; it came from the merchants of Liverpool and Lancaſter, who ſtated themſelves to be under circumſtances of embarraſſment on account, he obſerved, of the late very great failures at Hamburgh. In the Weſt India iſlands he ſaid, the merchants had been under the neceſſity of giving much longer credit than uſual, and the debts now due to them could not all be collected in with that diſpatch to which they had looked, and this made it impoſſible for them, in their turns, to fulfil all their engagements punctually as they had been accuſtomed to do. Their trade was alſo very much enlarged ſince hoſtilities had commenced between France and America, of which the returns were not made, and this was another ſource of the temporary embarraſſment, although it would produce ultimate profit to the Petitioners.

The object of this petition was to have the ſanction of Parliament to a ſmall temporary Loan, and they were aware that the mere ſanction of the Houſe to their propoſal would in a great meaſure do away the evil of which they had now to complain.

He did not conceive that there could be any objection to this meaſure, after he had ſtated the circumſtances of the Petitioners; but as ſome might think it ſtrange that this application ſhould come from Liverpool and Lancaſter rather than any other place, it was neceſſary that he ſhould ſtate that the buſineſs of theſe merchants was different from thoſe in London, the latter being merchants for the Weſt India Planters; the former being both exporters and importers of goods and manufactures, &c. In the courſe of their trade they had given bills which were now about to become due, and for the diſcharge of which they were not at preſent provided. The ſum for which they requeſted the ſanction of Parliament to a plan for the payment of, was very ſmall in compariſon

pariſon of the property they poſſeſſed; it being only about half a million for Liverpool and Lancaſter together; where it could be proved, from the Cuſtom-houſe books and other documents, which could have no deception in them, that there was property to the amount of two millions and a half in the poſſeſſion of the merchants of Liverpool only.

The queſtion now before the Houſe was not whether the price of ſugar ſhould be lowered, but whether the Weſt India Merchants in Liverpool and Lancaſter ſhould be enabled to live and carry on their trade through this temporary difficulty. He knew that ſome gentlemen might obſerve that very large fortunes had been made by ſugar merchants: he admitted that ſome handſome fortunes had been made in that trade; but in conſidering all ſubjects of this kind it ſhould never be forgotten that a large capital embarked in any buſineſs ought to produce large returns; and ſuch he believed to have been the caſe in the ſugar trade. He then obſerved that the trade of the preſent year was much larger than it had been laſt year; but that, owing to circumſtances which could not eaſily have been foreſeen, the Petitioners could not immediately avail themſelves of the value of the property they had in hand. It might be ſaid that ſugar, like other articles, might be left to find its level at the market; but that, he was confident, would not anſwer the purpoſe, as this was a temporary preſſure; and nothing but the ſanction of Parliament to a plan which the Petitioners had in view, would anſwer the purpoſe. Their object was to obtain leave to iſſue Exchequer Bills to a limited amount and a limited time. He therefore now moved for leave to bring up the petition.

The *Speaker* deſired the hon. Member to ſtate the prayer of the Petition.

He ſtated it to be, that the Petitioners might have leave to iſſue Exchequer Bills to a limited amount, and for a time to be limited; or that they might have ſuch other relief as to the Houſe ſhould ſeem meet.

The *Speaker* aſked, if the propoſition ſtated in the Petition, and which was prayed for, was ſuch as might eventually bring a charge upon the public?

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* ſaid, there was no chance of that, for the whole reſponſibility would be caſt upon the merchants themſelves, whoſe property was moſt abundantly ſufficient, not only for this, but for ten times the amount.

The *Speaker* ſaid that if, in the event of the Merchants

Petitioners not being able to make good their engagement, the public was propoſed to be anſwerable, this Petition could not be received without a recommendation from the Crown.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* obſerved, that after the ſale of the goods now actually in the hands of the Petitioners, the ſurplus, after the payment of all their engagements, would be immenſe.

The *Speaker* ſaid, that ſtill, if in any event, after the ſales, any failure ſhould happen, and that in the event of ſuch failure it was propoſed the public ſhould become reſponſible, it was abſolutely neceſſary, before the Petition could be received, that there ſhould be a recommendation from the Crown.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, it was certainly neceſſary in point of form in this caſe that there ſhould be a recommendation from the Crown; but it was form merely: becauſe, as had been accurately ſtated by the hon. Gentleman who propoſed to preſent the Petition, there could be no riſk to the public by aſſenting to the prayer of it, ſince the goods intended to be pledged as a ſecurity for it were upwards of four times the amount in value of the money to be advanced; in addition to which, if any addition were neceſſary, there were the names of merchants ſo reſpectable of themſelves, as to leave very little doubt upon the ſecurity in this caſe.

He did not enter into any particulars, nor deliver any binding opinion upon the ſubject now before the Houſe conſidered in the light of a general propoſition, but on the firſt view of ſuch a thing he ſhould be very averſe to giving the credit of the public to the ſolvency or the prudence of adventuring individuals; but he had conſidered the caſe a good deal, and he thought it one in which the public might interfere with ſafety and propriety; and the Houſe would be the more inclined to that opinion, as the caſe of the Petitioners did not ariſe out of any raſh ſpeculations of their own; but they had laid in unuſual large crops in the hope of ſelling much upon the Continent, but which proſpect had been impeded by ſudden failures on one part of it, and alſo by the preſent poſture of political affairs in another part of the Continent, but which he hoped would ſoon turn out favourable to this country. Under theſe circumſtances he ſhould hope this Petition would be received.

Mr. *Buxton* ſaid, that this matter was of rather a novel nature.

nature. He confeſſed, that after ſuch a price as ſugars had borne, and for ſo long a time, he could hardly expect that ſuch an application as this ſhould be made for the relief of ſugar dealers. Speculations of this kind in general ſhould be left to find their own level, and therefore if he gave way to this particular caſe on account of the ſpecial circumſtances of it, he hoped it would not be quoted as a precedent. Merchants were not to expect theſe aids as of courſe. any more than any other claſs of men; he ſaid this the rather becauſe it was obſervable the landed intereſt of this country never had any ſuch aſſiſtance. He hoped that if this favour was to be granted to the merchants, it was not to become a common practice.

The *Speaker* aſked, if there was any recommendation from the Crown?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* anſwered in the affirmative.

The Petition was then brought up, read, and referred to a Select Committee.

Mr. Alderman *Luſhington* ſaid, he had a petition grounded upon ſimilar circumſtances. It was a petition on the part of the planters and merchants of Grenada and St. Vincents. They were under the neceſſity of coming to the Houſe for relief. The preſſure on them at preſent was ſuch as they could not ſupport. This aroſe from a ceſſation of the ſale of thoſe articles of Weſt India produce, from which they derived their livelihood. This, he obſerved, although at preſent an inconvenience, aroſe from a cauſe which we ought not to regard with regret, for it aroſe chiefly from the preſſure which was made upon the frontier of the enemy; and alſo from the preſent ſtate of Holland, a trade with which he hoped would ſoon be opened. Upon theſe grounds the Petitioners hoped the Houſe would take upon itſelf the conſideration of their caſe, and afford them relief. The Petition ſtated the names of the Petitioners, and then ſtated that ſeveral inſtalments of a loan were due from them, which at preſent they are unable to pay; and praying that they may have further time for that purpoſe, and have ſuch relief as to the Houſe ſhould ſeem meet.

The *Speaker* aſked if there was any recommendation from the Crown? being anſwered in the affirmative, the queſtion was put, and the Petition was brought up, and ordered to be laid upon the Table.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that owing to very unfavourable circumſtances with regard to the harveſt, it was

thought adviſeable for the preſent to ſtop diſtilleries in Scotland. He therefore moved, that leave be given to bring in a bill to prohibit, for a time to be limited, the making of Low Wines, Spirits, &c. in Scotland. Granted.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved that leave be given to bring in a bill to enable the Lords Commiſſioners of his Majeſty's Treaſury to iſſue Exchequer Bills to a limited amount on the credit on the duties on goods imported and exported, &c. Granted.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* moved the order of the day, which was to go into a Committee of the whole Houſe on the bill for enabling his Majeſty to accept of the ſervices of an additional number of the Militia as may voluntarily offer to ſerve, under certain reſtrictions, &c.

The order of the day being read,

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* moved, That the Speaker do now leave the Chair.

Mr *Jones* ſaid, he was not an enemy to the bill now before the Houſe; if he was, he ſhould have ſaid ſo at the time a motion was made for leave to bring it in. He did not wiſh for any delay in this buſineſs; if he did, he ſhould have avowed it, and not have ſhrunk from the ſtatement of it. He thought Miniſters entitled to praiſe for planning the capture of the Dutch fleet; he wiſhed as much as any man could wiſh for the deliverance of Holland. He thanked every officer ſeaman, and ſoldier concerned in the expedition; they had done all that human beings could do, but they could not ſurmount impoſſibilities; and without a co-operation of the Dutch people, he was afraid that our troops, brave as they were, muſt be ſacrificed. He wiſhed for the deliverance of the Dutch people, but without efforts on their part, we could never accomplith that object. He wiſhed not only the deliverance of Holland, but of every country and territory that was now groaning under the galling, degrading, odious, infamous yoke of the French Republic. He wiſhed all people free from the deteſtable ſlavery of France; France, whoſe name was only to be written in blood. He did not with to ſpeak unworthily of our enemies, but France had been a prey to ſucceſſive and ſucceſsful tyrants, and had now her dictator *Sieyes*. But to return, he thought that this bill might be a meaſure of neceſſity, and therefore although he lamented that neceſſity he could not oppoſe it.

Doctor *Lawrence* ſaid that the Bill appeared to him in its preſent form hoſtile to a principle which he looked upon as ſacred;

ſacred; but as it might be altered in the Committee ſo as to do away the objection he had to it, in the ſame manner as had been done in another bill, although the objection was an objection upon the principle, for an amendment might be of a kind ſo material as to alter even the principle; as theſe points, he ſaid, might be thus ſettled, he ſhould not oppoſe the motion for going into a Committee on the bill, but he ſhould oppoſe the whole of it on the third reading if it appeared then, as it did now, to him, to intrench upon a ſacred principle which he thought it was the duty of the Houſe to ſupport.

Mr. *Addington* ſaid that we obtained the Dutch fleet under the moſt ſolemn engagement to protect and preſerve it for its lawful Sovereign; and we embarked in this expedition under the confident, and, he truſted, a well founded hope, that the people of Holland might be brought to the ſtandard of loyalty, to its legitimate Prince; an end not yet accompliſhed, but towards the attainment of which the preſent was one of the meaſures which were thought adviſable. We took the fleet for the legitimate Prince and Sovereign of Holland; we promiſed our exertions to reſtore to him the Provinces; and ſhould we now ſtop ſhort upon the capture of the Dutch fleet? He ſhould be ſorry to apply to Adminiſtration any unjuſtifiable epithet, but he could not help ſaying the ſtopping ſuddenly ſhort after the capture of the Dutch fleet would be a ſpecies of political ſwindling of which he thought his Majeſty's Miniſters incapable, and would be a conduct that would be highly injurious to the honour of this country.

Mr. *Jones* ſaid he had no doubt but that his Majeſty's Miniſters would take care not to act improperly by the Stadtholder.

Mr. *Tierney* thought the language of the hon. Gentleman who ſpoke laſt but one rather alarming. If we were at all events to perſiſt in the reſtoration of Holland to its lawful Sovereign, and are to be called ſwindlers if we do not, our caſe is a very hard one. For his part he was ſatisfied with the capture of the Dutch fleet, but the hon. Gentleman made much more of it, and ſeemed to inſiſt on our going on for the capture of Holland at all events. He ſhould wiſh to underſtand the terms under which we have taken that fleet. Was it a condition in the ſurrender of that fleet, that we were at all events to purſue the attempt of reſtoring the former government of Holland?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that if there had been

any

any ſecret attending the ſurrender of the Dutch fleet, upon any ſtate reaſons, it muſt be obvious that in that Houſe there could be no anſwer given to the queſtion juſt put by the hon. Gentleman; but the truth of the matter was, that no agreement of any ſuch ſort was entered into between thoſe who, on the part of this country, captured that fleet, and thoſe by whom it was ſurrendered; we were under no ſuch engagement as the hon. Gentleman alluded to; neither did his hon. Friend, he was confident, mean to ſay, that we were at all events and hazards to procure the emancipation of all Holland from the French yoke, and to reſtore its legitimate government; his hon. Friend had no ſuch meaning, nor could his words juſtify any ſuch inference; he had, indeed, expreſſed a ſentiment which every Member in the Houſe, he truſted, would approve of; which, in ſubſtance, was this; that if we took the Dutch fleet under the promiſe to reſtore it to its legitimate Sovereign, and the fleet being at our diſpoſal, and we afterwards uſed no endeavours whatever to reſtore the lawful government of Holland, but ſhould ſuddenly ſtop after we had gained our own ends, we might be accuſed of political ſwindling; but how did this apply? If it applied to our being bound at all events to purſue the plan of the reſtoration of the government of Holland, however difficult, impracticable or imprudent the attempt; that we ſhould run riſks and hazards too in trying to accompliſh it, then indeed the obſervation of the hon. Gentleman would have been juſt, but the ſentiment of his was no more than that, he truſted, of the Houſe at large; it was only that we were bound in point of honour and conſcience to uſe ſuch endeavours to reſtore that country to its lawful government as are agreeable to the rules of war and the principles of prudence; and now that he was upon the ſubject, he would juſt add, that he thought that could not be obtained without the co-operation of the people of Holland, and to add further, that not only many things had paſſed to ſhew that expectation to be well founded in its firſt formation, but that up to the preſent moment that expectation has been ſtrongly confirmed, and alſo that we have accounts ſince the ſubject was laſt diſcuſſed in that Houſe of the operations of the army as well as the operations of our fleet, which went ſtrongly to confirm that opinion and that expectation. In a very ſhort time after the approach of our arms, the inhabitants of one of the towns in Holland received our men with joy as their deliverers. He hoped this ſentiment would ſoon be generally expreſſed,

expreſſed, and he agreed with his hon. Friend in wiſhing we might ſucceed in reſtoring that country to its lawful government, nor had the hon. Gentleman any reaſon to doubt what was the import of the words which ſeemed to have alarmed him.

The Speaker then left the chair.

The Houſe went into a Committee upon the bill, and after ſeveral amendments had been propoſed and received, the report was ordered to be brought up the next day.

On the motion of the *Chancellor of the Exchequer*, the Houſe then reſolved itſelf into a Committee of Supply, in which

Mr. *Wallace* moved, that it is the opinion of this Committee, that 120,000 ſeamen be voted for the ſervice of two months, beginning the 1ſt of January, 1800.

Alſo, that 444,000l. be granted for the wages of the ſaid number of ſeamen, for two lunar months.

Alſo, 456,000l. be granted for their victualling; 720,000l. for wear and tear; and 60,000l. for ordnance ſtores during the ſame period of two lunar months.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved, that there be iſſued Three Millions of Exchequer Bills, to make good a like ſum granted laſt ſeſſion, and ſecured upon the firſt aids to be granted on the opening of the preſent ſeſſion. Agreed to.

Theſe reſolutions were agreed to, and the report ordered to be received the next day. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1.

Mr. *Secretary at War* brought up the Army Eſtimates Extraordinary for two months, beginning January 1, 1800, which he ſhould move in the Committee of Supply the next day, together with the ordinary Eſtimates which had already been preſented.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* brought up the Report of the Select Committee reſpecting the Petition of the Liverpool and Lancaſter Merchants connected with the Weſt India Trade. It appeared from the evidence of the witneſſes examined before the Committee, among whom were Meſſrs. Richards and Stout, that the ſaid Petitioners from Liverpool were poſſeſſed of an immenſe property, amounting to more than three times the ſum they ſolicited to be accommodated with; that the foreign markets were ſo overſtocked, that a variety of failures had taken place at Hamburgh, which had produced nearly ſimilar

ſimilar failures in the city of London; that the purchaſers for exportation had deſerted the market altogether, and that the purchaſers even for home conſumption had refuſed to come forward in a manner altogether unprecedented. In a word, thoſe who were beſt inclined to ſell at any price could find no market, and the Liverpool merchants had already conſented, and really ſold at a reduced price of 50l. per cent. The whole of this evidence was corroborated in the moſt ſatisfactory manner.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* then moved, that the Report of the Select Committee be referred to a Committee of the whole Houſe. Ordered.

Mr. Alderman *Luſhington* moved, that the Act of the 35th and 38th of his Majeſty be read, which being read accordingly, he moved for leave to bring in a bill to allow a further time for the payment of inſtalments now due on a loan by the Merchants of St. Vincents and of Grenada. Leave given.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that the 38th, &c. of the King be read, which being read accordingly, he moved, that the Houſe do, the next day, reſolve itſelf into a Committee, to conſider the ſaid Acts, as far as they regard certain appropriation duties. Ordered.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the Report of the Committee of Supply, and a Committee of Ways and Means was ordered to ſit the next day, to make good the ſame.

The Report of the new Militia Reduction Bill was brought up, and the Amendments agreed to.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* brought forward ſome clauſes to prevent Armourers and Muſicians from taking out a diſcharge without the permiſſion of their Colonels.

After a few obſervations from Colonel Strutt and Mr. Howard, the clauſes were agreed to, and the bill ordered to be read a third time the next day.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER, 2.

As ſoon as prayers were over,

Mr. Owen, from the India Houſe, preſented a copy of a letter from the right hon. the Governor in Council to the Secret Committee, dated Fort St. George, April 18, 1799, agreeable to an order of the Houſe.

LORD

LORD MORNINGTON, AND OFFICERS, &c. OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

Lord *Grenville* roſe, in conſequence of the notice which he had given on a former day, of his intention to move the thanks of the Houſe to a noble Lord at the head of the Government in India, and to the gallant Officers who had, by their unexampled bravery and ſkill, effectually achieved one of the moſt brilliant and important ſervices that had been rendered to their country during the progreſs of the preſent very arduous, critical, and extraordinary war, by the capture of the capital of the moſt powerful and reſtleſs foe to the Britiſh intereſts in India, and by the annihilation of the tyrant himſelf, who had reſorted to the baſeſt perfidy to undermine our exiſtence in the Eaſt, and had manifeſted the moſt unparalleled cruelty whenever the chance of war placed any of his Majeſty's ſubjects, whether officers or privates, within his power. A ſervice of ſuch magnitude, all its circumſtances conſidered, was ineſtimable, and well entitled thoſe to whoſe valour and ſkill it was to be aſcribed to the grateful thanks of their country, and of that Houſe: but in proportion to its importance, it was due to the honour and character of the wiſe and brave men, who had ſo well merited the praiſe and gratitude of every Engliſhman, that every part of the tranſaction ſhould be fully known and underſtood, and as the prints of the papers formerly moved for, had been only that day laid on the table, and he had ſince found it neceſſary to move for an additional paper, which, though it had been preſented, was not yet printed, he hoped their Lordſhips would agree with him, that it would be right to poſtpone the motion of thanks for the preſent, and make it on a future day, when every noble Lord ſhould have had full opportunity of making himſelf completely maſter of the ſubject. He would therefore give notice that he meant on Friday next to move the vote of thanks, and he accordingly moved that the Lords be ſummoned for that day. Ordered.

THANKS TO GENERAL ABERCROMBY.

Lord *Grenville* roſe again and ſaid, that with regard to the other matters, with reſpect to which he had given notice of his intention of moving the thanks of the Houſe, the ſame grounds of poſtponement did not apply, and therefore he, would ſubmit to the Houſe his reaſons for thinking Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Abercromby, well entitled to the

moſt honourable teſtimony of applauſe which that Houſe could beſtow on a Britiſh ſubject. That gallant officer had been entruſted with the command of a moſt important expedition, the deſtination of which had been ſo well covered by ſecrecy, that the enemy were diſtracted as to its object, and knew not which part of the coaſts in their poſſeſſion to prepare for defence, till tempeſtuous weather accidentally made known to them the point where a landing would be attempted, and thus enabled them to collect a force ſufficiently large to repel our invaſion. Notwithſtanding this adverſe circumſtance, by the bravery, ſkill, and judgment of Sir Ralph Abercromby, and the matchleſs ſpirit of the ſmall body of troops under his command, every difficulty was ſurmounted, a landing effected in the face of the enemy; that enemy more powerful in force, numbers, and artillery, ſucceſsfully repelled, and the principal fort and arſenal of the Dutch Republic ſecured and taken poſſeſſion of; by which event his Majeſty's fleet was afforded the means of reſcuing from the power of the French the naval force in the Texel, and the inhabitants of that part of Holland were enabled to evince their attachment to the original and ancient government of their country, and ſhake off the odious and galling yoke of French tyranny. Among all the various victories and glorious incidents that had attended the Britiſh arms during the progreſs of the preſent war, his Lordſhip ſaid, he knew not one more honourable to the commanders, officers, and men, than this great and important adventure, and the ſucceſs that had attended it in every point of view: it was eminently ſerviceable to Great Britain; eminently ſerviceable to the common cauſe of our allies: to the latter every means of diminiſhing the inordinate power of the French Republic was eſſential; but to this country it was ſtill more eſſential, to reſcue from her gripe the uſurped territories of our ancient friend and ally, and to render the coaſts directly oppoſite to our ſhores no longer ſubject to the dangerous uſe that an inveterate foe might make of them againſt the Britiſh intereſts. His Lordſhip concluded with moving the thanks of the Houſe "to Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, Knight of the moſt Honourable Order of the Bath, for the diſtinguiſhed gallantry and ability with which he effected his landing on the Dutch coaſt, and eſtabliſhed his poſition in the face of a powerful enemy, and by ſecuring the command of the principle fort and naval arſenal of the Dutch Republic, afforded

to

to his Majeſty's fleet the means of reſcuing from the power of the French the naval force in the Texel."—Reſolved *nemine diſſentiente.*

His Lordſhip next moved the thanks of the Houſe to Lieutenant-General Sir James Pulteney, Bart. Major Generals Francis D'Oyley, Eyre Coote, Harry Burrard, and John Moore, and the ſeveral Officers of the army under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, for their late gallant conduct, &c. &c. Reſolved *nemine diſſentiente.*

His Lordſhip afterwards moved a reſolution, that the Houſe did highly approve of, and acknowledge the ſervices of the non-commiſſioned officers and private ſoldiers of the army ſerving under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, at the attack of the Helder, on the coaſt of Holland, &c. &c. Reſolved *nemine diſſentiente.*

Reſolved, that the Lord Chancellor communicate the ſaid reſolutions to his Royal Highneſs Field Marſhal the Duke of York, Captain General of his Majeſty's forces, and Commander in Chief of the allied army in Holland; and that his Royal Highneſs be requeſted by the Lord Chancellor to ſignify the ſame to the General and other Officers referred to therein.

THANKS TO ADMIRAL MITCHELL.

Earl *Spencer* ſaid, that what had fallen from his noble Friend made it leſs neceſſary for him to occupy much of the time of their Lordſhips. He roſe for the purpoſe of moving the thanks of the Houſe to Vice-Admiral Mitchell, for his diſtinguiſhed ſervices in the expedition to Holland. His Lordſhip ſpoke of thoſe ſervices in terms of the warmeſt praiſe. He ſaid a tempeſtuous ſeaſon had ariſen at an unuſual part of the year, which rendered the keeping together ſo numerous a fleet of tranſports, and conducting them in ſafety to the object of their deſtination, a very arduous taſk, and ſuch as required the utmoſt exertion of ſkill and judgment, but that Vice-Admiral Mitchell, by his unwearied vigilance, attention, and good management, had contrived to ſurmount every danger, to land the troops deſtined for the ſervice, to afford them great aid and aſſiſtance, and effectually to co-operate with the land-forces, ſo as to contribute eſſentially to the ſucceſſes that had attended his Majeſty's arms, in the capture of the Helder, and in the courſe of the expedition to Holland. Excluſive of this diſtinguiſhed proof of uncommon zeal and equal judgment, Vice-Admiral Mitchell, his

Lordſhip ſaid; had performed a ſtill more valuable ſervice to his country; a ſervice of the firſt importance and magnitude. Unawed by the known difficulty and danger of the navigation of the Texel and the Zuyder Zee, the Vice-Admiral had ſkilfully conducted his fleet through thoſe ſeas, and to the aſtoniſhment of the Dutch Admirals, had placed them in ſuch a poſition near to the Dutch ſquadron, that it emboldened the Dutch ſeamen to declare for the ancient eſtabliſhment, and in conſequence obliged the Commanders to deliver up the whole ſquadron to the Britiſh force, and ſurrender priſoners of war. Whereas if an action had taken place, or been neceſſary, much blood muſt have been ſpilt, but by the good conduct of Vice-Admiral Mitchell ſuch a calamity had been avoided. His Lordſhip dilated on this ineſtimable piece of ſervice, and concluded with moving the thanks of the Houſe to Vice-Admiral Mitchell, for the diſtinguiſhed ſkill and perſeverance with which, in ſpite of great and unforeſeen difficulties, he kept collected, and conducted to the coaſt of Holland the numerous fleet under his command; for the zeal and readineſs with which he co-operated with the land forces in their deſcent on the coaſt of Holland, and for the promptitude and ability by which he reſcued the naval force of the Dutch Republic from the power of the French. Reſolved *nemine diſſentiente.*

The Earl next moved the thanks of the Houſe to the ſeveral Captains and Officers of the fleet under Vice-Admiral Mitchell, for their able ſupport and co-operation with the land forces, &c. &c. Reſolved *nemine diſſentiente.*

And afterwards moved, that the Houſe highly approved and acknowledged the ſervice of the ſeamen and marines on board the ſhips under the command of Vice-Admiral Mitchell, &c. &c. Reſolved *nemine diſſentiente.*

SIR SIDNEY SMITH.

Earl *Spencer* roſe again to call their Lordſhips' thanks to an officer of the navy for moſt diſtinguiſhed, and no leſs uſeful ſervices in a diſtant quarter of the globe. He had no doubt but that their Lordſhips already anticipated the purpoſe to which he alluded, and felt that it muſt be Captain Sir William Sidney Smith, to whoſe brilliant exploits in Syria he meant to do juſtice. Such certainly was his intention, and he ſcarcely was maſter of words ſufficiently ſtrong to convey the full force of his feelings on the very intereſting ſubject to which he wiſhed to call their Lordſhips' attention. The value and importance of every inſtance of ſucceſs ought to

to be judged by the proportion of the means with which the victor is furniſhed to enable him to atchieve it, and ſurely when the ſmall ſquadron that Sir Sidney Smith had under his command, and the limited force he was enabled to bring into the field, were compared with the numerous and powerful army of the enemy, headed by a leader who had long accuſtomed them to unvarying triumph and inceſſant victory, and the event of a ſiege of two months of a town ill fortified, and occupied by a garriſon little uſed to the moſt ordinary means of reſiſtance and defence, was conſidered, nothing could more forcibly excite general admiration and aſtoniſhment. After an almoſt inceſſant ſiege of ſixty days, their Lordſhips had learnt from Sir Sidney Smith's comprehenſive and ſatisfactory account of that important event, that in ſpite of the feebleneſs of the fortifications, and the weakneſs and want of ſkill of the garriſon, that gallant Captain, by the bravery, aſſiſtance, and ſkill of his handful of officers and companions, from on board his ſquadron, was enabled not merely to repel the attacks of a powerful and confident aſſailant, but to oblige them to quit the field, not only under circumſtances of diſgrace, but under circumſtances the moſt degrading and calamitous. So uncommon a proof of proweſs, valour, and judgment entitled the officers who had manifeſted it to every poſſible praiſe, and though, his Lordſhip ſaid, he was well aware that it was not uſual for the thanks of the Houſe to be voted to a ſingle captain, for his ſervices, yet on this occaſion that very circumſtance entitled Sir William Sidney Smith the more to ſo ſignal a mark of the approbation of his country, as the ſervices he had rendered in delivering Africa and part of Aſia from the yoke of French Republican tyranny were perhaps equalled by few, poſſibly ſurpaſſed by none of the many brilliant achievements that had diſtinguiſhed the Britiſh arms in the courſe of the preſent war. The Earl concluded by moving, "that the thanks of the Houſe be given to Captain Sir William Sidney Smith, for the conſpicuous ſkill and heroiſm by which he animated and directed the efforts of the Turkiſh forces, and of the ſmall number of Britiſh officers and ſeamen under his command in their long and ſucceſsful defence of St. John d'Acre, on the coaſt of Syria, againſt the formidable and deſperate attack of the French army under the command of Buonaparte."

Lord *Hood* ſaid, he could not, on the preſent occaſion, give a ſilent vote, highly as he approved of the motion of the noble

noble Earl at the head of the admiralty. He muſt take that opportunity of doing juſtice to the extraordinary merit of that brave and gallant officer, Sir W. Sidney Smith, to whoſe exertions, he was proud to confeſs, he had frequently been a witneſs, and been highly indebted on various occaſions, when he had the honour to have that very deſerving and meritorious officer under his command. His Lordſhip particulariſed the affair of burning the French ſhips at Toulon, in which important ſervice he declared no officer had manifeſted a more active zeal or a more judicious application of undaunted ſpirit than Captain Sir William Sidney Smith. Had the conduct of that gallant officer on that occaſion been imitated by the Spaniards, as well as it was lately by the Turks, not a ſingle ſhip belonging to the French at Toulon would have eſcaped deſtruction. Nor was that the only opportunity, his Lordſhip ſaid, that he had been afforded of aſcertaining the merits of the object of the preſent motion, and great and aſtoniſhing as his conduct had been at the ſiege of Acre, he was perſuaded that his country might expect ſtill more important ſervices at his hands; he joined, therefore, moſt cordially in ſupporting the motion of the noble Earl.

Lord *Grenville* ſaid, he was perfectly ſenſible that it was unneceſſary and fruitleſs for him to endeavour to add to the force of what had fallen on the ſubject of the motion then before the Houſe from his noble Friend near him, or the noble Admiral who had juſt ſat down; but he could not avoid ſtating, that it was on account of the ſmallneſs of the force with which Sir Sidney Smith achieved his glories at St. John D'Acre, that he was particularly entitled to their thanks, nor could he help remarking, in a very few words, on the double contraſt that the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith and his adverſary General Buonaparte afforded. Let their Lordſhips compare the modeſt letter of Sir Sidney Smith on his ſucceſs at the ſiege of Acre with the arrogant and preſumptuous proclamations of the French Commander, the boaſted conqueror of Italy, the future Alexander! after every one of his ſucceſſes through a defenceleſs country, to which he had carried impiety, hoſtility, and devaſtation, contrary to every principle of juſtice and humanity. 'Let them alſo look at the other contraſt; Sir William Sidney Smith, made a captive by the chance of war, was refuſed to be conſidered as every other priſoner of war was, but ſhut up in cloſe confinement in the Temple at Paris, and debarred of every means of comfort and relief, in direct defiance of the law

law of nations, and all the eſtabliſhed rules of warfare between civiliſed countries. Cruel as the treatment of Sir William Sidney Smith was, it was highly honourable to him, inaſmuch as it proved, that conſcious of his high and enterprizing ſpirit, his courage and his ſkill, the French Republic regarded him as a foe ſo greatly to be dreaded, that they were determined, at the riſk of their own character, and at every hazard, to deprive his country of his valuable ſervices. When Sir Sidney, by his ability and ſucceſsful exertion, effected his eſcape from the Temple, what was his conduct on again being entruſted with a command? His very firſt act on his arrival in the Eaſt was to uſe his efforts to procure the liberation of ſome French priſoners who had been taken at the battle of the Nile, and were detained in priſon at Conſtantinople. His whole conduct in Syria was not more diſtinguiſhed for bravery and ſkill than for humanity and tenderneſs to all at his mercy. It was, his Lordſhip ſaid, he was perſuaded, enough barely to mention theſe facts to impreſs their Lordſhips and the country with a deep ſenſe of the exultation and pride which they muſt feel in viewing the ſtrong contraſt between the republican General Buonaparte, the boaſted conqueror of Italy, and the unaſſuming Britiſh Captain Sir William Sidney Smith! His Lordſhip heartily aſſented to the motion, which was agreed to *nemine diſſentiente*.

The thanks to the officers on board the ſhips under the command of Sir William Sidney Smith, for the great bravery and unremitted exertions which they manifeſted, both on ſhore and on board, in the ſucceſsful defence of St. John D'Acre, on the coaſt of Syria, was moved and voted *nem. diſ.* as was alſo a vote of approbation and acknowledgment of the ſervices of the ſeamen and marines belonging to the ſhips under the command of Captain Sir William Sidney Smith.

MILITIA.

The Bill relative to the further application of the Militia corps was (after waiting till paſt ſix o'clock) brought up by Mr. Secretary Dundas and others; and on the motion of the Earl of *Weſtmoreland*, read a firſt time, and notice given, that if the prints ſhould be upon the table the next day, it was intended to move that the Bill be read a ſecond time on Friday. Adjourned.

HOUSE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, OCT. 2.

The *Speaker* informed the Houſe that he had received from Admiral Duncan a letter in anſwer to, and acknowledging the receipt of that which was ſent to him, tranſmitting the thanks of the Houſe to the Officers of the Navy concerned in the expedition to Holland, and the taking of the Dutch fleet in the Texel. The Speaker then read the letter of the noble and gallant Admiral.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved the order of the day for the Houſe to reſolve itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe to conſider of a ſupply to be granted to his Majeſty, which being agreed to, and the ſeveral eſtimates preſented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary at War, and Mr. Wallace, &c. being referred to the ſaid Committee, the Houſe reſolved itſelf into a Committee accordingly.

The *Secretary at War* ſaid, it was not neceſſary for him at preſent to do more than ſtate to the Committee that the eſtimates now before it, was partly the army eſtimates; and that it was propoſed to vote them only for two months, which was all that was thought neceſſary to be provided for in the preſent inſtance.

The eſtimates were made out as accurately as it was practicable to make them under the preſent circumſtances; poſſibly when they ſhould be brought forward hereafter, they might be made out better than they were at preſent; for when the regular period at which they ſhould be made up ſhould arrive, then they might be made up in their uſual form, and would of courſe be more likely to be accurate than it was poſſible to make them at preſent. They conſiſted of the expences of the army for two months under the heads of guards and garriſons; expences of the army on the continent and in Great Britain; and eſtimates of the militia, and of the fencible cavalry. They muſt all of them be imperfect from the reaſon he had aſſigned already; one of them muſt be particularly ſo from the nature of the ſubject, he meant the militia; that muſt be imperfect at this moment, particularly on account of the ſtate of things which produced a meaſure now under conſideration, he meant the Bill for the converting of certain parts of the Militia into a regular force. In conſidering the head of guards and garriſons it would occur to the Committee that much of the expence for

for barracks included the ſubſiſtence of the men, and muſt have been to be provided for, if they had not been kept there.

The Committee might look for greater accuracy in the eſtimates hereafter, than was to be met in them at preſent, for the reaſons he had already aſſigned.

He then moved, that a number of land forces, amounting to 90,000 effective men, including commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned officers, be employed for two months, &c. for the year 1800.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, he did not riſe to oppoſe this motion on its own grounds; ſince, from the nature of the ſubject it embraced, it was, as the Secretary at War had confeſſed, impoſſible to be prepared for the diſcuſſion now. What he objected to was, the idea of voting any ſupply at all at this moment, under the circumſtances which brought the Members of the Houſe together. The vote itſelf he did not know to be ſuch as might be proper to be agreed to, but he felt a duty caſt upon him, at a Member of Parliament, to proteſt againſt voting any ſupply at this time; and he would briefly ſtate why he was of that opinion.

By a late Act of Parliament his Majeſty could call them together in fourteen days. To their being ſo aſſembled he had no objection; on the contrary, he thought that every thinking man muſt ſee the neceſſity of their being ſo called together, and that much public inconvenience might be felt, if his Majeſty had not the power of aſſembling Parliament in leſs than forty days. The reaſon, however, for aſſembling them in fourteen days appeared in his Majeſty's gracious ſpeech delivered from the throne; it was to enable his Majeſty without delay to avail himſelf of the voluntary ſervices of the militia; upon that meaſure Parliament had a bill before it, and it was a meaſure which he ſaw no diſpoſition to oppoſe; he felt none ſuch himſelf; but what he objected to was this, that now they were called together upon a public emergency, they ſhould not only provide for that emergency, but ſhould alſo be called upon to enter upon buſineſs of another nature, and ſuch as had never before been ſubmitted to any Parliament without giving them the ſolemn notice of forty days to aſſemble; he meant that of voting a ſupply to his Majeſty. Gentlemen might ſay, that it would be uſeleſs to vote for a bill to increaſe the force of the army, without voting for a ſupply, for that an army is of no uſe unleſs there be money to ſupport it; that he knew, but he objected to the manner in which this was done, and the more

eſpecially ſince his Majeſty declared alſo from the Throne, "that the ample ſupplies which had been granted to him in the courſe of the laſt ſeſſion, would enable him, without further aid, to continue his exertions to the cloſe of the preſent year;" but then it was ſtated as a matter of convenience to the Members, for the Members themſelves to provide for an early part of the enſuing year, by which they were promiſed, if they voted a certain portion of ſupply now, they will not be called upon again until they have had a comfortable receſs. This was a mode of tranſacting the buſineſs of the nation, againſt which, notwithſtanding its perſonal advantages, he, as a Member of Parliament, was bound to proteſt, becauſe he could not allow of any practice that favoured the convenience of Members themſelves upon condition of voting away the public money of the nation; not that he meant here to inſinuate that any part of the money now propoſed to be voted would be miſapplied, or to ſay that in due ſeaſon it might not be proper to vote it, nor even to provoke any diſcuſſion, for that was what he did not wiſh, but he did not perceive how he could perform his duty without entering his proteſt againſt this mode of proceeding to vote ſupply without either the old and ſolemn notice of forty days to aſſemble, or ſome ſpecial application from the Throne for that purpoſe. Now having adverted to his Majeſty's ſpeech, he was naturally led to take notice of ſome deficiencies which were likely to ariſe in the ſupplies of the laſt year. He believed there would be 400,000l. in the navy; that the Miniſter might think a trifle, although in former days it might be thought a conſiderable ſum; the diſtilleries in Scotland were ſtopped; that would occaſion another deficiency. The Income Tax had been taken at the loweſt rate to produce ſeven millions and an half, whereas he believed it would not actually produce above ſix millions. This was a point which the Miniſter muſt know at leaſt within 100,000l. Poſſibly the Land and Malt now to be voted might be made to cover this deficiency; however, it was worth attending to; although, to ſay truth, the manner in which accounts were now made up, was ſuch, that country gentlemen, and he ſpoke it not by way of ſlighting their capacity, had very little diſpoſition to examine them. The accounts were become ſo complicated, that few gentlemen entertained any hope of being able to comprehend them clearly. Having ſaid theſe few words, he would add, that he had no objection to the vote now before the Committee,

but

but he objected to the manner in which public buſineſs was carried on, and if he had not done ſo, he ſhould have fallen ſhort of diſcharging that which appeared to him to be his duty

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, he ſhould fall ſhort of his duty if he did not expreſs ſome ſurpriſe at ſome of the obſervations he had juſt heard. The hon. Gentleman had complained of the multiplicity of accounts, and of the complicated manner in which they were made up to be ſubmitted to the view of Members of Parliament. Now he believed that any unprejudiced man who would take the trouble of looking into that ſubject, would ſee in the mode of making up theſe accounts no alteration from the old mode of making them up, except that of ſimplifying them and rendering them more clear, and in that reſpect the alteration was very conſiderable. It was ſo conſiderable that he would venture to aſſert that at no period in the hiſtory of finance were the public accounts nearly ſo clear and intelligible as at this period: and he thought the hon. Gentleman could not have pointed out a branch of public finance to which due attention had not been paid to render it perfectly clear and intelligible; and if that had not been done ſo clearly the hon. Gentleman would not have had the means of making his objections as he had done, nor would the Committee have had the ſatisfaction of knowing he had formed erroneous concluſions.

Now as to the proteſt of the hon. Gentleman, he could only ſay that he knew nothing in the mode in which Parliament met that did away the inherent functions of Parliament. The hon. Gentleman would not find one word in his Majeſty's ſpeech from the throne which went to reſtrain Parliament from entering upon the very buſineſs againſt which the hon. Gentleman entered his proteſt He ſhould be ſorry to uſe any improper word, but really after what he had heard he could not help ſaying, that the only preſumptuous conduct that he obſerved upon this ſubject was that of the hon. Gentleman himſelf, who oppoſed his individual opinion to the conduct of the Houſe of Commons, and that opinion having a tendency to fettering the inherent power of Parliament; and really this was the whole of the hon. Gentleman's conſtitutional defence of the uſage of the Houſe of Commons. If ever there was an occaſion on which the hon. Gentleman's objection could not apply to the proceedings of the Houſe, this was of that character. The proceeding before

the Houſe was a meaſure growing out of the preſent war, and out of the very point on which Parliament was aſſembled; the object was to transfer a conſiderable number of men out of the militia into the army, and which could not be done without an augmentation of the army eſtimates; whether that was a right or a wrong meaſure in itſelf he was not now arguing, nor was the hon. Gentleman diſputing; but this was nothing more than a neceſſary meaſure ariſing out of that plan, a plan which his Majeſty had recommended from the throne, which Parliament had adopted, and to which even the honourable Gentleman himſelf did not object. But the honourable Gentleman aſked, why vote this ſupply now? He would aſk, whether it was improper for the Houſe, when there was a full attendance, to proceed to voting that which hereafter muſt come before them, and that at a time perhaps when a full attendance could not be had with the ſame convenience as at preſent? This being the ſtate of the caſe, the Houſe would conſider what grounds there were for the obſervations of the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer had heard and attended to his right hon. Friend the Secretary at War, he would have found that upon his own doctrine, there was reaſon to wiſh that the buſineſs now before the Houſe had not been brought forward at this moment; for that Miniſter had ſtated that the eſtimates wanted that accuracy he wiſhed, and hoped hereafter to be able to give to them. But ſuppoſing the right hon. Gentleman to be right in aſſerting that the meaſure now before the Committee aroſe from the circumſtance of the army now to be augmented, what had that to do with voting the navy for two months, and out of the uſual way?

The right hon. Gentleman ſays, he accuſes me of preſumption in my conduct. He will have the goodneſs to conſider whether there is or is not any preſumption in a Miniſter who accuſes others of preſumption, when they ſay his proceedings are not agreeable to the old cuſtoms of this Houſe and the ſpirit of our Conſtitution. He will conſider who is moſt likely to have a preſumptuous ſpirit, he who does his duty with no reward but the hope of the approbation of his conſtituents, and the conſciouſneſs of performing his duty, and ſtanding almoſt alone in this Houſe, or he who by his conduct has diſguſted almoſt the whole of one ſide of the Houſe, and who can hardly muſter up a ſufficient attendance on the other to go through the public buſineſs of

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the nation. I aſk, whether this be or be not contrary to the ſpirit of regular parliamentary proceedings? He aſks me, whether I can find one word in his Majeſty's ſpeech from the throne diſqualifiying us from voting any ſupplies at this time? I certainly cannot: if I could I ſhould be glad to ſtate it. But I can remind him of the uſage of Parliament, and alſo tell him that it becomes Parliament to ſee that the notice given to it is ſufficient, before it votes the ſupplies of the year, or any part of them; for that is a part of the conduct of this Houſe, which it is not expected it ſhould go through until ſolemn notice and due conſideration. I can remind him too that no ground has been ſtated to the Houſe at large for thus proceeding upon ſupply. He has indeed ſtated ſomething to his friends before the meeting of Parliament. I would aſk him, whether he means to ſay that he did not ſtate this to his friends before the meeting, that they were to meet for the purpoſe of conſidering of a meaſure relative to the changing part of the militia into a regular force? Will he ſay that when a call of the Houſe was moved for, he did not oppoſe it on the ground that we all knew the purpoſe for which we were called together was that of conſidering of a propoſition relative to the militia? This, however, after all, turns out not to be the fact; but gentlemen thus coming up for the purpoſe of conſidering of a meaſure relative to the militia, are called on to vote for ſupplies, and to come to meaſures which have never before been propoſed but upon forty days notice of the meeting of Parliament. But here Members are expreſsly told they ſhall go back to their country houſes provided they vote a ſum of money for the two firſt months of the enſuing year. They are to take the diſgrace upon themſelves, that by voting ſupplies they earn their holidays. Now all this is for the Houſe and the country to determine upon.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer*. I am perfectly ſatisfied: it is certainly for the Houſe and Country to determine; and I do not think I am called upon to add one further obſervation.

The queſtion was then put and carried.

The other Reſolutions were all put and carried.

£10,596l. for defraying the charges of the above number of men for two months.

16,648l. for maintaining Forces in the Plantations, &c.

92,635l. for defraying charges of corps of Cavalry in Great Britain, &c.

232,998l. for defraying the charges of embodied Militia, and a Royal corps of Miners in Cornwall, &c.

40,000l.

40,000l. for defraying the charges of the increaſe of the rate of Subſiſtence to Inn-keepers and Victuallers, &c.
120,000l. for defraying charges for Barracks, &c.
230,000l. for the charge of Ordnance of Land Service.
121,510l. for the Ordinaries of the Navy.
115,625l. for Extraordinaries of ditto.

The Chairman then left the chair, reported progreſs, and the Report was ordered to be received the next day.

Agreed to go into a Committee of Supply on Friday.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved the Order of the Day for the Houſe to reſolve itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe, to conſider of Ways and Means for raiſing a Supply.

The Houſe in a Committee voted the Duty upon Malt, and alſo the Land Tax, on Places, Penſions, &c.

Report ordered to be received the next day.

Ageeed to go into a Committee of Ways and Means on Friday.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* moved the Order of the Day for the third reading of the bill for enabling his Majeſty to accept the ſervices of ſuch of the Militia as may voluntarily offer to ſerve, &c. under certain reſtrictions. Ordered.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, he gave no opinion upon the expedition to Holland, and he wiſhed Miniſters to take upon themſelves the whole reſponſibility of that act, for which he had an amendment to propoſe, which was, to leave out of the preamble of the bill every thing that related to Holland. He objected to taking any notice in any act of Parliament of any meaſure which his Majeſty, under the advice of his Miniſters, was carrying on. It was a meaſure which the Houſe, in agreeing to a bill, could take no notice of, becauſe it belonged excluſively to his Majeſty's prerogative. He would not ſuſpect the Miniſters of wiſhing by this bill to get the ſanction of Parliament to the Expedition to Holland in caſe it ſhould fail of ſucceſs. He did not believe them capable of ſuch an attempt; but whether they did or not the Houſe ſhould not agree to it. The preamble ſtated, that his Majeſty was endeavouring to reſtore the lawful government of Holland. He hoped his Majeſty would take upon himſelf to judge what that lawful government was, and that the Houſe of Commons ſhould not judge of theſe matters which belong to the Royal prerogative; and this beſides would take away the reſponſibility of Miniſters for the advice they might give give to the Crown. For theſe reaſons he moved, that all that related to Holland be left out of the preamble.

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The amendment being put,

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* ſaid, that his anſwer to the obſervations of the hon. Gentleman were twofold. The firſt was, that the ſucceſs of the Expedition had laid the foundation of enabling his Majeſty to make this propoſition to Parliament.

With regard to the queſtion of lawful government of the Stadtholder, the language of the bill did nothing more than follow what the law had ſaid, and what we were bound by the faith of ſolemn treaty to ſupport. We had by treaty guaranteed to Holland that government. While treaties ſubſiſted, acknowledging a government, he would not, becauſe he ought not, becauſe he could not by law make any queſtion whether any other government ought to be ſubſtituted, or whether that government was lawful or not. He knew of no doubts that could be entertained in Parliament, whether a government, which we were by treaty bound to ſupport, was or was not lawful.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, that the reaſon he had for the doubt was, that the right hon. Secretary had recognized another government in Holland by an endeavour to negociate.

The amendment was then negatived.

Mr. *Weſtern* ſaid, he could not permit this bill to paſs without delivering his ſentiments upon it. He felt it his duty to declare his ſentiments thus publicly; he was an enemy to ſo conſiderable a reduction to the Militia as this bill is about to occaſion. He objected to giving up into the hands of the Executive of this country, ſuch a part of the force of it, deſigned as it was for the protection of our internal defence and conſtitutional protection; and he objected ſtill further, becauſe he did not approve of the uſe that was made of a ſimilar force already. If we have any neceſſity for internal defence or conſtitutional protection, the Militia was the force deſigned by our anceſtors for that purpoſe. Theſe were principles which he had been accuſtomed to revere.

He did not think that this country could derive any material advantage from continental projects, and he thought a review of what had followed the conduct of our Miniſters on that head, ſupported him in that opinion. He did not like to ſay much with regard to Holland; but he believed our proſpect of ſucceſs there was not very flattering: for theſe reaſons, he could not ſupport this bill. He knew he entertained opinions that had not the ſupport of the majority of the Houſe, but that he could not help, and he was anxious to deliver

deliver his opinion, although he felt much embarraſſment in the endeavour, for he was not accuſtomed to public ſpeaking.

The *Speaker* ſaid, he was unwilling to interrupt the hon. Member, but theſe obſervations would have applied more regularly to the queſtion, that the bill do paſs?

The queſtion, that the bill do paſs? was then put.

Mr. *Martin* roſe, but ſpoke in ſo low a voice, that we could with difficulty collect what he ſaid. He ſeemed to doubt very much the policy of the meaſures which it was the object of this bill to enable Miniſters to proſecute; and he thought that the enormous expence both of men and money with which the war in Holland would be attended was not likely to be compenſated by any advantages which, on the moſt ſanguine calculation, it could produce; ſtill leſs, did he think that the proſpect of theſe advantages were ſufficient for the riſk. Theſe ſentiments, he was happy to reflect, were conſonant to thoſe he had ever held reſpecting continental wars. He quoted an author of great diſtinction to prove that we ought not to give up the advantages of our inſular ſituation to go and fight on foreign ground. He likewiſe quoted a poetic author in ſupport of the ſame opinions. He concluded with this obſervation, that he had remarked that the Repreſentatives of the People were artfully drawn in by Miniſters into great and expenſive undertakings, and afterwards were told that they had advanced in them too far to be able to recede with prudence or ſafety.

The bill was then paſſed with ſeveral amendments, and ordered to be ſent to the Lords.

LIVERPOOL MERCHANTS' PETITION.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* then moved the Order of the Day for taking into conſideration the report of the Committee on the Petition of the Merchants of Liverpool and Lancaſter.

The Houſe reſolved itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe for that purpoſe, Mr. Pierrepont in the chair.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* ſaid that, as he had opened the nature of the buſineſs on a former day, he ſhould ſay but little on the preſent occaſion, both becauſe he conſidered the grounds upon which the application was made to be ſo clear, and becauſe he did not anticipate any oppoſition to the meaſure. He admitted that, when the intended application was firſt communicated to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that gentleman had expreſſed himſelf decidedly againſt it; and nothing but the irreſiſtible ſtrength of the arguments in favour of the

application of the merchants could have altered his ſentiments. He underſtood, however, that ſome gentlemen thought that the evidence in ſupport of the prayer of the petion was not ſufficiently ſtrong. For his part, he thought the evidence in favour of it ſo conc'uſive, that in the Committee he had thought it ſuperfluous to adduce any more than that on the table. Beſides, the right hon. Gentleman had already ſent for a ſpecies of information on the ſubject which would leave nothing wanting, and fully confirm the allegations of the petition. This information was, the teſtimony of the cuſtom-houſe books of Liverpool, to ſhew that the merchants actually had then the property mentioned by them in their application. Upon this head he ſhould give the Houſe a few facts which would leave no doubt on their minds: by the returns from the cuſtom-houſe, it would appear that ſince January laſt, no leſs than 51,000 hogſheads of ſugar had been imported into Liverpool, and there remained in warehouſes, the whole duty on which, excepting a ſum of about 7000l. had been paid. The freight and inſurance of this quantity, amounted in all, with the duty, to 900,000l. already paid down. All that that the merchants of Liverpool then aſked in their petition, was an accommodation in Exchequer Bills amounting to 500,000l. between Liverpool and Lancaſter, at the rate of 400,000l. for the former, and 100,000l. for the latter. At the ſame time, it was to be obſerved, that there was not the leaſt danger of a loſs accruing to government, as property would be pledged to three times the amount of the advance. He concluded with moving as a reſolution, in ſubſtance, That his Majeſty ſhould be enabled to iſſue Exchequer Bills to an an amount not exceeding 500,000l. under the direction of Commiſſioners, for the relief of ſuch merchants of Liverpool and Lancaſter, as ſhould apply for it, giving due ſecurity for the ſums advanced.

Mr. *Tierney* obſerved, that he could ſee no reaſon why the grant now applied for ſhould be voted as a matter of courſe, an opinion, he thought, rather prevalent in the minds of ſome gentlemen. The only evidence laid before the Houſe, on which it could proceed, was that of two gentlemen intereſted in the queſtion. He believed they were very reſpectable men, yet it was to be kept in view, that they gave evidence in their own cauſe. As to the ſecurity too, he did not think it entirely ſatisfactory. The ſugar to be pledged, for the advances might be good ſecurity, but not ſo the bonds, as the ſame embarraſſment would probably be occaſioned by

government, by exacting payment of them, as that which it was the object of the preſent application to remedy. This, however, he did not reſt upon principally. He wiſhed to call the attention of the Committee to the general queſtion of giving aſſiſtance to private merchants on ſlight grounds. And ſurely the evidence of two gentlemen, however reſpectable in a matter in which they were ſo nearly concerned, was not evidence ſufficient for the Houſe to proceed upon. He wiſhed the report, therefore, to be recommitted that more proof might be obtained. If the application were properly ſupported, and its neceſſity clearly made out, he ſhould be very ſorry to throw any obſtacle in the way of the relief deſired. But, if on the one hand, he had a duty to perform to the merchants, if their claim was juſt, he had likewiſe a duty to the public, to ſee that their intereſt was conſulted. There was but one precedent for Parliament granting relief to merchants, that was in 1793, but the caſes were totally unlike. Then a univerſal embarraſſment prevailed which threatened public credit itſelf. Parliament likewiſe proceeded quite in a different manner: they entered into a full examination of the ſubject, and ſtated the cauſes of the preſſure. In the preſent inſtance, however, no enquiry had taken place to aſcertain the cauſes of the embarraſſment. Perhaps the evil had ariſen partly from unwarrantable ſpeculations. For ſome years paſt England had been very ill ſupplied with ſugar. The merchants had thought it better to ſend it to foreign markets. The conſumers at home now thought themſelves entitled to a reduction of price. The Houſe ſhould enquire to what cauſes the difficulties, which the merchants now experience, were to be attributed; not knowing but there might be ſome cauſes that ought to deter Parliament from interpoſing, ſhould the Houſe on ſuch ſhort notice, and ſuch ſlender information, reſolve to grant the relief deſired. In 1793 ſome gentlemen had conſidered it an objection to the aid granted by Parliament in that extraordinary criſis, that it might afford a precedent for applications of a ſimilar kind in circumſtances wholly different. He was afraid that this objection would be realized; and certainly it would, if Parliament acquieſced in the preſent requeſt without more deliberation and enquiry. Having the honour to repreſent a commercial place, he hoped commercial gentlemen would not conſider him as averſe to ſupport their intereſts. As a member of Parliament, however, he was bound to conſider the intereſts of the public. He did not think the precedent

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of 1793 in point, becauſe then public credit was endangered, but he ſaw no ſuch danger at preſent. It did not appear that even the gentlemen who made the application would be rendered bankrupts if it were refuſed. (Colonel Gaſcoyne, we believe, ſaid yes.) The hon. Gentleman from his particular means of information, muſt know better; but even were that the caſe, however the misfortune of reſpectable men was to be lamented, yet there was not a ground for Parliament to interpoſe. Parliament ſhould have other grounds to act upon, and their interpoſition ſhould be decided by better vouchers for the neceſſity than thoſe yet before them. With theſe conſiderations, the influence which Miniſters might derive among commercial men, ſo numerous a body in the Houſe, by countenancing applications of this ſort, was another reaſon for the Committee maturely weighing and examining the whole circumſtances of the caſe. Having made theſe obſervations, he begged leave to repeat that he was actuated by no perſonal motives towards the gentleman who made the application, but was guided ſolely by a ſenſe of duty to the public.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, he wiſhed to ſet the hon. Gentleman right as to the nature of the aid which Parliament was to afford, and to ſhew that there was nothing like voting away money on the preſent occaſion. There were to be two diſtinct ſecurities for the advances, the ſugar and the bonds, ſo that as to the danger of loſs accruing to the public, there was not the leaſt difficulty on that head.

He felt fully as ſtrongly as the hon. Gentleman, that the object of the petition was not to be granted as a matter of courſe. He was in general decidedly againſt the public being implicated in the affairs of individual merchants, or in the iſſue of commercial adventures; ſo much was this his opinion, that, as had already been ſtated, he was againſt the application when firſt communicated to him, a circumſtance which gentlemen would feel to be an argument in any way they were diſpoſed to take it. However ſtrongly he was impreſſed with the general principle, there might be occaſions where it ought to be modified, and when a caſe preſented itſelf, in which innocent men, free from the blame of any unwarrantable ſpeculation, were involved, though the mere compaſſion which muſt be felt for men in ſuch a ſituation might not be a ground for parliamentary interference, yet every perſon muſt be pleaſed to find that ſuch aid might be afforded as

was fully juſtified by public expediency: Certainly the caſe of the petitioners was not, as the hon. Gentleman had ſtated, unconnected with public credit and with public intereſt. The requeſt was ſupported by the general advantage of commerce throughout the country, and by the expediency of maintaining that capital and that enterpriſe, in which the cauſe of induſtry and manufacture in every part of the country was connected. The public intereſt therefore was unqueſtionably involved in this caſe. As this, then, was a true ſtate of the matter, no man would puſh a general principle ſo far as to oppoſe it to an application which might be granted with the greateſt ſafety and advantage to the public.

As to the evidence upon which the Houſe was to proceed, he conſidered the report of the Committee as neceſſary, chiefly in point of Parliamentary form; the neceſſity of the caſe was matter of notoriety; but, it was ſaid, that compliance with the prayer of the petition would keep up the price of ſugar. The hon. Gentleman, however, had only to aſk gentlemen acquainted with the Weſt India Trade, to be informed that the embarraſſment which the merchants had experienced, had ariſen from the immenſe importation of an uncommonly plentiful crop; from the ſudden ſtoppage of the foreign markets, and the failures which had taken place at Hamburgh; theſe were cauſes ſufficient to produce the difficulties which had been felt.

With reſpect to a diminution of the price of ſugar, no man ſurely could wiſh to ſee the commodity reduced to a price that would ſcarce pay the freight and duty, leaving not fair profit to the proprietor. The public could not be gainers by purchaſing at this ruinous rate, which muſt eventually be attended with a total failure of the ſupply. Sugars had already fallen very much in price; from 80s. they had fallen ſo low as 60s. and yet there was no market. There was no fear that the article would be kept up. The merchants had accepted bills largely drawn on the produce brought home, and they muſt be deſirous to ſell, and there was no doubt of the price being reduced to that below which no candid man could think it equitable both for the proprietor and the purchaſer that it ſhould be ſold.

There was one point of ſpecific proof which would be obtained to ſhew the value of the Weſt India produce at Liverpool, on which the advances were to be made. This would arrive before the bill could have proceeded far in its progreſs through

through the Houſe, and ſurely it would be unneceſſary to delay the meaſure for a piece of information that might be verified before the bill received the ſanction of the Houſe.

Mr. *Bryan Edwards* ſaid, that after the able ſpeech of the right hon. Gentleman, he ſhould detain the Houſe but a very ſhort time. He had collected a few facts illuſtrative of the ſubject, which his particular opportunities of knowledge upon this ſubject enabled him to obtain, and he ſhould take the liberty of ſtating them. He was ſurpriſed to find a perſon ſo well informed as the hon. Gentleman near him (Mr. Tierney) fall into the vulgar error reſpecting the prices of ſugar. The planters knew very well that having had ſuch good prices laſt year, they would, from ſeveral circumſtances, be obliged to ſubmit to a low price this year. But the merchants had nothing to do with this. They had only their profit on their commiſſion in proportion to the price. From the failure of demand for the commodity, the merchants, however, on whom the planters were in the habit of drawing bills for the produce ſent home, muſt be embarraſſed. He was convinced that the merchants of London would, in this emergency, be obliged likewiſe to apply for parliamentary aid. This was perfectly a new caſe which never had occured before, and never was likely to occur again. Since January there had been imported by the three laſt fleets, no leſs than 170,277 hogſheads of ſugar, and with the cargoes of ſome ſhips expected, the amount of the importation would be 180,000 hogſheads, double the importation of any former year. The duties upon this amounted to no leſs than 2,500,000l. The value of the commodity was not leſs than 5,000,000l. more. The merchants were in the habit of accepting bills drawn on this produce. Some of the planters drew for leſs than the value; ſome for more. So that upon the whole there was not leſs than 8,000,000l. which the merchants were called upon to pay, and all this when there was no vent for the commodity.

It had been ſaid that the commodity had been ſent to foreign markets. He conſidered it to be the natural right of the coloniſts to carry their produce to any market they thought proper. For a ſeries of years this right had been recogniſed by the laws of this country. But Parliament had at laſt thought that another courſe ought to be followed, and thought it fair to make foreigners pay a duty to this country for what they conſumed. Other nations were encouraged to take a ſhare in the trade; and in fact large ſupplies of ſugar had

had in the laſt year been imported into Hamburgh in American veſſels, from the Eaſt Indies, from the Brazils, and from other quarters: by this means the market was overſtocked. The aſſiſtance required by the merchants, then, was not to enable them to keep up the price of ſugar, but to enable them to bring it to market at all. It was a fact that there were not warehouſes to contain the ſugar in the port of London, and there were veſſels that could not be unladen for three months to come. Sugars could not be diſpoſed of at any price: he had even known a quantity from Martinique ſold ſo low as 54s.: a rate certainly far below what it was the intereſt of the public to buy it on a large view of the caſe, and on a fair conſideration of that encouragement which was neceſſary to enſure the ſupply of the market.

The evidence of theſe facts was within every gentleman's reach, it was to be derived from the cuſtom-houſe books. The caſe was totally novel in its nature. It was the Britiſh Merchants who muſt be the ſufferers, and to whom could they ſo properly apply as to a Britiſh Parliament? He conceived this relief as abſolutely neceſſary to the merchants of London, and if they did not obtain it, he was convinced that nineteen out of twenty of the Weſt India Merchants of the metropolis would be obliged to ſtop payment. He then proceeded to ſtate the loſſes that had been incurred by ſeveral of the Weſt India Iſlands; Grenada, by the ravages of the war, had ſuffered loſſes to the amount of 4,000,000l. St. Vincent's 800,000l. and the Maroon war, in Jamaica, had coſt that iſland a million ſterling. He concluded with warmly ſupporting the application, and the neceſſity of ſupporting the Weſt India Merchants, for the moſt cogent reaſons of public utility.

Mr. *Manning* roſe particularly to reply to the remarks of the hon. Gentleman who juſt ſat down, that nineteen out of twenty Weſt India Merchants of the city of London would be obliged to ſtop payment, if they did not obtain parliamentary ſupport. He was certain that the hon. Gentleman was miſtaken, and that this was not the ſituation of the Weſt India Merchants of London. He was convinced that without any parliamentary aid, the merchants would carry on their buſineſs as uſual. There was, undoubtedly, a great ſtagnation, but it was not to be attributed to ſpeculation; various cauſes had produced it. The drawback had been taken off, which had encouraged foreigners to make an attempt to compete with us with foreign markets, and accordingly great

great quantities of ſugar had been carried from different quarters directly to Hamburgh. The ſtagnation, however, could not laſt. There had formerly been only about one third of the whole importation re-exported, and it was, no doubt, proper to endeavour, by making foreigners pay the duty, to make them contribute to the public expences of this country. It certainly, however, required conſiderable prudence and management to conquer the difficulties which at preſent were felt. The merchants did not wiſh to obtain any unfair price, but at the ſame time ſomething was neceſſary to be done to aſſiſt the market. For one thing he thought it would be of great advantage to, while the diſtilleries were to be ſtopped, to permit molaſſes to be uſed for the purpoſe of diſtillation, which would both afford a demand for certain kinds of ſugar, and diminiſh the conſumption of grain at the preſent moment. He thought, however, that no application would be made to the Houſe by the Weſt India Merchants for pecuniary aid. There were various ways by which they would be enabled to go on. At the ſame time he voted moſt cordially for the preſent meaſure. The merchants of Liverpool had a better claim than thoſe of London, as they were ſo intimately connected with the manufactures of the country, and many of them ſent out goods on their own account, which was not the practice with the merchants of London.

Mr. *Bryan Edwards* explained, and ſaid that what he meant was, that the merchants of London could not go on without aid one way or other, and he hinted that the Bank would come forward liberally, as they ought on ſuch an occaſion, to ſupport credit. The merchants who had diſpoſed of their ſugar, might not feel the preſſure ſo ſeverely as thoſe who had not, and perhaps the hon. Gentleman was among the former.

Mr. *Manning* ſaid, that he had a great quantity of ſugar unſold, no leſs than 6000 hogſheads, and with others experienced the preſſure.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* obſerved, that the merchants of Liverpool could not have the various accommodations to which the merchants of London had acceſs, particularly the accommodation which the Bank could afford.

Mr. *Dent* ſupported the meaſure on the ſame ground with Colonel Gaſcoyne and Mr. Edwards.

Colonel *York* entertained doubts as to the policy of Parliament interfering in the commercial tranſactions of individuals.

viduals. Caſes might occur of merchants puſhing their ſpeculations beyond their capital on the calculation of having their credit bolſtered up by application to Parliament. It was ſaid that the planters were not concerned in any ſpeculation that could have produced the preſent ſtagnation. But ought they not to have foreſeen that the market would be overſtocked, and that the Americans and other foreigners would compete with us in the markets. He did not ſee either why the merchants ſhould have engaged to anſwer bills upon them in ſuch circumſtances, and foreſeeing ſuch events. He did not pretend to ſpeak with accurate information on theſe affairs, but theſe conſiderations had ſtruck his mind. With reſpect to the natural right which the colonies had to carry their produce to any market they pleaſed, it was not a proper time for the diſcuſſion of ſuch a queſtion, but he conceived that the right of the colonies to diſpoſe of their produce muſt be ſubordinate to, and directed by thoſe of the mother country, with which indeed thoſe of the colonies were inſeparably connected and dependent.

Mr. *Nicholls* ſupported the meaſure; his principal argument was, that by taking off the drawback we had in a conſiderable degree taken away the foreign market. He conſidered the taking off the drawback as a fair experiment, but ſtill Parliament was bound in a particular manner to remedy the inconveniencies which had reſulted from it.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that the Houſe could not conſider the preſent ſtate of the market as deciding on the experiment of taking off the drawback; the ſtoppage of the demand at Hamburgh from the cauſes mentioned by ſeveral gentlemen, and the failures there, had with other cauſes created an embarraſſment, and it might be prudent to reviſe the law which takes off the drawback, and to reſtore it for a limited time; and while the price remained under an amount to be ſpecified. He likewiſe intended this evening to propoſe another reſolution, to permit Sugar to be warehouſed under a bond for the payment of the Duties.

Sir *William Pulteney* was of opinion, that taking off the drawback may have been one of the cauſes of the preſent ſtagnation in the ſale of ſugars, as it encouraged foreign nations to endeavour to rival us in the market. He thought it proper to make the experiment, though it certainly might have occaſioned the embarraſſment now felt. He likewiſe approved of the propoſal to allow ſugars to be warehouſed on bond: it was an accommodation which would be no leſs advantageous

vantageous to the public than to the merchant, as it tended to encourage produce and thereby ſecure a ſupply at a reaſonable price. He approved of the meaſure for the relief of the merchants of Liverpool: the public intereſt was materially concerned in it; for bankruptcies in any part of the country would be felt in every part, and through the whole arch of commerce.

The reſolution moved by Colonel Gaſcoyne was then agreed to; the Houſe was reſumed, and the report ordered to be received the next day.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſtated, that his hon. Friend Mr. Dundas, would make his promiſed motion reſpecting a deceaſed Officer, the next day.

In a Committee of the whole Houſe,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* propoſed a reſolution for equalling the duties on Molaſſes, and permitting the Diſtillation from Molaſſes and certain kinds of Sugar. The reſolution was agreed to.

He moved another reſolution for permitting Sugars to be warehouſed on Bond, for the payment of Duties, which was likewiſe agreed to.

A third reſolution, to allow a Drawback on the Exportation of Sugar, when the price is below a rate to be fixed, was likewiſe agreed to.

The Houſe was reſumed, and the report to be received the next day, preparatory to the bringing in of Bills to carry the objects into effect.

The Scots Diſtillery Bill was read a ſecond time,

The Expiring Laws Bill was read a firſt time.

The bill for iſſuing three millions of Exchequer Bills was read a firſt time.

The Houſe went into a Committee on the Income Bill, and a reſolution for amending certain parts of it propoſed, agreed to, and reported. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THURSDAY, OCT. 3.

Their Lordſhips met, and after reading ſome papers, adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3.

Mr. *Luſhington* brought up a bill for allowing the Merchants of St. Vincent and Grenada further time for paying

the inſtallments on their loan, which was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the Reports of the Committees on the Army Eſtimates and of Ways and Means, which was agreed to, and bills ordered.

Mr. *Pierrepoint* brought up the Report of the Committee for raiſing the ſum of 500,000 l by Exchequer Bills, as a loan for the accommodation of the Sugar Merchants of Liverpool and Lancaſter.

The Houſe having reſolved itſelf into a Committee, to conſider of the Duties on Diſtilled Spirits,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, he wiſhed to propoſe a reſolution, the object of which would be to equalize the Duties on Spirits diſtilled from Barley and Molaſſes, by lowering that of the latter. He therefore moved, that the Duty of 4½d. payable on every gallon of Molaſſes intended to be diſtilled into Spirits, do ceaſe and determine. Agreed to.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the Report of the Committee, containing reſolutions for allowing the Drawback on Sugar exported, and for warehouſing Sugar imported. The latter reſolution was agreed to, and a bill ordered And the Houſe then reſolved itſelf into a Committee to reconſider the firſt reſolution, which was poſtponed, and the following, on the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was adopted: "That the Drawbacks taken off by the Act of the 26th of the King, and by the Act of laſt Seſſion, ſhould be allowed on Sugars exported whenever the ſame ſhould be under a certain price." The reſolution being reported to the Houſe, it was agreed to, and a Bill ordered.

The Three Million Exchequer Bill was read a ſecond time.

The Scotch Diſtillery Bill was committed, and ordered to be read a third time the next day.

Mr. *Roſe* brought up a bill for amending the Income Act, which was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

CORN.

The Houſe having reſolved itſelf into a Committee to conſider of the Exportation and Importation of Corn, and his Majeſty's order of Council being referred to the ſame,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſtated, that the Executive Government was to have no ſhare whatever in any ſpeculation relative to the importation of Corn into this kingdom, but had reſolved to leave it entirely to private individuals. He wiſhed however, that the merchants ſhould know the extent

of

of the period during which they might be ſafe in making their ſpeculations: and for that reaſon he would fix upon the 20th of September next year, as the time beyond which the bounty on importation ſhould not be continued. A reſolution to this effect was agreed to, and ordered to be reported the next day.

THE LATE EARL HOWE.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas*, purſuant to the notice which he had given, roſe to make a motion in which he was ſure every Member of that Houſe would moſt heartily concur. On the death of the late Lord Howe, he believed he could ſay with truth, that a general ſentiment prevailed all over the country, that ſo diſtinguiſhed a character ſhould not go out of the world without ſome teſtimony being manifeſted on the part of the country, of the high regard which they had entertained for him. In various circumſtances his Majeſty had at different times, rewarded the ſervices of his great Naval and Military Commanders, by conferring on them marks of his favour, which were more honourable than any pecuniary rewards could be. But in order that ſuch honours might not be a burthen to thoſe on whom they were conferred, it remained for that Houſe to grant them the means of maintaining that rank which they had ſo well merited. The noble Lord of whom he was ſpeaking had been advanced to a ſeat in the other Houſe of Parliament; but the preſent ſituation of his family was ſuch, that there was no occaſion for the Houſe to exerciſe its generoſity in the manner it had felt it neceſſary to do for others. There was only one way, then, by which it could manifeſt its regard to the memory of this diſtinguiſhed Officer, whoſe name would be handed down with honour and admiration to the remoteſt periods of time. It muſt afford a peculiar conſolation to the family of this noble Lord, when they ſhould perceive that his merits were not forgotten by the Public after his death. And to all thoſe poſſeſſing the manly and generous feelings which dwelt in the breaſt of that noble Lord, the preſent tribute of gratitude from the Public muſt be highly gratifying, and muſt excite in them a noble emulation to imitate ſo great an example. This tribute was no more than a monument to the memory of Lord Howe: and his reaſon for propoſing that it ſhould be erected in St. Paul's was, becauſe that was the place where, in the preſence of his Majeſty, the colours which were the trophies of his glorious victory of the firſt of June, had been depoſited, on the day when his Majeſty and the Royal Family

mily went in proceſſion to that church, in order to return thanks for our naval victories. He then moved, "That an humble addreſs be preſeuted to his Majeſty, praying that his Majeſty would be graciouſly pleaſed to give directions that a monument be erected in the Cathedral Church of St. Paul, to the memory of the late Admiral Earl Howe, with an inſcription expreſſive of the ſenſe which the Public entertained of his great ſervices during the courſe of a long and diſtinguiſhed life; and particularly of the brilliant and glorious victory which he obtained over the French fleet, on the firſt of June 1794: and that that Houſe would defray the expence attending the erection of the ſame." Agreed to, *nem. con.*

The Addreſs was ordered to be drawn up and preſented by ſuch Gentlemen as are Members of his Majeſty's Privy Council.

Mr. *Dundas* intimated that the next day he would move that the thanks of the Houſe be given to Lord Mornington for his ſervices in India.

Purſuant to the Order of the Day, the bill for enabling the Commiſſioners of Exchequer to iſſue three millions of Exchequer Bills on the Cuſtom Houſe Duties was read a ſecond time, and committed for the next day.

The Houſe then reſolved itſelf into a Committee upon the Scotch Diſtillery Bill, which underwent ſome trifling alterations, and the Report was ordered to be received the next day.

The Committee on the Bill for renewing Expiring Laws paſſed, the Army and Navy Seduction Bill, and the Corn Exportation and Importation Bill. Upon the latter, the Chancellor of the Exchequer intimated that he wiſhed it to be underſtood that Government did not intend to take the trouble or the riſk of engaging in any concern of importing corn to this country. He made this intimation becauſe, from the unfavourable ſeaſon, it was ſuppoſed that it would be neceſſary to import corn to this country, and becauſe he wiſhed free ſcope might be given to mercantile ſpeculation, which might be reſtrained were it ſuppoſed that Government would take any part in ſupplying any demand which might occur. This intimation was to extend till the 20th of September next.

A bill was brought in for amending an act paſſed laſt Seſſion of Parliament levying a certain ſum by a tax upon Income for defraying the expence of the war. It was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

Adjourned.

HOUSE

HOUSE OF LORDS.

FRIDAY, OCT. 4.

WAR IN INDIA.

Lord *Grenville*, immediately after prayers were over, roſe to make the motion for the diſcuſſion of which he had moved that their Lordſhips be ſummoned. The taſk he had undertaken to perform he perfectly felt to be as arduous as it was ſatisfactory, and he had only to lament his inability to do any thing like juſtice to the claims of ſuperior merit and unrivalled ſervices, which he had that day to recommend to the attention of their Lordſhips, and to the gratitude of the nation at large. In his endeavours to diſcharge the duty he had impoſed upon himſelf, he would begin by tracing the origin and progreſs, and marking the event of a war which had been embarked in after repeated and anxious attempts at amicable negotiation had proved unavailing, and which terminated in the total annihilation of a power that had perfidiouſly planned every meaſure of miſchief and hoſtility againſt the Britiſh intereſts in India, of which it had meditated the extinction, by combining with our moſt powerful and inveterate foe to effect our total expulſion from that country. It was alſo his taſk, (a taſk which he had undertaken with peculiar delight) to call their Lordſhips' attention to the merits of thoſe by whoſe vigilance theſe menaced miſchiefs were averted, and by whoſe courage and energy the moſt glorious triumphs were achieved. He was thoroughly ſenſible how inadequate he was to the performance of ſuch a taſk, and how ſhort every the moſt forcible expreſſion muſt fall of the public merits and ſervices which diſtinguiſhed the names and exertions of thoſe to whom he intended to move the thanks of their Lordſhips. Nor did he imagine that the great degree of intimacy and friendſhip in which, without the leaſt interruption, he had paſſed his life with the preſent Governor-General of Bengal, could in the leaſt tend to weaken the faint tribute of praiſe which he was anxious to pay to his very ſignal deſerts. In attempting the panegyric of that diſtinguiſhed, noble Lord, he obeyed the call of his public duty, and of the gratitude of the public, full as much as any private propenſity, and ſo far from fearing any danger that what he ſhould ſay, might be imputed to the prejudice of his private friendſhip, he was conſcious, that the higheſt ſtrain of eulogy in which he could indulge would but very inadequately repreſent the talents and virtues which he had ſo long loved and admired. They happily,

ply, however, loudly ſpoke for themſelves, they were now known to their Lordſhips and the country, having evinced themſelves in actions, the reſult of which has proved ſo glorious and ſo ſerviceable to the country. A detail of theſe actions might be deemed neceſſary to ſhew the extent and ſolidity of theſe ſervices, and the wiſdom and honour of thoſe by whom they were performed.

His Lordſhip then entered into an hiſtorical retroſpect of the time and manner in which Lord Mornington had undertaken a general and uncontrouled ſuperintendance over the Britiſh dominions in India. On his arrival in India, Lord Mornington found the Princes of the country at peace with our India Company, but that peace was not to be of long duration. Their Lordſhips were well acquainted with the great efforts that had been made by France to fit out the formidable expedition which ſailed from Toulon, nor was any man here ignorant of its deſtination and object; it meditated hoſtility and deſtruction to the Britiſh Empire in India, which France aimed at effecting by gaining over ſome of the native powers to co-operate in her plans. Tippoo Sultaun was the firſt and the moſt eager to go every length to derive advantage from that Expedition, and to lend it every aſſiſtance in his power. For this purpoſe he ſent an embaſſy to the Iſle of France, not with a view to complain of any grievance, or to ſolicit any redreſs, or to prefer any complaint, but to encourage and urge the attempts of the French, and embark himſelf in the deſign, for our utter expulſion from our India poſſeſſions; ſuch was his perfidious conduct towards thoſe from whom he had ſo frequently experienced the utmoſt forbearance, the moſt unparalleled magnanimity. The motives of this embaſſy Tippoo did not endeavour to conceal. They were avowedly an attachment to the cauſe of the French Republic—hatred and hoſtility to the intereſts of England His letters, addreſſed not only to the Government of the Iſle of France, but to the Executive Directory of France, openly invited them to conclude an offenſive and defenſive alliance with him, and offered to ſubſidize whatever troops France might furniſh him with, to enable him to commence hoſtilities againſt the Britiſh forces, and by their joint efforts and co-operation to realize the ardent anxiety which he felt of expelling the Britiſh nation from India. The firſt notice which Lord Mornington received of this propoſed alliance, was in the month of June, 1798, and coupling it with the information he had likewiſe received of the

the *naval* expedition which ſailed from Toulon, he immediately took every meaſure which prudence could ſuggeſt, and activity and deciſion could enforce. On the 18th of June, 1798, the Governor General received an authentic account of the proclamation that had been iſſued in the Iſle of France, and of the deſign which that proclamation unfolded and was calculated to realize. He then formed the reſolution, a reſolution evidently ſpringing from wiſdom and foreſight, not to await, but to anticipate the attack of the enemy. He accordingly diſpatched orders to the Governors of Madras and Bombay, to prepare for the event, and ſo forward were the preparations, that a deciſive blow was ſtruck even that year. Great doubts and difficulties however aroſe in aſſembling the army at Madras, and it was much feared that long before it was in readineſs to act, Tippoo's alarms might be excited, which would defeat all the meaſures which the Governor General was concerting. No ſituation could be more critical, or more full of perplexing anxiety, than that in which Lord Mornington was then placed—to await the danger with his eyes open to its approach, would be a flagrant neglect of his duty; to attempt to avert it by a ſudden and abrupt attack, ſeemed to the moſt experienced military men a meaſure of very doubtful and hazardous iſſue; ſuch was the trying dilemma in which the Governor General was entangled, and whatever ſide he was to embrace, he felt that he muſt incur the whole of the reſponſibility. The co-operation he was to expect from the native powers in alliance with Great Britain, was either doubtful, or of little advantage. By the treaties entered into by Lord Cornwallis, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam had engaged to furniſh their aſſiſtance whenever he ſhould act hoſtilley to the Britiſh. The Mahrattas, however, were rendered unable to afford any ſubſtantial aſſiſtance from internal diſſentions, though their good will was not to be called in queſtion. The abſence of their ſupport aroſe from real and undiſſembled inability. From the co-operation of the Nizam, little or nothing could be expected, his councils and army were at that period under the influence of a French faction, and two French officers were at the head of the ſepoys in the Nizam's ſervice, and indeed the whole of his military force was at the diſpoſal of the French officers. The aſpect of theſe difficulties created neither deſpondency or fear in the heart of the Governor General; he, on the contrary, adopted the moſt ſpirited and deciſive meaſures; an armed force

was

was immediately diſpatched into the territories of the Nizam; the French army was not only ſurrounded and made priſoners; but a new treaty was concluded with the Nizam, by which the diſpoſal of his forces were put into the hands of the Britiſh, and that very army which had been raiſed and deſtined to attack them, was immediately turned againſt the enemy. What could diſplay greater ability, than this maſterly manœuvre? but if it was great in ability, how much more uſeful was it in its conſquences, which ſo powerfully contributed to our ſubſequent ſucceſſes, by placing us in a ſituation to fruſtrate all the plans, and defeat all the attacks that had been meditated againſt us. Till that was accompliſhed nothing was ſafe; but as ſoon as it was atchieved a negociation was opened. Lord Mornington was not unmindful that it was the beſt policy to remain contented with our ſituation in India; to offend no power by our encroachments, or give umbrage to them by any plan of ambition or aggrandiſement; but faithfully and punctually to obſerve the faith of exiſting treaties. Such, indeed, was the nature and tendency of the orders under which as Governor General he was bound to act. He had, however, ample juſtification for purſuing an oppoſite plan, for what more clear and undiſguiſed hoſtility could there be than that which he experienced from thoſe who would negociate with our worſt enemy for our ruin, and enter into offenſive alliance with him for our deſtruction: Who ſtood forward in military array againſt our troops, and who aſſumed, if not the meaſures of actual hoſtility, at the leaſt the attitude of hoſtile preparation and menace; who propoſed to France, that if ſhe would ſuccour them with a military force from Europe, they would favour their landing at Porto-novo; they would lead them into the heart of the Dutch territories, into which they were ready to penetrate themſelves, and co-operate with the French arms, in expelling us from every foot of ground, and every trace of our dominion in India? Nor was it againſt the Britiſh eſtabliſhments alone that they concerted this hoſtile attack, but alſo againſt thoſe of Portugal, on account of her alliance with Great Britain. In the ſtorming of that capital, where theſe machinations were hatched againſt us, and in the fall of that power who acted ſuch a perfidious part againſt us, not only therefore great military ſkill and talent have been exerted and diſplayed, but the moſt conſummate wiſdom and firmneſs, and the moſt ſober juſtice had been evinced. With this crafty and perfidious power Lord Mornington

ington had, however, propoſed to open a negociation, even when Tippoo was doing all the evil and miſchief in his power, without uttering one word of grievance or complaint. Notwithſtanding his flagrant violations of all faith towards the Engliſh Government, Lord Mornington ſtill repeated and renewed his offers to remove every cauſe of difference and diſaffection, if any really exiſted. The whole of theſe patient and pacific offers were received either with ſullen ſilence or ſtudied duplicity, and at laſt with open preparations of hoſtile aggreſſion. When Tippoo ſaw the ruin he was drawing down upon his own head, his inveterate and rancorous animoſity ſuggeſted to his wicked imagination, that he already ſaw the gigantic plan of the French Republic on the eve of being realized, and that the hour was come for the ſubverſion and downfall of the Britiſh dominions in India. He was alſo anxious to gain time, and defer the meaſures that were taken againſt him, in order that the ſeaſon of the year might intervene, and allow time to receive the ſuccours with which he was to co-operate in our overthrow. But was it not unneceſſary, the noble Lord obſerved, to dwell any longer on theſe details; or on the wiſdom, firmneſs and ſound policy of the meaſures adopted by the Governor General, who months after months had made propoſals for negociation to an enemy, who inſtead of a ſincere deſire to eſtabliſh peace, was ſecretly endeavouring to diſable and deſtroy us? And if, after theſe repeated provocations, and avowed preparations for hoſtilities, his Noble Friends had reſolved upon offenſive operations, it was eaſy to relieve the Governor General from all reſponſibility for his conduct; a conduct which, when rightly viewed and appreciated, will be diſcovered not only to have averted the formidable perils and ruin which hung over our Indian Empire, but moreover eſtabliſhed it on a baſis of more permanent ſecurity than it ever before enjoyed. He truſted their Lordſhips ſhared with him in the ſenſe he felt of theſe ſolid and memorable atchievements, and that they would unite with him in expreſſing the thanks which he had to propoſe, and which ſuch ſignal ſervives ſo juſtly and ſo imperiouſly called for. There was one point more, and that a very ſtriking one, to which he would beg leave to advert, and that was the judicious manner in which the Governor General had proceeded to compoſe and reconcile all the jarring and diſcordant opinions which formerly prevailed among the ſervants of the India Company. In this he ſucceeded by a wiſe and temperate uſe of the ſole controuling power with which he was inveſted; and a greater and more

refined ſatisfaction aroſe in his breaſt from obſerving this ſalutary effect, when he perceived that this jar and diſcord of ſentiment were ſilenced, not merely by the interpoſition of this ſuperior controul, but by an appeal to the wiſdom and good ſenſe of the different Governors. Among them the conduct of Lord Clive ſtood peculiarly eminent, and reflected the greateſt honour on his heart and head. The noble Lord ſpurning all little jealouſies and all ſuggeſtions of mortified pride when obliged to ſtoop to ſuperior power, has not only expreſſed a very decided opinion, in favour of the propriety of the meaſures purſued by the Governor General, but by his zeal and ſpirit had principally contributed to promote the views, and ſecure the benefits which the adoption of theſe meaſures had in contemplation. The ſame ſpirit guided the conduct, and animated the exertions of the Governor of Bombay. Mr. Duncan, who equally concurred in forwarding the ends of the Earl of Mornington, and in ſecuring the ſupport of the Engliſh Government and Eſtabliſhments. In conſequence of theſe wiſe, ſpirited, and well-concerted meaſures, when the army was put in motion, it evidently appeared to be compoſed of troops the beſt diſciplined and appointed of any that was ever collected in India. The event, indeed, beſt ſhews the zeal and ſpirit, the courage and intrepidity with which it glowed, and by which all its movements were directed. It was not his intention to attempt detailing its different operations, or the ſucceſſes with which they were crowned. He could not, however, forbear mentioning the gallant action of the 6th of March, when a ſmall diviſion of the Britiſh army attacked and defeated a powerful and numerous force of the enemy, and by that victory laid the ground of the ſubſequent ſucceſsful actions which were cloſed by that final and brilliant event which was brought about by an army compoſed almoſt entirely of Europeans, who, during the intenſe heat of the day, attacked and took by aſſault, one of the ſtrongeſt fortreſſes that exiſts, and in the ſpace of two hours made themſelves maſters of the capital of the moſt implacable and perfidious foe, whom the Britiſh intereſts had to dread in India. Theſe were atchievements which baffled all deſcription, and ſoared above all praiſe; he would not, therefore, attempt a word more in their commendation. He truſted that the Houſe was convinced of the merits of the Governor General, and of thoſe who acted under him on this glorious occaſion, as he was, and he therefore did not doubt of their moſt cordial concurrence in the vote which he would have

have the honour to propoſe. Whatever he might have omitted to throw light upon the operations he had been deſcribing would be found in the papers on their Lordſhips' table, which they would obſerve, were written with the ſame ſpirit and ability with which were accompliſhed the glorious events they ſo forcibly record. His Lordſhip then concluded by moving the following Reſolutions:

That the thanks of this Houſe be given to the right honourable *Richard* Lord *Welleſley*, Earl of *Mornington* in the kingdom of *Ireland*, and Governor General of the *Britiſh* poſſeſſions in the *Eaſt Indies*, for the wiſdom, deciſion, and energy, with which he diſcharged the arduous duties of his ſtation from the time of his taking upon him the ſaid government to the glorious termination of the late war by the capture of *Seringapatam*; during which period, by oppoſing to the perfidy of the late Sultan of *Myſore* an uniform moderation, dignity, and firmneſs, and by counteracting with equal promptitude and ability the dangerous intrigues and projects of the *French*, particularly by deſtroying their power and influence in the *Deccan*, he prepared the way for the rapid and brilliant operations carried on under his ſuperintendance and direction, the reſult of which has finally diſappointed all the deſigns of our enemies in that quarter, and has eſtabliſhed, on a baſis of permanent ſecurity, the tranquillity and proſperity of the *Britiſh* empire in *India*.

That the thanks of this Houſe be given to the right hon. Lord *Clive*, Governor of the Settlement of *Fort St. George*, for his zealous, cordial, and honourable concurrence, in forwarding the wiſe and dignified views of the Governor General in Council, by which he has furniſhed a ſalutary and memorable example of the advantage of unanimity and concord among the perſons employed in high ſtations in the *Britiſh* dominions in the *Eaſt Indies*, and has, to the utmoſt of his power, promoted the ſucceſs of thoſe meaſures, from which the moſt important public benefits have reſulted to this country.

That the thanks of this Houſe be given to *Jonathan Duncan*, Eſq. Governor of *Bombay*, for the zeal and promptitude of his conduct in preparing the army of that Preſidency for the field, agreeably to the orders of the Governor General in Council, whereby that army was enabled materially to contribute to the ſucceſsful and glorious termination of the late war in *India*.

That the thanks of this Houſe be given to Lieutenant General *George Harrit*, for the whole of his able and meri-

torious conduct in the command of the forces of his Majeſty and of the *Eaſt India* Company during the late glorious and deciſive war with the Sultan of *Myſore*, and particularly for the ability, judgment, and energy, with which he planned and directed the aſſault of *Seringapatam*, the ſucceſs of which brilliant atchievements has ſo highly contributed to the glory of the *Britiſh* name, and to the permanent tranquillity of our poſſeſſions in the Eaſt.

That the thanks of this Houſe be given to Lieutenant General *James Stuart*, Commander in Chief of the *Bombay* army, which ſo glorioufly co-operated in the ſucceſs of the late campaign in *India*; and alſo, to Major Generals *John Floyd*, *Thomas Bridges*, *William Popham*, *James Hartley*, and *David Baird*, and to the reſpective officers of the armies employed on that occaſion againſt the enemy, for their diſtinguiſhed and meritorious ſervices.

That this Houſe doth highly approve of, and acknowledge the ſervices of the non-commiſſioned officers and private ſoldiers employed againſt the enemy in the late glorious and deciſive war in the *Eaſt Indies*; and that the ſame be ſignified to them by the commanders of the ſeveral corps, who are deſired to thank them for their gallant behaviour.

Which Reſolutions being agreed to, it was ordered,

That the *Lord Chancellor* do tranſmit the ſaid Reſolutions to the right hon the Governor General; and that his Lordſhip be requeſted, by Mr. *Speaker*, to ſignify the ſame to the Governors, General and other Officers referred to therein.

MILITIA REDUCTION BILL.

Lord *Grenville* moved the ſecond reading of the Militia Reduction Bill. His Lordſhip ſaid, and in that ſtate of the buſineſs conceived it neceſſary merely to obſerve in general terms, that the principle on which the preſent meaſure was founded, had, on a former occaſion, and not long ſince, been amply diſcuſſed in and recognized by Parliament. Its leading proviſion went to enable his Majeſty to avail himſelf of and accept the voluntary offers of thoſe perſons in the Militia who might ſtill wiſh to ſerve in the Regiments of the Line. The meaſure, it appeared from recent experience, was productive of the moſt beneficial effects, and even in the preſent circumſtances, an extenſion of the plan was warranted by ſound policy, and bid fair to produce, on its being carried into effect, the moſt happy conſequences.

Earl *Fitzwilliam* ſaid, that when the bill was brought into Parliament laſt year to enable Goeernment to accept the voluntary ſervices of a certain number of the Militia, he had foreſeen

foreſeen that what was then grounded upon a particular emergency, would be on every occaſion reſorted to as a general principle. He felt therefore the ſame objections to the meaſure which had induced him to oppoſe it laſt year, and theſe objections were ſtrengthened by the very extenſion propoſed. The firſt objection which ſtruck his mind was, that the plan was a virtual breach of the engagement which ſubſiſted with men raiſed for a particular purpoſe, under a particular ſyſtem. Such was the caſe of the militia, and when the nature of their ſervice was changed, government did that which thoſe who had entered into the militia had never anticipated. It was to be conſidered too that the burden in raiſing the militia was not equally diſtributed over the community; it fell chiefly on the owners and occupiers of land. The raiſing of the militia too, it would be found on examination, had been a conſiderable burden upon the poor rates: To the poor rates, however, thoſe who had fixed and oſtenſible property chiefly contributed. The landholders indeed had a ſuperior intereſt in defending their property; becauſe it could not be transferred like other kinds of property to other countries; for this reaſon, the landed intereſt might acquieſce in the burden, which a body of men calculated for the defence of the country might occaſion. They had reaſon to complain, however, when they found that corps which had been raiſed and maintained at a great expence for their defence, diverted to other purpoſes; it was an act of injuſtice to the landed proprietors, as it deſtroyed that ſyſtem under which they had engaged to contribute their perſonal ſervice, or pecuniary aid. This, however, was not the only ground on which he was unfavourable to the meaſure. It was objectionable not only as being unjuſt in its nature, but as introducing into the militia a degree of inſubordination that was of the moſt perilous example. Every perſon muſt have heard of the ſcenes of riot and diſorder which took place on the recruiting from the militia forces. All ſorts of mutinies were engendered by it. The officers were placed in the moſt mortifying and painful ſituation. Such was the ſtate of inſubordination that officers were obliged to confine themſelves to their barracks or their tents, and durſt not face the ſoldiers, or appear on the parades; ſuch was the overthrow of diſcipline which had reſulted from the meaſure. Upon the whole he ſaw ſo many inconveniences attending the mode of proceeding, that he was obliged to give it his negative.

Lord *Holland* ſaid, the avowed object of the bill now before their Lordſhips was, to reduce the number of the militia in order

order to obtain a diſpoſeable force. He truſted that it would not be neceſſary for him to demonſtrate what muſt be ſo obvious to every noble Lord, that no man could give his vote for the meaſure, unleſs he could likewiſe give his ſanction to the manner in which the force was to be applied. It was neceſſary no leſs to approve of the final object than of the means which they were called upon to furniſh for attaining it. This was evident from the terms of the preamble, which ſtated the employment of the militia recruits in the expedition to Holland to have been of the utmoſt advantage, and, as affording an argument in favour of the diſpoſition made by the bill on the table. Thus the approbation of the object of the expedition was connected with the concurrence in the propoſal for augmenting the diſpoſable force of the country. Upon both points he ſhould take the liberty of offering a few obſervations.

As to the mode which was propoſed, their Lordſhips had heard, from different members of the Houſe well qualified to give information on the ſubject, that it was conſidered as a breach of engagement between government and the militia eſtabliſhment: that it was odious and diſagreeable to the militia officers: in fact, it was conſidered as an inſult both to their ſpirit and to their rank: two things which in military men ought to be held moſt ſacred. Upon theſe topics their Lordſhips had at different times heard a great deal. They had heard but little, however, on the other branch of the ſubject, and that was the object in which the additional force was to be employed. In ſtating his ſentiments he hoped he ſhould be excuſed, if he differed from the majority of their Lordſhips. He was conſcious that he was expoſed to clamour and miſrepreſentation; he was aware that of late years a cant had been introduced into both Houſes of Parliament, which tended to render the exerciſe of one of the great duties of a Lord of Parliament obnoxious: it was ſaid that, to arraign the object or conduct of an expedition pending its ſucceſs was factious, unſeaſonable, and hoſtile to the intereſts of the public. Conſcious of the rectitude of his intentions, however, he little regarded theſe imputations. He was ready to admit that, in the courſe of the execution of an enterpriſe, ſome degree of miſchief might ariſe from the public diſcuſſion of the advantages or diſadvantages of its object, the wiſdom or folly of its contrivance. This, however, was but one view of the queſtion; and theſe evils were infinitely compenſated by the immenſe benefits which muſt ariſe from

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free enquiry and from public diſcuſſion. The inconveniences were to be found only in a contracted view: the advantages of debate and examination were to be diſcovered upon a great ſcale, and as peculiarly connected with the principles of freedom and the genius of the conſtitution.

He ſhould therefore proceed to examine freely the object of the expedition which it was the purpoſe of the new diſpoſable force to proſecute. He ſhould conſider whether or not the object at which Miniſters aimed was, in the circumſtances of this country and of Europe, prudent to be attempted or ſafe to be purſued. He was moſt willing to acknowledge that happy would it be for the United States to be again placed under their old government; he was ready to pay that tribute to the government which had been overthrown by the uſurpation of France: The reſtoration of that government was the avowed object of Adminiſtration. He could not but remark, however, that the ſentiments of the noble Secretary of State, reſpecting the former government of the United States, had undergone great change: on a former occaſion, when the queſtion of the Union was under conſideration, the noble Secretary had thought proper to repreſent that government which it was now the object of his exertions to reſtore, as the *ne plus ultra* of debility, incapable of ſelf-defence, incapable of energy. Arguments and principles, however, the noble Secretary made ſubſervient to circumſtances, and what was reprobated as incurably defective at one moment was to be re-eſtabliſhed by every effort of military power at another. He confeſſed, indeed, that if this country was bound more cloſely by the ties of juſtice and gratitude to one government than another, we were bound to uſe every rational means, conſiſtent with policy and duty to ourſelves, in favour of the Prince of Orange. That family had many claims upon us. From a ſteady attachment to our intereſts that eſtimable Prince had forfeited the regard of his countrymen and the high dignities with which he was inveſted; and if it was conſiſtent with the immutable rules of juſtice, we were bound to eſpouſe his cauſe. But there was ſomething more to be conſidered than what our gratitude to him might dictate. We ought to enquire what were the ſentiments of the people of Holland, becauſe unleſs they cordially ſympathiſed with our feelings and co-operated with our efforts, it would be the extreme of injuſtice and abſurdity to attempt the reſtoration of the Stadtholder's power. He was afraid, however, that the very conduct which had laid the foundation

foundation of the Stadtholder's claims to our aſſiſtance had tended to alienate from him the confidence of his countrymen. He was afraid that the diſpoſitions of the inhabitants were not likely to induce them to look with ſanguine hope to our aid, or to combine cordially to aſſiſt our undertakings. True, indeed, there was little opportunity to judge from the events of the expedition what their ſentiments were, but he doubted they were not very well diſpoſed to welcome our efforts for the reſtoration of the former order of things.

It was proper therefore to conſider, whether from the circumſtances under which this expedition to their country was undertaken, and the parties who were engaged in it, the Dutch were likely to join cordially with our efforts? True, indeed, we had gone over to offer them our aſſiſtance, and with fine words in our mouths. We held out the captivating ideas of protection and deliverance. We announced that it was our object to reſcue them from the galling, and degrading, and ruinous yoke under which they groaned. From the nature of mankind, whom the preſſure of an active and grinding tyranny muſt ever revolt, it was reaſonable to infer that the Dutch muſt ardently wiſh to be delivered from the oppreſſors under whom they had fallen. No doubt then the Dutch muſt curſe and deteſt the uſurpation of the French, and languiſh for independence. This was but a part of the caſe. It did not follow that they would riſe at once to aſſiſt as their deliverers thoſe who were the enemies of their oppreſſors. It did not follow, becauſe they abhorred French tyranny, that they would immediately coincide with the views of Great Britain and Ruſſia. They muſt know equally from experience and from obſervation, what is the meaning of protection and relief which the weak receive from the powerful. Twice within the laſt fifteen years they had felt what it was to be delivered and protected by powerful neighbours. They muſt have ſeen too around them that for a ſmall ſtate to be relieved and protectedby a great one, was in fact to be conquered and plundered. Muſt they not have ſeen what was the protection of the Netherlands, of Poland, of Venice, of Switzerland, and could they help entertaining ſome ſuſpicions, even of the moſt flattering proteſtations of diſintereſted kindneſs which could be held out to themſelves? But it might be ſaid, how is it poſſible to entertain a jealouſy of the offers of aſſiſtance and protection coming from the magnanimity of the Emperor of Ruſſia, and the generoſity of the Britiſh Nation? The proclamations

clamations we had iſſued to the Dutch people breathed nothing but liberal and friendly aid, but was there any thing to encourage them to repoſe an unlimited confidence in our profeſſions, and induce them to lend an active co-operation in our cauſe? Was there a word in theſe proclamations concerning the reſtoration of the Cape or of Ceylon? Was there any aſſurance that what we had taken from them in the courſe of hoſtilities would not be retained when we ſhould be connected with them as allies? Can they in fact depend upon reſtoration, from our friendſhip, of thoſe poſſeſſions, which we have taken as their enemies? If they look at the negociations at Paris, would they not ſee that we had reſolved to retain the ſettlements which had fallen into our hands? Muſt they not know that it had been ſaid in another place by a right hon. Gentleman, high in office, that he truſted the Cape of Good Hope would never return under the dominion of its lawful government? Comparing all theſe things with our diſintereſted profeſſions, what would they think of our protection and relief? Would they infer our generoſity from our readineſs to reduce the militia to procure troops to fight their battles in Holland, while we gave no reaſon to expect that we would put them in poſſeſſion of thoſe colonies which they deemed eſſential to their commerce and to their proſperity?

There was another conſideration which, in judging of the wiſdom of the expedition, it was neceſſary not to overlook. We ought to enquire whether the object which we now ſo doubtfully purſue by arms, might not have been attained by negociation? Was it not poſſible that, from its having been attempted by co-operation in the preſent ſituation of Europe, that very circumſtance might not contribute to prevent its attainment? There was great reaſon to believe that the King of Pruſſia muſt be deſirous to ſee the government of the Stadtholder reſtored, and perhaps France, upon certain conſiderations, might not have been unwilling to acquieſce in ſuch a change. To attempt it by force, however, and with the aſſiſtance of Ruſſia ſo actively interpoſed, might riſk the total failure of the expedition, and the diſappointment of our hopes. We ought to have recollected a maxim which had been well expreſſed by Mr. Burke on another occaſion, that if negociation failed, an appeal might be made to arms, but if force proved ineffectual, it was impoſſible to reſort with ſucceſs to negociation. If we failed, therefore,

we had no expedient left: baffled force left no room for amicable arrangement.

There was another queſtion which the propriety of the meaſure involved. Suppoſing it right that the reſtoration of the old Government of the United States ſhould be attempted by force of arms, it remained to be conſidered whether is was moſt eligible to employ our own forces or thoſe of our allies in carrying into effect the enterpriſe? He was aware that, to rely upon our own forces, was attended with many advantages, but ſtill they might be counterbalanced by the ſacrifices which they demanded. If, in the accompliſhment of the object by our means we were obliged to ſtrain every nerve; if we were even compelled to do that which may be conſidered a breach of engagement with the militia, the queſtion might admit of conſiderable doubt. To depend ſolely upon our allies certainly was attended with inconveniences. But when the enormous expence which the maintenance of a large army abroad was conſidered; when it was recollected that the employment of ſo many veſſels in tranſport ſervice had already produced an uncommon ſcarcity of coals, in the Metropolis; when the price of grain was riſing to ſo unuſual a height, and which the demand for veſſels by Government would probably continue, the policy of our foreign expeditions would appear extremely doubtful. There were other conſiderations which ſtrongly deterred us from ſending ſo great a part of our force out of the kingdom. The French fleet had returned to Breſt in great force. There ſtill was cauſe for apprehenſion in Ireland, ſhould foreign aid be joined to domeſtic diſcontent. The beautiful ſpecific of a Union held out by Miniſters had not yet tranquillized the ſiſter kingdom, and it was not ſafe to ſtrip the country of the force adequate to effectual defence in caſe of emergency. But Miniſters totally overlooked conſiderations like theſe when their minds were engroſſed with other objects. Sometimes they found it convenient to encourage the dread of an invaſion; again they thought it factious to ſuppoſe invaſion poſſible; but on a fair review of our ſituation, it was extremely queſtionable whether the propoſed reduction of our defenſive force in the country was politic, and the employment of ſo great an army on a foreign expediton was prudent.

Their Lordſhips had heard that the meaſure was not reliſhed by the officers of the Militia, and he thought that it

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was calculated to diſguſt gentlemen in that ſervice. The nature of its objects were different from thoſe of a regular army, and the views of thoſe who entered into the former were different from thoſe which ought to influence gentlemen engaging in the latter. Different qualifications were requiſite in each. The practice which had been introduced, of ſacrificing the Militia to the regular army, however, muſt tend ultimately to deſtroy that conſtitutional ſyſtem of defence. Some time ago Miniſters had encreaſed the Militia upon a threat of invaſion. Why did they not then rather encreaſe the diſpoſable force? He ſuſpected indeed that, from the very beginning, it was in the contemplation of Miniſters to make the Militia ſubſervient to the recruiting of the army. Upon the whole, as he neither approved the object which was to be purſued, nor the means propoſed to carry it into execution, he was compelled to give his negative to the Bill.

The Earl of *Weſtmoreland* ſaid, he had liſtened with the utmoſt attention and deference to the arguments, which had been urged againſt the bill, but he had heard nothing which, in his opinion, ought to induce their Lordſhips to heſitate in giving it their ſupport. Certainly the principle of the bill was not a novel one. It had already been diſcuſſed in a former ſeſſion, and the arguments in its favour had been amply juſtified by experience. So convinced was he of the beneficial effects which had reſulted from the permiſſion given to encreaſe our diſpoſable force by accepting the voluntary ſervices of a part of the militia, that he thought the thanks and gratitude of the country were due to the gentlemen at the head of that department who had had the wiſdom to deviſe, the courage to propoſe, and the addreſs to carry through, he muſt ſay, with deference to the noble Lords near him, with very little oppoſition, a meaſure of ſo much advantage to the public intereſt; and he conſidered it to be highly honourable to the officers of the militia that they had ſacrificed every thing that could be diſagreeable to their private feelings to the ſervice of their country. In order to obtain a juſt view of the advantages which had been derived from the Militia Reduction Bill of laſt ſeſſion, we had only to compare what was our ſituation previous to that period with what it is now. But a ſhort time ago we had been threatened with invaſion, and forced to conſider the means of our own defence. By the protection of Providence, by the vigour of our allies, and by the ſpirit of reſiſtance, which

the oppreſſion and tyranny of the French had every where excited, the aſpect of our affairs had greatly improved, and inſtead of dreading invaſion we were now in a ſituation to aſſail our foe. With an opportunity to ſtrike the blow we wanted the means. The advantages of acting on the offenſive, and the impotence of mere defence, it required little argument to demonſtrate. In the one caſe we were expoſed to injury without the power of retaliation, and in the other, we prevent attack by threatening it ourſelves. Before the Militia Reduction Bill was adopted, we had not 10,000 diſpoſable troops to protect our colonies in any quarter. Even the defence of Ireland, at a critical moment, was owing to the voluntary ſervices of the militia and fencibles. The recruiting ſervice was almoſt totally at a ſtand, not from any decay of our proſperity and population, but becauſe ſo many men were bound up in defenſive corps, and becauſe the population of the country was not adequate to ſupport ſo great a body of men for defence, and at the ſame time to furniſh a diſpoſable army equal to the exigency. Policy required, therefore, that a portion of thoſe who were tied up from the opportunity of effectually ſerving their country, ſhould be placed in a ſituation which their own wiſhes and the public intereſt pointed out. It was only neceſſary to render a part of the defenſive force diſpoſable, and the demands of the ſervice were ſatisfied.

As to the objection, that the principle of the militia ſyſtem was violated, he could not ſee that it had any force. It was difficult to decide what was the militia principle. There were various kinds of militia, from the Swiſs militia to the London trained bands. The principle of the militia of this country ſurely was not that they ſhould be uſeleſs to the ſtate. Their whole conduct diſclaimed ſuch a ſuppoſition. The militia who had contributed to ſave the country in 1793 from the deſigns of jacobiniſm, who laſt year ſo chearfully volunteered their ſervice for the defence of the ſiſter kingdom, could not brook the idea of being uſeleſs, when the country could be benefited by their ſervices. It had been ſaid, that in going to Ireland, they had left their homes defenceleſs. Certainly nothing could be ſo ill founded as ſuch a ſuppoſition. By defending Ireland they rendered their own homes ſecure from attack. What had been ſaid by the mighty *Hoche*, when he was ordered to invade Ireland. He ſaid, and w. ly in relation to the deſigns of his employers, that from Dublin he would proceed to London. The attack againſt

againſt the one was preparatory to an attack againſt the other, and by defying the attempts of the enemy in Ireland, England was moſt effectually protected from hoſtile invaſion.

He could not ſee that the objection of there being a breach of contract with the counties furniſhing the militia was any better founded; no additional burden was impoſed on the counties. Thoſe who extended their ſervices did it voluntarily, nor could he perceive any injury done to thoſe intereſted in the militia, by enabling them on a great emergency to render more important ſervices to the public in the regular army than in their former ſtate. But it was ſaid, that men would be deterred from enliſting in the militia by this mode of proceeding; to him it appeared in a very different light. He conceived it would be a recommendation to the ſervice, for men to find that when tired of one ſituation they might place themſelves in a different, with the addition of a conſiderable bounty.

Neither could he think that the officers were placed in a more irkſome ſituation, than if the reduction of the militia had been to take place by a diſcharge regulated by lot. The power of the officer in the preſent caſe was greater than it would be in the other. As to its being diſagreeable to commanding officers, he could ſee no real grievance in the caſe. The only thing that could be conſidered in that light was, that the Colonel of a militia regiment would now find himſelf at the head of a ſmaller body of men than he did ſome time ago, and ſurely this perſonal conſideration could not be balanced for a moment againſt the ſubſtantial intereſts of the nation.

But it was ſaid too, that this precedent being eſtabliſhed, the executive government would always have recourſe to this mode of recruiting the army. It ſhould be recollected, however, that the ſanction of Parliament muſt previouſly be obtained, and as the employment of this reſource would be regulated by the emergency, ſo there was no danger of its being abuſed, and he entertained no doubt, that if a criſis of ſuch magnitude as the preſent ſhould recur, Parliament would not heſitate to ſanction with their approbation, that employment of the national force which moſt effectually contributed to ſecure its defence and to promote its intereſts.

The Earl of *Carnarvon* obſerved, that he agreed with the noble Secretary of State, that the principle of this bill was decided laſt year; for certainly a moſt fatal blow was then given to the vital energies of the militia, and it is purſued

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by this bill to its final deſtruction; but the inconſiſtencies and errors in both theſe bills, and the total departure in the execution of the Act of laſt ſeſſions (by the direct order of government) from the clear and obvious intention of the legiſlature in that act, ſo much embarraſſes the interpretation to be given to the preſent bill, which is its offspring and auxiliary, that it is very difficult to diſcover the exact diſtinct principle which regulates its preſent purpoſe. Nothing now is clear but that their authors intend by any means the total perverſion of the militia, extracting all that was conſtitutionally uſeful, and leaving nothing but the ballot and the conſequent burthens on the occupier of land, and I do not (ſaid the noble Earl) riſe with any hopes or even wiſh to ſave any portion of the perverted ſyſtem of militia; its death blow is ſtruck. The legiſlature *could not*, if deſirous, reſtore to thoſe who are concerned in the militia, the confidence that what has now been done, will not again defeat all their future labours; the patriotic zeal therefore (which raiſed the militia beyond the moſt ſanguine expectation of thoſe who firſt looked to it for the internal defence of the country) is impoliticly annihilated by this new ſyſtem. A noble Earl (Weſtmoreland) has juſt ſaid that it is not a meaſure of government, but of the legiſlature; though by a few antecedent ſentences, he had taken credit to the cabinet, for the addreſs and management with which it had artfully conducted and brought about ſo delicate a buſineſs. He alſo ſays that it had the ſanction of a great number of officers of the militia; I know of none who have not reprobated it, I have indeed heard of one in the Houſe of Commons; and ſince the act of laſt year, I have met with many who think with me, that its total annihilation would be better for the country than the condition to which it is irrecoverably reduced. I have not indeed met with a ſingle perſon of any claſs out of this Houſe, and indeed very few in it, who approves of this meaſure, it was brought forward very late in laſt ſeſſions, when 17 members only were preſent, moſtly ſuch as public offices under government detained in town, and the diviſion 11 to 6. It is now reſumed at a very early period of a ſeſſion ſummoned in a moſt unuſual way, and ill attended, except by thoſe whom public employments have brought within reach; and the ſubject ſo much degraded in the eſtimation of thoſe concerned in the militia, that it is not conſidered as an object of further intereſt. The laſt Act, which is referred to, and makes in ſome meaſure a part of this bill, did not, in its fair inter-

interpretation, ſo totally deſtroy the principles of the militia by its enactments, as by the falſe conſtruction put upon it by government in the execution, by extending its operation to the original peace and war eſtabliſhment of the militia, and to the volunteers raiſed by the private ſubſcriptions of individuals. Nothing is ſo clearly repugnant to the obvious ſenſe and meaning of the Act. The preamble of the Act, without the leaſt ambiguity, ſtates its meaning, when it ſays that "the *preſent* ſtate of public affairs admits of a reduction of the defenſive force, and it therefore may be expedient to diſcharge a certain proportion of the militia, and at the ſame time to augment the regular forces." Nothing can be more certain from the words of this preamble, than that the reduction was intended by the legiſlature to affect that portion of the militia which was raiſed to meet a *ſituation* of public affairs *different* from the *preſent*, for the preſent ſituation of affairs could not admit the reduction of that part of the militia which was raiſed and adapted to the *preſent* as well as to every other ſtate of public affairs. The original militia is a permanent peace and war eſtabliſhment, and was calculated and raiſed for all circumſtances whatever, either of peace or war, and conſequently is not liable to be affected by any change in the ſituation of public affairs. The ſupplementary militia on the contrary was raiſed as a war addition to the permanent militia, and augmented to accommodate the defenſive force to the peculiar emergencies of the war, and of courſe a change from that ſituation of public affairs which called it forth, and afterwards augmented it, would neceſſarily admit its reduction, though not its perverſion from a militia, to a force of another nature. It cannot therefore admit of a doubt, whether the legiſlature meant, by a bill ſo prefaced, to reduce the permanent peace and war eſtabliſhment of militia, or the occaſional and temporary portion of militia, raiſed to ſerve the exigencies of the war; but, my Lords, it is not alone from the profeſſed views of the legiſlature, demonſtrable in the preamble, that I infer this obvious intention of the Act. The enacting clauſes afford the ſtrongeſt concurrent proof diſturbed by no one ambiguous word in the whole act. The firſt enacting clauſe, immediately following the above diſtinct preamble, reduces the ſupplementary, and not the permanent peace and war eſtabliſhment, within the operation of the Act, by repealing "ſo much of two Acts of the 37th of the King (namely, the two ſupplementary Acts) as fixes the numbers" to be raiſed

raiſed for that purpoſe. No part of the Act of the 26th of the King, which fixes the number of the original permanent militia is repealed, or even alluded to in the Act; ſo that it cannot be doubted that the legiſlature, meant to prepare the ſupplementary, and not the original militia, (namely, that raiſed by 37th, and not that raiſed by the 26th of the King) for reduction under the Act. The next clauſe alſo confirms the ſame clear inference, for it takes notice in diſtinct terms, that the Act of the 26th of the King ſtill continues untouched; for in ſumming up the future quota to be raiſed *after the reduction*, it divides it into three parts, and begins with the ſupplementary, whoſe numbers are thrown looſe by the repeal of part of the 37th of the King, and ſtates it as of doubtful numbers, but compoſing a quota, *(together with the numbers required* by the 26th of the King, *and with the volunteers* raiſed by ſubſcription under the 34th of the King) all which ſhall amount to a given number. The legiſlature, in the clauſe providing againſt the failure of this plan for recruiting the army expeditiouſly from the militia in its embodied ſtate, has again, in the ſtrongeſt manner, marked that the ſupplementary, and not the permanent, militia, was the object of reduction for the purpoſe of augmenting the army; for the clauſe empowering the King to diſembody a portion of the militia, in order to try to obtain the men ſo diſembodied, (as ſoon as they might be tired of their domeſtic labour,) has *only* enabled the King to diſembody a portion *of the ſupplementary* for that purpoſe. I am aſhamed to detain your Lordſhips by arguing a caſe which really cannot admit of a doubt, and nothing but the extraordinary conſtruction put upon the Act by government in its execution, would have induced me to enter upon it ſo much at large. The noble Secretary of State will not be able to produce a ſingle phraſe in the whole Act that can juſtify a concluſion contrary to this expoſition. No perſon admires the noble Lord's talents for argument more than I do, when he is ſure of his ground; but I defy the noble Secretary to find in the whole Act, a ſpace to ſet his foot upon in defence of a contrary conſtruction. The noble Secretary will hardly (with ſome I have heard) ſhew the weakneſs of his cauſe ſo much as to reſt upon the ſlighteſt and moſt untenable of all grounds, that the words "*any militia men*" (in the clauſe regulating the recruiting), means that all men denominated militia men (without reference to the intentions of the legiſlature declared in the preamble, in the context, and in the ſeveral explanatory and controuling

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clauſes) ſhall be permitted to enliſt in the army, and does not mean that any militia men by the Act intended to be diſcharged, and by the ſeveral clauſes enabled to quit the militia for that purpoſe, may enliſt. If ſingle ſentences in an Act were at pleaſure to be conſtrued ſubſtantively, and to ſhake off the controul of explanatory clauſes, every Act would become nonſenſe at the will of the executive government, and defeat the clear object of the legiſlature; but the noble Secretary would be embarraſſed with this mode of conſtruing the Act, if it was admitted as ſound, for if the words *any militia man* can, by ſhaking off the explanatory aid of other clauſes, ſtand for all militia men whatever, it muſt include in this range the militia of Scotland, as well as the original militia of England and Wales; but government has not thought fit to tamper with the feelings of that jealous people. The addreſs and management ſo much vaunted, has prudently ſtopt ſhort on the confines of Scotland. It will be ſtill more difficult if poſſible for the advocates of the meaſure to ſhow that the Act extends to the volunteers raiſed by private ſubſcriptions under the 34th of the King; for not only all the above reaſoning applies to the volunteers; the Act under which they were raiſed is in no part repealed, and they remain untouched, as appears by the clauſe ſumming up the quota; and there is not a ſyllable in the Act that applies in the moſt diſtant manner to the reduction of, or recruiting from the volunteers; but government muſt alſo impute the moſt groſs and palpable injuſtice to the legiſlature in ſuppoſing that they could have intended to divert money given by private ſubſcribers, from the ſpecified and declared purpoſes of their own domeſtic defence, within the iſland (and accepted as ſuch by the legiſlature) to purpoſes of a very different nature, namely, an attempt to re-eſtabliſh the ſubverted government of Holland. I do not mean to cenſure the meaſure of *ſo employing* the diſpoſeable force, but of *ſo obtaining* a diſpoſeable force. I am willing to give credit to government for the attempt on Holland, whatever may be its ſucceſs, if the juſtifiable means were adequate, and they have (as I truſt they have) had good grounds for conſidering the ſucceſs probable; but I mean diſtinctly to affirm, that nothing can juſtify the legiſlature in diverting money ſubſcribed and accepted for one purpoſe, to another clearly different, without the conſent of the ſubſcribers, who would by this meaſure be ſhamefully defrauded of their money under falſe pretences; but the legiſlature has not been guilty of ſuch an outrageous

act, it has been done by that fineſſe and management in miſcontruing the act, whoſe praiſes we have juſt heard. The noble Earl (Weſtmoreland) ſays, that the men have willingly entered into the ſervice; I doubt not they have; but the meaſure is not to be eſtimated by the approbation of the men, and in that caſe the majority who did not enter would be deciſive againſt the meaſure; but the inclination of men to change from one ſervice to another for a large ſum of money, does not make the meaſure leſs a breach of faith with the land-owners, who are ſtill loaded with the expence of their internal defence, when they are deprived of the ſecurity which they had purchaſed. I never doubted that ſoldiers may be obtained by money to get drunk with, and by all the tricks of alehouſe ſeduction: the management and addreſs is not very creditable which ſucceeds in debauching with public money men already encumbered with another ſervice; and indeed I have a right to conſider it as diſgraceful when the legiſlature takes ſhame to itſelf for giving ſanction to ſuch a *management* by ſolemnly aſſuring the very men, they had ſo ſeduced, in the very act by which they were ſo ſeduced, that at no future time they ſhould ever be transferred from the regiment they now enter into, *not even with their own conſent until they ſhall firſt be diſcharged from all ſervice whatever.*

I am conſcious (ſaid the noble Lord) that I trouble your Lordſhips in vain, the evil is as the noble Secretary ſays, already done, and I am not ſo romantic as to reſiſt individually and alone the falſe conſtruction of the Act of laſt ſeſſions, and I much fear the practical conſtruction in the execution of that Act may be ſuppoſed to colour the meaning, which the words even of the preſent Act have not. The meaning of the authors of this meaſure is at leaſt ſufficiently clear, and it is my duty reſiſt it here. The extent to which the avowed principle is carried, is to me a matter of very ſecondary importance; it is the ſyſtem of an inalienable home defence, under the command of gentlemen of independent fortune, that is alone, in my eſtimation, an object of conſtitutional value. The militia was a force by which the combined zeal and patriotiſm of the whole country was called forth and intereſted in the defence of the country (if attacked within the iſland) in the only way in which the zeal of unprofeſſional men can be called forth; it is not the numbers, but the ſyſtem, violated by this meaſure which is of importance. It is therefore a vain ſuggeſtion that there will poſſibly

poſſibly be ſtill left a number ſufficient to preſerve entire the original eſtabliſhment. The militia is a force of a peculiar ſort, not an army ſufficiently deſcribed by its numbers. After the whole body of militia has been reduced by furniſhing recruits to the army, there may remain, for any thing I know to the contrary, numbers equal to the original eſtabliſhment, ſpread through the various corps, original, ſupplementary, and volunteers, but the original militia cannot be re-compoſed by adding to its remains a number equal to its old eſtabliſhment drawn from the remnants of the other corps. The men of the two laſt. are not ſworn in for the ſame ſervice; the officers of the ſupplementary are not qualified by the ſame neceſſary property; the two laſt corps have no exiſtence beyond the war, they cannot therefore complete that militia which continues to exiſt in peace. Theſe ſeveral corps are not convertible the one into the other; they may be added aud ſpliced together during their mutual exiſtence into an heterogeneous compound, and form for a time a miſerable regiment of ſhreds and patches, no longer feeling themſelves the champions of their country reſerved for the laſt ſtake; but degraded to that ſituation of a drill for the army, and burthenſome to thoſe they were raiſed to defend. This perverſion of the militia once carried into execution, irrecoverably deſtroys it; the legiſlature has not, in its omnipotence power to reſtore it. You never can hereafter revive the confidence you have deſtroyed; you cannot expect that unprofeſſional gentlemen will again labour in the formation of regiments which they can have no expectation to command in the moment of danger; they muſt remember that their zeal and labour has been rewarded by the transfer of its object to another; they muſt know and well remember that thoſe who direct the military arrangements of the country hold in averſion the conſtitutional ſyſtem of militia, and have ſought every opportunity of depreſſing its zeal, and reducing it to a ſtanding army; they will never take pride in forming regiments which will be from time to time diſorganized to ſupply the deficiencies of the army; and the counties from whence they ſprung will not without murmur ſubmit to pay out of their private purſe the levy of recruits for the army. If the noble Lord really expects that the zeal of gentlemen of independent fortune will ſurvive this blow, he has a different opinion of mankind than any other perſon I have converſed with; indeed the authors of this bill have thought that the approbation of officers muſt be

obtained by other means, and they have introduced a clauſe as diſgraceful to the propoſers as it is to the perſons who are the objects of it. I allude to the ſhameful and iniquitous clauſe which enables the King to continue during pleaſure the pay of officers rendered uſeleſs by the deprivation of the men: it is a flagitious bribe held out to officers to perſuade them to become the corrupt inſtruments of the ſeduction of the men they command from the ſervice they are engaged in; it is a diſgraceful military penſion held out to reconcile ſelf-intereſt to a bad meaſure, by placing officers without ſervice, and its concomitant expences, in a better pecuniary ſituation than thoſe officers who retain the labour and expence of their vocations. I have taken too much of your time on a ſubject for which I think it is too late to find a remedy. Government has thought fit to deſtroy a militia which was the pride of the country, and of little burthen to the public purſe, and that in the midſt of an alarming war, at a moment when 50 ſail of the line are in Breſt harbour fit for ſea, and which a little change in the ſituation of the continental war will make again formidable to our coaſt. When the danger revives, and domeſtic defence is again wanted, the bad policy of deſtroying the militia will be felt to effect, which has been as much the object as getting a few more men, than might have been obtained by diſbanding the ſupplementary, in order to recruit from the increaſed numbers in the public ſtock.

The Earl of *Weſtmoreland* ſaid, he had made the obſervation that the militia officers were not adverſe to the bill, becauſe he did not hear more than one militia officer object to it in another Houſe of Parliament, and in their own Houſe that day he ſaw but few militia officers preſent.

The Earl of *Carnarvon* ſaid the bill of laſt year had been introduced at a late period of a protracted ſeſſion, when few noble Lords belonging to the militia were in town; but that if the noble Earl imagined that the militia officers in general approved of the bill, becauſe at ſuch an unuſually early opening of a ſeſſion, few of them appeared in Parliament to oppoſe it, he was miſerably miſtaken.

The Earl of *Hardwicke* ſaid he admitted that the bill was liable to much objection, and that it contained many things that muſt be felt by militia officers as grievous and painful, but that the propriety of enlarging the offenſive force of the country induced him to give it his ſupport, much as he deplored the neceſſity for any ſuch bill. His Lordſhip ſaid, he flattered himſelf that the militia officers would paſs over any little

little temporary inconveniences that they might be put to in conſequence of the meaſure then under conſideration, and recollect that it was the intereſt of the country gentlemen and landholders to lay aſide all perſonal conſiderations, and cordially to co-operate with the Legiſlature in adopting ſuch meaſures as were the beſt calculated to accelerate a ſafe and permanent peace. His Lordſhip reminded the Houſe of the very different ſtate of the country in point of ſafety when the augmentation of the militia was propoſed from what it was at preſent. That augmentation was called forth about nine or twelve months after the bill paſſed, becauſe then the French were making peace with the powers of the continent, concentrating a large maſs of force and marching them to their weſtern coaſts for the purpoſe of invading this kingdom. It was conſequently neceſſary to increaſe our internal defenſive force as much as poſſible. No man would aſſert that the ſame danger threatened now. On the contrary, the change of affairs pointed out the policy of diminiſhing our defenſive force and increaſing our offenſive force. For theſe and other reaſons which his Lordſhip aſſigned, he declared that although he ſaw conſiderable objections to the bill if it had been introduced under other circumſtances, he ſhould now think it his duty to vote for the bill.

Lord *Grenville* ſpoke to the following effect: my Lords, I ſhall not detain the Houſe long on a ſubject which has been already ſo fully and ably diſcuſſed, particularly as much has been anticipated of what I wiſhed to obſerve. With reſpect to the inconveniences likely to ariſe from the operation of the bill now before your Lordſhips, I have only to obſerve, that an argument of a ſimilar kind, might with equal propriety, be advanced againſt every meaſure of public utility. I am ready to admit that the bill will be productive of ſome inconveniences, but however great they may be, they muſt, when compared with the vaſt advantages likely to reſult from the meaſure, prove partial and trifling in their effect. It would indeed be peculiarly hard, when the exigencies of the public ſervice are duly conſidered, that the officers of the militia ſhould be permitted to keep on the defenſive a force in every reſpect adequate to act with effect on the offenſive, for the attainment of our general welfare and the ſecurity of our deareſt intereſts. In diſcuſſing the preſent queſtion, we cannot too attentively direct our conſideration to the nature of the times, and to the alteration which has taken place in political circumſtances. It has been ſaid, that the officers

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are ſenſibly affected at being deprived of the command of men whom they have diſciplined; but would it not be a curious kind of argument againſt the bill were they to ſay in defence of their conduct in reſiſting the meaſure, "we have trained a body of men able to ſerve their country; yet we cannot agree, that they ſhall volunteer their ſervices when the moment which peculiarly calls for manly and patriotic exertion is arrived?" Yet, my Lords, to that effect do the arguments tend which are brought forward againſt the bill. The noble Lord, my relation, has inferred from the preamble, that the bill does not apply to the old militia, but he will give me leave to obſerve that his inference is very much ſtrained. For to deduce any argument from the preamble, when the bill itſelf may be more juſtly referred to, is a proceeding rather out of the way. If therefore he will take the trouble of conſulting the clauſes, he will find, that it applies to any militia of the country, and not to the ſupplemental militia only. The enactment is diſtinct and undeniable, and relates to any militia; and if I am called upon to go further with my opinion, I have no heſitation in ſaying, that both bills do apply to all the militia. It is not, however, neceſſary now to enter into a recapitulation of what has been urged in the conſideration of the act of laſt ſeſſion, or to call the attention of the Houſe to a ſubject which was then ſo fully diſcuſſed. But it has been obſerved by my noble relation, that to convert what has been termed the conſtitutional defence of the country into a diſpoſeable military force, would be conſidered as a breach of faith with reſpect to the officers, the land-holders, and the farmers. I anſwer, no ſuch thing. For it is in reality converting it to the ſecurity and promotion of their happineſs and permanent intereſts. I grant it is not made to act within the kingdom, but the vigorous co-operation which our external efforts receive from it, muſt ultimately tend to the advantage and glory of the kingdom, and conſequently to the eſſential benefit and proſperity of the officers, land-holders, and farmers. With reſpect to any apprehenſion of a diminution of ſpirit and zeal throughout the country, ſo far am I from being alarmed by fears of that nature, that I am convinced, if we are to form an opinion of the future from the paſt and preſent glorious exertions of the country, in the arduous conteſt in which we are engaged, they will, on the contrary, increaſe and give additional energy to the meaſures of Government. Many ſtatements have been made

made by a noble Lord with reſpect to the expedition for the deliverance of Holland, and I can aſſure the noble Lord that I perfectly coincide with him in many of his poſitions. He admits that the reſtoration of the ancient Government would be an advantage to this country. In that ſtatement we cordially agree. He has ſtarted as an objection to me, that I formerly ſaid that Government contained in itſelf principles of inherent weakneſs, and carried in its boſom the ſeeds of its own diſſolution. Here alſo I agree with the noble Lord, and freely allow that I did make uſe of ſentiments to a ſimilar effect. But does it therefore follow from my admiſſion, that we are not to exert ourſelves in the reſtoration of a Government ſo formed, and for the weakneſs of which we cannot be accountable? Is it not evident, that if the ancient Government of Holland be once reſtored, it will be capable, like our own, of correcting the defects, and remedying the evils with which it has been vitiated? But perhaps the noble Lord is more inclined to pay reſpect to authorities than to arguments, and I am enabled to gratify him even in that point. Has he ever heard of the attempt made by this country, and its zealous interference in 1787, to preſerve the tranquillity of Holland from the violent exceſſes of a turbulent democracy? Even at that period, ſituated as we were, after a long and ruinous war, with our reſources impaired, and our finances diſtreſſed, we ventured, at the riſk of every thing, to ſtep forward in a bold and manly manner, to afford that aſſiſtance to Holland of which ſhe then ſtood ſo much in need. The conduct of Government upon that momentous occaſion was even approved by thoſe moſt agreeable at preſent in political ſentiment to the noble Lord, yet he now finds in it a ſubject of reprehenſion. He ſays the expedition is not ſanctioned by the wiſhes and co-operation of the people of the country. I do not deſire to puſh my opinion in this inſtance as far as the noble Lord, for it is not my wiſh to conſider the reſtoration of the ancient Government as connected with the inhabitants in a numerical point of view. But let us, my Lords, take the queſtion fairly, and conſider how far we are ſupported by facts. In referring therefore to them, we find that wherever opportunities have been given to the people to declare themſelves in favour of their ancient lawful Government, they have uniformly adopted that line of conduct. If we are to be influenced in our judgments by circumſtances devoid of doubt, and not by idle ſpeculations, what is the inference which

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we are authoriſed to draw from the events which have already occurred? Is it no proof of the ſenſe of the Dutch people in favour of the reſtoration of their former Government, that the ſailors of the fleet, forming a conſiderable body of them, ſeized the firſt opportunity of returning to that order of things under which they were once happy and flouriſhing? But without adverting to facts, we are furniſhed with abundant proofs of the wiſhes of the Dutch in the nature of man; and when we conſider the inſults experienced by them from the wanton tyranny of the French, the annihilation of their commerce from the deſtructive policy of their pretended allies, the total degradation of their national pride and the plunder of their property, can we be at a loſs to come to a deciſion with reſpect to the real wiſhes of the people of Holland as to the iſſue of the expedition? Many alluſions have been made to the lawful Government of Holland, and I beg leave, my Lords, to ſay a few words on that head. The noble Lord has ſtated that the Stadtholder has been named in an official paper as the legitimate ſovereign of that country, but he muſt be perfectly aware that the ſovereignty reſided in the States General. But he probably alludes to an article ſuppoſed to be written by a naval officer, and publiſhed in a Dutch Paper, of which I profeſs myſelf to have no knowledge but through that channel. The language of the noble Lord with reſpect to the Dutch poſſeſſions which have fallen into our power, would have been more ſuitable to the character of General Brune and General Daendels, and it would be extremely improper to diſcuſs here what the terms of adjuſtment may be hereafter.

Lord Grenville concluded his reply to the opponents of the bill, by obſerving, that we had uniformly evinced the ſincereſt proofs of our deſire to re-eſtabliſh the happineſs and independence of Holland, that we had even offered, during the negociation with France, to reſtore to the Dutch their moſt valuable poſſeſſions, provided France left them in the enjoyment of their rights; and that the object of the bill was to eſtabliſh on a permanent baſis the real intereſts of this country.

Lord *Holland* ſaid, he would only detain their Lordſhips two minutes to explain. The noble Lord, as uſual, had miſconceived his argument. He had argued on the good of the expedition to Holland, and counterbalanced it with the evils that might reſult from it; whereas the noble Secretary of State ſpoke of his admiſſions as if he had made uſe of them

them as arguments againſt the bill. With regard to the word *numerically*, which the noble Lord had that evening, as he had often before, put into his mouth, he defied him to ſhew that he had, either then or on any former occaſion, made uſe of it. He ſaw with what view the noble Secretary choſe to impute the mention of the word numerically to him; but he never would ſit ſilent and ſubmit to ſuch an imputation. His Lordſhip ſaid, undoubtedly, he ſhould always feel the utmoſt reſpect for that authority referred to in the latter part of the noble Lord's ſpeech; but, in reſpect to the matter alluded to, he happened to entertain an opinion different from that which fell from the authority in queſtion, of whom it was always the cuſtom of the noble Secretary to ſpeak in the manner that he had done that night.

Lord Holland complimented Lord Hardwicke, who had, he ſaid, with gread candour put the argument on its right grounds, viz. that as it was neceſſary to diminiſh our defenſive and increaſe our offenſive force, he would ſupport the bill, though admitted, it was liable to great objection.

The Houſe divided,

Contents - 26 | *Not-Contents* - 3

The bill was ordered to be committed the next day.

Adjourned at half paſt eight.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

FRIDAY, OCT. 4.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the Bill for ſtopping Diſtilleries, which was read, agreed to, the bill was ordered to be engroſſed, and to be read a third time the next day, if then engroſſed.

Mr. *Roſe* brought up the Bill for continuing the Duty upon Malt, &c. Read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

As alſo the Bill for continuing the duty as a Land Tax on all Places, Penſions, &c. which paſſed through the ſame ſtage.

Mr. *Roſe* alſo brought up a Bill for enabling his Majeſty's Commiſſioners of Cuſtoms to allow Britiſh Plantation Sugar to be warehouſed, and to take Bonds for the payment of Duties thereon in certain caſes, &c. Read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

Mr. *Roſe* brought up a Bill for raiſing Money by Loans

on Exchequer Bills to a certain amount, for the year 1800, read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

Colonel *Gaſcoyne* brought up a Bill for enabling his Majeſty to direct the iſſue of Exchequer Bills to a limited amount, and in the manner therein mentioned, for the Relief of the Merchants of Liverpool and Lancaſter. Read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that the 38th of George III. cap. 6 and 39. Geo. III. cap. 21 and 108, be read; which being done *pro forma*,

He moved, that leave be given to bring in a Bill to extend the period for giving preference to certain bodies therein mentioned, for the Redemption of the Land Tax. Granted.

The Bill for amending certain parts of the Income Bill was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole Houſe the next day.

WAR IN INDIA.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* then roſe to call the attention of the Houſe to a ſubject of which he had given notice, which was, to move thanks to a noble perſon who had a great ſhare in the late glorious war in India.

He confeſſed himſelf at a loſs to expreſs every thing he felt on this occaſion, and probably the beſt way would be for him to confine himſelf within a very narrow compaſs. With this view it was, that he moved for the papers which were now upon the table relating to the ſubject, by which every perſon who peruſed them was enabled to judge of the merits of this important buſineſs.

The Houſe would recollect that at the commencement of the adminiſtration of his hon. Friend in India, the affairs of that part of the globe were a good deal diſcuſſed; for it was a topic on which gentlemen differed in that Houſe, particularly with regard to the mode in which thoſe invaluable poſſeſſions ſhould be governed; but there was one topic on which there was no difference of opinion in the Houſe. Indeed it was a thing on which the underſtandings were ſatisfied; that where there was an immenſe territory ſo far removed from the Britiſh empire, it was in vain to think it could be governed otherwiſe than by a mixture of different ingredients; that on the one hand there ſhould be a powerful and energetic force capable of reſiſting thoſe whoſe ſyſtem made them the diſturbers of the peace of the world, but that

that this mere power would but ill anſwer the purpoſe for which we held a Government in India; it ſhould therefore be mixt and tempered with a due portion of juſtice, moderation, humanity, and a regard for and attention to the intereſts of others. Theſe were things on which the common underſtandings of mankind were ſatisfied, and without a due regard to them it was impoſſible that we ſhould continue our power in India. It was with this view that he thought neceſſary theſe papers ſhould be produced, and he was confident he did not ſay too much when he ſaid the peruſal of them would give ſatisfaction to every man who had at heart the intereſt of this country, and knew the value of its poſſeſſions. The propoſition eſtabliſhed by theſe papers was, that every exertion was made that could be made on our part to avoid hoſtilities with Tippoo Sultaun; and there does not remain any doubt on the face of theſe papers that while he was profeſſing an unlimited friendſhip for this country, there was ſtrong preſumptive evidence now brought clearly to light by the unequivocal diſcovery which has been made, that at that very period, and when he was evading every explanation with this country, poſtponing it under futile and idle pretences, he was determined to do every thing in his power to work our deſtruction in India; he endeavoured to amuſe us until he thought the military preparations he had made would be fit for open hoſtility, and while he was thus endeavouring to impoſe upon the government of India, he was ſecretly, as he thought, entering into an agreement with the enemy of this country.

He did not take notice, he ſaid, of the papers to which he referred for the truth of theſe aſſertions, becauſe to thoſe who heard the papers, the matter was too clear to need illuſtration, and it would be only conſuming time to advert to them.

Under ſuch circumſtances, the government of India was critical; the Governor General was not to enter haſtily into an attack, nor was he to wait at all events until the attack was made on us, or until an advantage was obtained againſt us. The firſt thing he was to ſay of the Earl of Mornington was, that in this delicate and critical ſituation, was to be ſeen on his part an accurate medium, ſuitable to the real intereſt of the Britiſh empire. On the one hand he was forcible and dignified, and on the other, cautious of entering into an open rupture, a thing long determined on by the enemy; this he carried perhaps beyond the verge of prudence, but where there was complete ſucceſs in the reſult, it was never gracious

to complain of the moderation of the ſucceſsful party. God forbid he ſhould ſay any thing againſt the moderation of his noble Friend when the ſupport of the dignity of Great Britain was his object; and without adverting to particulars he would only ſay that the conduct of Lord Mornington was of the moſt maſterly kind; but in ſpeaking of that conduct he could not forbear obſerving that it was in train, and was part of a ſyſtem which he found eſtabliſhed when he went to India; he walked in the footſteps of that illuſtrious perſon whoſe conduct in the former war in India was highly honourable to the Britiſh name. [Here he ſpecified ſome of the brave and worthy actions of Lord Cornwallis in India, as well as ſome of Earl Mornington's, and then obſerved] It was ſufficient to ſay, that on both occaſions the conduct of each of theſe illuſtrious perſons was complete, and directly tending to the glory and moſt valuable intereſts of the Britiſh empire, whether conſidered as to its moderation and dignity on the one hand, or for its prompitude, energy and vigour on the other.

Theſe obſervations applied merely to the *Myſore*; but there was another part of the conduct of Lord Mornington, and that which, in his opinion, formed the moſt prominent part of his character as a judicious ſtateſman. There was an army of 14,000 men, well diſciplined and trained, and guided by French officers, intended to act upon a plan of general confederacy, and which was to co-operate with a force in Egypt, for the purpoſe of accompliſhing our deſtruction in India, but Lord Mornington had the addreſs of annihilating the influence of the French, and of turning this army, thus intended for our deſtruction, into an engine for our ſupport. This was a circumſtance for which he thought we ought to be thankful to Providence. He obſerved alſo that great praiſe was due to General Baird for his brave conduct at the attack of Seringapatam. It was ſingular that this heroic officer was three years in impriſonment in irons, on the order of the very uſurper whoſe perfidy in this inſtance he was the inſtrument of Providence to puniſh.

Having ſaid this, he thought he was now called on to advert to another noble and illuſtrious character, who had acted in a manner ſo glorious that a man of a little mind could ſcarcely believe it of a human character; he meant the conduct of Lord Clive: it was not the conduct of a man affected by little jealouſy or peeviſh ambition, but it was plain, direct, open, honourable, cordial, and manly, ſuch as was worthy

thy the breaſt that pants for the glory of its country: he joined his efforts to thoſe of the Governor General for the common good. He ſaid this for various reaſons; he knew the private ſentiments and feelings of that Nobleman, and they were expreſſed in private correſpondence which he did not intend to reach his Majeſty's Miniſters, but which, as well as his actions, prove that he wiſhes to follow the glory of his illuſtrious anceſtor, who long ago laid the foundation of the Britiſh fame in India. Such was the feeling of Lord Clive, and he would ſay he was entitled to the warmeſt thanks of his country.

With regard to the military in general, he could only ſay, that from the higheſt of them to the loweſt, they vied with each other which of them ſhould do the moſt for the ſervice of his country, to all of whom a proper acknowledgment ſhould be made in that Houſe.

The papers before the Houſe, and to which he had already alluded, proved beyond the poſſibility of a doubt that this war on our part was purely defenſive; and the actions proved that all the perſons employed in it did their duty in the moſt gallant manner: they were entitled to the beſt thanks their country could give them; for by their efforts the Britiſh power in India was placed in a ſituation which nothing but miſmanagement could ever prevent from being permanent and moſt glorious. The world muſt know that we are great and powerful in India; and that, if neceſſary, we can repel an aggreſſion or reſent an inſult; and that we can call forth the vengeance of a great empire when any attack is made upon its intereſt or its honour; but above all, let the world know that we exerciſe our power with juſtice, and temper our reſentment with moderation. Let us bring the minds of the people of India to this reflection, that we are guided by humanity and mildneſs; that they will be ſafe only as they ſubmit to us; and that their happineſs, and that of their poſterity, will depend upon their being ſubjects of the Britiſh empire.

He then moved, that the thanks of this Houſe be given to the right hon. *R. Weſtley*, Earl of Mornington, Governor General of *India*, for the wiſdom, deciſion, and energy, diſplayed by him from the time of his taking upon him the government of *India* to the glorious termination of the late war by the capture of *Seringapatam*, &c. &c. Agreed to *nem. con.*

He then moved the thanks of the Houſe to Lord *Clive*, Governor of the ſettlement of *Fort Saint George*, for his zealous, cordial,

cordial, and honourable concurrence with the Governor General, &c. &c. Agreed to *nem. con.*

Thanks of the Houſe to *Jonathan Duncan*, Eſq. Governor of *Bombay*, for his zealous co-operation and ſupport, &c. &c. Agreed to *nem. con.*

Thanks of the Houſe to Lieutenant General *George Harris*, for the whole of his able and meritorious conduct in commanding the forces, &c. &c. Agreed to *nem. con.*

Thanks of the Houſe to Lieutenant General *James Stuart*, Commander in Chief of the *Bombay* army, for his co-operation, &c. &c. Agreed to *nem. con.*

That the Houſe doth acknowledge and approve the ſervices of the men, &c. Agreed to *nem. con.*

That Mr. Speaker do communicate theſe votes to Lord *Mornington*, &c. &c. Paſſed.

Sir *W. Young* moved the order of the day on the bill for allowing further time to certain perſons of the Iſlands of Grenada and St. Vincent's, to make good their payment of the inſtallments of a loan, due from them to the Public. The bill was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole Houſe the next day.

The bill for iſſuing Exchequer Bills to a certain amount on the credit of the laſt Duty upon Importation and Exportation, paſſed a Committee of the whole Houſe, and the report was ordered to be received the next day.

Deferred Committees of Supply and of Ways and Means to Monday. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER, 5.

The Houſe reſolved itſelf into a Committee on the New Militia Bill, and went through it without amendments. The report was ordered to be received on Monday, when the bill was ordered to be read a third time.

The Scotch Diſtillery Bill, and the Laws Expiring Bill, were brought up by Mr. Bragge and others, and read a firſt time. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5.

The bill for preventing Diſtilleries in Scotland was read a third time and paſſed. Its duration is until the 1ſt of March, 1802.

1800, but there is a power in it for the King in Council to allow the diſtilleries to take place at any time.

The Expiring Laws Bill was alſo read a third time and paſſed. This bill renews and continues until the 20th of February, 1800; the proviſions of the bill for the better Prevention and Puniſhment of Attempts to Seduce from their Duty any of his Majeſty's Forces by ſea or land, and alſo the bill to enable his Majeſty to accept the Services of ſuch Militia as may be willing to ſerve in Ireland.

The Malt Duty Bill was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole Houſe on Monday.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that the Act of the 37th of his preſent Majeſty be read, with a view, he ſaid, of ſupplying a defect in that ſtatute. It related to the power of his Majeſty to call Parliament together in 14 days by Proclamation. Parliament was at this inſtant acting for the advantage of the public, and aſſembled under that authority; but if they ſhould happen to ſeparate under an *adjournment* to a time more diſtant than public convenience required upon emergency they ſhould aſſemble, his Majeſty had no power to call them together before that period, becauſe the power given by the Act extended only to *prorogation*. The reaſon on which this power was given the Houſe would ſee applied equally to adjournment as prorogation: it was therefore adviſable to extend the power in that reſpect. The Act being read, he moved that leave be given to bring in a bill to empower his Majeſty to ſhorten the time of meeting of Parliament in caſes of adjournment. Granted.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Attorney and Solicitor General, and Mr. Bragge were ordered to prepare and bring in the bill.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of a bill to enable the Lords Commiſſioners of his Majeſty's Treaſury to iſſue Exchequer Bills on the credit of the duty on Exportation and Importation of Sugar, &c.

The amendments were read and agreed to, the bill ordered to be engroſſed, and to be read a third time on Monday, if then engroſſed.

The bill for impoſing the Duty as Land Tax on all Places, Penſions, &c. was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed to a Committee of the whole Houſe on Monday;

As was alſo the bill for empowering Commiſſioners of the Cuſtoms

Cuſtoms to allow Britiſh Plantation Sugar to be warehouſed, and to take Bonds for the Payment of the Duty, &c.;

As was alſo another Exchequer Bills' Bill for the ſervice of the year 1800;

As was alſo the bill for enabling his Majeſty to direct the iſſue of Exchequer Bills to a limited amount, and in a manner therein mentioned, for the Relief of the Merchants of Liverpool and Lancaſter, &c.

The bill for amending ſome part of the Income Tax paſſed a Committee of the whole Houſe, and the report was ordered to be received on Monday.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* brought up a bill for empowering his Majeſty to ſhorten the time of meeting the two Houſes of Parliament in caſes of adjournment. Read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time on Monday.

Mr. *Tierney* aſked if there was any objection to printing this bill?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, it was merely to extend to adjournment the power which his Majeſty poſſeſſed already in caſe of prorogation of Parliament.

RUSSIAN TROOPS.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid that the treaties between his Majeſty and the Emperor of Ruſſia, although for ſome time laid before the Houſe, not having yet been printed, he had been induced to go down to the Houſe in the morning for the purpoſe of peruſing them, and finding them to be of the higheſt importance he was deſirous to know when it was Mr. Pitt's intention to have them taken into conſideration. In the laſt ſeſſion a ſubſidy had been voted for 45,000 Ruſſian troops, and it now appeared that ſince that Treaty another had been entered into for 17,000 more to ſerve at our expence in Holland.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that the Houſe having in the laſt ſeſſion approved of a Ruſſian ſubſidy, and alſo given his Majeſty's Miniſters a vote of credit, he ſhould not think it neceſſary to bring the ſubject again before Parliament. With reſpect to the Treaties they would be printed.

Mr. *Tierney* replied, that the ſubſidy to which he more particularly alluded, was one which had not before been communicated to Parliament, and conſequently had not received its ſanction. Of the terms he would now ſay nothing: whether they were extravagant or otherwiſe he would not diſpute.

diſpute. All he contended for was, that as a grant of public money, it ought to be diſtinctly voted. But even putting this out of the queſtion there was one article in this latter Treaty which alone would demand the immediate attention of the Houſe. It is expreſsly ſtipulated that in the event of the 17,000 Ruſſians not being able to remain in Holland, they are to be brought to this country, and maintained here during the winter. This, ſaid Mr. Tierney, is a moſt alarming, and, as I take it, unprecedented circumſtance. I do not believe that in any former Treaty with any power ſuch a ſtipulation is to be found. There certainly have been inſtances of foreign troops being landed in England, but their arrival has been excuſed as the conſequence of ſome unforeſeen and unavoidable emergency, and the fact has always been immediately communicated to Parliament by a meſſage from the Crown. Here 17,000 Ruſſians are brought in deliberately and by treaty. What may be the juſtification intended to be ſet up for this meaſure I know not, nor is this the time to diſcuſs it; but ſurely the right honourable Gentleman will not perſiſt in refuſing to name a day for taking the ſubject into conſideration, and by ſome motion, giving an opportunity to Parliament to deliberate upon ſo important a queſtion.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer making no reply whatever,

Mr. *Tierney* roſe again and ſaid, as the right honourable Gentleman does not think fit to bring the ſubject forward, I feel it my duty, ſtrictly ſpeaking, to do ſo. But when I conſider how many Members have quitted town under an idea that no further buſineſs was to come on; when I recollect that a call of the Houſe has already been reſiſted by Miniſters, and when I reflect upon a variety of other circumſtances connected with the preſent ſtate of Parliament, I perſuade myſelf that I ſhall ſtand excuſed in the eſtimation of the country, if I decline making any motion. I have ſtated the facts: I can do no more."

The Bill for extending the period for the benefit of bodies contracting for the Land Tax, was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time on Monday.

The Committee on the Bill for extending the time for the payment of certain Inſtalments on a Loan due from the Merchants of Grenada and St. Vincent's was poſtponed to Monday, on the motion of Mr. Alderman Lufhington.

Mr. *Roſe* moved, that the Houſe ſhould reſolve itſelf into

a Committee, to conſider the Duties on Starch imported. He ſtated his object to be to equaliſe the duties on ſtarch imported with the home made, which he conceived would have the effect of lowering the very high price to which this article had riſen within the laſt fortnight. He accordingly propoſed a reſolution in the Committee to that effect, which was agreed to, and the report ordered to be received on Monday.

Previous to the ſecond reading of the Bill for reducing the duties on Spirits made from molaſſes, Mr. *Bucknell* expreſſed a wiſh that (on account of the great abundance of apples), if it could be done without infringing upon the exciſe laws, the ſame reduction of four-pence three farthings might be extended to the duties on cyder. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

MONDAY, OCT. 7.

On the queſtion for the third reading of the Militia Reduction Bill,

Lord *Holland* ſaid, he underſtood that this bill had gone through the Committe on Saturday laſt; but he had not known that the bill was either to be committed, or that the Houſe was to meet on that day. He did not therefore attend the Houſe on Saturday, for which he begged pardon of their Lordſhips. It had been his intention to propoſe ſome alterations in the Committee, if he had been preſent at the time; but as he was not, it was then his intention to move, that the bill be recommitted in order that he might propoſe ſome alterations which he conceived to be extremely material. The firſt of theſe reſpected one word in the preamble of the bill, which was the word *lawful*. This was the epithet by which the ancient Government of Holland was denominated, and by which it was evidently meant that the preſent Government in Holland was *not* a lawful Government. This was an expreſſion which he highly diſapproved of upon ſeveral grounds; eſpecially on the ground that no one country had a right to decide as to the legality or illegality of the Government which might exiſt in any other country. Great Britain had no right to enquire how the powers of Government were exerciſed in Holland, with a view of altering ſuch government as one which it diſapproved of. It was ſufficient for nations independent of each other that their reſpective governments were capable of managing their own concerns, whether in peace or war. But it was very

well

well known that there was at preſent a government in Holland, and it was not for the government of any other country, whether hoſtile or otherwiſe, to ſay that ſuch was not a lawful government. He objected alſo to this expreſſion on the ground of policy. It was more than poſſible that the forces of this country might fail in their efforts to reſtore the ancient government of Holland, and that his Majeſty's Miniſters ſhould ultimately be obliged to treat for peace with that very government whoſe legality they now denied; he conceived, therefore, that this expreſſion, which at preſent could have no good effect, would in that caſe only widen the breach, and be a ſtumbling block in the way of negociation. The preſent expreſſion, beſides, was a contradiction to the former conceptions of Miniſters; who, during the negociations carried on at Liſle, did acknowledge this very government. Conſidering ſuch an expreſſion, therefore, in a public Act of Parliament as likely to be highly prejudicial to the future intereſts of this country, he would, if his motion for recommitment was agreed to, propoſe that *ancient*, or ſome expreſſion equally harmleſs, ſhould be ſubſtituted in the room of *lawful*. There was only one other part of the bill in which he would propoſe any alteration; it was that which ſtated that the ſervices of the men who were to enliſt from the militia ſhould be confined to Europe. He conceived, that after thoſe men were diſcharged from the militia and enliſted into the regulars, they became to all intents and purpoſes a part of the ſtanding army of the country, between which and the militia there was the wideſt difference; and conſidering them as ſuch, it would, in his opinion, be creating a moſt invidious diſtinction between them and the remaining parts of the ſtanding army, to allow to the one certain exemptions and privileges which the others were not entitled to, and among whom it might have the effect of creating diſcontents and jealouſies. With reſpect to the term of five years, he approved of ſuch a condition, and wiſhed the principle was ſo far carried into effect with all ſoldiers when enliſted, that they might be engaged to ſerve for a ſtipulated time, rather than for life. In order to have an opportunity of offering the amendments he mentioned, he would move that the bill be recommitted.

Lord *Grenville* obſerved, that in anſwer to the firſt propoſition advanced by the noble Lord, he could only ſay that the expreſſion he objected to was made uſe of for no other reaſon than becauſe the government alluded to in the bill,

and which it was the object of this country to reſtore, was the *lawful government* of Holland. It was that government, between which and the government of this country a treaty did exiſt at this moment; and his Majeſty knew of no other government in Holland, but that of the Stadtholder and the States. With reſpect to the other objection made by the noble Lord, as to the impropriety of ſpecifying in the bill the countries out of which theſe men were not to ſerve, it was known to a certainty that they were not to ſerve out of Europe; and their ſervices were even intended to be confined to Holland; therefore, as all theſe men were to be volunteers from the militia, it was conſidered that the circumſtances of mentioning in the bill that they were not to be ſent out of Europe, would rather operate as an inducement to them to come forward more readily and join the new levies.

Lord *Holland* did not conceive that the explanation of the noble Secretary was in any reſpect an anſwer to his firſt objection; on the contrary, the acknowledgment of the exiſtence of ſuch a treaty as that which he alluded to, while the powers with whom that treaty had been made did not exiſt, would increaſe the animoſity between this country and Holland; and as he obſerved before, render the attainment of peace more difficult, in caſe we ſhould not ſucceed in conquering Holland. Such was the animoſity that exiſted between this country and France after Louis the XIVth entered into a treaty with James the IId, as King of England, while the people of England no longer acknowledged him as ſuch. And ſuch muſt be the conſequence of this country entering into a treaty, or continuing to maintain a treaty at preſent with the Stadtholder. He could not help obſerving that the conſtant practice of his Majeſty's Miniſters was, to make uſe of irritating and galling expreſſions whenever they conceived their plans as likely to be attended with ſucceſs; which expreſſions they as conſtantly retracted when they were unſucceſsful; by which means they placed themſelves in an infinitely worſe ſituation; and in a ſituation which removed them a thouſand times farther from their object than if they had uſed no ſuch provocation. He would juſt aſk the noble Secretary, how it could poſſibly ſerve the cauſe of the Stadtholder, or promote the objects of our government, to inſert in the bill the word he objected to? He was ſure it could not; and he was as certain that it might do a great deal of miſchief.

Lord

Lord *Grenville* roſe to correct one of the noble Lord's ſtatements. His Majeſty had not made any treaty with the Stadtholder, but with the States General.

The motion for the recommitment was then put and negatived, and the bill was immediately read a third time and paſſed. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MONDAY, OCT. 7.

The Bill for extending the time to Corporate Bodies to purchaſe the Land Tax, was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed the next day.

The Exchequer Bills Bill was read a third time, and paſſed.

The Malt, Mum, Cyder, and Perry Duty Bill, the Bill for impoſing certain Duties on Penſions, Places, &c. Sugar, Malt, Snuff, and Tobacco, the Exchequer Loan Bill of laſt year, the Liverpool and Lancaſter Weſt-India Merchants Loan Bill, and the Grenada Loan Bill, each went through a Committee, and the reports were ordered to be received the next day.

The order of the day for the ſecond reading of the Meeting of Parliament Bill being read,

Mr. *Jones* ſaid, he did not object to the bill, but thought that in the preſent criſis of the civilized world, and eſpecially when he reflected on the agreeable news from Holland which he had heard ſince coming to the Houſe, the preſent ſitting ought to be permanent.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that the bill merely gave the ſame power to the Crown of calling together the Parliament in the caſe of its own Act, (an adjournment) as his Majeſty already poſſeſſed in caſe of prorogation. With reſpect to the period of adjournment, the preſent bill in no reſpect fixed it.

The bill was now read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed the next day.

The Molaſſes Duty Bill was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed the next day.

The reported reſolution of the Committee which ſat on Saturday, for the purpoſe of equalizing the Duties on Starch, was referred to the Committee on the above Bill.

A Meſſage was received from the Lords, ſtating, that their Lordſhips had agreed to the Militia Volunteer Bill.

On the motion of Mr. *Roſe*, the Houſe went into a Committee on the Sugar Drawback and Warehouſe Bill.

A clauſe

A clauſe was moved and agreed to, that the drawback ſhall continue to be paid, ſubject to certain regulations, until the 5th of May 1800.

The Houſe being reſumed, the report was ordered to be read the next day.

The other orders were deferred. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

TUESDAY, OCT. 8.

The Bill entitled "an Act for enabling his Majeſty to accept the Services of an additional number of Volunteers from the Militia, under certain Reſtrictions," received the Royal Aſſent by Commiſſion.

The Scots Diſtillery Bill and the Expiring Laws' Bill paſſed the Committees of the whole Houſe, and were reported without amendment. Adjourned

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, OCT. 8.

The *Speaker* informed the Houſe he had been in the Houſe of Peers where the Royal Aſſent was given by commiſſion to the Bill to empower his Majeſty to accept the ſervices of ſuch of the Militia as may voluntarily enter, &c. in the regular ſervice, &c. under certain reſtrictions.

The Bill for amending certain parts of the Income Bill, &c. was read a third time, and paſſed.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the bill for enabling the Commiſſioners of the Cuſtoms to allow Britiſh Plantation Sugar to be warehouſed, and for taking Bonds for the payment of the Duty, &c.

After a ſhort converſation between Mr. *Sewell* and Mr. *Roſe* upon drawbacks, the amendments in the Committee were read, agreed to, ſome other amendments were made, and the report was ordered to be received the next day.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the Malt Duty Bill. Read, agreed to, bill ordered to be engroſſed, and read a third time the next day, if then engroſſed.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the Bill for continuing the Duty as a Land Tax on all Penſions, Places, &c. Read, agreed to, bill ordered to be read a third time the next day, if then engroſſed.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the Bill for raiſing a certain ſum of money by way of loan on Exchequer Bills.

Read,

Read, agreed to, bill ordered to be read a third time the next day if then engroſſed.

Mr. *Long* moved, that the Act of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, c. 114, relative to Exchequer Bills, &c. be read, which being done, he moved, "that leave be given to introduce a clauſe, providing that if Exchequer Bills ſhould be payable at a certain time, they ſhould be receivable as payment in any branch of the public revenue." This clauſe, he ſaid, he intended to propoſe on the third reading of the Exchequer Bills Bill the next day, if leave was given to bring it in. Leave given.

The Corporation Land Tax Extenſion Bill paſſed a Committee of the whole Houſe, the report was received immediately; read, agreed to, and the bill was ordered to be read a third time the next day, if then engroſſed.

Sir *W. Young* brought up the report of the Bill for allowing time to the Merchants of Grenada and Saint Vincent's, to make good the Payment of the Inſtalments due from them upon a Loan; read and agreed to; bill ordered to be read a third time the next day, if then engroſſed.

Mr. *Bragge* moved the order of the day for the Houſe to go into a Committee of the whole Houſe on the Bill to empower his Majeſty to ſhorten the time of meeting of the two Houſes of Parliament in caſes of adjournment. The bill paſſed the Committee; the report was received immediately, read, agreed to; bill ordered to be read a third time the next day, if then engroſſed.

Mr. *Pierrepont* brought up the report of the Bill for the iſſue of Exchequer Bills for the Relief of the Merchants of Liverpool and Lancaſter; read, agreed to; bill ordered to be read a third time the next day, if then engroſſed.

The Houſe in a Committee of the whole Houſe, to conſider of reducing the Duties on Spirits diſtilled from Sugar and Molaſſes, came to a reſolution upon that head, and alſo received a clauſe to provide for the reduction of the duty on Foreign Starch. Report to be received the next day. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

WEDNESDAY, OCT. 9.

The Scots Diſtillery and Expiring Laws Bill was read a third time and paſſed. The Exchequer Bills Bill, the Grenada and St. Vincent's Inſtalment Bill, the Malt Tax Bill, the

the Bill reſpecting Duties on Places and Penſions, the Bill for ſhortening the Notices for the Meeting of Parliament on an Adjournment, the Exchequer Loan Bill, the Bill for the Regulation of the Income Tax, &c. were brought up by Mr. Dent, Mr. Luſhington, and Mr. Bragge, and read a firſt time.

Mr. Tyrrell preſented a paper from the Corporation of the City of London relative to the improvement of the port of London, and the Wet Docks. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, OCT. 9.

The Malt, Mum, Cyder, and Perry Duty Bill was read a third time and paſſed.

Alſo the Bill for regulating the Duties on Starch, &c.

Mr. *Bragge* moved the third reading of the Bill for continuing the Duties as a Land Tax on all Penſions, Places, &c.

Alſo on Malt, Snuff, Tobacco, &c. The bill was read a third time and paſſed.

Mr. *Sheriff* brought up from the Corporation of the City of London a ſtatement of the progreſs made by the agents of the ſaid Corporation in executing the plan traced out by a late Act of Parliament for rendering more commodious the port of London. A ſtatement was alſo preſented of the progreſs made by the Weſt-India Merchants in forwarding a plan of the ſame nature.

Theſe ſtatements were read and ordered to lie upon the table for the peruſal of the Members.

On the motion of Mr. *Dent* the St. Vincent's and Grenada Merchants' Relief Bill was read a third time and paſſed.

The Bill for iſſuing Exchequer Bills for the accommodation of the Liverpool and Lancaſter Merchants was alſo read a third time and paſſed.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved the third reading of the Exchequer's Bills Bill for the ſervice of the year 1800.

Mr. *Tierney* expreſſed a wiſh to know at what time theſe Exchequer Bills ſhould become payable, and whether they did not interfere with the arrears of 1799? They would alſo, in his opinion, exceed, in ſome meaſure, the ſupply already granted by Parliament.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* contended, that the amount of

of the ſaid bills did not exceed what was already voted for the ſervices of the beginning of the year 1800. They were only iſſued to make good the amount of the Ways and Means already agreed to for the months of January and February, 1800. [A ſhort converſation here took place between Mr. Tierney and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, reſpecting the appropriation of two millions and a half, to be raiſed by the aforeſaid Exchequer Bills. Mr. Tierney contended that this ſum was wholly at the diſpoſal of Government without any controul whatever on the part of the Houſe of Commons. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the contrary, aſſerted that no ſuch diſpoſal of the public money reſted with the Treaſury; for it was already diſtinctly appropriated by Parliament for the ſervice of the army, navy, &c. for the beginning of the year 1800.] After ſome further explanation the bill was read a third time and paſſed.

The Corporation Land Tax Extenſion Bill was alſo read a third time and paſſed.

Mr. *Bragge* next moved the third reading of the Bill for empowering his Majeſty to ſhorten the time of the meeting of Parliament in caſes of adjournment, upon which

Mr. *Tierney* roſe and obſerved, that it was far from his thoughts to ſuſpect that Miniſters wiſhed to take any unfair advantage of the meaſure they now propoſed, but in his opinion, the meaſure, as it now ſtood, held out to them, or to any other deſcription of men in their ſituation, an opportunity of taking Parliament, as it were, by ſurpriſe, unleſs at the time the ſummons for the aſſembling of Parliament was iſſued, ſome grounds were alſo ſtated for calling Parliament together on ſo ſhort a notice; it was his wiſh to ſuggeſt, in caſes of this ſort, the propriety of enforcing a Call of the Houſe to accompany the ſummons for meetings of Parliament at the fourteen days notice.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* could not concur in this ſuggeſtion. There was no proviſion in any act of Parliament to enforce a Call of the Houſe; that was a meaſure which depended ſolely on the wiſdom and judgment of the Houſe itſelf; beſides, there could be no ſtronger Call upon Gentlemen to attend their Parliamentary duty than the ſpecial notice in queſtion iſſued by his Majeſty for the meeting of Parliament within fourteen days. On theſe grounds he muſt pronounce the propoſed ſuggeſtion to be uſeleſs.

Mr. *Tierney* was ſatisfied that his ſuggeſtion ſtood upon the moſt ſatisfactory grounds. The diſtance of a great number of Members from town, the attention they muſt neceſſarily

pay to their private affairs previous to their leaving their country reſidence, and, above all, the ſituation of the Scots Members made it almoſt impoſſible for them to reſume their Parliamentary duty at ſo ſhort a notice as fourteen days. Beſides, if ſuch were the diſpoſition of Miniſters, this innovation in the period that was to intervene between the meeting of Parliament after adjournments, would enable them to play almoſt any tricks that might promote their own meaſures and ſuit their own convenience. Beſides, it afforded an opportunity to Miniſters of appriſing their own particular friends of the time when Parliament was to meet, and of the meaſures which, on its meeting, they ſhould be called upon to diſcuſs. This, in his opinion, was an unfair advantage, and was wiſely guarded againſt by the wiſdom of our anceſtors, who looked upon forty days as not too long a notice. He wiſhed, therefore, that ſome clauſe might be introduced into the Bill to remove this inconvenience.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* repeated that the ſummoning the Houſe at fourteen days notice was as ſtrong a Call as, under the preſent circumſtances, could be enforced.

Mr. *Jones* thought there was ſome contradiction in the arguments of the right hon. Gentleman. He had oppoſed a Call of the Houſe on a former occaſion, when it was moved on the moſt urgent grounds by a very reſpectable Member, which motion he had the honour of ſeconding. The preſent criſis of affairs called for a very full attendance; and unleſs a greater number of Members were expected to attend at the next meeting after the approaching adjournment, it was his opinion that a Call of the Houſe ſhould be enforced.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that unleſs ſome more cogent reaſons were alledged for a Call of the Houſe than had been advanced upon a former occaſion, he would ſtill feel it his duty to oppoſe it as unneceſſary.

After a few words in explanation from Mr. Jones, ſome clauſes were added to the bill, which was then read a third time, and paſſed.

STATE OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS.

Mr. *Abbot* gave notice, that he ſhould take an early opportunity after the approaching receſs, of moving for an enquiry into the ſtate of the Public Records of the Kingdom, for the purpoſe of aſcertaining their preſent condition, of providing more effectually for their preſervation in future, and rendering the uſe of them more convenient to his Majeſty's ſubjects. He thought it proper to add, that the plan which he had it view to propoſe was the ſame as was undertaken

taken by Lord Hallifax in the reign of Queen Anne, and adopted by the Houſe of Commons, after the burning of the Cotton Library in the reign of his late Majeſty.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, it gave him great ſatisfaction to hear that the hon. Member had taken up this ſubject, as the Public Records were at preſent in a ſtate very much to be regretted; and he ſhould be happy to co-operate to the utmoſt with the hon. Member in the plan which he had brought forward.

The Bill for reducing the Duties on Spirits, &c. diſtilled from Molaſſes, &c. was read a third time and paſſed.

Alſo the Sugar Warehouſing Bill.

The Committee of Supply and of Ways and Means were then deferred till Friday, to which day, on the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Houſe adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THURSDAY, OCT. 10.

The Scotch Diſtillery Bill, and the Expiring Laws Bills, were read a third time and paſſed.

The Malt Tax Bill, the Duties on Places and Penſions Bill, the Bill for ſhortening notices for the meeting of Parliament in caſes of adjournment, the Bill for the Regulation of the Income Tax, and the bills brought up from the Commons the preceding day were ſeverally read a ſecond time.

The Bill for ſhortening notices for the meeting of Parliament in caſes of adjournment, alſo paſſed through a Committee of the whole Houſe, with one amendment moved by the Biſhop of Chicheſter. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11.

Lord *Holland* ſaid it was unneceſſary for him to make any apology for calling on the Houſe for its attention to a ſubject of which he had given notice, the ſubſtance of which he was about to open, and the whole of which he ſhould beg permiſſion to read at the concluſion of what he had to urge; his object was to move an Addreſs to be preſented to the Throne. He was however ready to confeſs that he was not ſo blind as not to ſee, nor ſo conceited as not to lament, that from the appearance of the Houſe it was evident that what he had

to offer was expected to be irkſome to their Lordſhips to hear; and that the more eſpecially as it was to come from a perſon who would not indeed have ſo often troubled the Houſe, unleſs impelled by the ſenſe he entertained of his duty, for by the ſingularity of his opinions he had unfortunately not the comfort of great ſupport in that Houſe. But following the light his underſtanding gave him, he ſtill thought it his duty to deliver his ſentiments, unwelcome as he had too much reaſon to apprehend they were to the Houſe. He would therefore ſay, that there never was a period, ſince the commencement of the conteſt in which we were engaged, in which we were ſo loudly called upon to try the effect of a negociation for peace, as the preſent period. Feeling this ſo forcibly as he did, he could not excuſe himſelf from the labour of laying before the Houſe reaſons why, in his opinion, their Lordſhips ought to addreſs his Majeſty in the preſent criſis.

In conſidering this ſubject he was firſt led to look at two treaties which had been entered into between his Majeſty and the Emperor of Ruſſia; the extravagance of ſome parts of thoſe treaties, and the ſingularity of one of the articles were ſuch, that under the feeling he had of the matter, he ſhould be an accomplice in an attack upon the Conſtitution of England if he did not lay his opinion, together with the motion with which he ſhould conclude, before their Lordſhips. Indeed the ſubſtance of what he had to ſubmit to the conſideration of the Houſe was ſuch as, under other circumſtances, might have demanded of him to make two motions; but feeling how irkſome it was likely to be to their Lordſhips to hear him more than once, he had determined to take that courſe which would lead him the leaſt to treſpaſs upon their indulgence. And now he would proceed to take a ſhort view of the Treaties at which he had already hinted.

It was a little remarkable that at an advanced period of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, it was aſſured by his Majeſty's communication, of the zeal and magnanimity of his Ally the Emperor of Ruſſia in the common cauſe; upon the faith of which Parliament voted moſt liberal ſupplies: but when Parliament were called together this ſeſſion for the intention, it was ſuppoſed, of merely enabling his Majeſty to avail himſelf of the ſervices of the Militia, it appeared that 17,000 men were to be added to the original 45,000, agreed upon by the former Treaty; and theſe 17,000 were agreed to be taken by this country, anterior to the Treaty for the 45,000, which were deemed ſufficient when the treaty for them

them was laid before Parliament. This was, to him, ſurpriſing when he firſt ſaw it; and he thought now that he could prove to the ſatisfaction of any perſon who ſhould attend to what he ſaid, that at the time when the treaty for the 45,000 men was laid before Parliament, Miniſters concealed from the people of England the agreement for the 17,000 additional Ruſſians; that while Miniſters were talking of the zeal and magnanimity of the Emperor of Ruſſia, and while they laid before the public a treaty about the 45,000, they knew that this ſame zealous, magnanimous Emperor, was ſtipulating for 62,000 of his troops to be taken into the pay of this country. It was a little extraordinary, that while that Monarch ſo full of zeal and magnanimity as he was in the common cauſe, ſo ſincerely engaged too, ſhould have endeavoured to make with us ſo very hard a bargain. When he was ſpeaking of the Emperor of Ruſſia, however, he begged to be underſtood as intending to convey no diſreſpect towards that Prince perſonally; he meant to ſpeak of the character of his Council; and therefore whenever he ſhould ſpeak of the Emperor of Ruſſia, he ſhould be taken to allude to the Court of Peterſburgh. The zeal and magnanimity of that Court he did not diſpute; on the contrary he thought them almoſt unbounded; but however highly we might think of them, it was a little unfortunate they ſhould bear ſo heavily on the purſe of this nation; it reminded him of a German proverb; "Give me a horſe of my friend's, and ſpurs of my own, and I will make the journey ſhort." This was a proverb that ſeemed to be pretty well underſtood on the Continent. Many of their Lordſhips recollected the Treaty with the King of Pruſſia. They recollected, perhaps, alſo ſome things that were ſaid upon that Treaty by a noble Lord (the Earl of Lauderdale) who now to the great loſs of that Houſe and the public was no longer among their Lordſhips. He dwelt upon the Treaty with Pruſſia with his uſual ability; he conſidered it as unprecedented in extravagance; he endeavoured to prove that Pruſſia was not ſincere in the cauſe in which he then was engaged; and to ſhew alſo that he was much more indifferent in it than Miniſters ſaid he was. He remembered, and ſo perhaps did ſome others in that Houſe, how very difficult it appeared to anſwer the arguments of that noble Lord; but upon a comparative eſtimate of things, that noble Lord's arguments upon that occaſion, might not only be anſwered fully, but might be anſwered triumphantly: it might be ſaid that the King of Pruſſia was calumniated when it was

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ſaid that he made a hard bargain with us, for that the zealous and magnanimous Emperor of Ruſſia had taken more for the ſame ſervice. Here the noble Lord went over the different items of charges made by the two Monarchs for the forces they ſtipulated to employ in the common cauſe, and maintained that the Emperor of Ruſſia was to receive 400,000l. more than the King of Pruſſia for the ſame force, that is to ſay, that the bargain between this country and Ruſſia was 400,000l. dearer than that which it concluded with the King of Pruſſia. Leaving the queſtion of prodigality in this bargain, as a thing not worth attending to, he would lay before the Houſe ſome obſervations upon another ſubject, which was indeed of much greater importance. By the 7th Article, between his Majeſty and the Emperor of Ruſſia, his Majeſty engages to receive 17,000 Ruſſian troops into England, and in one event to keep them here for the winter. His Lordſhip ſaid, he ſhould have thought there was no neceſſity to point out to the Houſe that the Crown of Great Britain has no right, conſequently no legal power, to introduce any foreign troops into Great Britain without the conſent, or ſubſequent approbation of Parliament. He knew there had been a diſcuſſion of that ſubject, and he knew there was but one perſon who entertained a doubt upon that ſubject, and even that perſon did not affirm the legality. The Bill of Indemnity that was moved for to protect thoſe who had adviſed the meaſure, was reſiſted, becauſe the neceſſity of the caſe was ſaid to be its juſtification. Had he been then in the Houſe, he believed he ſhould have voted for the Bill of Indemnity in that caſe, but here an engagement was made to receive into this iſland, and to provide for 17,000 foreign troops, without the approbation of Parliament. This, he underſtood, to be quite unconſtitutional. He was not aware of the neceſſity of quoting authorities upon this point, becauſe he conceived it to be clear, and upon which no doubt was entertained by any man who ever had any reputation as a man who underſtood the Conſtitution of England. However, to thoſe who called for authority for every thing, he would quote the Reſolution of the Houſe of Commons of 1641. Here his Lordſhip read the words of that Reſolution, the ſubſtance of which is, "That whoever ſhall give the Crown advice for the bringing into this country any foreign force without the conſent of Parliament, ſhall be adjudged an enemy to this kingdom." His Lordſhip then quoted the caſe of 1756, when Mr. Speaker

Speaker Onſlow, at the bar of the Houſe of Lords, made a ſpirited declaration againſt the landing of foreign troops without the approbation of Parliament, and conſidered an attempt to do it as an alarming thing. But without debating that point, which was indeed too clear to be doubted, he would only ſay, that if the Cabinet of Peterſburgh did not, the Cabinet of London did underſtand what it was to ſend a meſſage to Parliament, requiring its approbation to a meaſure of public conſequence. Such were the arguments to ſhew the illegally of the conduct of his Majeſty's Miniſters upon this occaſion; but, yet ſo dear to the nation was the faith of his Majeſty's public engagements, that he ſhould wiſh to ſee even this engagement fulfilled, illegal as it was; an illegality could be cured, but a breach of faith could not; and therefore his motion, after proteſting againſt the illegallity of the act, to prevent its being eſtabliſhed as a precedent, propoſed to carry it into effect. But here he could not help calling on the Houſe to conſider what would be the effect of ſuch a power of entering into engagements being veſted in the Crown; a power not pretending to have any legal exiſtence, and only defended in the exerciſe in 1794, upon the plea of abſolute neceſſity. This had no ſuch excuſe; here was a premiditated act; an engagement was entered into, though not carried into effect, and no communication was made upon the matter to Parliament; let this be acknowledged as a right, ſaid his Lordſhip, and it will remain as a precedent. If the Crown has this power, it muſt be notorious to the world that all the fine things which have been ſaid of your Conſtitution, are mere idle vapour, or unmeaning rant; that all the periods you have been turning with a view of illuſtrating the excellence of your Conſtitution, are a ſilly declamation; for that you have no liberty; you have not the ſkeleton of a free ſtate, nor any thing but the ſhadow of a Conſtitution; that you exiſt by the mere ſufferance of the Executive Government, that can overwhelm you at once with a foreign force; unleſs you enter a proteſt againſt this practice, there is no ſecurity for the perſonal freedom of any man in the kingdom for an hour. But it may be ſaid, that theſe fears and alarms are the mere idle ſpeculations of a viſionary politician, that they are the exaggerated deſcriptions of a factious ſpirit, and that there is no reaſon really to ſuſpect that his Majeſty's Miniſters will make any improper uſe of the ſtipulation they have entered into; to which I anſwer, whether I have any ſuſpicion

of

of them or not, my knowledge of the Conſtitution tells me I am bound to act as if I had ſuch ſuſpicions.

With regard to the particular object of the force in the treaty he had been alluding to, namely the Ruſſian force, the Houſe was in poſſeſſion of his opinion upon that ſubject already. He wiſhed to ſay nothing againſt that force: he did not believe it was in our power, nor in the power of the Emperor of Ruſſia, to change the opinion which the inhabitants, of Europe generally entertained of the conduct of the Ruſſians in war. It was moſt dreadful. This was a conſideration which prudence ought to take in charge on our part. We looked for conciliation with the people of Holland. They were, as appeared from hiſtory, a ſenſible people, attached to the comforts of life, and extremely attached to a ſyſtem of protection to property; it was therefore difficult to ſatisfy them by making their country the theatre of war. He would not dwell on the progreſs which had been made by us in Holland, which by the way, was much ſlower than Miniſters expected, for they thought that 30,000 men would have been ſufficient; they now found otherwiſe. But he would ſuppoſe that we were to march to Amſterdam, and even to Rotterdam, without reſiſtance—what then? without the poſſeſſion of the barrier towns, the whole of our ſucceſs would not do. Beſides, we could not ſupport even our poſſeſſions there for the winter without very large and powerful armies to reſiſt the irruption of the French. This, in his opinion, was a point of immenſe importance.

With regard to the general policy of an alliance between us and Ruſſia, while our views are the ſame, he ſaw no objection to it, for, under the preſent condition of things, Ruſſia might be ſaid to be a natural ally of Great Britain; but then came a queſtion which was very well worth conſidering: "May not Ruſſia differ in her views from Great Britain?" There was a declaration, which, if not authentic, he ſhould be glad to have that ſtated. It was a declaration of war on the part of Ruſſia againſt Spain. Here his Lordſhip read a part of the declaration he had been alluding to; and obſervedly, whether it was authentic or not, it was moſt manifeſt that the policy of this country to ſhew a deſire to negociate for peace at this moment. Indeed it was his opinion, that excepting once, there never was a period ſo favourable as the preſent for a diſplay of a diſpoſition on our part for a negociation for peace; but ſuppoſing the Houſe was purſuaded this was not the beſt time for a negociation,

yet

yet he would contend, their Lordſhips ought to vote the Addreſs he ſhould propoſe, which had negociation for one of its objects, becauſe he was perſuaded that was the wiſeſt courſe that could now be taken. The ſingularity of the preſent time made it a preſumption, in the opinion of ſome, againſt any man who propoſed any ſtep for peace; but this, he ſaid, had no effect upon him, and if he had nothing but the convenience of a great part of the little world to urge him; if he had nothing but the view of putting an end to the devaſtation and horror which war produced among the human race, he thought he ſhould be favourably adjudged by God and man for his efforts to procure peace. He ſhould, therefore, if he thought that he was waving ſome punctilio on our part, which he did not, be clearly convinced of the propriety of our entering on a negociation. He thought it not only conſiſtent with, but neceſſary for the ſupport of our dignity, and we were called on, not only by policy, but almoſt as an act of neceſſity to enter upon a negociation. Beſides, as we had never yet ſhewn any ſincerity in any of our negociations, it would have a good effect by our doing ſo now; hitherto we had only attempted to talk of peace in the hour of adverſity; if we ſhewed a readineſs firſt now, our ſincerity could not be doubted. Here his Lordſhip recited ſhortly the circumſtances of former negociations on our part, and contended it was manifeſt they were not ſincere as to the object which was profeſſed by them; and then proceeded to ſhew the good effect an attempt to negociate at this time would have on the French people; even if it ſhould not meet ſucceſs as to its main object, he apprehended it would make the French people diſcontented with their Government. His Lordſhip then took a view of the dreadful effects which might poſſibly follow if we did not negociate. If it ſhould turn out that Ruſſia ſhould have views of aggrandizement of its own, into which not only we did not enter, but againſt which we always proteſted; a ſuppoſition by no means extravagant, when we conſider what had been done to Poland, and when the deſire of the Emperor of Ruſſia was expreſſed with regard to Malta, he having become Grand Maſter of Malta, it might not be improper to ſuſpect that the ſpirit which guided the partition of Poland might follow the Emperor of Ruſſia's deſire to the Mediterranean. Nor was this ſuſpicion at all unwarrantable, nor could it be ſtrange to thoſe who ſome years ago ſaw danger to the balance of Europe in the empire of Ruſſia having

Ockſacow annexed to its dominions. Ockſacow had been called the key to Egypt—a key pretty far from its lock; but thoſe who thought Ockſacow a key to Egypt, would not heſitate to call Corfu a key to the Mediterranean. It ſhould be remembered alſo, that if the views of the Emperor of Ruſſia were for aggrandiſement, we have now in our pay 62,000 Ruſſians that may be employed by Ruſſia with that viewand that object.

His Lordſhip then intreated the Houſe to remember that Auſtria engaged with us in the common cauſe, had entered into preliminaries for a peace without aſking the opinion of the Miniſters of this country; that it may do ſo again, and that Ruſſia may do the ſame thing, and that theſe things were not very improbable; the remedy againſt it, his Lordſhip ſaid, was a Negociation to be ſet on foot by us at this moment. Here the noble Lord took a view of the preſent ſtate of Italy, of Belgium, of Naples, of Tuſcany, and the other different parts of Europe, to ſhew how very poſſible it was that both Auſtria and Ruſſia might be contented with terms which would be quite unſuitable to the intereſt of this country. He reminded the Houſe of the poſſible event of the very Ruſſians whom we are now employing on the Continent, being employed by us for the defence of Great Britain or Ireland. He hoped that would never come to paſs, but if we proceeded for a few years to come as we had for ſome years paſt, he not only feared, but he believed that would come to paſs.

But it might be ſaid, that if we ſhould propoſe a negociation for peace, the French would not hear of it. In the firſt place, he did not know that; but this he knew, if they would not receive it fairly, it would give us great advantage. The French were now in much the ſame ſort of ſituation as they were in the year 1793. The allies were then ſucceſsful and ſeemed to threaten France with ruin; but the French had recourſe to ſuch ſtupendous exertions as enabled them to repel unjuſt aggreſſions; but having ſo little means to pay their troops, they were compelled to turn them looſe to ſeek reward for themſelves, and they became the peſt of Europe. We ſaw what had united the French into a maſs. Were we to purſue the ſame mode again? It might be aſked, How was this? He would anſwer, by leaving the object of the war undefined; by a number of allies having ſuppoſed contradictory objects, and by our never ſhewing any ſincere diſpoſition for peace. We had better have avowed the ſyſtem of Mr. Burke, that of eternal war until Royalty was reſtored;

ed; fooliſh, and even wicked, as that ſentiment might be, it was better than our preſent ſyſtem, becauſe it was definite. That was a ſyſtem which had the Royaliſts of France, whatever might be their force, in its favour, but our ſyſtem had as much the hatred of Royaliſts as Republicans, becauſe all Frenchmen regarded it as a ſyſtem for the diſmemberment and partition of France, and ſo every Frenchman, whatever his politics, was againſt us in his heart. Theſe being his ſentiments, he ſhould not have thought himſelf juſtified if he had not given their Lordſhips an opportunity of carrying a recommendation to the Throne.

His Lordſhip then read his motion, which was for an Addreſs to his Majeſty, the ſubſtance of it was, "To return his Majeſty thanks for his late gracious communication. To beſeech his Majeſty to enter into a Negociation for Peace with the French Republic, and to aſſure his Majeſty, that although we are in the ſeventh year of a war, we will meet all the neceſſary expences of carrying it on with vigour, if Negociation ſhould be unſucceſsful. To manifeſt a deſire to fulfil the engagement made between his Majeſty and the Emperor of Ruſſia, for the purpoſe of maintaining his Majeſty's honour, by keeping good faith in his treaties; but to repreſent to his Majeſty the concern of the Houſe, that his Majeſty ſhould have been adviſed to enter into a treaty ſo hoſtile to the ſpirit of the Britiſh Conſtitution, as that of introducing any foreign force without the conſent Parliament. To diſclaim any wiſh to reflect on his Majeſty's allies, but to expreſs ſome apprehenſions of danger, ſhould their views be diſſimilar to thoſe of his Majeſty, for which there is no adequate ſecurity, but in Negociation, &c. &c."

Lord *Grenville* ſaid, after what had fallen at ſo much length from the noble Lord, the Houſe, he preſumed, would not expect to be detained much longer. At leaſt they would not be detained by him, as he ſhould not think it neceſſary to follow the noble Lord through the many conſiderations on which he had touched in the extenſive view which he had taken of the various events and incidents of the war, the greater part of his argument bearing not the ſmalleſt immediate relation to the ſubject of the treaties, but being one more of the extraordinary interferences with his Majeſty's privileges and prerogatives that had been brought forward in a manner ſo unprecedented, and ſo new to the known practice of the Conſtitution, not only Seſſion after Seſſion, but almoſt week after week, during the periods when Parliament

were aſſembled. The noble Lord in the commencement of his ſpeech had himſelf confeſſed the *ſingularity* of his opinions, and with great truth had he called them ſingular, becauſe, he verily believed, there was not another man to be found who entertained ſimilar ſentiments. Indeed, after what had paſſed in the preſent campaign, after the recent events of the war, not only in Europe, but in almoſt every quarter of the globe, he was not a little ſurpriſed to find that even the noble Lord ſhould venture opinions which, he verily believed, were excluſively his own. All the latter part of the noble Lord's ſpeech had conſiſted of ſtale and hackneyed arguments againſt the origin and conduct of a war which the noble Lord thought proper ſtill to call an aggreſſion on the part of this country, although, after having diſcuſſed and examined the whole of that queſtion, not only one, but both Houſes of Parliament had again and again declared it to be a juſt and neceſſary war, and a war to which they were determined to give the moſt effectual and decided ſupport. The noble Lord's ſpeech, as uſual, had been made up of threadbare attacks on his Majeſty's Miniſters, and of a renewal of inſinuations againſt the good faith and ſincerity of his Majeſty's allies. He was ſure their Lordſhips would excuſe him if he declared that he thought it unneceſſary to treſpaſs upon their time and abuſe their patience, by attempting to make any regular reply to what had been ſo often anſwered, nor ſhould he indeed have ſaid even the little that he had ſaid upon the latter part of the noble Lord's ſpeech, were it not that had he preſerved entire ſilence upon it, it might poſſibly have been imputed to diſreſpect towards the noble Lord, which he certainly meant not to ſhow in the ſmalleſt degree. With regard to the neceſſity of entering into negociations for Peace at this time, the noble Lord ſeemed to feel the weakneſs of any argument that could be advanced upon it, becauſe he had reſted that part of his ſpeech chiefly on a ſeries of trite and common place declamations on the evils and calamities inſeparable from all wars, and therefore not more to be lamented at preſent, than during any former hoſtilities in which this country had been engaged. But the noble Lord had declared, that he dreaded the danger of our being deſerted by our allies, and had recalled the attention of the Houſe to the ſituation in which we ſtood during a part of the years 1793, 1797, and 1798. True it was, that this country had been deſerted by its allies, but what had been the conſequence? Great Britain

Britain had evinced then, what he truſted ſhe would again evince under ſimilar circumſtances, that ſhe had ſpirit and energy enough to ſtand ſingly againſt all Europe, and not only protect herſelf, but carry on offenſive operations with vigour and effect againſt all her enemies. Would any man, however, take upon him to declare, that our ſituation at preſent was any thing like what it had been in the years 1793, 1797 and 1798? Moſt certainly we had at preſent powerful allies, a. 'es animated with a heartfelt zeal and congenial ſpirit in the common cauſe. To notice what the noble Lord had ſaid of the treaties on the table, he was ſurpriſed to hear the noble Lord complain of the extravagance of the ſubſidies engaged for, or to ſelect the freight of the Ruſſians to Holland, as a circumſtance that proved that the zeal, magnanimity and ardour of the Emperor of all the Ruſſias were not ſincere and evident. The noble Lord talked of the gratuitous aid, that if the Court of Peterſburgh were ſincere, he ſhould have expected at their hands. Was the noble Lord to learn, or could he deny, that the ſtrength of Ruſſia conſiſted in men, while finance conſtituted the ſtrength of this country? In a treaty of alliance between Ruſſia and Great Britain, for the purpoſe of offenſive war, the only means of rendering it effectual, therefore, was for the former to find men, the latter money. With regard to the freight, and the additional ſtipulation of ſending 17,500 Ruſſian forces to Holland, if any thing more than another could prove the zeal and active deſire to co-operate effectually with us in an object, the chief intereſt of which with relation to Ruſſia and this country were purely Britiſh, it was the Emperor's readily agreeing not only to ſend ſo large an aid to aſſiſt in our operations in Holland as 17,500 men, but at a conſiderable diſadvantage to employ a part of his navy in tranſporting them to that country. With regard to the expence of freight the noble Lord muſt be aware that troops muſt either be brought from ſo diſtant a part of Europe as Ruſſia by land or ſea. He muſt alſo know that they would not be allowed to march through neutral States, and therefore they could only come by ſea. The noble Lord had gone into a detail of the comparative expence of the former treaty with Pruſſia and the preſent one with Ruſſia: he had been erroneous, however, in his calculations, as any noble Lord would ſee, if he fairly compared the expence of each; the treaty with the latter (the Court of Peterſburgh) he would find was made on much cheaper terms than that with the Court

Court of Berlin. With reſpect to the ſeventh article of the Proviſional Treaty, whereby his Majeſty engages, under certain circumſtances, to admit the Ruſſian troops into this country, (an event not at preſent very likely to take place) he defied the noble Lord to point out a ſingle Act of Parliament againſt what had been engaged for, nor did he believe the noble Lord himſelf could conceive or imagine a law that could be drawn to prevent it, without directly infringing on the known principles of the conſtitution. Under that conſtitution it was the undoubted prerogative of the Crown to declare war, or make peace; to enter into treaties of alliance, and ſtipulate the conditions of thoſe treaties, and it was for Parliament ſubſequently to declare whether it approved thoſe treaties, or was willing to ſupport or enable his Majeſty to make good ſuch engagements as the Crown had ſo entered into with foreign Powers. The two authorities the noble Lord had referred to were unfortunately choſen. Was the year 1641 the time of all others the moſt fit to reſort to for conſtitutional precedents? A time when the Parliament were taking meaſures to dethrone the monarch, and the monarch to make war againſt his Parliament. Was the preſent Parliament bent on any ſuch object, or would it endure the compariſon? With regard to the other precedent, that of 1756, would that Houſe, acting in their parliamentary capacity, learn the practice of the conſtitution from the mouth of a Speaker of the Houſe of Commons, however reſpectable his character, (and great, weighty, and reſpectable, the character and name of Mr. Speaker Onſlow undoubtedly were) in the courſe of a caſual ſpeech, which, when he brought up a Money Bill, and ſtanding at their Lordſhips' Bar, on the laſt day of a Seſſion, he thought proper to addreſs to his Majeſty? The fallacy of the noble Lord's argument was, that he had reaſoned as if the Ruſſians were actually landed in this country without the conſent of Parliament. His Lordſhip made a few more obſervations in reply to Lord Holland, declaring, that whenever the article of the convention, under which his Majeſty engages to receive the Ruſſian troops eventually into this country, came to be likely to be carried into execution, it would be ſeen whether his Majeſty's Miniſters did their duty, and conducted themſelves legally and conſtitutionally. His Lordſhip concluded with giving his decided negative to the Addreſs that had been moved.

Lord *Holland* roſe to explain. His Lordſhip ſaid, he ſhould not

not have been deſirous of claiming the indulgence uſually granted by their Lordſhips to perſons who came forward with motions in that Houſe, if ſome of the obſervations made by the noble Secretary of State had not rendered it abſolutely neceſſary for the ſake of his having the argument, he had in his former ſpeech had the honour to make uſe of, clearly underſtood. On that ground it was that he would take the liberty of intruding on the Houſe for a few minutes. He gave the noble Secretary due credit for his abilities and his eloquence, but he could not ſo far compliment him as to ſay he thought the noble Lord's diſtinct apprehenſion of the argument of thoſe he undertook to anſwer, was one of his moſt prominent talents. Certain it was, the noble Secretary of State had completely miſconceived, or he could not otherwiſe have ſo groſsly miſrepreſented, much of what had fallen from him. The noble Secretary had begun his reply with declaring, that he did not think it neceſſary to ſay much on the ſubjects treated of by him (Lord Holland) in the latter part of his ſpeech, and after a few general obſervations, the noble Secretary had declared he ſhould not have ſaid even the little he had urged upon the topics in queſtion, had he not felt himſelf anxious to avoid the ſuſpicion of illiberality and diſreſpect towards the noble Mover of the Addreſs, in caſe he had preſerved an entire ſilence with regard to that part of his ſpeech. Lord Holland aſſured the noble Secretary, that if he had preſerved an entire ſilence on the latter part of his ſpeech, ſo far from being angry or offended, he ſhould have thought he had done wiſely, becauſe an adherence to entire ſilence would have been preferable to a futile reply or groſs miſrepreſentation. The noble Secretary complained of his having touched upon the origin of the war, and having, in treating of its character, called it an aggreſſion. The word might give offence to the noble Secretary, but as often as he had occaſion to refer to the origin of war, his Lordſhip ſaid, he muſt call it an aggreſſion on our parts, becauſe he thought it to be ſo. The noble Secretary had alſo ſaid he had recurred to ſtale arguments when he referred to the ſtate of this country in 1797 and 1798, and had mentioned our having been deſerted by our allies with an air of triumph and exultation; but how and for what purpoſe had he in his former ſpeech alluded comparatively to our ſituation in that year and our preſent ſituation? He had made the alluſion, Lord Holland ſaid, to ſhew, that when this country was deſerted by her allies, then it was that the noble Secretary of State condeſcended to enter into a negociation for peace

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and he had mentioned it to convince their Lordſhips with how much more advantage, with how much more grace and dignity a negociation for peace might now be entered into when our allies were with us, and the operations of our arms and the arms of Auſtria and Ruſſia had been attended with ſucceſs. The noble Secretary had further ſaid, that he had endeavoured to ſupport his motion for an Addreſs with trite and common place declamation on the ordinary evils and calamities that were inſeparable from war. So far from reſting upon ſuch an argument, his Lordſhip deſired to appeal to the Houſe whether he had not expreſsly ſaid, if he had no other argument to bring forward he ſhould feel himſelf juſtified in the face of God and man on that account alone, to bring his motion forward, but that it was from a fair view of the utmoſt poſſible ſucceſs that could be expected from a continuance of the war, balanced againſt the probable miſchiefs that might enſue if the preſent favourable opportunity for negociation were not embraced, that he had been induced to move the addreſs. But what was moſt extraordinary in the noble Secretary of State's ſpeech was a declaration that any attempt like the preſent to interrupt the Executive Government in the conduct of a war was to interfere with his Majeſty's privileges and prerogative in a manner wholly unprecedented and new in the practice of the conſtitution; a doctrine which Lord Holland ſaid was far from true, as there were numberleſs inſtances on record to the contrary. He had then in his eye a noble Duke (the Duke of Portland) who had during the American war, in repeated inſtances, come forward with thoſe with whom the noble Duke then acted with motions ſimilar in effect to that before the Houſe. It might perhaps be ſaid, that what the noble Duke and his friends had done had been merely to move amendments in addreſſes in reply to his Majeſty's Speech from the throne. If there was any material diſtinction in the two caſes, his Lordſhip ſaid, he would leave it to the noble Secretary of State, who was ſo great a maſter of diſtinctions, to explain. It was an eſſential privilege of Parliament for any member of either Houſe to move ſuch an addreſs as he had that day moved, and therefore his Lordſhip declared, as often as he felt it his duty to exert his undoubted privilege in that reſpect, he would not fail to exert it.

With regard to the treaties on the table, the noble Secretary of State had not, he ſaid, done his argument any thing like juſtice. He had called upon him to deny, that finance was the great ſtrength of this country, and men the great ſtrength

ſtrength of Ruſſia? Undoubtedly, he could not deny it; but, upon that principle, why were 25,000 Britiſh troops neceſſary to be ſent to Holland? It made our contingent diſproportionably large if we furniſhed men as well as money. If the Court of Peterſburgh were ſo zealous and ſincere in the good cauſe, why did not that Court do it more gratuitouſly? Did ſhe not recollect that her dominions were at a diſtance from the approach of war, and that in proportion, as Great Britain was nearer to France, it was the more neceſſary for us to keep a large force at home for our protection? The noble Secretary of State had ſeemed to underſtand what he had ſaid about the expence of the freight of the Ruſſian troops, as if he had argued it as a proof of the want of zeal and magnanimity of the Emperor of Ruſſia. On the contrary, on examining the reaſonableneſs and advantages of the two treaties, (the former one with Pruſſia, and the preſent with Ruſſia) he had put the amount of the expence of freight wholly out of the queſtion, but when he came to balance their comparative amount in point of the expence of each, he certainly did take the charge for freight into the calculation. Nor ſhould he have calculated fairly if he had not done ſo. The noble Secretary had ſaid, he had computed the comparative expence incorrectly. Poſſibly he might have done ſo. With reſpect to the treaties generally, excluſive of their extreme prodigality, and one other objection, he had declared he made no great exception. In what the noble Secretary had ſaid, in reference to the article enabling his Majeſty, in certain caſes, to receive the Ruſſians into this kingdom; he differed totally. He had contended, and he was ſatisfied he had contended on conſtitutional ground, that it was not lawful for his Majeſty to bring foreign troops into this kingdom, without having either the previous conſent or ſubſequent approbation of Parliament. The noble Secretary had complained of the precedent of 1641; but he could not agree that precedents of thoſe times were neceſſarily bad. In that Houſe, precedents of 1641 had been repeatedly quoted and relied on; and, as to the declaration of the noble Secretary, that the reſolution of 1641 was to prevent the King from introducing foreign troops to enable him to make war againſt the rights and liberties of his people, that very obſervation, his Lordſhip ſaid, made the precedent peculiarly applicable in the preſent inſtance; nor was it his buſineſs at all to diſcuſs the queſtion whether Charles the Firſt was juſtified in levying forces to make war againſt his

Parliament, or the Parliament in making war upon their King: it was enough for his purpoſe that the precedent was a conſtitutional one. All the reaſoning of the noble Secretary, in defence of the article in the treaty by which his Majeſty engages in a certain incidental circumſtance to receive the Ruſſian forces into this kingdom ſerved, Lord Holland ſaid, to furniſh him with an additional argument againſt the expedition to Holland, as that which led to the poſſibility of the reception of foreign troops into this country muſt be regarded in that reſpect as bad *per ſe*. His Lordſhip took a ſlight notice of a few other of Lord Grenville's obſervations.

The queſtion was then put, and the Houſe divided.

Contents - - 2 | *Not Contents* - 15

Adjourned till the next day.

The Contents were Lord *Holland* and Lord *King*.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11.

At four o'clock the *Speaker* counted the Houſe, and there being but 38 Members preſent, an adjournment took place of courſe.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

SATURDAY, OCT. 12.

The Houſe met at half-paſt eleven.

The bill enabling his Majeſty to ſhorten the time of calling Parliament together in caſes of adjournment, was brought from the Commons, who had agreed to the amendment made by the Lords.

His Majeſty's Commiſſion was then opened and read, (the Speaker and Commons being at the bar) and the royal aſſent given to the Scots Diſtillery Bill, the Expiring Laws Bill, the bill to enable his Majeſty to ſhorten the time of calling Parliament together in caſes of adjournment, the Malt Duty Bill, the Penſions, Offices, and all the various bills that have paſſed both Houſes, received the royal aſſent.

An order was made that no more reports from the Judges, or petitions for private bills be received after the 8th day of April next.

The Duke of *Portland* then informed their Lordſhips that he had it in command from his Majeſty to inform them that his royal will and pleaſure was that the Houſe adjourn to the 21ſt day of January next. Adjourned accordingly.

PROTEST,

PROTEST,

ON THE BILL FOR ENABLING HIS MAJESTY TO ACCEPT THE SERVICES OF AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS FROM THE MILITIA, UNDER CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS.

DISSENTIENT,

1ſt. Becauſe, by this Bill, and by the recited Act of the laſt Seſſion, whoſe powers are by this Bill aggravated and extended, the conſtitutional purpoſes of the Militia eſtabliſhment are totally and finally ſubverted.

2dly. Becauſe, all the purpoſes of procuring men for the army might have been eaſily obtained by diſbanding the Supplementary War Militia (which by its extraordinary encreaſe had profeſſedly occaſioned a ſcarcity of men) without reducing the permanent Militia eſtabliſhment to a ſervice, in which no Gentleman could hereafter hope that his patriotic and diſintereſted induſtry would enable him to form his county regiment to a continued ſtate of diſcipline, at the head of which he might, with credit and honour to himſelf, anſwer the purpoſe of its inſtitution in the defence of his country againſt invaſion.

3dly. Becauſe, by this meaſure, all that ſyſtem and arrangement which nouriſhed the zeal of independent country gentlemen is irrecoverably done away in the exiſting preſſure of a formidable and alarming war, and the peace eſtabliſhment of the Militia (if, mangled as it is by this Bill, it can ſurvive the war) will neceſſary be reduced to a mere ſtanding army of the worſt ſort; independent of an annual vote of Parliament; deprived of all its former conſtitutional advantages; connected with the people by nothing but the unequal and oppreſſive burthens it impoſes on them, and commanded by ſuch perſons as may be procured to be regulating officers to a mere drill of army recruits.

4thly. Becauſe the landed intereſt of England and Wales, already ſo heavily burthened, is moſt materially affected by this total revolution in the Militia ſyſtem; inaſmuch as the peculiar expences of a Militia originally formed for our unalienable domeſtic defence and inſular garriſon, are unjuſtly continued on the oppreſſed Owners and Occupiers of Land in England and Wales, when they are by this meaſure deprived of the advantages which they had purchaſed, namely, thoſe of ſecurity, reſulting from a permanent domeſtic protection for their wives and children, which, under the faith of Parliament, was held out to them as the valuable conſideration for heavy taxes impoſed ſolely on them.

5thly. Becauſe this Bill operates with moſt unjuſtifiable partiality: it does not fairly and equally extend to Scotland; Scotland is ſtill protected in the enjoyment of a Conſtitutional Militia; neither reduced to the diſgraceful condition of a drill for the army, nor liable to be employed in the defence of England; from its ſervices (confined and limited ſolely to the boundaries of Scotland) England and Wales can derive no protection, while the reduced remnants of the Militia of England and Wales may be removed from the defence of their own homes to that of the moſt remote parts of Scotland.

CARNARVON,
WENTWORTH FITZWILLIAM,

All but the ſecond reaſon.

BUCKINGHAMSHIRE.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

SATURDAY, OCT. 12.

The Speaker took the chair before twelve.

A meſſage from the Lords informed the Houſe their Lordſhips had agreed to a great number of public bills without any amendment; and to the bill for empowering his Majeſty to ſhorten the time of meeting of the Houſes of Parliament in caſes of Adjournment, with an amendment, to which they deſired the concurrence of the Houſe.

The amendment was read and agreed to.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* informed the Houſe, that his Majeſty had been waited on with the addreſs of the Houſe for a Monument to the memory of Earl Howe, when his Majeſty was graciouſly pleaſed to ſay he would give directions accordingly.

Mr. *Dent* moved, that there be laid before the Houſe an Account of the nett Income of the Poſt Office, for the years 1797, 1798, and 1799, as far as the ſame can be made up. Ordered.

Mr. *Roſe* moved for a Writ to elect a Commiſſioner for the Shire of Dunbarton, in the room of Colonel Smollett, deceaſed. Ordered.

Another for the County of Flint, in the room of John Lloyd, Eſq. who has accepted of the office of ſteward of the Chiltern Hundreds.

Another for the Borough of Eyre, in the County of Suffolk, in the room of Mark Singleton, Eſq. who has alſo accepted the office of ſteward of the Eaſtern Chiltern Hundreds. Ordered.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* obſerved, it had been uſual in the early part of a ſeſſion to limit the time of receiving private petitions. He therefore moved that the Houſe do not receive any petition for a private bill after the 8th of March next.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, he had no objection to this limitation, but a notice had been communicated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of an adjournment of the Houſe; he ſhould be glad to know when that adjournment would take place, and to what day?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, it was perfectly well underſtood that an intimation would come from his Majeſty upon that ſubject, but that was a ſubject of which there could be no parliamentary notice before its arrival.

Mr.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, that by this mode of proceeding a great inequality was created between the Members of the Houſe of Commons with regard to information when the Houſe was to carry on its buſineſs. Some perſons had advantages which others had not: for inſtance, yeſterday at four o'clock there happened not to be forty members preſent, conſequently there could be no Houſe, an adjournment took place to the uſual hour, which was this morning at ten o'clock: that, however, was the mere nominal, formal hour; the real time every member muſt have conceived to be the uſual hour at which the Houſe actually met. It was merely owing to the perſonal civility of the Speaker that he learnt the Houſe was actually to meet this day at eleven in the morning. This was quite out of the uſual courſe of modern parliamentary practice, and it was in the power of a Miniſter to take very unfair advantages in this way; ſince his own friends might have intimation, and others might not, of buſineſs being to be tranſacted before the uſual hour. Not that he apprehended that any improper proceeding would take place in the Houſe, becauſe he knew the Speaker would take care that the rules of the Houſe, when met, ſhould not be violated; and he truſted the Miniſter would take no advantage in this particular.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that he ſhould act according to the ſenſe he entertained of the duty of a Member of Parliament, and the hon. Gentleman would of courſe act according to his own ſenſe of his duty.

Here the Speaker was ſummoned up to the Houſe of Peers to hear the commiſſion read for giving the royal aſſent to various bills.

The Speaker went up accordingly, and having returned, the queſtion that no private petition ſhould be received after the 8th of March next was put and carried.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that in obedience to his Majeſty's pleaſure intimated to the two Houſes, this Houſe do now adjourn to the 21ſt of January next.

The *Speaker* ſaid, that before he put this queſtion of adjournment he thought it right to advert to what had been ſaid on receiving private bills. He did not underſtand that the hon. Gentleman's (Mr. Tierney's) obſervations applied to the nature of that proceeding. That which was now before the Houſe, the queſtion of adjournment, was not a novel proceeding; there were many inſtances on the journals in which it appeared the Houſe had adjourned conformably to

to his Majeſty's pleaſure. When the rumour reached him of a probability that an intimation would come, ſignifying his Majeſty's pleaſure, at an hour on which the Houſe did not uſually ſit, he ſearched the journals, and he did hope to find there a precedent for not putting the queſtion immediately. If there had been an interval of adjournment from the time of his Majeſty's intimation being given to the uſual hour of meeting, he ſhould have taken the liberty of recommending a ſuſpenſion of this motion for adjournment until the time of the day at which the Houſe proceeded uſually to public buſineſs. But upon ſearching he found no proceeding to juſtify him in making ſuch recommendation. All the inſtances on the journals were of this deſcription; his Majeſty's pleaſure was ſignified by the motion, and the Houſe accordingly adjourned immediately. That being the caſe, he had no alternative.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that as there was no order of the day remaining, it appeared to him that he was conſulting the convenience of Members by making this motion, when, now, there being as full an attendance as was uſual at the commencement of public buſineſs at the uſual hour. It had been uſual to come forward with an intimation of his Majeſty's deſire that public buſineſs ſhould be proceeded in, and that was the time when the ſeſſion uſually commenced. The adjournment took place whan all the buſineſs for which Parliament was called together was at an end. Conſidering, therefore, that there was nothing likely to come forward, and that this was now ſo well underſtood; and, conſidering that this propoſed adjournment was nothing more than what his Majeſty could direct by his prerogative under the title of a prorogation; conſidering alſo that there was no inconvenience whatever to the public; and conſidering that he was doing that which was moſt convenient to the Members of that Houſe, he thought he was taking the beſt courſe that could be taken in the motion which he made. Hereafter it would be proper to take all the beſt means that could be taken to procure a full attendance when public buſineſs came forward.

Mr. *Tierney* thanked the Speaker for the politeneſs with which he informed him that the Houſe was to meet at the hour of eleven this morning. He ſaid, he had had the misfortune not to be diſtinctly underſtood: he never meant to ſay, there was no precedent for the Houſe adjourning, in compliance to his Majeſty's pleaſure, and that immediately after

after that was intimated. On neither of theſe points did he mean to trouble the Houſe. He meant to obſerve on the very particular circumſtances of the caſe, as it ſtood this day. He would ſtate the facts, which contained all the arguments. He could not be heard this day if forty members had not been preſent; the Speaker muſt have adjourned the Houſe until Monday morning ten o'clock, as he did yeſterday; the uſual hour, however, for the meeting of the Houſe, muſt have been underſtood to be four o'clock. There had been an inſtance of the Houſe meeting at eleven o'clock, in the morning beyond a doubt; but had the Houſe done ſo, without the Speaker previouſly announcing that he ſhould take the chair at eleven? When the Houſe attended his Majeſty to St. Paul's, the Speaker announced that he ſhould attend at eleven in the morning. All the Members of the Houſe being ſuppoſed to be preſent, muſt alſo be ſuppoſed to know that circumſtance, and therefore had full notice; but further than this, the practice of the Houſe did not go, nor could go, conſiſtently with the rules of Parliament; for here, ſpeaking parliamentary language, no Member of the Houſe could know that the Houſe was now ſitting. No Member could know, except from the perſonal civility of the Speaker, that his duty called him to attend this morning. No precedent could apply to the caſe now before the Houſe, for it was a meeting at an unuſual hour, of which it was impoſſible to give any regular notice, becauſe there was no Houſe yeſterday to receive a notice. In truth he might ſay, that public buſineſs was never tranſacted on a Saturday without ſpecial notice, but that he waved; though he wiſhed to know, whether in the Speaker's opinion, Members of Parliament could regularly know that the Houſe would ſit this morning at eleven, and whether he ſhould proceed to buſineſs without notice to attend to ſuch proceeding?

The *Speaker* ſaid, that whether Members did know or not that the Houſe would meet was a thing impoſſible for him to conjecture: he hoped they did know it: it was his duty to attend: he received an intimation that a commiſſion to give the royal aſſent to certain bills would take place at twelve this day. There had been no public intimation of the matter. It was conveyed to him from the Speaker of the Houſe of Lords by means of the black rod. That was ſufficient for him to attend. He did ſo. He likewiſe heard his Majeſty's pleaſure announced that Parliament ſhould adjourn to a future day. He wiſhed that the proceedings of the Houſe

ſhould

ſhould have taken place at the uſual hour of ſitting; but he found no precedent to govern this caſe. The motion for adjournment had been made, and the queſtion muſt be put upon it. He was not to judge on the propriety of a motion, but to put it to the Houſe; he had no alternative: nor had he any as to his attendance: he received an intimation to attend, and it was his duty to attend.

Mr. *Tierney* diſclaimed all idea of imputing the moſt diſtant degree of impropriety of conduct to the Speaker. He knew it was his duty to attend; and what was his duty every body knew he would perform properly. He knew alſo that now the motion was made, the Speaker muſt put the queſtion; but what he complained of was, that this was inconſiſtent with the ordinary practice of Parliament. Upon a ſuggeſtion of impropriety of a motion, he ſhould hope no Member would heſitate to withdraw it; if that was not acceded to, he muſt aſk the chair, whether or not this proceeding was unuſual and improper?

The *Speaker* ſaid, he was ſure the Houſe would not think that this was a proper queſtion to be put to him. The hon. Gentleman imagined that this was an unprecedented motion; he could only anſwer that, by ſaying, that whenever a motion was made, he was bound to put a queſtion upon it, and whether the motion was one that ought to be adopted or rejected, was a thing for the Houſe to decide. It certainly was not uſual—he was aware of only once in his experience—meeting at this hour. He had ſaid already, he had found no caſe that governed this; he knew of no inſtance of any delay between the intimation of his Majeſty's pleaſure and a motion for adjournment, and he thought that ſufficient to entitle him to ſay, at leaſt, that he ſhould not be juſtified in recommending a different practice.

Mr. Secretary *Dundas* ſaid, it muſt be obvious that theſe objections were calculated to make ſome impreſſion on others unfavourable to the mode now propoſed to be adopted; but whatever importance the hon. Members who made them was pleaſed to attach to them, he could not help ſaying, they appeared to him to be as captious as any he had ever known made in that Houſe. The adjournment took place yeſterday, becauſe a ſufficient number did not attend to make a Houſe: What was the conſequence? The right of the King's meſſage he ſuppoſed was not diſputed; nor did the hon. Gentleman call in queſtion the right of putting the queſtion when delivered to the chair. Why then, what was the

the objection that was made? It was, that contrary to all cuſtom and precedent, the Speaker ſhould delay, or the mover ſhould withdraw, the conſideration of the queſtion until ſome future hour. Was there any reaſon for his? he took upon him to ſay, there was none. The Houſe knew there was not now before it one article of buſineſs. There was nothing in reality to be done; nothing was put off; therefore there was no ſurpriſe upon any body. Theſe things were well known; and, therefore, he maintained, there was no inconvenience in what was now propoſed. How did the hon. Member conſult the convenience of the Houſe? If there was to be no buſineſs at four o'clock, what was the reaſon why the Houſe ſhould not do now what they might do at four o'clock, namely, to adjourn, becauſe no buſineſs was before them? Suppoſe the hon. Gentleman's objection was to prevail, the probability would be, that at four o'clock not 40 Members would attend, the conſequence would be that the Speaker would be obliged to adjourn, and come down the next day, and ſo from day to day for three months to come, he might be obliged to attend, for as it was well known there was no buſineſs, it was not likely that 40 Members would be preſent at any one time to enable him to adjourn, except from day to day. He did not like to ſpeak harſhly or diſreſpectfully of any Member, but this objection had really nothing in the world in it, except public inconvenience.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, that as to the word "Captious," or any other peeviſh word, he had nothing to ſay, but that he was too much accuſtomed to epithets of this kind being applied to what he ſaid in the Houſe to be affected by them; but it was not ſufficient to call it ſo, it muſt be proved to be ſo, before it could affect him. The right hon. Gentleman ſaid, he was of opinion, that if an adjournment took place, forty Members would not aſſemble at four o'clock; why Members of Parliament would not attend their duty, the right hon. Gentleman knew beſt. But he ſaid there was now no buſineſs before the Houſe. Yeſterday there was before the Houſe what, in former times, was conſidered as buſineſs of very conſiderable magnitude; a Committee of Supply, and the right hon. Gentleman would allow a very young Member of Parliament to tell a very old one, that if the Houſe had met yeſterday the Order of the Day muſt either have been diſcharged or poſtponed, and that it might have been made to ſtand for this day. It was too much for him, as a plain

Member of Parliament, to ſay it was the intention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer not to bring forward the Supply, although the right hon. Gentleman might know it, for ſo he muſt, before he ſaid there was no buſineſs before the Houſe. But the time of proceeding was what he objected to. Why not adjourn until Monday; one day could make but little difference; there would be no inſult offered to his Majeſty on his meſſage; and it would afford Members time to come to a determination whether the adjournment now propoſed, or any adjournment, ſhould take place. It was ſaid that his Majeſty might, by virtue of his prerogative, might prorogue Parliament to the time now propoſed; he knew it; but there was a material difference between prorogation and adjournment; the one was the pure act of Royal prerogative, the other was the act of the Houſe itſelf. Beſides, he could conceive many acts that a Miniſter might propoſe and perſuade the Houſe to agree to, but which the Houſe might not like to give him the diſcretion of, nor might he like the reſponſibility of, for three months. But how ſtood the caſe with regard to ſupply; the Miniſter had now under a Vote of Credit and Supply upwards of five millions, the application of which was not ſpecified by Parliament. Now, ſpeaking Parliamentary language, without any regard to confidence in perſons, what ſecurity was there that this large ſum of money would be duly applied? Here Mr. Tierney went over the calculations he had made on a former day, to ſhew that upwards of five millions would be under the diſpoſal of Miniſters for three months, if this adjournment took place; for that Parliament had really made no appropriation of the money; and then ſaid, he therefore thought there ſhould not be an adjournment of above a fortnight or three weeks. It was true that Miniſters ſaid there was no more buſineſs; that was to ſay, *they* had no more buſineſs; but how did they know that no Member of Parliament had any buſineſs to bring forward for three months? for his part, viewing public affairs as he did, he thought that public Parliamentary buſineſs ought not to be conſidered now as only commencing, inſtead of concluding. Upon the ſubject of forty members not being preſent at four o'clock, he really feared there was hardly that number now; he had not counted them, but there was not many above forty he was confident.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that as the hon. Member

ber objected to the proceeding on account of there not being forty members preſent, he muſt beg that the Speaker might count the Houſe.

Strangers were then excluded, but we underſtood the further proceeding was as follows:

Mr. *Tierney* moved, that the adjournment ſhould be for one month only; and on a diviſion there appeared Noes 38—Ayes 6; Mr. Tierney and Mr. Jones, the Tellers for the Ayes, and Tellers for the Noes not voting, ſo that there appeared to be 42 Members in the Houſes. Mr. Tierney next moved, that the debate be adjourned till four o'clock. The diviſion was the ſame; after which the original motion was carried by the like majority; and the Houſe accordingly adjourned till the 21ſt of January.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

TUESDAY, JAN. 21.

The Houſe met according to laſt adjournment.

Lord *Grenville* roſe, and ſaid, he believed it was not ſtrictly regular to give notice of a meſſage from his Majeſty, but as he ſaw many of their Lordſhips preſent, who might wiſh to be apprized of the circumſtance, he took that opportunity of informing the Houſe, that he ſhould next day have the honour to bring down a meſſage from his Majeſty, and lay upon the table certain official papers, ſtating the overtures that had been made by the enemy. He meant to move, that the ſaid meſſage and papers be taken into conſideration on ſome future day, perhaps Monday next.

The Duke of *Norfolk* ſaid, it had been his intention to have moved an humble addreſs to his Majeſty, deſiring his Majeſty to give orders that there be laid before the Houſe, copies and tranſlations of the letter from Buonaparte, the Chief Conſul of the French Republic, to his Majeſty, together with the anſwer tranſmitted by his Majeſty's Miniſters, and alſo the letters of the Miniſter of Foreign Affairs in France, and the anſwer to the ſame. Perhaps the papers alluded to by the noble Secretary of State would preclude the neceſſity for any ſuch motion.

Lord *Grenville* ſaid, that conſiſtent with the forms of the Houſe, he could not anticipate what the papers he had alluded to would be, but the noble Duke would do well to poſtpone his motion till the next day.

The Duke of *Norfolk* obſerved, that nothing that the noble

Secretary of State had ſaid, ſhewed that there was any impropriety in making the ſort of motion that he had mentioned.

Lord *Grenville* replied, that it appeared to him as a matter of civility due to the noble Lords, who were abſent, as well as from the reſpect which the Houſe owed to itſelf, which always induced it to take a day or two to conſider of all matters of importance intended to be ſubmitted to their judgment, ſome previous notice of ſuch a motion ought in point of regularity to be given. If the noble Duke perſiſted in his intention of making his motion then, he muſt be under the neceſſity of giving it his negative.

The Duke of *Norfolk* roſe again, and deſired their Lordſhips to underſtand, that if the papers he had mentioned were not laid before the Houſe the next day, he ſhould then make his motion.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, JAN. 21.

The *Speaker* informed the Houſe he had communicated the vote of its thanks to his Royal highneſs the Duke of York, and to be communicated by his Royal Highneſs to Sir Ralph Abercrombie; and alſo thanks to be communicated by Lord Duncan to Sir Andrew Mitchell: to which communications anſwers were returned, which the Speaker then read as follows:

Head Quarters, Schagen Brug, Oct. 10, 1799.

SIR,

In conſequence of your letter of the 26th ult. I have communicated the thanks of the honourable Houſe of Commons, to Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Abercromby, *the generals, and other officers, under his command, together with their approbation and acknowledgement for the ſervices of the troops employed at the attack of the* Helder, *on the 27th of* Auguſt, 1799, *which thanks have been received by Sir* Ralph Abercromby, *the generals, other officers, and troops, as one of the moſt honourable teſtimonies and beſt rewards of their exertion in the ſervice of their country.*

I beg to expreſs, that having been employed to communicate the reſolutions of the Houſe of Commons upon this occaſion, I ſhall ever conſider as one of the moſt pleaſing circumſtances of my military life. I am, Sir, Yours,

FREDERICK.

The Right Honourable the Speaker of the Houſe of Commons.

Kent, Yarmouth Roads, Dec. 30, 1799.

SIR,

I have the honour to enclose Vice Admiral Mitchell's *acknowledgment of the thanks voted by the House of Commons to the naval department in the late expedition to* Holland; *and should have done so sooner, had not the original miscarried.*

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

The Right Honourable *DUNCAN.*

Henry Addington, &c.

His Majesty's Ship His, *in the* Vlieter Channel, Oct. 15, 1799.

My Lord,

I had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 30th September *last, accompanied with the copy of one to you from the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the unanimous vote of thanks of that House to me and to the captains, officers, seamen, and marines, employed, under my command, in the expedition against* Holland.

When the important plan of rescuing from the hands of an usurping power a fleet that should have acted as the friend of Great Britain *was committed to me, I determined that no exertions should be wanting on my part to secure so desirable an object; and you Lordship's continuing and assisting me in the trust with which I was vested, did not lessen those exertions. The weather soon occasioned obstacles that required our utmost skill and activity to surmount; and they could not have been surmounted but by the most ardent zeal in the captains, and in the whole fleet which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and your Lordship, did me the honour to put under my orders, whose conduct was more like that of brothers than of men serving under command.*

To two other causes also do we owe our success. First, the unanimity that prevailed between the army and navy; and, next, the very liberal equipment of the armament by the executive branches of his Majesty's government. The least deficiency in the former, would have lost us the favourable moment of landing; and, in the latter, would have rendered us unequal to persevere against the storms we encountered.

If any thing could add value to the unanimous vote of thanks of the Commons of Great Britain, *it would be the obliging terms in which the Speaker has conveyed that vote to your Lordship, together with the very friendly manner in which*

your

your Lordſhip has tranſmitted it to me. I have taken the earlieſt opportunity to communicate it to the captains, officers, ſeamen, and marines, under my command; and, conſcious of our own zeal in the cauſe of our King and country, we have equal pride and ſatisfaction to find our ſervices approved and acknowledged by ſo high and ſo honourable an authority.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
your Lordſhip's, moſt obliged, moſt obedient,
and faithful, humble ſervant,
A. MITCHELL.

The Right Honourable
Admiral Lord Viſcount Duncan.

Colonel *Stanley* preſented a petition in behalf of the debtors confined in Lancaſhire gaol, ſtating the diſtreſſes of their ſituation; ſubmitting to the humanity of the Houſe, whether it might not be juſt that the act of 1797, with regard to debtor and creditor, might be extended to them; or that they might have ſuch other relief as to the humanity and wiſdom of the Houſe ſhould ſeem meet.—Ordered to be laid on the table.

Mr. William *Dundas* moved for a new writ for Dunfermline and Stirling, in the room of William Tait, Eſq.

EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.

Mr. *Sheridan* roſe to give notice it was his intention to introduce a motion reſpecting the late expedition to Holland. A call of the Houſe, he ſhould think, would be proper previous to the diſcuſſion of that ſubject, but that he did not intend to move; perhaps it might occur to ſome other member to do ſo, and if it did it ſhould have his concurrence. The motion he intended to make he ſhould make on Monday, the 3d of February.

CALL OF THE HOUSE.

Mr. *Tierney* wiſhed to know whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer had any objection to a call of the Houſe before the diſcuſſion of this important buſineſs?

OVERTURE OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid that he could, perſonally have no objection whatever to a call of the Houſe. All the members who could be preſent without great inconvenience, he conceived, would attend the diſcuſſion of that queſtion; they would be naturally led by its importance to attend. However, upon the ſubject of a call of the Houſe, there might be many members who had great objections to it,

it, though he had none, as far as regarded himself. Under that impreſſion, the regular way would be to give notice that a call of the Houſe was intended to be moved for. He had no anxiety upon it, either one way or other; he only ſubmitted what appeared to him to be the fair courſe. He had another ſubject to give notice of, and further than notice it was not regular to go at preſent; but it was a ſubject likely to occupy the ſerious attention of the Houſe. He meant that to-morrow he ſhould have the honour of a communication from his Majeſty to that Houſe, with regard to the overtures of the enemy. He ſhould alſo propoſe the taking that meſſage into conſideration on Monday next.

Mr. *Tierney* thought this too ſhort a notice for the diſcuſſion of ſuch a ſubject, which he conceived ſhould not precede a call. Indeed, he lamented to ſee the Houſe ſo thinly attended upon deliberations of the greateſt moment. So much was this the caſe, that he, who was hardly abſent upon any one diviſion, had ſeen queſtions of the greateſt magnitude decided by, what with both ſides counted, would not amount to half the number of the members of that Houſe. He ſhould move for a call of the Houſe for Monday, the 3d of February. He had no objection to giving that notice, at the ſame time he did not underſtand it to be a thing to be inſiſted upon that notice ſhould be given of a motion for a call; he underſtood the current of the practice of members on that ſubject was to move without notice. Therefore, if the right hon. Gentleman had no objection, he ſhould move for a call of the Houſe on the 3d of February.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid that he, individually, had no objection, but conceiving that many other members who could not be preſent on the 3d of February would have great objections to a call ſo much on the ſudden, he ſhould certainly oppoſe that motion.

Mr. *Tierney* then ſaid he ſhould move it the next day.

Mr. *Long* brought up an account ordered to be laid before the Houſe, of the net income of the poſt office for the years 1797, 1798, 1799, as far as it could be made up.—Ordered to be laid on the table.

Mr. *Abbot* ſaid, he was about to move this year for the ſame ſort of accounts that he moved for laſt year, relative to revenue and trade.

He then proceeded to move for various documents on public accounts.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that theſe accounts were

were ſo very complicated and minute; that they could not poſſibly be produced without a great deal of time.

Mr. *Abbot* ſaid, he wiſhed to quicken the officers as much as poſſible; he did not expect theſe accounts immediately, but he thought they might be produced in the courſe of this ſeſſion at leaſt.

The motions were then all put and carried.

Mr. *Tierney* moved for a great number of documents upon the ſubject of finance—ſuch as

An account, ſhewing how the money raiſed by virtue of an act of parliament for exchequer bills for the year 1800, has been diſpoſed of and applied.

An account, ſhewing how the money voted for the ſervice of the year 1799 has been diſpoſed of; diſtinguiſhing it under certain heads, &c.

An account of debts outſtanding on exchequer bills, on the 5th of January, 1800, &c. &c.

An account of the produce of the income tax for the year ending on the 5th of April, 1800, as far as it can be made up, diſtinguiſhing the amount aſſeſſed by the commercial commiſſioners.

An account, ſhewing how the money raiſed by virtue of an act of the laſt ſeſſion of parliament for raiſing three millions, for the uſes therein mentioned, has been diſpoſed of and applied.

An account of the total amount produced by the act of the 38th of the preſent reign for granting an aid for the proſecution of the war.

An account of the total amount produced by the act for granting duties on importation and exportation, and the tonnage of ſhips, &c. for the year 1800.

An account of the diſtribution of two millions and a half, granted for the extraordinaries of the army for 1799, paid by the pay-maſter-general, together with the extraordinaries of the army, &c.

An account, ſhewing how the money raiſed by virtue of the malt duty bill, &c. has been diſpoſed of and applied.—Which were all ordered to be laid before the Houſe.

He then moved for an account of the advances to government by the bank, on the land and malt duties; and alſo on exchequer bills, and other ſecurities, &c. up to the firſt of January, 1800; and of exchequer bills now in the hands of the bank, &c.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that to the firſt part

of

of this motion he had no objection, but to the latter part he had; the Houſe of Commons ſhould not enquire into what way the bank of England laid out its money, any more than they ſhould enquire into the affairs of any private man. The latter part of this motion was for an enquiry into the exchequer bills in the hands of the bank, which was a private concern, and as ſuch he objected to it. This was an enquiry into the manner in which they laid out their private caſh at the bank, with which the Houſe had no more to do than they had with the affairs of an individual.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, that his object was to learn how much in reality the bank of England was in advance to government. Whether they advanced money by loan, or whether they advanced it on exchequer bills, it was the ſame in his view of the ſubject, for it ſtill was an advance to government, although exchequer bills were held for it as a ſecurity for that money. It was no enquiry into the management of the private affairs of the bank; the object was ſimply to learn how much, in point of fact, the bank was in advance to government, and it was impoſſible to aſcertain that fact without knowing what exchequer bills the bank held at this time. He did not move this from any malicious motive, but merely as a neceſſary piece of information upon the ſtate of public finance; neither was the motion without a precedent. But if the Chancellor of the Exchequer perſiſted in oppoſing it, he ſhould not preſs it, becauſe by preſſing it he had no hope of ſucceſs. He would, however, repeat that his object was to know the advance of the bank to government, which he could not do without this information upon Exchequer bills.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, I am doing my duty, as a member of parliament, when I oppoſe a meaſure which appears to me to be an improper one. I aſſign reaſons why I think the motion improper; it is competent to me to do ſo. If the hon. Gentleman thinks, as he ſays he does, that the motion is ſuch as the Houſe ought to adopt, it is not only competent to him, but I conceive it to be his duty to call for the ſenſe of the Houſe. He makes his motion, and aſſigns reaſons in ſupport of it. I oppoſe him, and aſſign ſuch reaſons as occur to me againſt his motion, and the Houſe ſhould decide between us. But what he ſtates as a precedent is not applicable to the caſe before us: the caſe he alludes to was that of an enquiry inſtituted by this Houſe into the ſolvency of the bank. It was natural then to call for an account of its debts and of its credits, for we were

then to report upon its ſolvency, and the reſult was, as might have been expected, highly to the credit and the opulence of the bank. But, in the preſent inſtance, I contend, that what is now aſked with regard to the bank might as well be aſked of any banker; therefore, upon that ground, I feel myſelf called upon to oppoſe that part of the motion, and ſhall now move an amendment to leave out that part of it, which he moved accordingly.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, he did not agree exactly with the Chancellor of the Exchequer as to the application of the precedent upon the ſolvency of the bank. This reminded him that, at the time alluded to, the bank complained of the preſſure which came upon it by the drainage of their caſh by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. However, ſaid Mr. Tierney, I will not preſs my motion, not becauſe I do not think it a proper one, but becauſe the right hon. Gentleman reſiſts it; for I have been taught by experience, that his reaſons are much more forcible than mine in this Houſe. Whenever he ſtates any meaſure of his own, or oppoſes any meaſure of mine, he always carries his point. Now, without vanity, at leaſt without much of it, I may ſay, that by accident I may have been right once in my life; but if I refer to the deciſions of this Houſe, in which that right hon. Gentleman and myſelf were opponents, I have never been in the right. Therefore I ſay, that becauſe he oppoſes me I give it up, and not becauſe I think the motion is improper."

The amendment was then put and carried; and afterwards the firſt part of the motion was agreed to. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

WEDNESDAY, JAN. 22.

Printed copies of the letter of Bonaparte, Firſt Conſul of the French Republic to his Majeſty, and the anſwer of Miniſters, were laid on the table from the Secretary of State's Office.

Lord *Grenville* preſented a meſſage from his Majeſty.

This meſſage was read by the Lord Chancellor, and afterwards by the Reading Clerk at the table, as follows:

"GEORGE REX.

The ſupplies granted in the commencement of the preſent Seſſion having been calculated to provide only for the firſt months of the year, his Majeſty now recommends it to the Houſe to make ſuch further proviſion as they

they may judge neceſſary, under the preſent circumſtances, for the ſeveral branches of the public ſervice, and for the vigorous proſecution of the war: and his Majeſty has given directions that the proper eſtimates for this purpoſe ſhould be laid before the Houſe.

His Majeſty has thought proper, on this occaſion, to direct that there ſhould be laid before the Houſe copies of communications recently received from the enemy, and of the anſwers which have been returned thereto by his Majeſty's command.

His Majeſty entertains the fulleſt confidence, that thoſe anſwers will appear to this Houſe to have been conformable to that line of conduct which was required from his Majeſty on this occaſion, by his regard to all the moſt important intereſts of his dominions; and his Majeſty having no object more at heart than that of contributing, as ſoon as the ſituation of affairs ſhall make it practicable, to the re-eſtabliſhment of the general tranquillity of Europe, on a ſure and ſolid foundation, and of providing effectually for the ſecurity and permanent proſperity of his faithful people, places a firm reliance on the continued ſupport of his Parliament, and on the zeal and perſeverance of his ſubjects, in ſuch meaſures as may beſt tend to confirm the ſignal advantages which have been obtained to the common cauſe in the courſe of the laſt campaign, and to conduct the great conteſt in which his Majeſty is engaged to a ſafe and honourable concluſion.

G. R."

Lord *Grenville* ſaid, he had given notice the preceding day of his intention to bring down the meſſage that had been juſt read, and of his deſign to move that the ſaid meſſage be taken into conſideration on Monday next, but as he had underſtood ſince he came into the Houſe that Tueſday would be a more convenient day to ſome noble Lords, he would move that the meſſage be taken into conſideration on Tueſday next, and that the Lords be ſummoned. Ordered.

Lord *Grenville* then ſaid he had another Meſſage to preſent from his Majeſty, which was read as follows:

"GEORGE REX.

"His Majeſty thinks proper to acquaint the Houſe that a body of auxiliary Ruſſian troops, employed with his Majeſty's forces on the expedition to Holland, having neceſſarily been brought to theſe kingdoms at the cloſe of the campaign, and the ſeaſon of the year, and other circumſtances, not having admitted of their being ſent back to the dominions of the Emperor of Ruſſia, his Majeſty has taken meaſures, agreeably to treaty, for their being ſtationed during the winter in his Majeſty's do-

miniſters; and that his Majeſty has accordingly directed proper accommodations to be provided for them in the Iſlands of Guernſey and Jerſey.

G. R.

The meſſage having been read in due form, Lord Grenville moved that it be alſo taken into conſideration on Tueſday.

An order of his Majeſty in council, ordering an exportation of 3,000 quarters of wheat to the iſlands of Guernſey and Jerſey, was laid upon the table by the Duke of Portland, and read. Adjourned to Tueſday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, JAN. 22.

Mr. *Cornwallis* took the oaths and his ſeat for the borough of Eye, in Suffolk.

Mr. *Huſkiſſon* moved that there be laid before the Houſe accounts of the annual revenue ariſing to the Eaſt India Company from the provinces of Bengal, the Benares, &c. alſo of the different charges of the different preſidencies, and the whole of the accounts which are uſually laid before the Houſe preparatory to the introduction of the India budget. Ordered.

Mr. *Abbot* moved for ſeveral accounts, viz. of the diſpoſal of the money remaining in the Exchequer from the 5th of January, 1799 to the 5th of January, 1800;

Of the amount of the Exchequer, Navy, Tranſport, &c. Bills, iſſued during the ſame year; and

Of the amount of the Unfunded Debt now outſtanding on Exchequer, &c. Bills.

Thoſe different accounts were ordered to be laid on the table.

MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then brought up a meſſage from the King, which was read from the chair, and was exactly ſimilar to that delivered to the Houſe of Lords.

After the Speaker had read the meſſage to the Houſe,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved that his Majeſty's moſt gracious meſſage be taken into conſideration on Monday next.

Mr. *Tierney*, after obſerving that he had given notice of a motion for a call of the Houſe, expreſſed a wiſh that the conſideration of the momentous buſineſs which the right hon. Gentleman had propoſed for Monday, might be deferred till the

the day which he intended to move that a call ſhould take place.

He did not conceive that ſo ſhort a delay could prove of the leaſt inconvenience to the progreſs of public buſineſs. If his wiſh in this point, which he imagined every motive conſpired to juſtify, was agreed to, he would now forbear entering into any arguments to ſhew the neceſſity of a fuller attendance.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid that it muſt be obvious to every Gentleman, how unneceſſary was the motion intended to be made by the hon. Gentleman, and how dangerous the conſequences with which the propoſed delay might be attended. The very face of the tranſaction itſelf ſhowed how requiſite it was to come to as ſpeedy a diſcuſſion and deciſion on theſe great points as poſſible, and any heſitation or uncertainty about that deciſion muſt appear ſtrange in the eyes of Europe and of the world. The Houſe would therefore feel that it was not poſſible to admit ſo long an interval to intervene as that propoſed by the hon. Gentleman. Beſides, the communication made to his Majeſty by the enemy has been long known to the public at large, and the Houſe and the public muſt feel that this fact was the beſt notice that could be given for a full attendance, for it involved the great queſtion of peace or war, and that at a moment when this queſtion was of greater intereſt and importance than ever. Thoſe who felt, as they ought to feel, the full importance of ſuch ponderous intereſts, would be ſure to attend from a due ſenſe of their duty, and not from the neceſſity impoſed upon them by enforcing a call. The attendance of ſuch men would be as full and effectual as if no call was moved for. He muſt therefore oppoſe the motion as altogether unneceſſary, and object to any further delay of ſo preſſing a ſubject beyond the day he had already propoſed.

Mr. *Tierney* profeſſed himſelf not ſatisfied with theſe obſervations, and ſaid, that he would make his intended motion as ſoon as the papers were laid upon the table.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then preſented the papers containing the late correſpondence between the French government and his Majeſty's miniſters.

He then moved, that they be taken into conſideration on the ſame day as his Majeſty's meſſage. Agreed to.

Mr. *Tierney* now roſe and ſaid, that nothing that had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman was ſufficiently convincing with him to diſſuade him from the motion of which he had given

given notice. He would ſtill perſiſt in it, without thinking it neceſſary to anſwer the objections urged againſt it by the right hon. Gentleman. If the arguments of that right hon. Gentleman were good, then that Houſe had been in error from time immemorial; for calls of the Houſe were ſurely not unuſual on ſuch occaſions. It was far from his wiſh or intention to haraſs members by any motion of that nature; and he truſted they would not ſuſpect him capable of entertaining ſuch a deſire. He thought, however, that a full attendance ſhould be enforced on theſe great occaſions, if not during the whole of the ſeſſion; for he would aſk Gentlemen, whether there ever came before Parliament buſineſs of more magnitude and importance than that which was to occupy their attention this ſeſſion? When his hon. Friend (Mr. Sheridan) gave notice of his motion for an enquiry into the cauſes which produced the failure of the late expedition againſt Holland, he imagined that queſtion of ſufficient moment to juſtify a call of the Houſe. To whom the blame of that fatal failure was to be imputed, he would not now ſtop to examine; but ſurely it was an event that ſufficiently affected the honour and intereſt of the country to juſtify a call of the Houſe for the day on which a matter of ſuch high conſideration was to be diſcuſſed. On that day, however, he might not be diſpoſed to enforce a call; for there were other queſtions behind that which would require an equally general attendance and attention. Among others, there was the queſtion of the union with Ireland, and the introduction into that Houſe of, it was ſuppoſed, one hundred members. Indeed a vaſt variety of important queſtions were expected to come under conſideration during the ſeſſion, and he could not be ſuppoſed to harraſs any individual by calling the attention of every member to the diſcuſſion of ſuch momentous points. The generality of gentlemen had no great reaſon of complaint on this point; they ſhould now feel ſomewhat for the ſtate to which the country was reduced; for it was a melancholy fact, that during theſe three years paſt he had never ſeen one half of the Houſe preſent, even at the diſcuſſion of the moſt important queſtions. He muſt therefore perſiſt in moving, that the Houſe be called over on Wedneſday, the 4th of February.

Mr. *Jones* ſeconded the motion. With due ſubmiſſion to the right hon. Gentleman who oppoſed it, he could not think him juſtified in that oppoſition, unleſs he brought forward better arguments than thoſe which he uſed againſt a ſimilar

motion

motion for a call, which was moved for in order to give a full diſcuſſion to a moſt important bill, and which he conceived to be the ground of the diſaſtrous expedition againſt Holland. If the failure of that expedition did not require to be examined into by the collective wiſdom of the Britiſh Legiſlature, he was at a loſs to conceive what could. It was far from his intention to give any unneceſſary trouble to Gentlemen, but he now ſupported the motion for a call of the Houſe on the ſame grounds that he oppoſed the late long adjournment, and he would continue to ſupport, though he were left in a minority of only himſelf and the hon. Mover, as had been the caſe on a former occaſion. There were many urgent and important queſtions which imperiouſly claimed the attention and the collective ſenſe of that *National* Aſſembly (a laugh from the Treaſury Bench). Here Mr. Jones confeſſed that he did not poſſeſs that command of words for which the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), and perhaps thoſe around him were diſtinguiſhed, but he would nevertheleſs obey the deep ſenſe which he felt of his duty as a member of Parliament, and he would perſevere in contending that ſeveral important queſtions loudly call for the collective ſenſe of the Houſe of Commons, eſpecially the great and alarming ſcarcity which now prevailed of the neceſſaries of life, and which aroſe from that great evil, a monoply of corn, coals and hops, which the wiſdom and vigilance of Parliament ſhould haſten to correct and extinguiſh. The nation loudly called for ſome forcible laws to correct this evil, and the call of the nation ſhould be liſtened to. For his part he had never witneſſed a full Houſe but on one occaſion, and that was upon a bill reſpecting *partridges*. On that occaſion, indeed, Gentlemen were obſerved to attend in coveys. He hoped they would do ſo on the preſent occaſion.

The *Maſter of the Rolls* oppoſed the motion. During the time he had the honour of a ſeat in Parliament, he had never ſeen any good ariſe from a call. The attendance on ſuch occaſions was not greater than when there was no call; he ſaw no uſe in a call, except, as it held out a notice that ſome matter of importance was to come under diſcuſſion; if any other purpoſe was expected from it, he had never obſerved that it was anſwered by it. As to the particular queſtion of war or peace, that was to be diſcuſſed on Monday next, and therefore a call of the Houſe, ſuch as that propoſed, was unneceſſary for that diſcuſſion. The expedition againſt

Holland

Holland was the other queſtion, and he was ready to confeſs it to be one of the deepeſt and moſt home-felt importance; but its very importance would bring together as full an attendance as may be; beſides, it had been long and generally underſtood, that theſe great queſtions were to come before Parliament immediately upon their meeting; upon this ground did he agree to ſo early a day as Monday for the conſideration of his Majeſty's communication. It appeared then, that theſe two important queſtions would be diſpoſed of before the propoſed call of the Houſe could have any effect. As to the intention of keeping the terrors of it hanging over the heads of members from day to day, he could not expect the intended benefit to ariſe from it, for he had never known the call to be enforced, or to operate otherwiſe than as a notice, and then even it only operated as a diſadvantage to ſome particular perſons. Thus it was in the call to enforce attendance on Mr. Grenville's Bill, which, however, was only meant to enforce the attendance on Committees, to an omiſſion of which was attached a cenſure of the Houſe. Unleſs the preſent motion was intended to enforce a full attendance during the whole ſeſſion, he did not ſee the uſe of it; but if the two queſtions aſſigned were the only grounds upon which it was ſupported, then Gentlemen would ſee whether there was any neceſſity of entertaining it; for his part, he could not ſee that it would operate otherwiſe than as a notice, and on that ground he would oppoſe it.

Mr. *Tierney* conceived that the learned Gentleman miſrepreſented him, but no doubt unintentionally. He had merely ſaid, in anſwer to ſomething that had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman, (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) that perhaps he would not enforce the call upon the day appointed, but poſtpone it to a future day, when important buſineſs was to come on. As to the queſtion itſelf, it was admitted that a call, on ſome occaſions, might be beneficial; and if there were thoſe that did not feel that the motion he had alluded to was not of ſufficient importance, he meant that which was to enquire into the cauſe why an army of 50 000 men was compelled to ranſom their return; if there were any, he ſaid, who did not think ſuch a queſtion called for the fulleſt poſſible attendance, from them he could not expect any concurrence in his opinion; but from thoſe who felt otherwiſe, and who were alive to the honour of their country, he truſted he ſhould meet with proper ſupport.

The

The queſtion was then put on Mr. Tierney's motion, when the Houſe divided.

Ayes - - 32 | *Noes* - - 115

On our return into the Gallery

Mr. *Abbot* made a motion that certain accounts belonging to the departments of the ordnance and victually offices, as far as they were connected with the proceedings of the Committee of Finance, ſhould be laid before the Houſe by the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty.

Mr. *Wallace* thought himſelf bound to object to the motion, as it might ſeem to caſt ſome imputation on the conduct of the Lords of the Admiralty, and more eſpecially as there was already an order that the papers now called for ſhould be laid before the Houſe at the beginning of the ſeſſion, when all their proceedings were regularly to be laid before Parliament. The preſent motion he therefore thought ſuperfluous, or as having no tendency but to throw an unmerited reflection on the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty.

Mr. *Abbot* diſclaimed any ſuch intention, and was ready, on the contrary, to beſtow the higheſt praiſe on the vigilance and activity of thoſe who, ſo much to the honour and the ſafety of their country, now preſided over that department. His only object was the introduction of certain arrangements into the ordnance and victualling offices, which ſome time ſince had been promiſed ſhould take place.

After a few words in explanation between Mr. Abbot and Mr. Wallace, the motion was agreed to.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved, that the Houſe at its riſing ſhould adjourn to Monday next, that Gentlemen ſhould have time and leiſure to examine the nature and tendency of the important buſineſs that was on that day to come under their conſideration. This motion was agreed to, and the Houſe accordingly adjourned till Monday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MONDAY, JAN. 27.

Mr. *Nepean* brought up a variety of accounts from the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, which were connected with the report of the committee of finance, and which, on a former day, had been moved for by Mr. Abbot. Ordered to lie on the table.

The ſeveral financial papers moved for by Mr. Tierney,

were brought up by Mr. Long. Ordered to lie upon the table, and to be printed.

On the motion of Mr. Long, the order of the day was then read for taking his Majeſty's moſt gracious Meſſage into conſideration. The order being accordingly read,

Mr. *Long* roſe and ſaid, that it was with infinite regret that he had to announce to the Houſe that a ſudden indiſpoſition of his right hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had prevented his attendance this day, and the diſcuſſion of the important buſineſs of which notice had been given. He begged leave to expreſs, in the name of his right hon. Friend, the uneaſineſs which he felt both for the delay of this momentous diſcuſſion, and the inconvenience which this diſappointment might have occaſioned to a great number of gentlemen, who had made it a point to attend that day. The delay, however, he hoped would be very ſhort, and he would now move, that his Majeſty's Meſſage be taken into conſideration on Wedneſday next. This motion was then put and agreed to—and an order was alſo made for taking the papers relative to the late communications from the enemy into conſideration on the ſame day, which was agreed to. The Houſe then adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

TUESDAY, JAN. 28.

Lord *Mountfort* took the oaths and his ſeat.

The Commiſſioners of the Cuſtoms preſented at the bar ſeveral public accounts from that department.

Lord *Grenville* having moved the order of the day,

The Clerk read at the table the Meſſage received on Wedneſday laſt from his Majeſty.

Lord *Grenville* roſe. He ſaid, the nature of the queſtion on which he had the honour of addreſſing their Lordſhips, excluſive of the importance of the ſubject to which their attention was called, by the Meſſage which they had juſt heard read, was ſo manifeſt, that no comments of his could be wanting to heighten the intereſt of that diſcuſſion which would neceſſarily ariſe from it; indeed it was ſo materially and intimately blended with the former proceedings of this Houſe, uniformly adopted ſince the commencement of the preſent war, that he thought it right to notice it in the very outſet, and to obſerve, that all he meant to call upon the Houſe to agree to, was to concur in an addreſs to his Majeſty on his Meſſage, on the ſubject of the papers on the table;

table; an addreſs, the purport of which ſeemed to him to be ſo obviouſly the natural and neceſſary conſequence of the line of conduct which the Houſe had hitherto, without a ſingle variation, purſued during the courſe of the preſent conteſt, and of which ſuch infinite advantages had hitherto reſulted to the country, that he could not bring himſelf to believe that any noble Lord would act ſo inconſiſtently as to refuſe his aſſent to the addreſs he ſhould have the honour to propoſe. So much was known already to the Houſe concerning the preſent ſtate of this country and of Europe, ſuch had been the declarations, from time to time, of thoſe of their Lordſhips who, with him, ſaw the neceſſity and juſtice of the war in which we were engaged, that for him to detain their Lordſhips that evening to any great length, by ſtating arguments to ſupport the motion he ſhould have the honour to propoſe, would be to arraign the juſtice of thoſe declarations, and to appear to doubt the policy of thoſe determinations which reſulted from them. Their Lordſhips had, in their repeated addreſſes, laid at the foot of the throne the demonſtrations of their perfect acquieſcence in the propriety of thoſe meaſures which the ſervants of the crown thought it moſt conſiſtent with their duty, and with the real intereſts of the country, to recommend and adopt. Unfortunately the ſame neceſſity ſtill exiſted for perſevering in the conteſt. Nothing in the ſtate and poſture of the affairs of Europe admitted of a rational hope, that for this country, that for Europe, there was any ſecurity but in a continuation of the war. In ſaying this, in calling on their Lordſhips to concur with him in opinion, he would be underſtood to make the appeal to thoſe of them only who always concurred with him, for to thoſe who never did admit the neceſſity and the juſtice of the war, to thoſe who never had approved of the conduct and concurred in the ſentiments of his Majeſty's Miniſters, who, after the experience of ſeven years war, concurred not indeed merely with the majority of that Houſe, but with the majority of all the thinking portions of the nation, who would not even concur with the greateſt part of mankind, he would make no appeal; on them he would not that night call for co-operation or ſupport, becauſe he utterly deſpaired of effectuating their converſion or conviction by any argument in his power to urge or to adduce. It was not poſſible to have made the ſtudy of the preſent condition of the world the principal object of his whole political life, without perceiving that an hoſtile mind ſtill pervaded the whole conduct

of the enemy. He hoped his mind was not ſo framed, as to be inſenſible to the calamities of war, and its dreadful conſequences; ſure he was that he was not ſo ignorant of the real intereſt of any country, as not to know that peace was preferable to war. Peace was only to be wiſhed for the intereſts of our commerce, the pleadings of humanity were decidedly in favour of ſo deſirable an event, but there were, nevertheleſs, ſome circumſtances equally important, which called on the Britiſh government at this moment to be extremely cautious of entering upon a ſubject of ſuch magnitude with the perſons who were at preſent the rulers, or who poſſeſſed the ſupreme power in what they ſtyled the French Republic. The firſt circumſtance, his Lordſhip ſaid, to which he would beg the attention of the Houſe, was, whether the preſent rulers were in ſuch a ſituation, as could promiſe any greater degree of ſecurity to this country, with regard either to obtaining a peace, or to keeping it when obtained. This he obſerved, Miniſters had thought proper to aſk in the note returned as an anſwer to the firſt diſpatch, and it was a circumſtance which deſerved the moſt ſerious and deliberate conſideration of their Lordſhips, before they decided on the queſtion then to be ſubmitted to them. He would divide it into two points: firſt, Was any good conſequence likely to be hoped for, as the reſult of entering into negociation? And, ſecond, ſuppoſing a negociation was to take place, were there any grounds to ſuppoſe the preſent Conſular government could give greater ſecurity for concluding a treaty, than any former revolutionary government, which had ſo rapidly ſucceeded each other, could have done? From the documents on their Lordſhips' table the truth of the propoſition that they were hoſtile was obvious. It was obvious, that the ſame proneneſs to aggreſſion, the ſame diſregard to juſtice, ſtill actuated the conduct of the men who rule in France. Under ſuch circumſtances there could be no ſecurity for Europe in peace. Peace with a nation whoſe war was made againſt all order, all religion, all morality, would be rather a ceſſation of reſiſtance to wrong than a ſuſpenſion of arms in the nature of ordinary warfare. Hence was it incumbent on that Houſe, and the country, to perſevere with increaſed vigour in the conteſt. It was incumbent on their Lordſhips to renew that night the pledge of their ſupport of his Majeſty's crown, and of all the deareſt and the beſt intereſts of Engliſhmen. It was incumbent on their Lordſhips to give to Europe, and the world, demonſtrations

ſtrations of that unyielding and undaunted ſpirit which has maintained Great Britain, and ſuccoured ſurrounding nations, in their great ſtruggle againſt the arms, and worſe than the arms, the inſidious levelling principles of France. No man could read the papers on the table, coupled with the real conduct and apparent views of that country—no man could gravely, and with diſcrimination, reflect on the profeſſions and acts of the rulers of that Republic, without feeling that no defence could be effectual but what was planned with the deciſion, and maintained with the vigour of war. It was in war, therefore, that ourſelves, and the great civil community of Europe, were to find ſecurity. It was in war, too, as he moſt confidently hoped and believed, that France was to find the full meaſure of punithment for her crimes. There then was no courſe for the Houſe to take, but to ſupport his Majeſty in the proſecution of thoſe meaſures of juſt defence which the urgency of the criſis rendered inevitable, and which the nature of our ſituation required. In other periods of the world, when the difference between nations aroſe only from cuſtomary difficulties, from cauſes not overgrowing the laws and the acknowledged rights of nations, but were the effect of ordinary events, the work of peace was always undertaken with readineſs, and perſevered in with real zeal. In theſe times, when the differences that agitate ſtates are of no common origin, when indeed they are the offſpring of a mad and maddening ſpirit of innovation, the work of peace is to be entered on with caution, and purſued with jealouſy. Thus to negoicate with eſtabliſhed governments was formerly not merely eaſy, but under moſt circumſtances ſafe; but to negociate with the government of France now, would be to incur all the riſks of an uncertain truce, without attaining one of the benefits even of a temporary peace. Yet were it not in contradiction to all experience to believe that a peace with that Republic is attainable and is ſafe, ſo much did he lament the miſeries of war that he would try negociation. Their Lordſhips might believe him when he ſpoke theſe ſentiments: they might believe that he deplored how much nations were diſturbed, were ravaged and oppreſſed in the progreſs of obſtinate and hard conteſted war. He deplored the ſufferings of the nations of Europe; he deplored the loſs of the lives of thoſe brave men who fell fighting the battles of their country; he deplored the ſpreading miſery in ſtates the ſeat of war—all theſe things and more he deplored; but he knew not how to

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avert ſtill greater evils, to cut of the entail of human miſery, than by perſevering in virtuous and energetic hoſtility againſt a power which ſought the dominion, and with that the deſtruction of the world. Beſides thoſe moſt important conſiderations, there were other reaſons which powerfully influenced him in wiſhing for peace. He was perſonally intereſted, as were thoſe other perſons who along with him formed the adminiſtration of the country. By peace, they would be relieved from much labour, toil, anxiety, and perſonal reſponſibility, while they ſaw in that event the pledge of tranquillity and proſperity to their country. But this muſt be a peace with all the attributes of peace. It muſt be a peace with a government and people formed and accuſtomed to preſerve and maintain the relations of amity and friendſhip. The exiſting government of France appeared to him not to be of this character; and until he could tell their Lordſhips, and the country, until he could tell Europe, that he ſaw in the temper and conduct of the enemy the return of genuine moderation, and of good principles, with all its horrors, and great undoubtedly they muſt always be, he would prefer war. Nor did he doubt but thoſe were the ſentiments of the majority of that Houſe, as when the character of the enemy was rightly underſtood, they could not fail to be the ſentiments of the great body of the people. He was not therefore apprehenſive, that the motion he ſhould preſently ſubmit would meet with material oppoſition. In ſubſtance, that motion would give to his Majeſty a pledge of the unchanged and unalterable affection of that Houſe, while the continued ſupport of Parliament, the aſſurances of the zeal and unanimity of his people, would yield that animating ſanction to perſeverance and to conſtancy, which muſt add weight to opinion, and give energy and effect to ſuch meaſures as may be adopted to conduct the great conteſt in which his Majeſty is engaged, to a ſafe and honourable concluſion. There were two principles material to the queſtion directly reſulting from this ſtatement, and which muſt form the baſis of all diſcuſſion on it. The firſt was, that France ſtill retained thoſe ſentiments, and ſhewed that conſtancy to thoſe views which characteriſed and marked the dawn, and continues to march with the progreſs of her revolution. She was innovating, ſhe is ſtill ſo: ſhe was Jacobin, ſhe is ſtill ſo: ſhe was faithleſs to treaty, ſhe is ſtill ſo: ſhe declared war againſt all kings, ſhe continues to ſeek the deſtruction of all kings. But he would ſtate the facts, and their Lordſhips would judge

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of the exactneſs of his concluſions. Before doing this, it was more in order to ſtate the ſecond principle from whence to reaſon, and he would mention it; and that was, that no ſafe, honourable, and permanent peace could be made with France in her preſent ſituation and with her preſent rulers. What were the facts on which reſted the firſt of thoſe principles for proof and ſupport. The whole hiſtory of a war provoked by the ambition and reſtleſs ſpirit of France, and continued to check her devaſtating progreſs, may be read inſtructively for documents and facts. We were, however, to reaſon from paſt experience and from preſent appearances. We were to reaſon not only from what we knew of the deſtructive march of the revolution over the faireſt portions of Europe, through America, in Africa, and over Aſia, but the recent and public declaration of the rulers in the laſt of their uſurpations, is to form a pregnant ſource of evidence of the ſame ſpirit diſguiſed under new forms, but changed in form only, for ſtill we might mark their devotion to the unity of the end. In the note of M. Talleyrand we found it aſſerted, "that from the commencement of her revolution the Republic ſolemnly proclaimed her love of peace, and her diſinclination to conqueſts, her reſpect for the independence of all governments." Thoſe were the exact words of the French Miniſter in the note on their Lordſhip's table, but how ſtood the facts. "Solemnly proclaimed her love of peace," and yet this love of peace, ſo ſolemnly proclaimed, was manifeſted in being at war in the courſe of eight years with every nation in Europe except two, Sweden and Denmark, and next to being at war with America. Was it in this their Lordſhips would find it proved that France had changed her ſentiments, and adopted pacific views? If love of peace were eagerneſs for war, then might M. Talleyrand well urge it in favour of his government, that the Republic ſolemnly proclaimed her love of peace. But not only was the Republic at war with all the nations of Europe, except the two already named, but is at this moment, if not at war, at leaſt on terms of threatening hoſtility with one of thoſe two ſtates. Their Lordſhips would conjecture that he here alluded to Sweden and Denmark, whoſe ambaſſadors recently quitted the metropolis of the Republic with precipitation, and the probability of their being replaced was very doubtful. On the other hand, if war has not been formally declared by France againſt thoſe two northern powers, their ſubjects, and the commerce carried on by them, have ſuffered in aggravated inſtances

inſtances from the cruizers of the Republic, (whoſe depredations found ſanction from her laws), a ſeries of injuries, of inſults, and injuſtice; tolerable in war, becauſe common to it; but moſt intolerable in peace, becauſe directly repugnant to the principles of any juſt peace or recognized neutrality. He had already remarked that even America could not eſcape that ravaging Republic. The fact had indeed been, that next to a ſtate of active and inveterate war, was the ſtate of thoſe two Republics for a long time. Then ſurely it was not in thoſe facts noble Lords were to look for proofs that the principles and views of the Republic were at length changed from wild and anarchic and deſtructive hoſtility, to all the cheriſhed eſtabliſhments of civilized community, to the habits of meekneſs and moderated ambition and tempered pride; to a ſyſtem, in ſhort, of juſtice and love of order, which were to make peace deſirable, becauſe it might be obtained in the ſpirit of peace, and with the guarantee of juſtice for the permanence of its ſtipulations, and of the rights and liberties of Europe and mankind. Theſe were not the only facts, however, he had to ſtate as proofs of the hoſtile mind and innovating views of the government of France. The war was an aggreſſion on juſtice in its origin, and began its progreſs with every demonſtration of injuſtice. No ſingle act of their government is free from the direct charge of meditated oppreſſion, or matured contempt for the laws of nations and the rights of individuals. Would then any man hereafter ſtate it in the face of their Lordſhips and of Europe, that the original character of the Republic is wholly changed, that ſecurity for peace is to be ſeen in their more recent declarations and conduct. But how is it with that other aſſertion in the note of their Miniſter. "The Republic proclaimed her diſinclination to conqueſt." She did, and we have accordingly ſeen her march her armies to the Rhine, ſeizing the Netherlands, and annexing them, if that were poſſible, for ever to the Republic. Have not we witneſſed her progreſs in Italy? are not the wrongs of Switzerland recent and marked? Do we in thoſe tranſactions diſcover that diſinclination to conqueſt which the Republic proclaimed? But it is not in Europe only that France has developed her plan of dominion and her projects of conqueſt! Even into Aſia has ſhe carried her arms, and ſeparated from the Porte a vaſt and valuable portion of his empire. It is not then in her diſinclination to conqueſt, that we are to find the pledge of altered ſentiments, the manifeſtation of moderated

moderated views and principles. "The Republic proclaimed her reſpect for the independence of all nations." We had here a very important enquiry, in entering on which it was right to obſerve, that nations at war, and nations at war too to add to their territory by conqueſt, might in many caſes reſpect the independence of other nations. It is not neceſſarily the condition on which new provinces are conquered, that the conqueror ſhall violate the independence of thoſe provinces. States may indeed change their rulers, but the form and ſpirit of the general and eſtabliſhed inſtitutions may be reſpected and preſerved. Hence could the right of France to extend her line of territory by conqueſt be admitted, ſtill would that be a violation by her of the laws and rights of nations not to reſpect the independence of other ſtates. But with the right of conqueſt denied her, as how could a government, itſelf an uſurpation, the creation of a day, poſſeſs that right? with this denied her, her interference in the internal government of other nations, her aggreſſions on the rights, and violation of the independence of other ſtates, added to the criminality, and deepened the atrocity of her conduct. Did not Jacobin France attempt the overthrow of every government? Did not Jacobin France arm governors againſt the governed; and, when her politics ſuited it, did not ſhe arm the governed againſt the governors? What had been her conduct in Switzerland? In Italy the whole ſcheme of civil ſociety was changed, and the independence of every government violated. The Netherlands too, remain to exhibit to mankind monuments of the awful veneration with which the Republic has regarded the independence of other ſtates. Was it part of the ſyſtem formed to give permanence to their abhorrence of all interference with the internal government of other countries, to their reſpect for the independence of all other nations, to publiſh their memorable decree of November, 1792? That decree had not ſlept a dead letter on their ſtatute book. No, it was ſtill the active energetic principle of their whole conduct. It was that principle on which they acted when they dethroned kings and plundered princes. It was that principle, which ſtill ſtrong and ſtill indefatigable, every monarch in Europe muſt arm himſelf to reſiſt and overcome. The whole world was intereſted in the extinction of that principle for ever.

Having thus ſtated the queſtion on thoſe various views with much eloquence and force of language, his Lordſhip claimed it as the fair reſult of the facts he adduced, that the

aſſertions of the Miniſters of France were contradicted and proved to be falſe, by a reference to the mere events of the war, and to the hiſtory of the riſe and progreſs of the revolution. The aſſertions of M. Talleyrand being the declaration in great part of the altered ſentiments and views of the rulers of France, their Lordſhips would readily perceive in the refutation of thoſe aſſertions a proof alſo of the hollowneſs of that declaration. They would perceive, that far from having renounced all views of aggrandizement, far from being willing to reſpect the independence of other nations, far from being ſincere in her proclamation of a love of peace, ſhe is ſtill Jacobin France, that France that urged Europe to a cruel and deſtructive war, that has accumulated province on province, has overthrown ſtate after ſtate, has outraged the rights of humanity, and trampled on and deſtroyed the laws and the conſtitutions of other nations. The application of all this to his firſt principle, his Lordſhip conſidered inevitable. The Houſe muſt have felt that every fact in the whole ſeries, tended directly to prove that no change has taken place in the genuine ſentiments and views of the government of France. How truly the ſecond principle was founded on juſt conceptions of the views and conduct of the Republic would appear preſently. It would appear, that no ſafe, honourable, and permanent peace could be made with France in her preſent ſituation, and with her preſent rulers. The proofs in this caſe were numerous. Every power with whom the Republic has treated, whether for armiſtice or for peace, could furniſh melancholy inſtances of the perfidy of France, and of the ambition, and injuſtice and cruelty of her rulers. Did ſhe agree to a ſuſpenſion of arms, it was to be admitted into the ſtate of the negociating Prince, that ſhe might the more ſucceſsfully undermine his throne by corrupting the principles of his ſubjects. She has only wiſhed for an armiſtice as a truce, in the courſe of which ſhe was to plan the diſorganization of feeble ſtates, to excite the people to rebellion, depoſe the magiſtrates, and ſeize on the revenues, and force, of powers for whom ſhe vowed eternal friendſhip. In no ſtage of their progreſs have her generals diſguiſed that they entered neighbouring countries only to deſpoil the rich of their inheritances, and even poverty itſelf has been ſtripped of her rags, of thoſe relics of wretchedneſs which the ſtorm had not quite torn away, that the Republic might yet perſevere in her war of extermination to all people and to all kings. The fate of Switzerland, of that brave, honeſt and generous people, was in the recollection of noble

Lords.

Lords. Switzerland concluded a truce with the Republic, the Republic excited inſurrections in Switzerland, overthrew her inſtitutions, oppreſſed the people with contributions, degraded or depoſed, or exiled her magiſtracy; ſeized on her ſtrong places; aſſumed the command of her armies; and to give permanence to the uſurpation, impoſed on her a government not merely new in form but in name. Here was a ſtriking illuſtration of the good faith the Republic obſerved towards powers with whom ſhe concluded armiſtices. If again armiſtice has been followed by negociation for peace, negociation for peace has ſeldom been productive of little elſe than protracted ruin, or has been the prelude to more deſtructive war. The hiſtory of her negociations was the hiſtory of wickedneſs, was the record of crime. It was the teeming annals of hollow, deep, inflexible perfidy, of treaties made to be violated without ſhame, and of alliances formed to be outraged without remorſe. Through all Europe theſe truths were acknowledged, becauſe through all Europe the effects had been felt, and deprecated, of the terrible wreck of thrones and the overthrow of ſtates, which were the iſſues of French alliance and the pledges of French faith. The Grand Duke of Tuſcany was among the early ſufferers by a treaty of peace with the Republic. In every thing that abuſed Prince ſtrove to conform his conduct to the views of France, but the train had been laid, and at a moment when the honour of the Republic was pledged for the ſecurity of his ſtate, he ſaw the troops of his ally enter his capital, the governor of that city (Florence) impriſoned, his ſubjects in a ſtate of rebellion, and himſelf about to be exiled from his dominions. It was to this Prince, however, that the Republic repeated her aſſurances of attachment; but the Republic that ſought not conqueſt, that would not interfere with the government of other ſtates, depoſed the Sovereign, and gave a democracy to the Florentines. The king of Sardinia opened the gates of his capital to the Republican arms, and confiding in the integrity of the French government, expected to find his poſſeſſions guaranteed by the treaty which recognized his title and his rights, and which guaranteed to France adequate advantages. He was forced to reſign his continental dominions, while the citadel of Turin was treacherouſly taken poſſeſſion of by the Republicans. Hiſtory would record theſe events with the minuteneſs which belonged to them, and in that ſucceſſion in which, for the misfortune of all nations, they opened on mankind. The change of the papal govern-

ment was part of that ſyſtem. It was ſchemed by Joſeph Bonaparte in his palace, and being by that ambaſſador excited to inſurrection, we ſaw the revolution effected by him at the head of the Roman mob. In the example of Naples was diſplayed the ſame contempt of the laws of war and of the rights of peace. The king of that ſtate might have hoped that towards him the faith of treaty would be obſerved, for he had done nothing to provoke the wrath, or excite the cupidity of the Republic. It was true, indeed, that a war broke out between that Prince and the Roman Republic; but was there a man living who doubted but that that Republic, in itſelf neither inclined nor prepared to commence a war, was inſtigated by France to provoke hoſtilities. The ſubſequent events of the war moſt fully proved that France was in reality the author of it. For no ſooner did the armies of theſe two ſtates take the field, than the Republicans joined the troops of Rome, and, not ſatisfied with defending the Capitol, carried their pillaging and deſtroying arms into the heart of Naples. Fortunately thoſe ſovereigns regained their dominions, but ſo deep had the principles of anarchy and diſloyalty been every where ſown, that not even at this hour were the ſtates of Italy in poſſeſſion of half the comforts of peace; nay, it might be feared that they experienced rather thoſe hardſhips which are the concomitants of war. Pruſſia could not be fairly ſaid to have ſuſtained no infraction of the rights of peace, though Pruſſia might poſſibly be conſidered as having peculiarly ſhared the tender ſolicitude of the Republic, to avoid war. It was five years ſince France and the Court of Berlin ceaſed to be enemies in the field, but thoſe who knew what was the ſenſation produced at that court at the time, could clearly ſee an infraction of the faith of treaty, in the proceedings of France towards Hamburgh. In this city, whoſe independence Pruſſia guarantees, the agents of the Republic impoſed and levied large contributions, and all Europe muſt be convinced that Pruſſia regarded ſuch conduct as a violation of the pledged friendſhip of France. Holland and Spain, her allies, or rather her tributaries, how had her treaties with them been obſerved? The privateers and armed veſſels of the Republic, that ſwarm of buccaneers fitted out to pirate the trade of the whole world, took and carried into the ports of France the veſſels of thoſe *friendly* powers. This was not all; for, in contempt of the acknowledged law of nations, the Republic decreed the property of the ſubject of her allies, lawful prizes, and to fill the meaſure of her injuſtice,

injuſtice, even appointed Conſuls in the ports of thoſe very ſtates to regulate the *commerce* in captured commodities—in the commodities of an allied republic, and an allied kingdom. Reverting to the intercourſe of the republic with the ſtates of the empire, the ſame want of faith was to be diſcovered throughout. The armiſtice concluded by the Archduke with the general of the republic, was ſucceeded by the treaty of Campo-Formio; and was this treaty better obſerved than any of thoſe which went before? It generated the cauſes of war which now rages for the ſecond time through Europe. The republics of Italy that might hope to find ſome indulgence from the republicans of France, were next outraged and overthrown by the ſame arts which we ſaw ſucceſsful againſt princes. After concluding the buſineſs of the armiſtice with the Emperor, and the ſubſequent preliminaries to a treaty, France directed her arms againſt Venice. Here they proclaimed that they came as deliverers, who would releaſe them from the yoke of Auſtria, that, according to the French generals, had long inſulted, betrayed, and oppreſſed the republican Venetians; but it was a mere proclamation, for in no long time was the republic raiſed by themſelves, annihilated, and Venice ſold to that very Emperor whoſe vaunted aggreſſions and extortions afforded the original pretext of the invaſion of the French. Genoa received them as friends, and that the debt of gratitude might be paid in the ſtyle of the new ſchool, Genoa was revolutionized, a new government hurried up, while under the authority of a mock conſtitution we ſaw the people plundered and the country pillaged. But if injuſtice againſt princes and ariſtocracies forms part of the creed of the modern revolutioniſt, was juſtice better obſerved towards the republics raiſed eſpecially under the wings of France, her own offspring, and affiliated with her? Was it in any or in all thoſe facts that noble Lords ſaw the ſecurity to this country from a peace concluded with ſuch a power? But it would be ſaid thoſe were not the acts of France more than they were inevitably the reſult of a ſtate of war. This was eaſily anſwered by a reference to the report of a principal member of the new government, who tells the Committee of the Elders, that neither the revolutionary nor the conſtitutional government was capable of maintaining the relations of friendſhip and peace with the powers of Europe, that treaties (as with Auſtria) were only made to be broken, and that there were no ſecurity for Europe, or even the republic itſelf, while ſuch a maſs of abſurdity, of folly, and error,

continued

continued to form the baſis of the government. So much did the actors in the laſt revolution believe the ſtatement of this reporter (Boulay de la Meurthe), that they found their claims to the approbation and aſſent of the people of France, on the declaration that their government is founded on a profound view of thoſe vices and defects, and on principles which are, to ſtop the revolutions of the Republican order. If then the declarations of the rulers of France ſo entirely ſupport all his Majeſty's Miniſters have from time to time ſtated on the ſubject of war and peace, what other courſe would wiſdom bid Great Britain to adopt, but to await the event of things, to await the reſults of future experience, and not to enter on negociation at a time when no one advantage can fairly be expected from it. To attempt to negociate would in fact be to impeach all former deciſions, to libel the paſt declarations of that Houſe, to libel the good ſenſe and ſpirit of the people of England; but above all, it would betray the intereſts of our allies at a moment when the whole world hails with impatience the renewal of that vigorous reſiſtance to the aggreſſions of France, which has already produced ſuch ſignal good, and which, under the bleſſing of God, may yet lead to the deliverance of Europe from the principles and the arms of the common enemy of man. Thus much he had detained their Lordſhips' attention to a mere ſtatement of facts, and ſo concluſive did thoſe facts appear to him, that he would not attempt to diverſify their aſpect by arguments. He had obſerved with how much grave attention their Lordſhips followed him in his ſtatement; and he would now aſſume, as proved moſt completely, the two propoſitions above ſtated. There had juſt occurred to him a topic which, in the order of juſt arrangement, ſhould have preceeded much of what he had been ſtating. This was the aſſertion in the note of M. Talleyrand, that this country was the original aggreſſor in the war. Here his Lordſhip entered into the detail of that queſtion, and urged with great ability the arguments of Miniſters to prove that France was the aggreſſor. He diſclaimed all alliance and connection with any power or powers whatever for the purpoſe of overthrowing the government of France, eſpecially the pretended treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz; and obſerved, that ſo far was the Emperor from meditating ſuch interference, that he expreſsly notified to all the courts of Europe, that he conſidered the acceptance of the new French conſtitution by the king as the proper act of the king. The effect of this declaration was however but too

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ſoon felt by his Imperial Majeſty. For in 1792, when the French invaded his dominions, ſo unprepared was he, that the Netherlands ſpeedily fell into the hands of the republic. England not only did not mean to interfere with the internal affairs of France, but actually authoriſed her Miniſters on the continent to become the mediators between the powers at war. Even M. Chauvelin himſelf, and M. Talleyrand, admitted this. In fact, the latter in his declaration as an ambaſſador contradicted his declaration as a miniſter. Here his Lordſhip took a general view of the correſpondence of that period, and inſiſted that in all reſpects its proved the aggreſſion to have originated with France. He next took a rapid view of the limited queſtion of the practicability of negociation at this time, and maintained that the reception of our ambaſſador at Paris and at Liſle, the final reſult of the negociations there attempted, the preſent temper and conduct of the government of France, were in all reſpects ſuch as to warrant no man in conſidering negociation practicable. But were negociation even practicable, were we quite ſure that it would not be converted againſt us as an engine of deſtruction? Had not the ſame thing happened to other nations, and did we all at once forget the ſworn hatred of the Jacobins againſt England? Here his Lordſhip commented with much ſucceſs on the note of the French Miniſter; and with reſpect to the aſſertion in it that the powers of Europe had originally provoked the republic, by refuſing to recognize her, "to the exertion of her own ſtrength and of the courage of her citizens," his Lordſhip obſerved, that more was meant in the original than could be expreſſed in any tranſlation with appropriate ſpirit and face. It was an artful inſinuation that the republic was dragged into the war, but the ſpirit of the original was, that ſhe carried her arms into neutral ſtates, to make her claims valid againſt nations at war. In other words, if a neutral ſtate would not commit aggreſſions on ſtates at war with the republic, or ſupply the wants of her ſoldiers, ſhe was to reſort to the exertion of her ſtrength, and the courage of her citizens, to ſubjugate and plunder them. It was in this ſpirit they invaded and ſeized on Egypt; and in the ſame ſpirit might England expect to be invaded, if, unlike the other powers of Europe which, unfortunately for them, ſurround the republic, we were not ſurrounded by a channel that, under God, will ever be impaſſable. The words in the note which appeared to him ſo inſidious and ominous were, *Elle a porté partout ſes armes defenſifs.* His Lordſhip

Lordſhip having expatiated on thoſe different topics with great ability, and enforced his arguments with uncommon clearneſs and energy, proceeded to an inveſtigation of the degree of credit to which the perſonal character of Bonaparte could be conſidered as juſtly entitled. Let us now, my Lords, examine the proofs, the recorded evidences of which we are in poſſeſſion, and which can enable us to form a correct opinion of the perſonal good faith of the Firſt Conſul! We ſhall not be deſtitute of ſufficient grounds to judge what degree of reliance is to be placed on his preſent promiſes and profeſſions, from conſidering his paſt actions, if we trace General Bonaparte from the period when, in the third year of the republic, he impoſed upon the French people, by the mouth of the cannon, that very conſtitution which he has now deſtroyed by the point of the bayonet. In this conſideration I am certainly ſpared a great deal of detail by the previous ſtatements which I have given to your Lordſhips of the acts of the French general himſelf, or of thoſe immediately executed under his command. If a treaty was concluded and broken with Sardinia, it was concluded and broken by Bonaparte; if peace was entered into and violated with Tuſcany, it was entered into and violated by Bonaparte; if armiſtices were ratified and annulled with Modena, and the other petty ſtates of Italy, they were ratified and annulled by Bonaparte; if Venice was firſt drawn into the war and afterwards forced to conclude a treaty of peace, that ancient republic was drawn into it and compelled to conclude peace with Bonaparte, that he might with more eaſe overthrow her conſtitution, and annihilate her political ſyſtem by which ſhe had been enabled to exiſt with glory and ſecurity for ages; if the government of Rome was terrified into terms of negociation, and forced to conclude the treaty of Tolentino by Bonaparte, that government was alſo ſubverted by Bonaparte; if Genoa was reduced to the ſame humiliating ſituation, her wealth and her independence were ſacrificed to the will of Bonaparte; if Switzerland was induced to ſurrender up her rights and liberties by the deluſive offers of peace and alliance, ſhe was deprived of them by Bonaparte, for his ambitious and perfidious deſigns were carried into execution in that country by general Brune, the ſame commander whom the Firſt Conſul has ſelected to head the army diſpatched to reduce the inhabitants of La Vendée. Even the affiliated republics were alike the victims of his deſtructive perfidy. The conſtitution of the Ciſalpine Republic, which was the work of Bonaparte, was

was overthrown by the hands of his general, Berthier. But this is not all, my Lords; let us now pass from the continent of Europe, and try if the subsequent conduct of the First Consul can furnish any grounds more satisfactory to give us a favourable opinion of his sincerity. When he arrived at Malta, he held the same specious promises of good faith, with which he had so frequently succeeded in betraying states and governments; but he treated that island as a conquered country, and despoiled it of every thing that was valuable. I now come to his proceedings in Egypt; but it would be unnecessary for me to detain your Lordships with details with which you are already too well acquainted. Yet I cannot avoid calling your attention to that part of his conduct which is diplomatic. I shall of course pass over his deceitful professions, his rapacities, and the cruel massacres which were perpetrated by his troops, and by his immediate orders. He solemnly declared to the Porte that he had no intention to take possession of Egypt; he declared to his own generals that his object was to take possession of that country; and he assured the people of Egypt, that he had expressly come to reduce it to the power and dominion of the Turkish empire. What can we think of his blasphemies, his hypocrisies, his repeated acts of perfidy, his multiplied violations of all religious and moral ties? Did he not declare in the most unqualified terms, that the French were true Mussulmen? Is it in that country that he has laid the foundation for us to rest with security upon the good faith and sincerity which he now professes? Having, therefore, such bases for us to form a correct opinion of his policy, can it be thought inconsistent to believe that he has no intention of fulfilling his engagements? Can we so soon forget his delicate apprehensions with respect to the lives of his remaining soldiers after his flight, and his directions to general Kleber to propose preliminaries of peace to the Porte; to enter into a treaty of peace, and to defer the execution of the articles. You may (says he, in his official letter) sign a treaty to evacuate Egypt, but do not execute the articles, as you may observe with great plausibility that it must be sent home, in order to be submitted to the inspection and ratification of the Directory. Thus, my Lords, we are in complete possession of his system of politics, a system as fradulent, perfidious, and destructive, as ever was practised, to the disgrace and misery of human nature. Thus are we provided with unquestionable pledges of his future integrity. In the corre-

ſpondence which appears upon your table his motives are open and undiſguiſed, and there is not the leaſt neceſſity of having recourſe to conjecture to aſcertain that he has a double object in his communication. The one is to amuſe Great Britain, and the other to induce her to give offence to her allies. I hope I ſhall not be accuſed of entertaining any unfounded jealouſy of ſuch a man, who, having done nothing to redeem his good faith, which he ſo often violated, but the overturning the government of his country by the terror of military deſpotiſm, now comes forward with propoſals of pacification. When we are fully ſatisfied with the ſhare which he has had in previous aggreſſions and depredations, can we be too ſlow in giving him credit for profeſſions of ſincerity? Will any ſecurity be found in his perſonal aſſurances? If his intereſt be deeply concerned, I grant, indeed, that he may be ſincere: but let us for a moment examine this queſtion. I have heard it reported as a matter of opinion, that it is the peculiar intereſt of the Firſt Conſul to make peace, and that we conſequently were bound to turn that conſideration to our own advantage, and meet the overture which has been made to us. It is hardly neceſſary for me to remark, that in this important buſineſs there are three diſtinct ſteps to which our attention ſhould naturally be directed. Firſt, the opening of negociation; ſecondly, the concluding a treaty of peace; and, thirdly, the obſerving of the conditions of peace. We ſhould be clearly convinced that negociation will lead to peace. I am undoubtedly convinced that it may be the intereſt of General Bonaparte to conſolidate his power, but it cannot be paſſed over in ſilence, that whenever any acts of atrocity were to be accompliſhed by the French, they have been uſually effected by a ſuſpenſion of arms. The propoſed negociation would relieve France from the preſent preſſure of numerous and alarming difficulties, and could not relieve England from any. The ports of France, which are now blockaded by our fleets and cruizers, would be thrown open for the purpoſe of introducing naval ſtores, and a variety of uſeful and neceſſary articles, of which the country is in want, and fleets would be ſent to bring back the troops, which are now deprived of all intercourſe with the republic, and might then be employed in augmenting the numbers of the French armies. To us a ſuſpenſion of arms could not be productive of any benefit whatever. Are our ports blocked up? Is our commerce interrupted? And it will alſo be conſidered that there would, in that caſe, be no more ſecurity

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for the maintenance of ſuch a ſuſpenſion than other powers have formerly experienced in ſimilar inſtances. There was not a merchant in the country who would ſend a ſhip to ſea without convoy, on ſuch an account. So far I have no objection to agree that it would be the intereſt of Bonaparte to enter into a negociation, for he would derive from it conſiderable advantages to the commerce, trade, and manufactures of the republic, while this country would be left merely in its preſent ſituation with reſpect to any benefit. He would alſo enjoy the ſatisfaction and triumph of lowering the tone and the character of a people who have hitherto proved the great and effectual barrier againſt the encroachments of republican policy, and infuſe into our allies and the other powers, a diſtruſt of our reſolution and integrity. He would, I entertain no doubt, be inclined to open ſuch a negociation as that which he directed General Kleber to open with the Ottoman Porte, but the concluſion of peace would be ſuitable to the views by which the overtures have been dictated.

An important conſideration occurs to me, and it will, I am confident, have the weight to which it is entitled in your Lordſhips' minds. Is Bonaparte now prepared to ſign a general peace? Is his power ſufficiently eſtabliſhed, and the ſtability of his government ſo fixed, as to enable him to carry through a treaty of that nature? If he be not prepared, it follows that he cannot be ſincere in his offers. On what ground does his power reſt in France? He indeed announces that he is called by the wiſhes of the French people to fill the firſt magiſtracy of the republic, and this information he thinks proper to communicate, before it was thought poſſible to learn whether the French people were ſo ſervile, ſo degraded, as to accept as a gift the conſtitution which he was forcing on them at the point of the bayonet. He has, it is true, ſucceeded in eſtabliſhing a military deſpotiſm, and every act of his government is ſupported by an armed force. For can there exiſt a difference of opinion with reſpect to the character of his power, when we learn that an army of ſixty thouſand men is neceſſary to preſerve tranquillity in the interior of France? You cannot, my Lords, forget that in turbulent republics it has ever been an axiom to preſerve tranquillity by conſtant action, and that axiom has uniformly been the ſtandard by which the ſyſtem of the political rulers of France has been regulated. Such is the impulſe that actuates the preſent government of France: ſuch was the grand and leading motive by which Briſſot was influenced, and ſuch was

the cauſe of the military operations purſued in the time of Robeſpierre. That the ſame ſyſtem prevails at this moment in France there cannot exiſt a doubt, for if Jacobin principiples are adopted at home, if Jacobin doctrines are ſtill maintained at home, the principle of engaging the nation in a ſtate of continual warfare muſt alſo be ſtrictly adhered to. I have now, my Lords, but little more to trouble you with. If Bonaparte had really ſhewn a particular deſire for a general peace, the offer would be leſs an object of ſuſpicion. He ſays, that he has given many proofs of his eagerneſs to put an end to the war, and of his diſpoſition to maintain the rigid obſervance of all treaties concluded; and he alſo obſerves, that this is the ſecond proof of his deſire to effectuate a general pacification. For my part, I am at a loſs to find any proof of his having entertained ſuch a deſire. Does he allude to the treaty of Campo-Formio? and if he does, we certainly are not in poſſeſſion of a ſingle fact to corroborate his aſſertion. We on the contrary learn, that his ſentiments were then in direct oppoſition to a general peace, and were particularly hoſtile to this country. When official intelligence of that tranſaction was ſent by him to the Directory, *Monge*, ſpeaking in his name and delivering his act, his acknowledged inſtrument and his confidential agent, declared, that the French Republic and England could not exiſt together. So that if he even were allowed to have an evident intereſt in promoting peace, would you not be perfectly juſtified in pauſing and reflecting on what degree of faith ſhould be given to the intereſt and power of ſuch an individual? You were lately told by the preſent government of France, that there exiſted no ſecurity, no guarantee for the preſervation of peace in the republic from 1793 to November 1799; a juſt remark, and one which utterly confounds all the aſſertions, all the arguments, all the obſervations made here, that no change of men in power could affect the execution and permanence of a treaty. Yet ſuch was the language uſed in ſupport of the negociation which was carried on at Liſle. Your Lordſhips muſt perceive how much you hazard by hazarding all on the faith, on the power, and on the life of Bonaparte.—If the laſt ſecurity fail you, what remains behind? Will you place your reliance upon the unanimity of the French people in accepting the new conſtitution! Will you reſt your dependence on the hopes of its permanence? But you are alſo deſtitute of every hope from the change which has recently taken place in the perſons employed

ployed in the different departments of the public ſervice. Men of the blackeſt characters have been appointed to ſituations of the greateſt truſt; perſons infamous for the profeſſion of the moſt licentious principles of anarchy have been raiſed to places of confidence and power, and thoſe who were judges in the ſanguinary tribunals of Robeſpierre are now exalted to a diſtinguiſhed rank in the republic. I am only deſirous to call your attention to two principles: whether you are of opinion that while the ſyſtem of government in France, which you have reprobated, ſtill prevailed, there were any hopes but in proſecution of hoſtilities? And whether any event has happened ſince November, to induce your Lordſhips to alter that opinion? I have now merely to notice what has been advanced here, and repeated, that we are determined to reſtore monarchy in France, and to engage in eternal war, ſooner than relinquiſh that object. I have ſtated this aſſertion, which has been often made, though it has been as often publicly and ſolemnly diſclaimed. It has been diſclaimed after the capture of Toulon, in a variety of inſtances, down to the preſent moment, and the ſlighteſt alteration has not taken place in the language of government. I do not pretend to deny that we conſidered the re-eſtabliſhment of monarchy as the beſt, the ſureſt, and the ſpeedieſt means of reſtoring peace; but it has never been maintained that it was the only means of effecting that deſirable end. We merely wiſhed for a government that was capable of preſerving the cuſtomary relations of peace and amity, nor would his Majeſty heſitate to treat with a republic, a monarchy, or any non-deſcript form of government, and conſequently the reſtoration of monarchy was never made the *ſine quâ non* of negociation. If I am aſked what are the circumſtances that may induce me to think proper ſecurity for the obſervance of the articles of treaty is to be obtained in France, I can only anſwer, that my judgment is to be regulated by future events. It would be diſhoneſt to commence any negociation that was not in every conſiſtent reſpect like to terminate in peace. It would be unwiſe, it would be fruitleſs. If, in 1795, when France with her numerous and triumphant armies threatened all Europe; when ſhe found conſiderable reſources in the ſpoils and plunder of Italy and Holland, and menaced this country with a formidable invaſion; if, when ſhe declared that nothing would content her unbounded ambition and inveterate animoſity but our complete ruin; if, under ſuch a ſituation, pregnant with imminent danger, the

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ſpirit and firmneſs of this Houſe led them to meet the approaching peril with undaunted fortitude, and enabled us, under the protection of Divine Providence, to tranſmit to our deſcendants the bleſſings of national independence, of religion, morality, and ſocial happineſs, has any event occurred ſince to make us doubt the juſtice of our cauſe, and the iſſue of the conteſt? If the ſame ſpirit which then actuated our deciſions continues, I aſk, are our means leſs than they were? Let us direct our views to our own ſtrength and reſources, and to the triumphant ſucceſſes of our allies! Our object is declared, and will be effected; we earneſtly deſire a ſafe and honourable peace. If, then, our means are not inferior to what they have been; if the ſituation of our allies is improved; if that of the enemy is impaired and conſiderably weakened, we have greater grounds of confidence, and we approach nearer to the attainment of our wiſhes. I have now, my Lords, ſtated every obſervation which occurred to me as connected with the important ſubject to which your attention is directed, and if you abandon the manly and energetic conduct which has hitherto diſtinguiſhed your proceedings, you deſcend from a ſtation which you have filled with ſo much honour to yourſelves and advantage to your country. Upon theſe grounds I move your Lordſhips, that an humble addreſs be preſented to his Majeſty, thanking him for his gracious meſſage, and expreſſing the concurrence of this Houſe in the ſentiments which it contains.

The Duke of *Bedford* roſe to give his decided negative to the addreſs, and at the ſame time to declare himſelf a decided enemy to the paper, or declaration of his Majeſty's Miniſters, on the table. He conſidered that paper as a compound of inſult, evaſion, and arrogant provocation. If he had only to anſwer the arguments which had been advanced in its ſupport by the noble Secretary of State, he would not have to treſpaſs long upon the patience of their Lordſhips. The origin of the war, or the baſis of a negociation, were not now the topics which their Lordſhips had to diſcuſs. Yet upon theſe the noble Secretary had principally dwelt, and widely expatiated. It were abſurd to expect that either country would confeſs that they had been the authors of an unprovoked aggreſſion, which led to a war from which ſuch a black train of crimes and calamities had flowed: upon this point he deſpaired of bringing about any change of opinion; he would not, therefore, conſume any of this Lordſhips' time upon it. His wiſh and intention was to impreſs upon their

their minds the real ſituation of the country, and the gloomy and alarming proſpects to which they muſt look forward, if they reſolved to perſevere in repoſing that confidence in Miniſters which emboldened them to perſevere in the war, and to ſhut their ears to all propoſals of negociation. The noble Secretary had taken a long retroſpect of the character and conduct of the French nation ſince the commencement of their revolution, and, from the ſuppoſition that they will perſevere in the ſame line of conduct, he infers the impoſſibility of coming to any thing like a negociation, upon the ſpirit or reſult of which he could depend. The ruling power in France ſtill avowed the principles that ſwayed throughout the revolution, and that begot all the horrors that had marked its progreſs. How, then, ſays the noble Secretary, is it poſſible to negociate with men who avow ſuch horrid principles? For his part he was far from defending theſe principles, or from palliating the frightful exceſſes to which they had given birth. By their atrocious conduct they had juſtly provoked the indignation of all Europe. As ſoon would he defend the partition of Poland, the unprincipled views of ambition of the Houſe of Auſtria, or the iniquitous means by which England eſtabliſhed her dominion in India. The horrors that accompanied theſe attempts of ambition and aggrandiſement had ceaſed, from their remoteneſs to excite our indignation; but were they as freſh and green in our remembrance as the enormities committed by the French revolutioniſts, they would not fail of calling forth an equal degree of diſguſt and deteſtation. The noble Secretary inſiſted much on the avowal of Jacobin principles contained in the late communication from the French rulers, and is ſurpriſed they did not take an opportunity of recalling them.

But of what nature is the language of Miniſters in reply? Is it conciliatory? Does it argue a ſpirit of peace, an anxiety to terminate hoſtilities? Quite the reverſe; for Miniſters ſeem to ſay to the French nation, we will revolutionize your ſtate again; we will not treat with your preſent rulers; they do not appear to us capable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity. The noble Secretary next inveighs againſt the French government for having the preſumption to ſay that they were not the aggreſſors in the preſent war. But in their attempt to prove their innocence of this aggreſſion, have they recourſe to provoking and opprobrious language? Surely not. Their tone is very different from that which we aſſume, and their language very different from that reſorted

ſorted to on the preſent occaſion by the noble Secretary; or that which had before been held to M. de la Croix, when he very liberally threw the whole blame of the war on the French nation, an accuſation which it was natural enough for them to wiſh to repel. To whom that charge ſhould properly be imputed was not the queſtion now to be diſcuſſed, or one upon which England has a right to decide. It is natural that both countries ſhould be equally anxious to exonerate themſelves from a charge which muſt bring down upon them the curſes of exiſting mankind, and the execration of poſterity, together with an indelible ſtigma of odium and diſgrace.

The noble Secretary ſeemed alſo apprehenſive that his colleagues in office would be charged with an intention of carrying on the war for the reſtoration of the French monarchy, and had anticipated that charge. He was glad he had, as he certainly for one ſhould have made it. But he had thought fit to diſclaim it; but while he diſclaimed it, his very arguments ſtrongly implied ſuch a determination on the part of Miniſters. Without the reſtoration of monarchy they could look for nothing but an endleſs ſeries of revolutions, an eternal change of men and meaſures; upon men who, upon every new change, would break through whatever treaties or engagements into which their predeceſſors had entered. Any intention on theſe accounts to attempt the re-eſtabliſhment of the French monarchy, he truſted, would be reprobated by moſt of their Lordſhips, as a determination the moſt frantic and wild that ever could be entertained by any wiſe or prudent man. Wild, however, and frantic as it muſt appear to every cool obſerver; it ſeems, however, to be the *ſine qua non* of a peace, or at leaſt the *ſine qua non* of negociation. But what fair hope was there that monarchy could be reſtored in France? France herſelf was utterly averſe to it; at leaſt ſhe ſeemed determined not to reſtore the perſons who claimed the crown of France, or the emigrant gentlemen in their ſuit, who muſt diſpoſſeſs two millions of French citizens of the property which they purchaſed on the faith of the revolution. But in ſpite of this evident diſinclination on the part of France to reſtore monarchy, or re-admit the exiled princes, we ſtill look for that reſtoration, or for the eſtabliſhment of ſome form of government different from that which now prevails. This is obviouſly the object of Miniſters; but how will they accompliſh it? Should not paſt experience have taught them that

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every ſuch attempt only gives riſe to more violent meaſures and more violent men than thoſe that preceded, and that by their endeavours to extinguiſh, they in reality revive and re-eſtabliſh Jacobiniſm. Beſides, we might only look to our ſtatute book to be convinced of the reſiſtance and indignation which all ſuch attempts at all times provoke. We are then to wait for a more favourable opportunity to negociate, for a better ſituation of our own and the affairs of our allies, and for a diminution of the territorial poſſeſſions of the enemy, before we can liſten to any pacific propoſals. When this was to come it was difficult to ſay, but the manner and language which we held towards the preſent French government did not beſpeak the leaſt inclination to treat with them. This manner was ſtrongly apparent in our publication of the Intercepted correſpondence, and in the notes and introduction that accompanied it. He would not ſay that this production came immediately from government; but from whatever quarter it iſſued, he could ſafely aſſert that it muſt reflect more diſgrace on the writer than on any other living being. As to a more favourable opportunity to negociate, or a better ſituation to command a peace, he could only ſay, that it was merely poſſible, and that only; for we ought to conſider the proſpect our own internal ſituation held out, and how much the iſſue of affairs depended upon our allies. Have they not ſhewn, that when it favoured their particular views and intereſts, they did not heſitate to make a ſeparate peace? Has Auſtria not betrayed projects of aggrandizement, which ſhe does not labour to conceal; and ſhould more reliance be placed on the Emperor of Ruſſia? He was not diſpoſed to ſcrutinize the character of any individual prince, but his conduct was full of contradictions and heſitations, which left no well-grounded hopes in the cordial co-operation of ſuch allies. But even ſuppoſing we could keep our allies together, were there not other conſiderations to which we ſhould equally attend? Ought we not to look to our own internal ſituation, and to our means of a further proſecution of the war? What, beſides, was the ſituation of Ireland? After all that had paſſed there, did not thoſe, who were beſt acquainted with the ſtate of that country, contend that it was far from being tranquil? Do our finances encourage farther expences? He ſhould think not; we had already been obliged to abandon the financial ſyſtem, avowedly becauſe we could carry it no farther, and to adopt a new one; which, together with

being oppreſſive and burthenſome, was found to be extremely defective: in its room, therefore, it muſt be expected that ſome meaſure, ſtill more violent and burthenſome, will be ſubſtituted. The demands of our allies are great, far greater than they have been; and every effort will be made to anſwer them. Beſides, it ſhould be remembered that we once expected to be able to ſtarve France, and the fate we prepared for her ſeems now to hang over our own heads. If all theſe things be duly conſidered, the preſent moment will not be found ſo unſeaſonable for negociation—a time of war is well known to cauſe greater conſumption than a time of peace. Our ſituation, in every point of view, is alarming in the extreme, and many noble Lords who have lately been in the country muſt know, that in the fields and woods many miſerable wretches are to be daily found, to whom their deſperate neceſſities have left no other means than thoſe of depredation to ſilence the cries of their miſerable ſtarving children. Such noble Lords as act in the capacity of magiſtrates muſt alſo be acquainted with the complaints brought againſt pariſh officers. If an able healthy man applies to them for ſubſiſtence, they will tell him that he has ſtrength to labour, and therefore refer him to his labour for ſubſiſtence; but though he proves, by the teſtimony of his neighbours, that no man can toil more aſſiduouſly, yet his labour is inſufficient to procure food for his family, with whoſe cries he is aſſailed on his return from his work. Theſe their diſtreſſes have indeed of late been ſomewhat alleviated by the relief afforded to the poor by men of property. But is the majority of a people to be driven to depend upon the charity of a few? This, indeed, would be a dangerous and highly alarming ſituation for any country.

The Duke then animadverted on the means lately employed to recruit the army—an army, that on a late expedition ſeemed rather to go to triumph than to fight, but which afterwards was compelled to purchaſe its retreat by diſgrace. Is another expedition to be again fitted out? Are our men to be carried away? Are our proviſions to be engroſſed for magazines, merely to purchaſe new diſaſters and diſgrace? Surely ſome ſolid reaſons ſhould be offered for perſevering in ſo dangerous a career: none, however, have been offered this night, while Miniſters declare they will not liſten to any pacific overtures. Yet, if it be fairly attended to, the preſent moment is more favourable than any that has yet occurred for hearkening to theſe overtures. Is it not as favour-

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able as that which engaged us to negociate at Liſle, or did the reſult of experience, and the evidence of facts, promiſe a better iſſue to the Liſle negociation? The people then called for peace, and peace was attempted; if they made their voice now heard again, another attempt would be made. But it is objected that the French government had not laſted a ſufficient time. It had, however, now laſted ſix weeks and more, and at Liſle Miniſters did not refuſe to treat with a government of five days. It has alſo been ſaid that no reaſon was held out for giving ſecurity to the negociation, but the perſonal character of Bonaparte; but that this aſſertion was ill founded would plainly appear from Bonaparte's letter to his Majeſty, in which a variety of urgent reaſons were adduced for endeavouring to terminate the calamities of war; beſides, peace was the manifeſt wiſh of the whole French nation; every public addreſs and ſpeech breathed nothing but peace, and even in the proclamation to the armies, who are not uſually addreſſed on that ſubject, the great and real object of their toils and fatigues is declared, by every one of their generals, to be the attainment of peace. The language of the tribunate is likewiſe pointedly and ſtudiouſly pacific. As to the ſilly opinion, ſaid to be entertained by ſome, that at all events we ſhould treat, becauſe, if the negociation did not ſucceed, it would at worſt leave us where we were; he, for one, entertained that ſilly opinion, and he entertained it upon no mean authority—that of the noble Secretary himſelf; for that noble Lord had written much on the ſubject of negociations, and in the maſs of his compoſitions on that ſubject every line completely contradicted every ſentence he had that night uttered on the topic of negociation, which it were eaſy, if not too long, to prove at preſent. For the proof of theſe contradictions the Duke referred to the correſpondence with Barthelemy, and ſeveral public documents, which all imputed the continuance of the war to the obſtinate refuſal of the enemy to liſten to any overtures of pacification. As to the arguments urged from the report of Boulay de la Meurthe, and the former language of M. Talleyrand, they were too inconcluſive to require any refutation. The noble Lord had gone much at length into the perſonal character of Bonaparte. It was not his intention to follow him through that inveſtigation. He believed that Bonaparte, like every other ſtateſman, would wiſh to make a treaty for the advantage and intereſt of the people over whom he preſided, without ſtrict regard either to humanity or juſtice. This

was the principle actuating moſt ſtateſmen, who had more regard for their own glory, than for abſtract conſiderations of the rights of humanity, or the duties of morality. This much, however, he would ſay of his perſonal character, that it had appeared, he knew the utility of moderation. By the treaty of Campo Formio, Mantua was to be ſurrendered to Auſtria, and this part of the treaty the convention refuſed to ratify. On that occaſion Bonaparte wrote to them, that it was not fit to exact too much from an unſucceſsful enemy, as it would ever rankle in his mind, and be the means of ſpeedy and reiterated hoſtilities. So far he had evinced that he had a due ſenſe of the benefits reſulting from moderation. Indeed he did not feel that the language and invective uſed by adminiſtration was of much conſequence, becauſe he well knew, by experience, that they could, and would, if occaſion required, as ſuddenly retract all they had before ſaid. It was, then, his moſt decided opinion that at no time could we ſtand upon better ground, or hope to treat with more effect than we might at preſent: if we did not, for what were we contending? Suppoſing peace could be immediately eſtabliſhed, might we not aſk ourſelves, What have we done? For what have we been fighting? True it was, he had not ſuch hopes of peace from the preſent adminiſtration as he might reaſonably hope from any other, becauſe he conſidered it as intereſted in a prolongation of the war. He had now ſtated his opinions upon the preſent queſtion, and the grounds upon which thoſe opinions were founded. He thought that the preſent time was a criſis upon which not only depended the fate of exiſting man, but alſo of future generations. It was this conſideration alone had induced him to the performance of his duty in addreſſing their Lordſhips. Nothing elſe could have impelled him to undertake the irkſome taſk; he implored them, therefore, to endeavour to ſave the country by trying to promote the concluſion of a peace. He intreated them not to ſanction meaſures which muſt plunge their country into eternal war. For ſo it muſt be, if the reſtoration of monarchy was to be the object for which we fought. Let them not add to the thouſands contained in the catalogue of widows whoſe huſbands have fallen in the dreadful carnage of this war, nor to the tens of thouſands of orphaned children bewailing their loſt fathers. Let them endeavour to relieve the diſtreſſes of the country by the hand of peace, and promote our proſperity by encouraging the uſeful arts of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures. Let them ſup-

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port the kingdom by active induſtry, and ſoftening the improvements of ingenuity—Let us contend with our enemy in theſe points, and it would be a conteſt worthy of great and emulous nations. Theſe were the topics he wiſhed to preſs upon their Lordſhips conſideration, and he felt grateful for the indulgence they had ſhewn in patiently liſtening to him; at the ſame time he was ſorry to ſay, that he feared it would not be of much avail. The nation had not expreſſed any public wiſh for peace, and that Houſe ſeemed ſtill to retain all its former confidence in adminiſtration. Notwithſtanding the fetters impoſed of late upon the freedom of the people, they had yet the power of meeting to petition the throne for peace. They had not, however, done it. He turned, therefore, to their Lordſhips, and implored them to ſave the country. If it fell, it might not be in their power to raiſe it again. Loaded and weighed down by the burthen of accumulated taxes, the people would ultimately ſink to torpid ſlavery, or be rouſed to deſperation. Slavery or revolution muſt be the ultimate conſequence. If he failed of making an impreſſion upon the Houſe, he muſt drop into retirement, and not trouble them more. There, anxious and trembling for the fate of his country, he would endeavour to diffuſe happineſs among the few around him, which would have been his boaſt and glory could he have given it to the country at large.

He would now only obſerve, that the Houſe ought not to regard the addreſs propoſed by Miniſters as containing the ſentiments of their Sovereign, but their own, and as ſuch they ſhould freely and rigorouſly diſcuſs and examine it. It was his intention to propoſe another addreſs in its ſtead, which he would now ſubmit to their Lordſhips' conſideration.

The Duke then ſat down, apparently much exhauſted; and Lord Holland roſe, and read the propoſed counter-addreſs as follows:

That an addreſs be preſented to His Majeſty;

To return our moſt humble thanks for his condeſcenſion and goodneſs in having been graciouſly pleaſed to communicate to us the Correſpondence between the Miniſter of Foreign Affairs in France, and his Majeſty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and moſt humbly to repreſent to his Majeſty that, on the 8th of December, 1795, his Majeſty was graciouſly pleaſed to acquaint this Houſe, that he had been induced, by the order of things in France, to meet any diſpoſition for negociation

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on the part of the enemy with an earneſt deſire to give it the fulleſt and ſpeedieſt effect.

That, in purſuance of this diſpoſition, his Majeſty directed an overture to be made in his name, by his Miniſters in Switzerland, in the ſpring of the year 1796.

That on the rejection of that overture his Majeſty gave the moſt ſolemn aſſurances, in a note, dated April 20, 1796, that whenever his enemies ſhould manifeſt more pacific ſentiments, his Majeſty would at all times be eager to concur in them by lending himſelf, in concert with his allies, to all ſuch meaſures as ſhould be beſt calculated to re-eſtabliſh general tranquillity on conditions juſt, honourable and permanent.

That his Majeſty has ſince entered into two negociations for peace with the French Republic at Paris, in the autumn of the year 1796, and at Liſle in the ſummer of the following year, 1797.

That his Majeſty has repeatedly and ſolemnly declared that the rupture of both theſe negociations was ſolely to be aſcribed to the determination of the French government to reject all means of peace, and to purſue, at all hazards, their hoſtile deſigns againſt the proſperity and ſafety of theſe kingdoms.

That, on the failure of the negociation at Paris, his Majeſty, in a manifeſto dated the 27th of December, 1796, was graciouſly pleaſed "to renew, in the face of all Europe, the ſolemn declaration that, whenever his enemies ſhould be diſpoſed to enter on the work of general pacification, in a ſpirit of conciliation and equity, nothing ſhould be wanting on his part to contribute to the accompliſhment of that great object."

That on the rupture of the ſubſequent negociations at Liſle, his Majeſty had again declared in a manifeſto, dated October 28, 1797, that "He looked with anxious expectation to the moment when the government of France ſhould ſhew a diſpoſition and ſpirit at all correſponding to his own," and that "He then renewed before all Europe the ſolemn declaration, that he was yet ready to conclude peace on the ſame moderate and equitable principles and terms which he had before propoſed."

That we, his Majeſty's moſt dutiful and loyal ſubjects, the lords ſpiritual and temporal in parliament aſſembled, impreſſed with the juſtice of theſe ſentiments, and equally anxious for the re-eſtabliſhment of tranquillity, and for the preſervation of the honour and dignity of his Majeſty's crown (of which we are, by the conſtitution, the hereditary adviſers), cannot conceal our regret at perceiving that his Majeſty has been adviſed to reject the firſt overtures for a general pacification on the part of the enemy; and we beg leave moſt humbly to implore his Majeſty to give directions

rections for the immediate renewal (if poſſible) of a negociation for peace with the French Republic, moſt fervently beſeeching his Majeſty to recur to thoſe principles of moderation and equity, ſo ſolemnly and ſo repeatedly avowed, and which, if ſtrictly adhered to, muſt either enſure the ſpeedy reſtoration of all the bleſſings of Peace, or render our enemies alone accountable for all the calamities too certainly attendant on a continuance of hoſtilities.

The Earl of *Carliſle* roſe to ſpeak to order. He lamented ſo frequently to obſerve the Houſe forgetful of its own forms. That was, he believed, the firſt time that any noble Lord had read a part of the ſpeech of another noble Lord, and he roſe to call the attention of the Houſe to it, becauſe ſuch irregularities would increaſe upon their Lordſhips, unleſs the eſtabliſhed forms of the Houſe were more ſtrictly adhered to.

The Duke of *Bedford* ſaid, it was not a ſpeech, but an amendment, which feeling himſelf extremely exhauſted, he had put into the hands of his noble Friend to read for him, but was not conſcious at the time, that he was infringing the forms of the Houſe by ſo doing.

The Earl of *Carliſle* ſaid it was extremely painful for an individual Peer to take upon himſelf to point out a violation of order, and if the noble and learned Lord on the woolſack would be ſo good as to enforce order, whenever it was infringed, it would be more regular; but he muſt ſtill obſerve, that it was unuſual and irregular for one noble Lord to read a part of the ſpeech of another noble Lord. If the noble Duke had found himſelf exhauſted, he might have handed the latter part of his ſpeech to the Clerk at the table to read for him.

The Duke of *Bedford* roſe again to repeat, that it was not a part of his ſpeech, but an amendment that his noble Friend had read for him.

The Earl of *Carliſle* ſaid, an amendment was undoubtedly a part of a noble Lord's ſpeech.

Lord *Boringdon* ſaid, it was not his intention to enter into all the various topics which had been brought forward by the noble Duke in the courſe of the ſpeech which he had juſt delivered. He ſhould abſtain from doing ſo, becauſe a great deal of what he muſt ſay on ſome of theſe topics, had already been anticipated by the Secretary of State: other points had been brought forward by the noble Duke, which had already undergone in that Houſe at different times, full and ample diſcuſſion; and others which had been brought forward by

him

him had appeared to him to be in a great degree irrelevant to the preſent queſtion, which was ſimply whether or no they would or would not aſſure his Majeſty of their ſupport in the preſent conteſt, until ſuch time as it ſhould appear that, in any treaty to be concluded with France, the ſecurity of his own dominions and of Europe could in any manner whatever be ſufficiently provided for. He could not ſtate the queſtion more ſhortly than by thus quoting the words uſed in the official note, of which the addreſs before them expreſſed their approbation. This, he ſaid, was the ſum and ſubſtance of the addreſs which had been propoſed; and it was from being thoroughly perſuaded that no token of ſuch ſecurity exiſted at the preſent moment, and that the ſafety of the country would in a great degree be riſked by preſent negociation, that he called upon their Lordſhips to ſupport the addreſs which was then before them. That the ſafety of the country would at leaſt have been riſked by preſent negociation, was a matter, he ſaid, not incapable of proof. A revolution, perhaps the moſt important of any that even France itſelf had yet witneſſed, had lately placed upon the throne of power in that country—he would give him no epithets—certainly a moſt celebrated and extraordinary man. It was not, however, then his intention to enter into any conſideration of his perſonal character; it was ſufficient for his purpoſe if he ſtated to them that he was very recently arrived at the poſt he occupied; that it was utterly impoſſible to gueſs how long he might remain there; and conſequently, equally impoſſible to feel any ſecurity with reſpect to his power of obſerving any treaty that might be concluded with him. Did he wiſh to ſtate in ſtill ſtronger terms the degree of riſk to which he thought preſent negociation would have ſubjected the country, he might obſerve, that in caſe of Bonaparte's being driven from his preſent ſituation (no impoſſible event, he believed, in the apprehenſion of any one), how probable it was that he might be replaced by that faction whoſe exterminating and undiſguiſed hatred toward this country, whoſe old cry of war, eternal war with England, would no doubt lead them to put an immediate end to any treaty which might be depending between the two countries. In this caſe he had no heſitation in ſaying, that we ſhould be entirely at the mercy of France; and not only that, but we ſhould have the ſhame and mortification of knowing that we were ſo entirely from our own haſte and our own imprudence; and that it was our own miſconduct alone which had

had driven us from that proud pre-eminence on which we at preſent ſtood, to the moſt diſgraceful ſituation in which any country could ſtand: namely, that of an imploring and depending power, at the foot of a Jacobin Directory, or whatever elſe might be the name of the dignity with which Bonaparte's ſucceſſors might chuſe to inveſt themſelves. He did not traduce the country when he ſaid, that we ſhould then ſtand at the mercy of France. He would not pretend to determine what might be the real diſpoſitions of the Firſt Conſul relative to general pacification. It was, however, not a little remarkable, that though in the firſt note tranſmitted by the Secretary of State to France, his Majeſty with that loyalty and good faith ſo well becoming his character, as well as that of the nation of which he was the chief, expreſsly ſtated his intentions of acting only in concert with his allies, it was not a little remarkable, that in the ſecond French note not one word ſhould be ſaid reſpecting peace with the allies. We were expreſsly invited to ſend plenipotentiaries to Dunkirk for the purpoſe of concluding peace between England and France, and no reference whatever was made to any of thoſe allies, in concert with whom alone his Majeſty had ſo properly declared his intention of acting. He argued, therefore, that even if we had acceded to the French propoſitions, it was highly probable we might have left in exiſtence the continental war; we might have enabled France, in a certain degree, to have ſtrengthened and recruited her forces; we might baſely have allowed her to bring her whole ſtrength againſt the power now in alliance with us; we might have left alive the military habits, ſpirit, and occupations of that military nation; and we might have put into the hands of theſe ſucceſſors of Bonaparte (for he would not ſuppoſe Bonaparte himſelf to be a faithleſs obſerver of treaties); we might have prepared for Bonaparte's ſucceſſors a power more formidable than that now enjoyed by Bonaparte himſelf; more formidable from its intrinſic ſtrength; more formidable from the views and principles of thoſe who might be inveſted with it; but above all, more formidable from the depreſſed and abject ſtate in which moſt aſſuredly it would, under ſuch circumſtances, find this country. He did not vilify the country when he ſtated that ſuch, in all human probability, would be the ſituation in which England would then be, for it was utterly impoſſible to conceive means more calculated to damp the ardour, and check the enterprize of our fleets; to deſtroy the diſcipline and ſpirit of our armies; to enfeeble

every branch of the public ſervice; and to transfuſe into the public mind at large, ſentiments of diſtruſt and deſpondency, than would be the haſty concluſion of an inſecure and temporary peace, and the infraction of it on the part of the enemy, under the circumſtances which he had been deſcribing; or under the only other circumſtances by which ſuch infraction could be attempted: he meant, by the rapid ſucceſſion of innumerable little inſults and provocations, each of them perhaps, taken ſeparately, of no great magnitude; but when preſſed one upon the other, as if to ſee to what point our humiliation would be carried, abſolutely inſupportable: a mode of proceeding which their Lordſhips would well recollect, had been repeatedly adopted by the different Jacobin governments in France with reſpect to foreign countries. On theſe accounts, he ſaid, that as there was at this time no mark of ſtability in the preſent government of France, and conſequently no poſſible ſecurity for the obſervance of any treaty that might be concluded with it, he could not but think that it would be the height of miſconduct to riſk by preſent negociation all the numerous advantages which the firmneſs and perſeverance of Parliament, the high ſpirit of the people, and the energy of government, had ſo ſucceſsfully combined to procure us. He totally differed from the noble Duke in his opinion that the perſonal character of Bonaparte did not enter into the preſent queſtion; ſo far from it, the riſk which was in his mind attached to preſent negociation was greatly augmented by it. It was impoſſible for their Lordſhips, who had been ſuch anxious witneſſes of the extraordinary events which the laſt ten years had produced in Europe, at once to diſmiſs from their recollection what was the character, and what had been the part acted in thoſe events by him, in whoſe perſon was now concentrated the whole government of France. It would be difficult for their Lordſhips to believe that power was, in this inſtance, likely to produce effects ſo oppoſite from thoſe which were uſually attributed to it. That it was here ſo particularly likely to ſoften the heart of one who, beyond any other man, appeared indifferent to the lives of others; that it ſhould here eradicate every inclination to deceit, and ſubſtitute ſincerity; that it ſhould reſtrain ambition and engender moderation. He was far from denying that ſuch an alteration might take place; but at leaſt he thought he was juſtified in entreating them, in a meaſure of ſuch anxious moment, not to preſume upon it before hand; and at leaſt, to have the common prudence

of

of waiting for the teſt of experience, and the evidence of facts. It had been ſaid by the noble Duke, that Miniſters, by their anſwers to France had declared eternal war. He did not ſee how this propoſition could be proved. It appeared to him, that ſhort of preſent negociation, they could not have more ſtrongly expreſſed his Majeſty's anxious deſire for the reſtoration of peace. The teſt of experience, and the evidence of facts could, in fair interpretation, mean nothing elſe than that his Majeſty feels it to be his duty to wait to ſee whether the power of the preſent ruler in France ſhould be eſtabliſhed, and whether, contrary to preſent expectation, his uſe of it ſhall be ſuch as can induce his Majeſty to hope for the faithful obſervance of any treaty that might be concluded with him. He had not been inſtalled a month at the time he was ſpeaking; ſo that his Majeſty's Miniſters could ſcarcely have any *data* upon which to proceed. And ſuch was the nature of the French revolution, that no reference to the hiſtory of former times; no recurrence even to thoſe extraordinary tranſactions of which France, for ſo many years, had been the melancholy and ſanguinary theatre, could in any way lead to the formation of a plauſible conjecture, much leſs to the formation of ſuch a reaſonable and ſolid opinion as muſt neceſſarily be adopted before they could honeſtly proceed in a meaſure of ſuch deep and momentous importance. Surely, in waiting for the teſt of experience, and the evidence of facts, there was nothing that bore the appearance of unwiſe or uſeleſs delay, or juſtified the imputation of a weak and timid policy. In October 1795, upon the eſtabliſhment of the conſtitution with the Directory and the two Councils, his Majeſty, upon meeting their Lordſhips in Parliament, intimated his wiſh of being able to take advantage of that criſis, (ſhould it end as he was led to hope) for the purpoſe of propoſing peace. But although the noble Duke had ſtated it to be in December,* it was not till the March following that his Majeſty thought that conſtitution ſo ſufficiently ſettled as to juſtify him in making propoſals of peace; which it appeared he did in that month through the medium of his Miniſter in Switzerland. If Miniſters had been more precipitate in acknowledging the preſent, than they were the laſt conſtitution, the noble Duke might have accuſed them of having done ſo from a love of tyranny, and from an

* The Duke of Bedford was correct in his aſſertion; as a meſſage reſpecting peace was ſent by his Majeſty to Parliament on the eighth of December, which, probably, Lord Donngdon had forgotten.

anxiety to confirm and conſolidate a conſtitution the moſt abhorrent, from every principle of liberty, that ever was impoſed by the arm of power on a ſubdued and injured people. If government was juſtified in pauſing a ſhort time after the eſtabliſhment of the laſt conſtitution, at leaſt there was nothing in the nature of the preſent which could prejudice them more in its favour. He made no comment upon peace having been propoſed to them on this laſt occaſion, becauſe betwixt powerful and independent nations that circumſtance makes no difference; nor can the propoſing peace ever be conſidered, in itſelf, either as an act of humiliation or a pledge of ſincerity. The noble Duke had ſaid that, notwithſtanding the ſolemn and clear manner in which the Secretary of State had diſclaimed any ſuch idea, yet nevertheleſs the reſtoration of monarchy was become the *ſine qua non* of peace, or, at leaſt, of negociation. Theſe accuſations againſt Miniſters had repeatedly been made in that Houſe, at different periods of the war; with what degree of correctneſs, the negociations at Paris and Liſle would determine. He had ever conſidered the reſtoration of monarchy in France as a means to peace, and in no way as a juſt and legitimate end for the continuation of the war. For his own part, he thought it highly deſirable for the tranquility of Europe, though he had no ſcruple in ſaying, that it was an event of which he did not entertain the ſame expectations with, perhaps, many of their Lordſhips. At the ſame time, however, he did not think that the noble Duke could be borne out in his uſe of the epithets, "wild and frantic," which he had applied to ſuch an expectation; ſince the lateſt accounts from France had brought the intelligence that royaliſt chiefs were in Paris, treating upon an apparently equal footing with the government, and obtaining by formal treaty, that large and populous diſtricts ſhould be exempted from contributing, either in men or money, to the wants of the republic; an event which, he believed, had never happened during any period of the war. The noble Duke had ſaid, that the firſt note tranſmitted by the Secretary of State to France, was not one which was likely to induce Bonaparte to acknowledge the original aggreſſion of France, or to diſclaim thoſe principles which had contributed ſo much to the commencement and continuance of the war. This he denied, and in ſupport of his aſſertion, read a paragraph from Lord Grenville's note: in that paragraph it was ſtated, that no advantage could ariſe from negociation until it ſhould diſtinctly appear that the

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cauſes and principles which originally produced the war had ceaſed to operate. If Bonaparte was really ſincere in his profeſſions of peace, this would naturally have induced him, if not to make any new profeſſions of principles, at leaſt to confirm thoſe which he had already made on the eve of his revolution, by his organ, Boulay de la Meurthe. So far, however, from that having been the caſe, M. Talleyrand, in his ſecond note is made, in a great degree, to juſtify all the exceſſes of the former governments, and to plead the cauſe of thoſe whoſe aggreſſions had originally provoked the war. Had Bonaparte been really deſirous of peace, is it not probable that he would have taken advantage of the invitation which he had juſt read, to announce his dereliction of the principles and objects which had hitherto guided the different governments in France, and to confirm thoſe profeſſions which he had made through Boulay de la Meurthe? His organ, Boulay de la Meurthe, is, however, ordered to renounce them when no negociation is depending; but his organ Talleyrand when negociation *is* depending; when he is invited to renounce them; and when the renunciation of them might remove an obſtacle to peace: his organ Talleyrand is then ordered to adopt and juſtify them. He would aſk, did that look like a ſincere deſire for concluding peace?

The noble Duke had charged his Majeſty's Miniſters with a change of principle, and a breach of promiſe, in not adhering to the declaration made after the breaking off the negociations at Liſle. He would aſk, however, did the noble Duke conceive that that declaration was to remain in force to the end of time? The very terms in which it was couched proved, that no ſuch intention could ever have been entertained: nor could it reaſonably be ſuppoſed, that the ſame conduct could be adopted in ſituations ſo extremely different. Since then, Italy had been reſcued from the tyranny of its invaders, the flower of the French army had been deſtroyed in Africa, the glorious and immortal battle of the Nile had been obtained. Could it be expected, then, that we ſhould now accede to the ſame terms to which we then offered to agree, or that a declaration ſhould be binding two or three years after it has been iſſued?

The noble Duke had been led to hope, that any negociations for a peace would now be crowned with ſucceſs, becauſe, he ſaid, the rulers and the people of France both equally wiſhed it. He moſt ſincerely believed that the people of France had been long tired of the war, and moſt anxiouſly

ouſly wiſhed for the reſtoration of tranquillity and peace. But he would aſk, ſince the death of Robeſpierre, whether every French government had not made the ſame pacific profeſſions? Each faction, as it came into power, had held out the ſame allurements, but each had been actuated by the ſame inſatiable ambition. Each faction had made pretenſions to equity and honour, and each had proved unjuſt and perfidious. Upon the whole, it was upon the grounds of his thinking that there was no preſent mark of ſtability in the government of France; that the nature and character of that government juſtified our expectation of ſomething beyond mere profeſſion; that theſe circumſtances called upon them to aſſure his Majeſty of their ſupport, until ſuch time as it ſhould appear that in any treaty to be concluded with France, the ſecurity of his own dominions, and of Europe, could in any manner whatever be ſufficiently provided for. It was upon the grounds of his feeling confident, that his Majeſty's anxiety for the eaſe and welfare of his people would lead him to look with impatience to that period, that he called upon their Lordſhips to ſupport the addreſs as it had been originally moved.

Lord *Romney* ſaid, he never roſe in that Houſe under ſuch painful feelings, as he then did, having the misfortune to differ both from his noble Relation (Lord Grenville), and the noble Duke. He lamented this the more, as he highly approved of the general tenor of the conduct of Miniſters, and thought the people at large under deep obligations to them for their manly, vigorous, and perſevering exertions which he, in his conſcience, believed, had been the means of ſaving the country. The public, with very few exceptions, had felt an almoſt perfect unanimity on the ſubject of the proſecution of the war, and he dreaded that the difference of opinion, which the paper might give riſe to, would break that unanimity. For his own part, though he could by no means concur in the amendment moved by the noble Duke, yet he muſt ſay, that in their anſwers to Bonaparte's letter to his Majeſty, and the letter of M. Talleyrand, Miniſters did not appear to him to have taken the moſt advantaged ground. In the ſecond letter, in reply to M. Talleyrand, it is ſtated that his Majeſty refers the Miniſter for Foreign Affairs in France, "to the anſwer which he has already given," and then it goes on to ſay, "that he has explained (ſtill ſpeaking of his Majeſty), without reſerve, the obſtacles which, in his judgment, precluded at the preſent moment all hope of advantage

vantage from negociation, &c. &c." Now to underſtand this, every man is obliged to look back to the firſt letter, and there he finds it is ſaid, that "the beſt and moſt natural pledge of its reality and permanence (meaning a change of principles in the rulers of the French republic) would be the reſtoration of that line of princes which, for ſo many centuries, maintained the French nation in proſperity at home and reſpect abroad." It is true, that his Majeſty is afterwards ſaid to preſcribe to France what ſhall be the form of her government; but he really thought if the reference had been omitted in the ſecond letter of the Secretary of State, it would have been better, becauſe, as it now ſtood, it might excite a jealouſy, that this country did pertinaciouſly perſevere in making the reſtoration of monarchy to France the ſole bone of contention. He alſo thought differently from his noble Relation as to ſome of the doctrines laid down in his ſpeech, eſpecially when he ſaid broadly, and without any qualification, that no man could differ from the concluſion he had ſtated, without a dereliction of his former principles. It appeared to be caſting an unfair and unmerited ſtur upon ſuch noble Lords who had chearfully ſupported Miniſters in their meaſures during the war, but who, like himſelf, happened unfortunately to differ with them in opinion on the preſent occaſion. With regard to Bonaparte's good faith, he certainly did not entertain the moſt favourable opinion of it, but we had ſeen but too many proofs of the bad faith of the Bourbons, while that family filled the throne of France, to make the doubt of Bonaparte's ſincerity a matter of ſufficient conſequence to prevent the opening a negociation with the preſent rulers of the French republic. He thought we might fairly have ſaid to them, "by your overtures you expreſs a deſire for peace; we have acted upon ſuch an impulſe in two ſeparate negociations with you, and, in the laſt, have delivered in a *projet* of our terms. Do you, now, let us know your terms, and ſee what you propoſe." This language might have been held, and the negociation proceeded without any armiſtice or ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, becauſe what had paſt, in the courſe of the preſent war, ſhewed the advantage that had been taken of armiſtices and ſuſpenſions of hoſtilities. At preſent hoſtilities are neceſſarily ſuſpended, but each party might have gone on in the mean time as vigorouſly as ever in preparations, for the proſecution of the war at the beginning of the campaign. It was to be remembered, that our former negociations were commenced,

that

that at Liſle eſpecially, after the treaty of Campo Formio, and that we now ſtood in very different circumſtances. At that time we were then almoſt left alone, having been deſerted by our allies, Auſtria and Pruſſia. Even then the ſpirit of the country bore up manfully againſt the difficulties of our ſituation, and he had not the ſmalleſt doubt, that it would ſtand forward with the ſame ſpirit again, ſhould we unfortunately feel a like emergency. At preſent we had powerful allies, and the different armies of Auſtria and Ruſſia are likely to take the field at the opening of the campaign in greater force than ever. There is one particular in which he owned he was perfectly ignorant, though he had endeavoured to gain information from all quarters, and that is, whether the Chouans are in force or not. But whether they are in force or not, no danger could accrue to them, or the hopes of this country, founded on their co-operation, by opening a negociation with the rulers of the French republic. Beſides Bonaparte's language is entirely changed. His profeſſions are of a pacific nature, and however much we may doubt his ſincerity, how can it be aſcertained but by a negociation? We cannot ſuppoſe that a great nation like France, however crippled in her power for the preſent, will fall in with our prejudices, and make all the conceſſions that we may require. But there could be no harm in hearing what terms Bonaparte might have to offer; ſhould they prove unreaſonable and inadmiſſible, we ſhould have it in our power to reject them with the diſdain they might deſerve, and in that caſe, the odium of continuing the war would be thrown on Bonaparte, and the ſpirit of this country would riſe ſtill higher in conſequence, and every Engliſhman would unite and join heart and hand in chearfully contributing to enable the executive government to proſecute the war with vigour. A great deal of conſideration was due to the country, which had made prodigious ſtruggles to ſupport the war; the country was in fact bleeding at every pore, and the people, with great difficulty, but without reluctance, had continued to bear the heavy burthens that the continuance of the war rendered neceſſary: not that he intended by any means to recommend too implicit a reliance on the ſincerity of the preſent rulers of the French republic. He had not forgot the old maxim,

Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes;

and whether he was fighting with a Bonaparte or a Bourbon, he ſhould always act with that degree of ſuſpicion, which policy

policy and prudence dictated. He ſtill, however, thought to carry our ſuſpicions ſo far, as to make them the ground of refuſing even to open a negociation was neither wiſe nor reaſonable. Indeed he feared that a high ſenſe of the bleſſings that Engliſhmen derived under our free conſtitution and equitable laws, ſo wiſely and impartially adminiſtered under the government of his Majeſty, a prince whoſe eminent virtues, moderation, and parental care of his people, rendered him the juſt object of their regard and adoration, might a little too much elate the minds of Britiſh ſubjects, and induce them to look down on the vices of thoſe in power in other countries, and the miſeries ſuſtained by thoſe under their dominion, with too lofty a diſdain, and a conſideration bordering upon contempt. Such a feeling was natural, but, in great political circumſtances, it ought not to be cheriſhed to the excluſion of all candour toward foreign nations.

His Lordſhip ſaid, painful as it really was to differ from his noble Friend, he thought it more becoming, and conſiſtent with his duty as a Peer of Parliament, to deliver his ſentiments ſuch as they were, and ill as they had been expreſſed, than to ſit ſilent when an addreſs was the queſtion, for which, for the reaſons he had ſtated, he could not bring himſelf to vote. At the ſame time he begged to have it underſtood, that however his opinion, and that of his Majeſty's Miniſters, might differ on this occaſion, he wiſhed to be conſidered as their warm friend and well-wiſher. His Lordſhip concluded with returning thanks to the Houſe for their indulgence in ſo patiently attending to him.

Lord *Grenville* roſe merely to aſſure the noble Lord, that much as had been ſaid reſpecting thoſe noble Lords who had ſupported the meaſures of adminiſtration during the war, and who might differ from him on the preſent occaſion, that he meant not to caſt the ſmalleſt reflection on any noble Lord who might differ from him that day, much leſs upon his noble Relation, whoſe zeal for the welfare of his country, and whoſe character for integrity and ſincerity, he ſhould be proud on all occaſions to acknowledge.

Lord *Carliſle*, in reply to the noble Duke's queſtion for what the war commenced, and what had been its object, ſaid, that this was not a war to preſerve a trifling colony, or to gain an extenſion of dominion, but a war to preſerve our laws, our liberty, our religion, our property—every thing we hold dear. We fight for ſecurity, and we ſhould accept of no offers of peace until it is eſtabliſhed on a permanent baſis.

By carrying on the war we have obtained every object we propoſed to ourſelves in beginning it. We have deſtroyed that monſter which preyed upon the vitals of the conſtitution, and threatened its exiſtence. We have checked the career of the conqueſts of France, which, there was reaſon to dread, would ſpread miſery and deſolation over every country in Europe. We had obtained ſecurity: ſecurity we ſhould continue to enjoy by perſevering in the conteſt, and in this way alone. He was confident that to enter into a negociation at preſent would be to ruin the country. He would therefore vote heartily for the addreſs. The whole debate hitherto had appeared to him to be wholly irregular, and in ſome meaſure unconſtitutional, as it touched on the royal prerogative, which ſurely was competent, indeed excluſively ſo, by the conſtitution, to the conduct of all treaties. To this irregularity he imputed the variety of opinion that had been ſtated. Only three noble Lords had delivered their ſentiments, and two of them condemned the papers, but upon different grounds. He thought it would have been more prudent had the addreſs been confined to thanking his Majeſty for his gracious communication, and not have given any opinion upon the conduct of the executive government. They were already pledged to continue the war till the reſponſible Miniſters of the crown ſhould ſay that the period was come when peace would be ſecure. This was a ſubject unfit for their diſcuſſion; who could not have full information on the ſubject. They only knew a part of the tranſaction, and Miniſters might, not improbably, have reaſons unknown to them, to juſtify the firm anſwers which had been returned to the overtures of the French government. He thought very highly of Miniſters: they had by their prudence and ſteadineſs ſaved the country, which would inevitably have been ruined, had the oppoſition been allowed to carry into execution their impolitic projects. He only wiſhed that they would not ſhift the reſponſibility which they themſelves are ſo able to bear, upon others who muſt neceſſarily be incompetent judges. He would make no ſpecific motion upon this ſubject, but he could not help taking notice of it.

Lord *Holland* ſaid, that the noble Secretary of State had begun his ſpeech with ſtating, that the approbation of the conduct of Miniſters, in the correſpondence under conſideration, was an undeniable conſequence of the former votes of the Houſe. By this poſition he endeavoured to entrap thoſe who had formerly ſupported their meaſures into an implicit acquieſcence

acquieſcence in every part of their conduct. Nothing, however, could be more unfounded than this concluſion. For his own part, he had not the honour of being in the Houſe when the firſt reſolutions reſpecting the war were adopted; but when, during the preceding part of the preſent ſeſſion he had made a motion for peace, that motion was reſiſted on grounds totally different from thoſe which the noble Secretary had taken up for his defence, in refuſing the overture of the French government, and every noble Lord who had ſpoken, whatever his ſentiments were, admitted, that circumſtances were materially changed. Formerly it was the conſtant anſwer to every motion that pointed to peace, that the ambition of France was inſatiable; that ſhe refuſed to liſten to any terms of accommodation. But after the Houſe had ſo decidedly expreſſed their approbation of the declaration of Miniſters after the rupture of the negociations at Paris and Liſle; when the Houſe had expreſſed its opinion in favour of the profeſſion they contained of a readineſs to treat whenever the enemy diſcovered a ſimilar diſpoſition, ſurely it was not an undeniable conſequence of any former vote, that their Lordſhips ſhould now approve of the conduct of adminiſtration, in refuſing to enter upon negociation. One great point was now aſcertained by the correſpondence, which, in a moſt important degree, changed the relative ſituation of the two powers. We could no longer ſay, as formerly, that the continuance of the war was to be aſcribed to the avowed animoſity of the enemy. What then are the arguments by which this ſtep is juſtified? What are the objections now urged to any negociation with the preſent government of France? There was one circumſtance of which he could not help taking notice, becauſe it ſeemed to proceed on an objection which had not been openly acknowledged, and he hoped did not exiſt at all: it was remarkable, that in the title of the correſpondence, there was a ſtudied anxiety to avoid giving Bonaparte the title which belonged to him as chief Conſul of the French republic. He was ſtyled General Bonaparte. This appeared to proceed from a wiſh not to recognize him in the character which he claimed. Certainly, however, a negociation with a government did not ſanction that government. It was merely a recognition of power, and nothing more. But the recency of the late revolution in France was one of the principal objections inſiſted upon. On former occaſions, Miniſters themſelves had not conſidered ſuch a circumſtance as affording any objection to negociate, as of

itſelf it could be none. When the late conſtitution of the French republic was eſtabliſhed, Miniſters, by a meſſage on the 8th of December, 1795, admitted that a criſis was approaching that might lead to the termination of the conteſt. On that occaſion ſix weeks had been ſufficient to determine their minds. What greater objection then could apply to the preſent government of France, that could render it improper to treat with thoſe whom it has placed in authority? Was there any greater appearance of inſtability in this government, than in that which had ſatisfied Miniſters on ſo ſhort a trial? Now the inſtability of the new order of things is an inſuperable objection; ſurely, after having approved of Miniſters for proceeding to negociation with a new eſtabliſhment, it was not an undeniable conſequence that they ſhould approve the conduct of Miniſters in acting in a manner diametrically oppoſite to that which they ſubmitted to the ſanction of parliament. Another objection was to the principle of the French republic: that principle, then, was of two kinds, revolutionary and ambitious; but would any man now contend that more danger was to be apprehended from the preſent government of France than any former one? Was not the direct contrary the caſe—had not every thing alarming, every thing of deſtructive tendency and pernicious example in political principle been given up and abandoned under the preſent ſyſtem? It was clear, then, that the objection did not lie againſt the revolutionary principle of the new government. Was its ambition then ſo dangerous now? That the conduct of France had been deteſtable on different occaſions, he did not diſpute; it was not his wiſh or intention to juſtify its proceedings; but it was ſaid, the republic had broken every treaty it had concluded. The noble Lord, on this point, perhaps, might have left more ſtrength to his argument if he had omitted certain treaties in the enumeration; for inſtance, it was by no means clear that the French had violated the treaty with Pruſſia. This was the caſe that was moſt applicable to this county, and it was not made out that the French had been guilty of any violation of it. At any rate, however, that violation of treaty did not ſerve the purpoſe for which it was brought forward. It afforded no proof of inſecurity from the inſtability of the new government: for moſt of the treaties alluded to had been violated by the ſame government by which they were concluded. As to the ambition which characterized the preſent government, that was a conſideration that might have weight in the arrangement

rangement of terms, it was not a preliminary objection precluſive of all treaty. But what proof elſe could be given of an abandonment of dangerous views and exorbitant pretenſions, but a negociation in which either ambition or moderation would be diſplayed? It was ſaid, likewiſe, that Bonaparte might be inſincere. Caſes might be ſuppoſed, in which ſtrong grounds to ſuſpect the ſincerity of an overture might juſtify a refuſal to negociate, eſpecially if negociation might lead to danger. Nothing like this was the caſe here. There were no good reaſons to imagine that the French government was inſincere. On the contrary, every day tended to demonſtrate its ſincerity. It had done all that depended on itſelf to evince that diſpoſition. What elſe could be expected from Bonaparte? Was it reaſonable to ſuppoſe that he ſhould admit that the guilt of the original aggreſſion lay with France? This was a point which ought not to have come into diſcuſſion. He was happy here to find, that againſt the noble Secretary's preſent arguments, he could produce his own authority: In an official correſpendence during a former negociation, the noble Lord, in a note to the French government, expreſsly ſtated, that there was no reaſon to go into the queſtion who was right or wrong, in a preceding negociation; the object was to negociate upon the actual circumſtances of relative ſituation, and upon the real grounds in diſpute. It was not Talleyrand who began this conteſt about the original aggreſſion; he did not, like our Miniſters, talk in a haughty tone, and throw out ſevere reproach and pointed inſult: Talleyrand merely ſtates that the original aggreſſion was not the queſtion; and it was the poſſibility of arrangement that alone ought to be conſidered. Upon this point, however, the noble Secretary had thought proper to employ one-third of his ſpeech. After dwelling upon the objections to peace, however, the noble Secretary did not ſay how it was to be obtained. The note in anſwer to Bonaparte's communication hinted at a mode, indeed; but what was that? Suppoſe that Bonaparte, deſirous to obtain peace by every means, ſhould ſit down to conſider how he could ſucceed in the object of his wiſhes; what does the note, then, allow him to do? He would find, indeed, that the reſtoration of the hereditary line of kings is the only caſe in which a ſpeedy peace is admitted to be poſſible: his own government muſt be proved by experience, and the evidence of facts, before it is admitted to negociate. But what is this experience and evidence of facts? Formerly ſix weeks were judged ſufficient; now the probation

tion required is neither aſcertained by its duration, nor by the mode in which it is to be conducted. In fact, therefore, the reſtoration of the hereditary line of kings was the only alternative in which immediate negociation was admitted by Miniſters. But, ſurely, if the ambition of the French republic was ſo formidable, we could not forget this ground of apprehenſion, and this ſource of danger, when we talked of reſtoring the Houſe of Bourbon. Had we forgot the recorded charges of the Parliament of this country againſt the ambition of the French monarchs of that Houſe, at various periods? Had we forgotten their almoſt proverbial ambition? And was their reſtoration the remedy for evils ariſing from ſuch a ſource? Every Frenchman, however, ſuſpected that the reſtoration of the ancient family would be ſo clogged as to render France inſignificant. Frenchmen, therefore, could not be ſuppoſed to enter into our views in that reſpect. As to that event, if it were likely to take place, he perhaps differed from many noble Lords. It did not ſeem ſo deſirable as ſome imagined. He did not look upon it as affording the proſpect either of much tranquillity or happineſs to France; it was ſaid in the note in reply to the firſt communication from the French government, that the moſt natural pledge they could give of ſounder principles, was the reſtoration of that family which had maintained France in proſperity at home, and in reſpect and conſideration abroad. It was, indeed, rather a ſingular circumſtance, to obſerve ſo much anxiety in Miniſters for the proſperity of France. But what reſpect and conſideration was here alluded to? Was it the reſpect of juſtice, of moderation, of wiſdom, fidelity and uprightneſs? No; it was the reſpect ariſing from the power of France, and was founded on no better claims. To promote the internal proſperity, and the external reſpect and renown of the French monarchs, ſurely would not be conſidered as Britiſh objects; and to purſue them, would be to do that which Miniſters had ſo often imputed to the Jacobins, feel an intereſt for France without any regard to the ſecurity of our own country, and its ſuperior title to our ſupport. France then, by the deciſion of Miniſters, was to be put in a ſtate of probation, if ſhe refuſed the alternative of the reſtoration of loyalty, till ſhe had renounced all the principles complained of, or till convinced by ſuch arguments as thoſe of the noble Secretary, ſhe was ready to acknowledge the guilt of original aggreſſion. But how were we to be ſatisfied that theſe changes had taken place unleſs we agreed to

to negociate. The noble Lord had ſtated with much pomp and ſolemnity, that the ſecond letter of Talleyrand contained a principle more deteſtable than any of the very worſt periods of the revolution. On hearing this aſſertion he had peruſed the letter with additional attention, but he could diſcover in it nothing of this dreadful deſcription. The French Miniſter did not defend every act of every preceding government. He ſtated that the perſeverance of this country had driven France into exceſſes. Unfortunately, it was too true that the example of this country might give to France an apology for ſome parts of her violence. What had been our conduct to neutral powers? Had we not violated the neutrality of the Grand Duke of Tuſcany, in ſpite of the moſt ſolemn treaties? Had we not violated the neutrality of Genoa? What was the conduct of our allies? Did not the Ruſſians violate the neutrality of other ſtates? Did it not preſcribe to the king of Denmark that no clubs ſhould be permitted in his dominions? He was aware that to prove that we, or our allies, were guilty of the ſame crime, did not exculpate the French; but when we ſaw ſuch unjuſtifiable proceedings on the ſide of thoſe who made the crimes of France the cauſe of the war, it proved that this was nothing but a pretext. Ambition was objected to France, but was France the only ambitious power in Europe? He did not ſay that we ought never to have an ally that was ambitious; but ſurely when we ſaw ambition ſo clearly evinced in a power not very long ſince the object of jealouſy even to the preſent Miniſters, we ſhould be careful how we imputed the cauſe of the war excluſively to the ambition of our enemy. But it would be remarked by their Lordſhips with ſurpriſe, that the noble Secretary, in juſtifying the conduct of Miniſters in rejecting all negociation, drew many of his arguments from the ſecond letter of Talleyrand. Whatever principles that letter diſplayed, whatever expreſſions it contained, could not be the leaſt palliation of the refuſal to negociate, becauſe the deciſion of Miniſters was pronounced before they could know or ſuſpect that a ſecond meſſenger would be received. It was objected to, that the French had ſaid nothing of a general peace, to which we alone could agree. The letter of the Chief Conſul to his Majeſty, however, alluded to the miſeries of war every where, and the neceſſity of putting a ſtop to the effuſion of blood. It evidently pointed to the miſeries of war every where, and a deſire to co-operate in putting an end to them; at any rate we might have ſuggeſted the propriety of an explicit avowal. The noble Secretary enumerated the evils

that

that would ariſe from negociation; but theſe ſentiments were new with him; not a word was ſaid of that matter after the failure of the negociations at Paris and Liſle. We had negociated formerly in circumſtances that might have given riſe to the charge of timidity—at the time of the mutiny; after the breaking of the bank; ſuch were the circumſtances in which negociation formerly took place. The reſult, ſurely, was not of that dangerous tendency which had been deſcribed. On the contrary, they had contributed greatly to unite the whole country in its defence. It was ſaid, that intereſt alone induced France to keep well with Pruſſia; but might not the ſame intereſt prompt France to obſerve faithfully the engagements of treaties? The intereſts of the two countries was not ſo divided as to be irreconcileable. Bonaparte had given every proof of his ſincerity, and every thing tended to confirm that teſtimony. Much was ſaid of the character of Bonaparte, but he could not perceive that any advantage could ariſe to us from blackening the character of an individual. It was not dignified, it was not politic. We had now taken up the principle ſo much objected to the Jacobins, of diſtinguiſhing between a people and their government. What, on the contrary, was the conduct of the French? In the letter to the king, Bonaparte diſtinctly renounces this principle, and acknowledges the title and character of his Majeſty's government. On our part, the note of Miniſters was a manifeſto to the royaliſts, and framed for that purpoſe. It ſpoke of the miſeries of France; but the miſeries of France were not the cauſe of the war. They might intereſt our humanity, but they were not fit to be noticed in diplomatic papers. As little had we to do with the internal miſeries of the republic, as Talleyrand would have to retaliate, by reproaching us with the teſt acts, the want of Parliamentary reform, the income or aſſeſſed tax acts, or any other public meaſure that might be conſidered as a grievance. With reſpect to the Chouans, he thought the queſtion extremely delicate; and if any argument could juſtify Miniſters for their refuſal to negociate, it would be their engagements with theſe men; though, certainly, to this country, even that would not be a ſatisfactory apology for refuſing to liſten to any overtures from France. It was a dreadful thing to reflect, that by the obſtinacy of Miniſters, we might be condemned to carry on the war for years without gaining any advantage which we might not receive from negociation at the preſent moment. He differed from his noble Relation when he ſaid that the people of this country acquieſced in the conduct of Miniſters. He was convinced

convinced that the people at large disapproved of their abrupt refusal to listen to any overtures; and if it should afterwards clearly appear that Bonaparte had been sincere, how would their Lordships reconcile it to their consciences to have given their implicit sanction to measures that prolong the calamities of war for so long a period, without any motive of honour, interest, or security? He therefore gave his decided support to the amendment.

The Earl of *Carnarvon* said, that he could not give a silent vote on this subject, as he would not willingly be understood to pledge himself to the continuation of war, until Ministers shall acknowledge that peace may be made with security; Ministers had material information that he was not possessed of; it was not fit that they should make public all that had directed their judgment: he could only give an opinion on the subject before him, aided by such information as he was then master of, and should always consider himself as free to criminate Ministers on better information, for the very conduct he had before approved upon insufficient grounds. I do not (said the noble Earl), quite like the present question, as it stands on the proposed address, much less on the amendment: I should rather have approved with my noble Friend (Earl of Carlisle), that the address had contained simply, thanks to his Majesty for his communication and confidence, in his paternal care for the interests of his people, and left the conduct and undiminished responsibility to Ministers, which always seems, rather than is, affected by the interposition of Parliament. The present question has been debated upon a wrong ground, it has been treated, as if we were to decide by the vote of to-night, whether this country should be plunged into a long and ruinous war, or make an immediate peace; this is very far from being the true state of the question. His Majesty has been pleased to communicate to us proposals of peace, from a government which has just made its appearance in France, together with the answers made by the noble Secretary of State; we have to give our approbation or disapprobation of those answers. I have no difficulty in saying, that I entirely approve of them as far as I am able to judge from the view of our public situation, which I have had no other means of acquiring, than from newspapers and public discourse; they appear to me well calculated to meet all the possible intricacies of our situation with our allies; they do not reject peace; the impediments (with a view to their removal), are fairly stated; they decline

(under the exiſting circumſtances), dilatory and poſſibly inſidious negociations; they can give no umbrage to our allies, nor diſcouragement to the royaliſts in France; the moſt important operations of the war might be defeated by inſidious negociations of peace, in which they might not terminate; if the intercepted letters had not clearly pointed out the dangers of negociation, by the advantages Monſ. Pouſſielque hoped to derive from them, they muſt have been obvious to a leſs ſubtle politician. He ſtates peace as deſirable, and poſſibly to be advantageouſly derived from negociation, but if that ſhould fail, time, he ſays, would be obtained, and the diſunion of our allies would be the probable reſult. In declining negociation, the noble Secretary does not reject diſtinct propoſitions, which may be conſidered by our allies, and evidenced by ſpeedy ratification and immediate execution; that this is a juſt interpretation of the anſwers, appears manifeſt from Rœderer's comment upon them: (he now holds, I think, the office of Counſellor of State), he ſays they are not hoſtile anſwers, that their caution ariſes from the danger of negociations without the certainty of peace; he feels that we have cauſe to apprehend inſincerity; he admits that nothing in the anſwer impoſes the reſtoration of the Bourbon family as an eſſential condition. In every point of view I approve the anſwer, it marks with dignity and ſpirit, that we ſhall not through our ſincere wiſh for peace, be the dupes of artifice; that it is not the *nature of the government*, but its ſincerity and faith, of which we have ſo many reaſons to doubt, which alone impedes peace; that we ſhall not quit our advantageous ſituation on the firſt ſong of peace, nor betray our ſecurity and that of our allies, to the known and experienced perfidy of an inſidious enemy, without ſomething more than mere profeſſions. I underſtand by what the noble Secretary has ſaid this night, that he means only to juſtify a pauſe neceſſary to underſtand the ſituation of this new ruling power, its force, ſtability, and intereſts, not that he rejects peace; he has detailed at large, and in ſtrong colours, the numberleſs perfidies of the ſeveral revolutionary governments which have ſucceeded each other in France; he has likewiſe detailed the individual reproaches due to the character of its preſent ruler; nothing certainly can be more diſgraceful than his conduct, no greater accumulation of horrors were ever in any period exhibited on the public ſtage of the world, than by this man, who from the throne of the Bourbons propoſes peace and amity, on the credit of his humanity,

his

his faith, and his honour: but the character of the ruling ſovereign has never been the ſole reaſon for rejecting a peace with any nation, nor repeated breach of national faith the ſole reaſon for continuing a war. Breaches of faith as enormous and diſgraceful, are imputable to the ancient legitimate government of France; where can be found in the hiſtory of mankind, a more atrocious inſtance of inſidious treachery, or more perfidious breach of faith, than that, which took place on the treaty of peace which preceded, and was diſturbed by the capture of Falkland's Iſland? At the very moment that Spain and France ſigned peace with this country, an order was ſigned by the Miniſter of Spain, in concert with the Duke de Choiſeul, to attack Falkland Iſland, on a given date ſome years after, in order to produce a rupture, reſolved on at the very inſtant of executing a treaty, profeſſing perpetual amity; at the time when this ſealed order was opened and put in execution, it ſuited the intereſt and views of neither court, and produced equal aſtoniſhment in both. Monſ. D'Oſſun, then ambaſſador from France to the Court of Spain, from whom I heard this anecdote, was directed to remonſtrate againſt this act of aggreſſion, which embarraſſed the court of Paris; he found equal ſurprize at Madrid, for the order was forgotten by both, nor was recollected till the attack was defended by the production of the order. Is any act of the revolutionary governments more indefenſible than the interference in our American embarraſſments, by the late unfortunate monarch of France, then in a ſtrict alliance with us, and profeſſing amity? Hiſtory is full of diſgraceful proofs of national want of faith. Peace muſt always be made when the intereſts of both parties require it, and will ſeldom laſt longer. I own that I cannot agree with the noble Secretary, that peace is not conſiſtent with the intereſts of Bonaparte. The noble Secretary ſays, that military governments in their nature lean to war, and that a ſovereign with feeble title, will divert the people from attention to his title, by the alarms and dangers of war: this policy ſeems to me to apply more to old and eſtabliſhed governments, who wiſh to divert the attention of the public from internal miſconduct, by the ſuperior intereſts ariſing from war: but this policy is by no means applicable to the poſition of the preſent ruler of France. He is called out of Egypt that his military reputation may be the key-ſtone to power, raiſed by the intrigues of others, out of the ruins of an expiring republic. The reign of attornies and mountebanks,

banks, controuling generals and armies, from the capitol, is at an end; the reign of generals is commenced; Bonaparte is the firſt whoſe military reputation has placed him in the ſeat of power; he has all the dangers of newly acquired power, without having gradually advanced to it by his own intrigues, they are dangers equally to be apprehended from his preſent friends, and from all thoſe who envy his exaltation; he muſt maintain himſelf by his own intrigues againſt even his creators; he cannot, therefore quit the capital, and command in perſon the armies of the ſtate; he muſt truſt his armies to the ableſt generals, their failure or their ſucceſs are equally fatal to him, and equally tend to undermine the foundation of his power. The firſt advances a Bourbon to the throne; the laſt raiſes a formidable rival, with equal claims to his own, and furniſhes him with the means of aſſerting it. War cannot fail to produce theſe inconveniences to him; peace, on the contrary, arreſts the growing reputation of rival generals in the bud, reduces them to the maſs of common dependants on his power, their armies diſbanded and rewarded, or brought within the immediate ſphere of his own command, are by no means ſo formidable: add to this, that the neceſſary ſupplies for the ſupport of war muſt be raiſed in an exhauſted country, by means which muſt make him the object of univerſal odium; by peace he will acquire popularity, and the gratitude of a people too much ſickened with revolutionary miſery, to care who is ſeated on the throne of France; their former miſery will not be attributed to him, and the contraſt will be in his favour. I cannot doubt, therefore, that it is the perſonal intereſt of the preſent ruler to obtain peace, and preſerve it; his ſtability is the only doubt I entertain; even peace may not be able to confirm his power; there can, however, be no great difficulty about the terms of peace, as between France and this country; and if there was, ſhould Bonaparte feel that peace is neceſſary for his private intereſt, he will not ſcruple to ſacrifice the intereſt of France to acquire it. Much on the terms of peace may fairly be inferred from the official notes on both ſides. Monſ. Talleyrand ſays, that the revolution was founded in the love of peace, the averſion to conqueſts, and reſpect for the independence of other governments, and inſinuates, that the preſent rulers retain theſe principles in their original purity, though they had been obſcured by the want of moderation in the preceding governments; the reſtoration of conqueſts, and of ſubverted governments, may be expected from theſe inſinuations, and theſe principles. That his

his Majeſty's Miniſters have the ſame moderation, is manifeſted in the firſt anſwer, where it is ſaid that, in caſe the former line of princes ſhould be reſtored, France might retain all her ancient dominions; and it is no unreaſonable ſuppoſition, that the ſame terms would be conceded to the nominal republic, if peace ſhould be concluded with her. I am not, therefore, without hopes that the horrors of war may ſhortly ceaſe, either by the overthrow, or the confirmation of the preſent power in France, but I do not think negociation and ſuſpenſion of arms neceſſarily the ſhorteſt road to peace. The noble Lord (Lord Holland), ſays, that all the arguments which have been adduced againſt entering into a negociation at this time, were of equal force againſt the negociations of Paris and Liſle. Our ſituation certainly is very different: we had been deſerted by Spain, who was converted into an avowed enemy inſtead of an ally: the Emperor was probably treating for himſelf at the moment; for the rupture of the negociations at Liſle, which began 1ſt of June, 1797, took place at Liſle on the 17th of September, 1797, and the treaty between the Emperor and France was ſigned 17th of October, 1797. No intricacy of ſituation with allies who had deſerted us, could then have exiſted; Miniſters have the merit at this criſis, of having placed us in ſo ſtrong a poſition with reſpect to alliances, that the common enemy ſinks before it, and is reduced to ſue for peace, or draw hopes from inſidious negociations; the price of the advantages of alliance is attention to our allies, and the operations of combined warfare, does not leave the Miniſters of an allied power at liberty at all moments, to enter into negociations, particularly ſeparate negociations of peace, and none other are diſtinctly offered: but if they had, I am decidedly againſt interference with Miniſters in this critical time, being perſuaded they wiſh peace as ſincerely as I do. I ſhall therefore concur with the addreſs as it ſtands.

The Earl of *Liverpool* ſaid, ſo many arguments had been ably ſtated by his noble Friend near him (Lord Grenville), ſimilar to thoſe that he meant to have troubled their Lordſhips with, that he ſhould have little occaſion to treſpaſs on their patience. He was ſatisfied, from every view of the ſituation of the two countries (and from a conſideration of their ſituation only could a proper judgment be formed), that it was highly prudent and proper to pauſe before Miniſters entered into a negociation for peace with Bonaparte. Let their Lordſhips ſhortly compare the two ſituations. France had

had loſt her marine, had loſt her commerce, had loſt her trade; ſhe had not a ſingle merchant ſhip in any of her ports, for every one of them, even the ſlighteſt, had been converted into petty, pilfering privateers, ſent out to prey, but, thank God, not very ſucceſsfully, he believed, upon our commerce. Her revenue was adequate to her expence in no way whatſoever. On the other hand, our revenue was increaſing; the current revenue conſiderably larger than that of the preceding year. Our commerce had proſpered beyond all example. In fact, we might almoſt be ſaid to have the commerce of all the world in our hands. Our trade, manufactures, and agriculture, alſo flouriſhed extremely; ought we then, under ſuch a difference of ſituation in every reſpect whatſoever, to conſent, by a raſh and premature negociation, to open the ports of France, to let them ſhare our commerce, to enable the republic to revive their manufactures and trade, ſurely no man of common prudence would give ſo weak, ſo ill-adviſed an opinion? Much had been ſaid in the courſe of the debate of the ſincerity of Bonaparte, and that idea of his ſincerity had been reſted on his profeſſions, made in his letter to his Majeſty, a mode of application extremely diſreſpectful and objectionable it itſelf; but would any man verſed in ſtate affairs, manifeſt ſo little judgment as to rely upon the mere profeſſions of ſincerity of an individual like Bonaparte, who had ſhewn ſo little ſincerity in his military tranſactions during the war? Would not a wiſe ſtateſman wait to ſee the conduct of the new government of the French republic before he made up his mind as to the degree of its real ſincerity? The famous reſolution of the 19th November, 1792, (a reſolution, founded in a ſpirit of aggreſſion, carried at that time to the higheſt pitch of inſolence), declaring the intention of the republic of France to uſe their endeavours to overthrow the government of every other ſtate in Europe, ſtood as yet unrepealed: no mention was made of a deſign to reſcind it in Bonaparte's letter to his Majeſty, nor had they ſeen any ſteps taken in Paris to reſcind it. In like manner had they renounced their unheard of practice during a war, of annexing for ever to the French republic every ſtate and territory that they ſubdued by their arms, and declaring that they were not to be made the ſubject of future negociation! No country or ſtate had ever acted upon ſo unjuſt a maxim, but had waited till a treaty of peace had been concluded, and reſerved only ſuch territory as was regularly, and by mutual conſent, ceded to them. In Bonaparte's

Bonaparte's letter we were called upon to open a negociation at Dunkirk, and immediately agree to an armiſtice. Would it not be in the higheſt point diſadvantageous for this country, with ſuch ample reſources, ſo extenſive a commerce, and ſo large a trade, to agree to an armiſtice? Surely it would in every point whatſoever. Under ſuch an armiſtice, during negociation, France would have every thing to gain, and this country every thing to loſe. By the anſwer given by the King's Miniſters to Bonaparte, and M. Talleyrand, it was not declared that this country would not treat, or wiſhed to wage eternal war. It, on the contrary, declared the expreſs wiſh of his Majeſty to treat for peace, when he could do it with ſecurity. His Lordſhip ſaid he had much more upon his mind to ſay to the Houſe in ſupport of the addreſs moved by his noble friend, but he would detain their Lordſhips no longer.

Lord *Carliſle*, while he lamented that the diſcuſſion had taken place, roſe to anſwer a part of the argument of the noble Earl, which he conſidered as dangerous and fallacious. He was, therefore, extremely ſorry that it had fallen from ſuch very high authority. It was ſtated that we were in poſſeſſion of the trade and commerce of all the world, but to what were we indebted for it? No doubt to the war. Peace, therefore, muſt deprive us of a part, and return it to its former ſources. This argument then was not only againſt entering into a negociation with France at this but at any future time, and under any circumſtances whatever. He put it, then, to the noble Lord, and he aſked whether it was arguing like a philoſopher or a ſtateſman, to inſiſt that war muſt be continued in order that all the ſhips of the world ſhould come to the port of London? Excluſive of the various other calamities attendant upon war, which muſt counterbalance this advantage, was the change of property, that muſt neceſſarily ariſe from the preſſure of taxes, of little moment? This proſperity of trade might be pleaſing to trading men, and a certain claſs of men would riſe into opulence in conſequence of it, but noble Lords, country gentlemen, and landholders, had no ſhare in its benefit. There was another argument adduced by the noble Lord to which alſo he could not ſubſcribe. He was pleaſed to aſk what proof France had given of her diſpoſition to renounce the ſyſtem of conduct of which we complained. Surely it was not to be expected that France, in the heat of war, would make the *amende honorable*, and deprive herſelf of the confidence and aſſiſtance

aſſiſtance of thoſe men who ſupported her government by condemning their conduct. This was a proceeding that muſt weaken her, and was not to be expected until the arrival of peace. His Lordſhip then proceeded to obſerve upon the anſwer returned to the French propoſition for opening a negociation, and diſapproved of it as going too far. He did not condemn Miniſters, whom he, and the noble Lords connected with him, wiſhed to ſupport, for pauſing before they ſhould embrace ſuch an overture; what he condemned, was their going ſo much into detail in their anſwer. How ſhould he, as an individual Peer, or that Houſe, who, parliamentarily conſidered, were in a ſtate of ignorance, as to information which Miniſters doubtleſs poſſeſſed, of the whole grounds on which the purport and tenour of the anſwers to Bonaparte reſted, be able to diſcuſs ſuch a queſtion, much more decide upon it? In his mind it would have been ſufficient to have ſtated that the propoſal took no notice of our allies; but there was another objection to the addreſs, as it went to procure the ſanction of Parliament to the conduct of government. Miniſters might have their reaſons for thinkings there was no ſtability in the preſent government of France to juſtify entering into negociation with her; but Parliament were kept in ignorance of theſe reaſons, and very properly ſo. It was going too far, therefore, to call upon them to ſanction a proceeding, the whole merits of which they could not be acquainted with. Theſe were his objections to the addreſs; at the ſame time, he confeſſed, if he liked it even leſs than he did, that he ſhould vote for it.

The Earl of *Liverpool* roſe to explain, becauſe it was evident that the noble Lord had totally miſtaken his argument in two of its moſt eſſential points. He had argued againſt the policy of adopting the noble Duke's advice to enter directly, blindly and raſhly into negociation with Bonaparte, and as one great reaſon why he thought Miniſters acted warily and wiſely, to pauſe firſt and ſee more of the conduct of the new government of France, at the ſame time declaring, that "his Majeſty looks only to the ſecurity of his own dominions, and thoſe of his allies, and to the general ſafety of Europe. Whenever he ſhall judge that ſuch ſecurity can in any manner be attained, his Majeſty would eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of immediate and general pacification." Could any language convey a ſtronger deſire for conciliation and peace, when it could be made with ſecurity? As to the other point, the ſtreſs he had in

in his ſpeech on the greatneſs and extent of our commerce, appealed to every noble Lord who had heard him, whether he had not done ſo, and applied his reaſoning, when arguing the danger of opening a negociation coupled with an armiſtice, during which the enemy muſt neceſſarily, from our ſuperior trade, gain much, while we ſhould neceſſarily riſque that, the poſſeſſion of which was at preſent highly valuable. The noble Earl had, therefore, actually miſtaken his argument, as from no two points whatſoever was an inference to juſtify a war, *ad internecendum*, leſs fairly to be deduced.

Lord *Grantley* ſaid a few words in explanation of the meaning of the French republic, by their reſolution of November 19, 1792, viz. that they only meant by it to endeavour to overthrow the governments of thoſe countries that were at war with them.

The amendment was read, and the queſtion put, "that the words of the original motion" ſtand, as moved by Lord Grenville. The Houſe divided,

Contents	79	*Proxies*	13
Not Contents	6	*Proxies*	0

The amendment of the Duke of Bedford was conſequently loſt.

Lord *Grenville* then moved an addreſs to his Majeſty, thanking him for his gracious communication reſpecting the providing accommodations for the Ruſſian troops in the iſlands of Guernſey and Jerſey. Agreed to *nemine diſſentiente*.

Adjourned at half paſt twelve to Monday next.

The ſix Peers who voted as *Not Contents* on Lord *Grenville's* motion for the addreſs were—

The Duke of Bedford	Lord Holland
The Earl of Albemarle	Lord King
Lord Ponſonby (Earl of Bſborough)	Lord Camelford.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, JAN. 28.

A meſſenger from the Commiſſioners of the Cuſtoms preſented accounts of prohibited Eaſt India goods, naval ſtores, &c. &c. Ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. *Steele* preſented an account, ſhewing how the 2,500,000l. voted laſt year for the extraordinaries of the army, had been diſpoſed of.

A petition from the priſoners confined for debt in the

county jail of Derby, was preſented by Mr. Charles York. Ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. *Bragge* moved for leave to bring in a bill to indemnify the holders of public offices who had neglected to qualify themſelves according to act of Parliament.

Mr *Abbot* complained, that ſeveral accounts, which, from a motion of his laſt ſeſſion, had been laid before the Houſe, were extremely unſatisfactory. He then moved for the production of an account of the total amount of the monies which would have been applicable to the expences of the civil liſt, from the 5th of January, 1777, to the 5th of January, 1800, had the hereditary revenues of the crown enjoyed by the late King been enjoyed by his preſent Majeſty; the amount of the annuities granted by Parliament in lieu of the ſame; the ſums voted at different periods to pay the arrears of the civil liſt; and the difference made by this arrangement to the public. Ordered.

He then prefaced a motion for the production of various other documents, by ſaying that it was his intention, in the preſent ſeſſion, to move for the adoption of the method practiſed in the reigns of King William and Queen Anne, of making money bear intereſt after it had lain in the hands of the officers of revenue beyond the legal time. Preparatory to this, he moved that there be laid before the Houſe a liſt of all the accountants who had, on the 5th of January, 1800, given in their accounts to the commiſſioners for auditing public accounts, ſpecifying their names, ſervices, places of abode, the ſums paid in, and the balance due; the amount of the arrears due by the commiſſioners of the cuſtoms and exciſe, the diſtributors of ſtamps, the receivers-general of the land-tax, the general poſt office, the penny poſt office, the deputy poſt maſters in England, Scotland, Ireland, and the Weſt-Indies, and the balance due to government by the receivers of the revenues of the crown lands. All theſe papers were ordered to be laid before the Houſe.

Lord *Sheffield* moved for an account of the quantity of wheat, barley, oats, and rye imported into Great Britain from the 1ſt of January, 1794, to the preſent date, as far as can be made up. Ordered.

Mr. *Munden* preſented a petition, praying for relief, from the debtors confined in the county gaol of Derby, which was ordered to lie on the table.

The Houſe then adjourned till the next day.

PRO-

PROTEST entered on the Journals of the Houſe of Lords againſt the Addreſs to his Majeſty approving of the refuſal to enter into a negociation for peace with the French Republic:

DIE MARTIS, 28 JANU. 1800.

The original motion being put, That an humble Addreſs be preſented to his Majeſty, &c.

The ſame was carried in the affirmative.

DISSENTIENT,

Becauſe the addreſs adopted by the Houſe directly approves of the rejection of an overture for peace, when that invaluable bleſſing might very probably be attained with honour and ſecurity, by opening a negociation with the French Republic, and indirectly approves of the language in which the rejection of the offer was conveyed to the French government; a language which, in my opinion, can only tend to widen the breach between the two countries, to exaſperate the enemy, and prolong the calamities of war. HOLLAND.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, JAN. 29.

Lord *Belgrave* preſented a petition from the priſoners confined for debt in the county jail of Cheſter, ſtating their hardſhips, and praying for relief. Ordered to lie on the table.

A petition was preſented by the Maſter of the Rolls from the church-wardens of the pariſh of St. John, Hampſtead, praying for leave to bring in a bill to enable them to build a new work-houſe. Referred to a committee.

The order of the day for taking into conſideration his Majeſty's moſt gracious meſſage being read,

Mr. *Long* ſaid, that he roſe to move for the conſideration of his Majeſty's meſſage being ſtill farther deferred. He was ſorry to ſtate that the indiſpoſition of his right honourable Friend ſtill continued ſo as to prevent him from attending his duty in the Houſe. He was authoriſed by him, however, to ſay, that he was extremely anxious that the diſcuſſion of the important buſineſs, which was to come before the Houſe this day, ſhould come on as early as poſſible, and that he expected ſoon to be able to be preſent at it. He would therefore move, that his Majeſty's moſt gracious meſſage be taken into conſideration on Monday next. He was aware, that an honourable member (Mr. Sheridan) had given notice, that he was, on that day, to make a motion relative to the Dutch expedition; but he was authoriſed by him to

ſay, that he had no objection to his motion being put off till Monday ſe'nnight.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, that he lamented extremely the illneſs of the right honourable Gentleman, and would be extremely happy to accommodate him. But he was not a little aſtoniſhed at this propoſal for putting off the buſineſs to ſo diſtant a day. When he himſelf had objected to an affair of ſuch magnitude and importance being conſidered with ſuch precipitation, and before Gentlemen from the country could have an opportunity of attending, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had made anſwer, that it was of infinite importance to Europe, and to the world, that the Houſe ſhould come to a deciſion upon it without delay. It would damp the ardour of our allies, and relax their efforts, if Parliament ſhould not inſtantly follow up the declarations of his Majeſty by a promiſe of ſupport: the eyes of Europe were eagerly fixed upon our deciſion and its reſult. If ſuch diſaſtrous conſequences were to follow from delay, why ſhould the buſineſs be put off ſo long? He confeſſed that an event which had happened laſt night in another place made him ſtill more averſe to any delay. A nearly unanimous declaration was there given to an addreſs in favour of the proſecution of the war. This would be conſidered abroad as the deciſion of the Britiſh legiſlature, and he truſted that this was a miſtake, and the ſooner the world was undeceived, the better. Beſides, let Miniſters conſider what anxiety and apprehenſion they excite in the boſoms of our allies. They are ſtill in a ſtate of painful ſuſpenſe whether they will receive the penſions and ſubſidies that have been promiſed them. It was cruel thus to trifle with their feelings. Why not come to an inſtant deciſion, and ſet their minds at eaſe? It was unuſual, he believed, for the Houſe to do buſineſs on the 30th of January; but why ſhould the diſcuſſion on the momentous ſubject of peace or war, be put off longer than Friday? The illneſs of the right hon. Gentleman muſt be much more alarming than had been repreſented to him, if there was a certainty of his not being able to attend his duty on that day. But if Miniſters inſiſt that it ſhall be put off till Monday, he hoped they would have no objection to its being put off for two days more. He was inclined to move for this for ſeveral reaſons. He ſtill wiſhed that members for the country might have an opportunity of being preſent when this queſtion came before the Houſe. By this means his honourable Friend would have it in his power to bring forward his motion

tion on the day he appointed; and ſtill farther he was authoriſed to ſay, that an honourable Friend of his, the member for Northumberland (Mr. Grey), who had been detained in the country for ſome time by a fractured limb, would attend the Houſe on Wedneſday, if the buſineſs ſhould be put off till then. Theſe were ſtrong, and, in his opinion, unanſwerable reaſons. A full attendance was extremely deſirable; it was wrong that an enquiry into the conduct of Miniſtry ſhould be put off for a ſingle day, and ſince we facrificed ſo much to the convenience of one member of the Houſe, why ſhould we not ſacrifice a little to the convenience of another? In every point of view he muſt object to Monday being fixed upon.

Lord *Belgrave* ſaid, that it would be univerſally allowed that it was of the utmoſt importance that his right hon. Friend ſhould be preſent when the buſineſs came before the Houſe; and it was put off till Monday, not becauſe Miniſters were leſs anxious for its being diſcuſſed, but merely for the convenience of Members. They muſt have ſuffered great inconvenience and diſappointment by coming thrice with the expectation of being preſent at an important debate, and hearing that it was put off. It was, therefore, better to defer the conſideration of the buſineſs till there was a high probability that the right hon. Gentleman will have recovered from his indiſpoſition. He could not conſent, however, to the propoſal of deferring it till Wedneſday. There was a great difference betwixt the two hon. Members alluded to; one was in a high official capacity, and it was proper he ſhould be heard, the opinion of the other, however reſpectable, was only that of an individual.

Mr. *Hobhouſe* was ſurpriſed that the propoſal of his hon. Friend ſhould be oppoſed. Nothing certainly could be more fair or reaſonable. He hoped however that, if Monday ſhould be fixed upon, the diſcuſſion would at all events come on then. The public buſineſs had, at a former period, been conducted by the right hon. Gentleman's Friends during his illneſs; and why might it not be ſo again?

Mr. *Long* replied, that in all this there was nothing new. When a Miniſter was indiſpoſed it had been the uniform practice to adjourn any buſineſs in which he was particularly concerned, until he had recovered. Perhaps, on Monday, the Houſe might be diſpoſed to accommodate the honourable Member for Northumberland; but it could not be expected

that

that it ſhould now, on his account, delay the conſideration of the buſineſs for a longer period. In anſwer to the queſtion of the laſt ſpeaker, he ſaid, that he truſted the debate would certainly come on on Monday, at all events.

Mr. *Tierney* preſſed for either an earlier or a later day than Monday being named. He did not object on a former period to the diſcuſſion being delayed two days on account of the illneſs of the Miniſter—that he conſidered to be reaſonable; but it could ſerve no end to put it off now ſo great a length of time. How hard was it for thoſe who had come from the country for the expreſs purpoſe of being preſent at this debate, to be obliged to remain ſo long in town. If it did not come on this week, it ought ſurely to be deferred till Wednesday, for the accommodation of his hon. Friend, of whoſe talents and whoſe ſervices every one muſt have the higheſt opinion, and whoſe attendance on this diſcuſſion was of ſuch importance to his country.

Mr. *Percival* ſaid, that what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman who had juſt ſat down would have had conſiderable weight with him if he did not conſider the delay in taking into conſideration his Majeſty's meſſage as an accommodation to the public, and not to the right hon. Gentleman now indiſpoſed. It was of infinite conſequence to the nation that that Gentleman ſhould be preſent at the diſcuſſion of a meaſure in which, no doubt, he had taken a part, and for which he was in a great meaſure reſponſible. It had been remarked by an hon. Gentleman on the other ſide of the Houſe, that this wiſh for delay was contradictory to the ſentiments expreſſed by his right hon. Friend when he brought down the meſſage from his Majeſty. But in his opinion he had only meant then that it would be injurious to Europe and the world if there ſhould appear any heſitation in that Houſe in approving of the meaſures of government. By this delay no heſitation could appear on their part, for it was not voluntary, but produced by neceſſity. Mr. Long's motion was then put and carried.

A meſſenger from the exchequer brought up ſeveral public accounts, which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. *Wilberforce* preſented a petition from the priſoners confined for debt in the county gaol of York. Ordered to be laid on the table.

Mr. *Long* ſaid, that he had authority from the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sheridan), who had promiſed to make a motion relative

relative to the expedition to Holland on Monday next to ſay, that he would defer making it till Monday ſe'nnight.

Upon the motion of Mr. Long, the Houſe then adjourned to Monday next.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

MONDAY, FEB. 3.

The cauſe of appeal from the court of ſeſſion in Scotland, Donaldſon *verſus* Lord Perth, was heard at the bar, and after counſel for the appellant and reſpondent, had reſpectively gone through their caſes, Lord Elden moved that the counſel withdraw.

His Lordſhip then with great perſpicuity examined the merits of the appeal, and of the reſpondent's anſwer, and ſtated the ſum and ſubſtance of the evidence, as given by the reſpective witneſſes, whoſe depoſitions had been made before the court of ſeſſion, inferring from the whole of it, that there was no ſufficient reaſon to conclude, that Lord Perth had acted *malo animo*, or done any thing that could enable the party to ſuſtain an action for defamation; his Lordſhip therefore moved, that the unanimous decree of the court of ſeſſion be affirmed. Ordered.

The Houſe adjourned to Wedneſday, on which day another appeal from Scotland is to be heard.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MONDAY, FEB. 3.

Mr. *M. A. Taylor* gave notice to the Houſe, that it was his intention in the courſe of the preſent ſeſſion to ſubmit a motion to its conſideration reſpecting proteſtant diſſenters. It was by no means his intention, he ſaid, to bring forward any thing that might at all affect the general toleration of the country. All he had in view was the remedy of certain abuſes which at preſent, in his opinion, required to be removed. He then particularly adverted to the caſe of licenſed preachers; and ſaid that he had, within a very ſhort time, been applied to, and obliged to grant a licence to a boy of ſeventeen years of age, as a preacher of the goſpel.

Mr. *Whitbread* gave notice, that he intended, on Tueſday ſe'nnight, to move the Houſe for leave to bring in a bill ſimilar to that he had the honour to introduce two ſeſſions ago, relative to the poor laws.

HIS

HIS MAJESTY'S MESSAGE.

Mr. *Secretary Dundas* moved the order of the day for taking into conſideration his Majeſty's meſſage. The meſſage being accordingly read.

Mr. *Dundas* ſaid, I now riſe to move an addreſs to his Majeſty, to thank him for the gracious communication contained in the meſſage we have juſt heard read. With reſpect, Sir, to what has paſſed in conſequence of the overtures from France, which gave riſe to the preſent queſtion in the anſwers thereto returned, I certainly cannot claim any ſhare of the merit thereto attached, having been abſent, and in the country when the particular meaſures which were thereupon adopted were concluded on by the reſt of his Majeſty's Miniſters; but in making the motion which I am now about to do, I put in my claim, not only to a ſhare of all its demerits, but of all the merits and reſponſibility alſo which attach to it, in common with the reſt of his Majeſty's adviſers upon that occaſion. Sir, I apprehend, and hope, that in diſcuſſing the queſtion now ſubmitted to the conſideration of the Houſe, there will be no occaſion for me to enter at length into the detail of all the hideous features which have, from its very origin, attended the French revolution. It will be ſufficient for me to call the attention and recollection of the Houſe to ſome of the prominent principles which diſtinguiſhed it in its outſet, and which have ſince invariably accompanied its progreſs. I will, Sir, firſt of all mention that odious and abominable decree of the 19th November, 1792, which decree has been uniformly followed up by every ſucceeding government in France, by a uniformity of conduct pregnant with aggreſſion, an utter diſregard of all treaties, and a moſt ſovereign contempt for the uſages and cuſtoms of all other nations. This, Sir, I well know; and if any Gentleman diſputes the fact, I can produce the moſt indubitable proofs of it. Since the paſſing of that decree, Sir, the French people and its government have been continually at war, with almoſt every nation in Europe; and as to thoſe who have not actually been engaged, it has been with the greateſt difficulty they have been able to keep out of it. I will beg leave, Sir, to enumerate thoſe with whom the French government have been actually engaged; beginning with Auſtria, the Empire, Pruſſia, Spain, Great Britain, Genoa, Modena, Sardinia, Venice, Rome, Naples, Tuſcany, Ruſſia, and the Porte. The kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden, though never directly

engaged

engaged in the war, had nevertheleſs, as neutral powers, received ſo many flagrant and violent aggreſſions and acts of oppreſſion, in the courſe of the war, that they had very recently been under the neceſſity of withdrawing their reſpective ambaſſadors from Paris, and might now be ſaid to be the next door to a ſtate of hoſtility with them. It would appear to me, Sir, extremely ſtrange that all this ſhould be the work of chance. It would ſeem ſtrange to me that any man could be ſo blind as not to perceive, that it was, in fact, attributable ſolely to the nature and genius of the revolution, which was formed of thoſe abominable, diſorganizing, and Jacobinical principles, which ſtruck directly at the root of every regular government, and threatened deſtruction to all ſocial and civilized order. This, Sir, I have no heſitation to declare, is the fact; and it is particularly requiſite, that in examining and diſcuſſing the preſent queſtion, this Houſe ſhould look with a ſcrutinizing eye to the peculiar character of that government whoſe principles and practice are ſo peculiarly adverſe to the peace of all other countries. Sir, it is only neceſſary for me to advert to their own proceedings ſince the preſent government was eſtabliſhed, to ſhew you the ſituation in which they conceive themſelves to have been from the commencement of the revolution. They acknowledge, Sir, that till the fourth of November laſt, no preceding government had ever had the power to make peace with any degree of ſecurity to other nations. This, Sir, is not my report of them, it is their own—it is the report of the very men who veſted the power of government in the hands of the very perſon with whom it now remains. What, Sir, am I to collect from this? Is the revolution now at an end? No, Sir, by no means. It may, perhaps, in one reſpect, be ſaid to be ſo. The preſent government is certainly very different from all which preceded it, ſo far as relates to the executive part; but the municipalities, and all the ſubordinate officers of the republic, are on the ſame footing as in the time of Robeſpierre; and from them the ſame ſeditious, turbulent, and jacobinical doctrines may again burſt forth. The only ſingle difference which now exiſts is, that all the tyranny is concentrated in Bonaparte himſelf. But, Sir, let me aſk the gentlemen the queſtion, and let me beg the Houſe ſeriouſly to conſider, if we may believe their own words, that there was no ſecurity for any nation making peace with them previous to the month of November laſt, what more ſecurity can there be in the preſent caſe than there was in any of the

others? Looking upon the matter in this light, and viewing the importance to this country of the ſubject in queſtion, his Majeſty's ſervants thought it a duty peculiarly incumbent on them to adviſe his Majeſty to reject entering into any treaty with a government, which was no way different from thoſe which had preceded it, further than having had one tyrant ſucceed to another. Another reaſon, Sir, may be added for this conduct in his Majeſty's Miniſters, which is, that they were not in poſſeſſion of any circumſtances or facts which could lead them to believe there was the leaſt ſincerity in the overtures which were made on the part of the French government; and if, Sir, we cannot believe there is any ſincerity in the deſire of negociation, nor any ſecurity ſhould a peace be concluded, I would wiſh the Houſe ſeriouſly and deliberately to conſider whether it would be conſiſtent in us to throw ourſelves into the arms of the recent uſurper? Gentlemen, Sir, have frequently ſtated opinions, and aſked the queſtion, what are the grounds on which to form a judgment of the ſincerity of a treaty? I will anſwer them very conciſely. I think, Sir, ſuch a judgment may be very fairly formed from a conſideration of the nature of the ſovereigns, from the form of a government, from its antiquity and ſtability, from the Miniſters who adminiſter it, from its relative intereſts with regard to other powers. Theſe, and many other ſtriking circumſtances attending all regular and eſtabliſhed governments, form ſo many criterions on which a judgment might be founded with the greateſt preciſion. But I will aſk, Sir, is there one of thoſe criterions to be found in the preſent inſtance? Not one; every thing reſts upon the ſingle aſſertion of Bonaparte himſelf, that he is of a pacific diſpoſition—accompanied, I muſt confeſs, with M. Talleyrand's certificate. Perhaps, Sir, I may be found fault with for bringing forward the perſonal character of Bonaparte; I cannot, however, perceive any juſt grounds for the ſmalleſt cenſure on that head. Indeed, Sir, it is not I who am the occaſion of it, but Bonaparte himſelf, who has thruſt himſelf on our notice. He has averred himſelf to be pacifically inclined, and it remains with us to inveſtigate whether we can place that confidence in his words which is abſolutely neceſſary before we can venture to rely on him. It is not my intention to rail at or revile Bonaparte; certainly, if he had not blaſphemed his Maker, and uſurped the government of his country, he might have ſtood fairer in my eſtimation: but, Sir, in the inveſtigation of his character, in the preſent inſtance, I ſhall confine

confine myſelf to that part of it relative to pacification. I ſhall requeſt the attention of the Houſe whilſt I enumerate to them the ſeveral treaties he has entered into with different powers; the faith with which he has kept the ſeveral alliances he has entered into; and from theſe gentlemen will be enabled to draw the concluſion, whether it would not, at the preſent period, be highly inconſiſtent in his Majeſty's Miniſters to enter into a negociation with him, when no ſecurity can be depended upon for the maintenance of that which is to have for its baſis the reciprocal intereſts of the two countries? Sir, I beg leave to recur to his conduct with Tuſcany, Sardinia, Naples, Malta, Venice, Egypt; with every one of which he broke the treaties he made with them. He entered into the Venetian territories as a profeſſed friend, under the moſt ſolemn aſſurances that he came to deliver them from the yoke of Auſtria; but no ſooner was he once fairly in poſſeſſion of Venice, than he overturned the ancient government, and afterwards gave them up to that very power from whoſe tyranny he pretended he came to deliver them. But the moſt atrocious of all was his conduct to the Ciſalpine republic. After overturning an ancient government in that country alſo, and modelling a conſtitution exactly after his own taſte and fancy, this very republic was puniſhed in a moſt exemplary and extraordinary manner, only for exerciſing an independent right veſted in it by that very conſtitution itſelf. I ſhall, in the next place, Sir, follow him to Malta, which iſland he attacked without the ſmalleſt provocation on the part of thoſe who governed it, and after leaving a ſtrong garriſon in the fortreſs, he bent his courſe for Egypt, where he ſeemed to improve on all he had done before. The laſt act he did there ſhews in the moſt glaring colours the true nature and bent of his character. In this laſt act he writes to the Grand Vizier, proteſting that he never had any inimical deſign againſt Egypt, but came merely to puniſh the refractory Beys and the Mamelukes. That he had no wiſh or intention of injuring the Porte, and to evince this, he was ready and willing to withdraw his army from Egypt. But what, Sir, in this laſt act did he write to General Kleber, whom he left to command the army after he quitted it? Why, Sir, he deſired that reſpectable general to enter into a negociation with the Grand Vizier, but by all poſſible means to prevent the army from quitting Egypt till a general peace ſhould be concluded; with a view, no doubt, that when ſuch an event took place he would endeavour to ſend out freſh ſuccours and ſupplies, and ſo retain

that country which he had ſo long been pretending he was ready to evacuate. In this curſory detail of the conduct of Bonaparte, I have been talking of him, Sir, as a warrior and negociator; and from the ſeveral facts, and the conſequences reſulting from them, which I have ſtated, relative to his conduct, I do not heſitate to declare it appears to me, and I think it muſt be clear to every impartial man, that a total diſregard of all treaties is the leading feature of his character. If I am right, Sir, in ſtating theſe points, let me aſk the Houſe what ſecurity we have to treat? I know it has been ſtated, why not make the experiment? Let me tell thoſe Gentlemen who aſk that queſtion, that the experiment is by no means an indifferent or an innocent one. Let me tell them that the experiment might be attended with the moſt ſerious and fatal conſequences to this country. I will aſk them alſo, if it would be politic or juſt, by making ſuch an experiment, to expoſe the reſt of the powers of Europe, who are engaged in the conteſt, to be ſacrificed, one after the other, to the inſatiable thirſt for power and aggrandizement which has ſo pre-eminently diſtinguiſhed the rulers in France from the very commencement of the revolution? Let Gentlemen conſider what was the ſituation of Europe, and of Italy in particular, previous to the laſt campaign. It was no ſmall conſolation that all Italy was, by the valour and good conduct of our allies, wreſted out of the hands of the French. Italy, which had before been over-run and conquered by Bonaparte himſelf, and ſurely to enter into a negociation now would be a ſorry return for the late brilliant ſervices of our allies, in that as well as in every other quarter. Such a proceeding could not fail to damp their ardour in the common cauſe, and to create jealouſies, and want of confidence in us for the future. In this point of view, therefore, this was neither an indifferent or an innocent experiment. Beſides, Sir, the preſent deſire of Bonaparte to enter into a negociation for peace, appears to me to operate as a double-edged conſideration. He may be deſirous for negociation, not only for the purpoſe of raiſing diſtruſt and jealouſies in the breaſts of our allies, and thereby weakening and enfeebling our mutual efforts, but to gain time at the preſent moment, in order to recruit and retrieve the exhauſted finances and reſources of France. Pending a negociation and armiſtice the ports of France would be open for the obtaining ſupplies of every kind of warlike ſtores; and are we to reach forth our foſtering hand to conſolidate the power of Bonaparte? This, indeed, would not be an innocent experiment. In anſwer to another obſervation

obſervation which I have heard ſtarted; in caſe he ſhould prove inſincere, are you in a worſe ſituation than you would be with the princes of the Houſe of Bourbon? To this, Sir, I will decidedly anſwer, Yes; we are in a much worſe ſituation. I do not mean to deny, Sir, that the ſpirit of ambition has frequently manifeſted itſelf in the Houſe of Bourbon, but then it was an ambition of a different ſtamp, it had ſome bounds, and the ends of it were always diſcoverable. The princes of the Houſe of Bourbon would declare war againſt you, and ſend out their fleets and armies againſt you, but then it was always for ſome end and purpoſe which was avowed and definable. They did not pretend to change and overturn the baſes of governments with whom they went to war; they did not endeavour to cut up by the roots all the ranks and privileges of the different orders of ſociety; nor had it been uſed to corrupt every principle by which ſociety are held and linked together. On the contrary, the French revolution has done this. There is at this moment a government in France founded on a principle which can give no ſecurity. A pure, unadulterated Jacobin government. We, Sir, have a heed on this ſubject; we are firmly fixed in the opinion that the beſt form of government will be the ancient one, conſidered both as to the proſperity of France, and the repoſe and happineſs of all Europe; but we do not, nor ever have maintained that it is the only one. All that we want is a government of ſtability, that may be able to give ſecurity for maintaining the relations of peace and amity. Since the commencement of the French revolution there has never been any government of this nature, and for want of it the peace and ſecurity of the world have been kept in hot water. Some Gentlemen, perhaps, will aſk, May not ſome fraction of all thoſe that have been formed ariſe that may prove ſuperior to the ancient? To this I anſwer, that I know the former; I know what is the extent of every inconvenience to which it has ever given riſe; I know the nature of its bearings, and am able to guard againſt its moſt miſchievous tendencies. Not ſo the governments which have ſo rapidly ſucceeded each other ſince the commencement of the revolution. Notwithſtanding the tyrannies of Briſſot, Robeſpierre, Barrere, &c. have been ſucceſſively overthrown, we now ſee that a ſucceſsful uſurpation has taken place. Perhaps I ſhall be aſked, What! are you againſt all revolutions? To this I anſwer, No; there may be revolutions both neceſſary and ſalutary. What was the nature of the revolution of this country? Why,

Sir,

Sir, it was an attack upon a monarch who attempted to make himſelf ſuperior to the law of the land: it was a ſtruggle to preſerve thoſe rights and privileges which the conſtitution had veſted in the people, and which were attempted to be violently wreſted from them by arbitrary power. But mark what was the reſult of this revolution. The opinion of the great and celebrated Lord Somers will beſt ſhew this. He ſaid, we have obtained a redreſs of our grievances, and now let us endeavour peaceably and quietly to ſecure them for the future. There was no idea of removing the landmarks of ſociety, of deſtroying ranks or orders therein. Every thing, on the contrary, was eſſayed to preſerve, and not to deſtroy. The French revolution, on the contrary, had tended to deſtroy every principle which could bind ſociety together; nay, even every principle between God and man.

I now come, Sir, to the treaty of Campo Formio, which was made by this very Bonaparte himſelf, and afterwards broken, like all the reſt. In the courſe of ten years we have twice opened negociations with France; once at Paris, and again at Liſle. Yet, Sir, notwithſtanding this, his Majeſty's Miniſters felt no inconſiderable alarm, being aware of the danger of a ſucceſsful iſſue to the treaty. There were many collateral circumſtances which led to the adoption of this meaſure; but the principal reaſon was, that the great body of the people of this country had ſuffered themſelves to be perſuaded, that the reſources of the country were exhauſted, and that the country, from particular events which took place, was ſo critically ſituated, that they expreſſed an almoſt univerſal wiſh for peace, which his Majeſty's Miniſters did not think proper to withſtand, and therefore the negociation was ſet on foot. At Paris very conſiderable conceſſions were made, and at Liſle ſtill greater; but ſtill this was not ſufficient to ſatisfy and appeaſe the implacable ſpirit of hoſtility which France then breathed againſt this country. But ſuppoſe for a moment, Sir, that peace had at that time taken place, can there be a perſon either within or without theſe walls who thinks that we ſhould not have been at war again before this time? Is there any one who can be ſo blind as not to ſuppoſe that the correſpondence with Iriſh traitors would not have been carried on with as much or greater zeal and activity than it has already been? The matter, Sir, I think, will not admit of a doubt. But even ſuppoſe that out of the caſe, the expedition to Egypt would have cauſed a war. After the treaty of Campo Formio it was evident that Bonaparte

naparte gave up his whole mind and attention to the grand expedition to Egypt. Had a peace been concluded with us, is it to be ſuppoſed they would have relinquiſhed a deſign for which ſuch great preparations had been made in the equipment of a fleet for the tranſporting of forty or fifty thouſand men? Egypt was no province of ours it is true; nor was the Porte, to which it really belonged, in any ſuch kind of actual alliance with us as to warrant our interference as a guarantee of any treaty or otherwiſe. Nevertheleſs, the ſucceſs of an expedition of that magnitude was pregnant with ſuch imminent danger to our moſt valuable ſettlements abroad, that it would have been impoſſible to have avoided a declaration and recommencement of the war. I am ſorry, Sir, to have treſpaſſed ſo long on the time and patience of the Houſe, but there is one topic more to which I beg leave to crave their attention. Suppoſe at the preſent moment a treaty of peace was to be ſigned, would you wiſh his Majeſty to diſband his troops or diſmantle his fleets? Pruſſia has at this inſtant a very large army in the field for the purpoſe of protecting a line of demarcation: we have alſo a line of demarcation to protect. The ſame force we have now on foot would be equally neceſſary in the midſt of peace. You muſt be equally guarded at all points, both for the protection of poſſeſſions at home and abroad. We muſt be prepared with troops for the defence of our colonial poſſeſſions, and we muſt keep our fleets in pay for the ſame purpoſes. We ſhould otherwiſe be leaving France at liberty to act againſt all Europe, and againſt ſome powers in it which are, and ought to be, moſt near and dear to us, whilſt our hands would be tied up. Under theſe circumſtances I cannot, either as one of his Majeſty's Miniſters, or as a member of Parliament, give my voice for negociation. I ſhall, therefore, beg leave to move the following addreſs to his Majeſty.

[The addreſs was then read, and was to the ſame purport as that moved in the Houſe of Lords on Tueſday.]

Mr. *Whitbread* ſaid, I ſhould, Sir, think it extremely inconſiſtent with the conduct which I have held in this Houſe, did I not give my decided negative to this addreſs. Having been of opinion that this war might have been avoided in the firſt inſtance, and having uniformly oppoſed its progreſs whenever occaſion offered, I cannot now refrain from offering my ſentiments on the preſent ſubject of negociation. The right honourable Gentleman has ſet off artfully enough by calling the attention of the Houſe to all the ſe enormitie

which

which have taken place ſince the commencement of the French revolution, and he aſks if any perſons would now juſtify it? Sir, enormities of the moſt atrocious and abominable nature have no doubt been committed, but I have no doubt in my mind of a great part of thoſe enormities having ſprung from and been produced by the intolerable oppreſſions of the old government. The right honourable Gentleman ſays, that from the commencement of the revolution they have attacked and been at war with every nation in Europe. The right honourable Gentleman has, I ſuppoſe, forgot the numerous provocations by which they were compelled to this by the preſſure of every other nation againſt them. He has, I ſuppoſe, forgot the inſolent declaration of Pruſſia to the reſpectable ſenate of Hamburgh, that he would march a garriſon of twelve thouſand men into that free commercial city, if they did not immediately ſend away the French Miniſter reſident there. He has forgot alſo the many inſolent and haughty demands made by Lord Hervey at the court of Florence. He has forgot that Lord Hood ſent an expreſs to Florence to intimate, that if the French ambaſſador there was not diſmiſſed within a certain limited time, he would attack Leghorn; and that Mr. Drake threatened Genoa with a bombardment if the ſame condition was not complied with. The right honourable Gentleman talks of Jacobin principles being now prevalent in France, and of there being no ſincerity in the overture for negociation: I aſk him if they were not equally more ſo when thoſe very negociations took place at Paris and Liſle which he has mentioned to night. In thoſe negociations the right honourable Gentleman has confeſſed, that "he was aware of the danger of ſucceſs in thoſe treaties," and yet Lord Malmeſbury negociated with that Jacobin government as if he expected ſincerity. On the return of Lord Malmeſbury from Liſle, Miniſters publiſhed an official declaration, expreſſing that "his Majeſty had thus availed himſelf of every opening which could in any manner lead to a ſecure and honourable peace:" and after a ſimilar declaration to England, to Europe, and the world, that "*he looks with anxious expectation to the moment when the government of France may ſhew a diſpoſition and ſpirit in any degree correſponding to his own.*" During the ſecond negociation at Liſle, Lord Malmeſbury offered terms, and whilſt the ſame was pending, a revolution took place in France, by which the government paſſed into the hands of more violent Jacobins than the preceding one, yet Lord Malmeſbury

Malmeſbury continued at Liſle, and the negociation went on till Lord Malmeſbury was diſmiſſed from thence, without any objection having occurred to him either on account of Jacobin principles or inſincerity. Did his Majeſty refuſe to treat then? No: he expreſſed the ſame ſentiments of a deſire for peace as before. I beg leave now, Sir, to advert to the papers on the table, and I aſk, is there any thing offenſive in them? Is there a ſingle expreſſion in his letter to his Majeſty which could be taken amiſs from one crowned head to another, *(a laugh)* ſuppoſing him to have been a crowned head? I am by no means diſpoſed, Sir, to defend Bonaparte's aſſumption of power, nor his conſtitution which he has given the people: but I think the power of Bonaparte as great as any which was ever veſted in any other hands; and therefore that a negociation may be entered upon with as much propriety and ſecurity with him as with any government which has preceded. The right honourable Gentleman ſaid he would not dwell on his perſonal character, and he has contented himſelf with only telling us he is a blaſphemer and an uſurper. Certain letters have alſo been publiſhed, which accuſe him with not having obſerved any treaty he had made. In order to form an accurate judgment on this point, the Houſe will do well to convince themſelves as to facts. I deny, however, Sir, the broad aſſertion of the right honourable Gentleman, that he never obſerved any treaty he made; it has never been pretended that the preliminaries of Leoben were broken, or in the ſmalleſt degree infringed; the armiſtice with Prince Charles was not broken; and as to the treaty of Campo Formio, that could not be broken by Bonaparte, for, at the time of the breach of it, he was not in France, nor had been from almoſt the time of his having made it. The right honourable Gentleman objects to treat with Bonaparte, becauſe he breaks treaties. If you object that to him as a crime, look at the breach of treaty which Pruſſia made with this country when he took our money, and then ran away and left us in the lurch. The right honourable Gentleman has attributed to Bonaparte the puniſhment of the Ciſalpine republic: but I aſſert, Sir, that was the act of the executive directory, and not of Bonaparte. The right honourable Gentleman has dwelt with great force and energy on the Egyptian expedition; he has endeavoured to paint it as full of horrors—referring to the letters on this ſubject. I will beg leave to aſk, Sir, if we have all the documents before us? If we have not, it is impoſſible to form an accurate

opinion; but, Sir, even from what we have before us, the right honourable Gentlemen's account of Bonaparte's letters to the Grand Vizier, and to General Kleber, is not conſonant to the fact. He ſaid to the Grand Vizier that he was willing to withdraw his army, and he deſires General Kleber to enter into a negociation, but not to conclude it before a general peace took place: nothing, however, appears on the face of the letters which can induce a belief, that he did not mean the army ſhould be then withdrawn, though, it is aſſumed by the right honourable Gentleman, that he intended to deceive the Grand Vizier, and keep the army there till reinforcements could be ſent out to it, ſufficient for the entire ſubjugation of the country. Much has been ſaid by the right honourable Gentleman on the injuſtice of this expedition, and he has inveighed with no ſmall degree of bitterneſs againſt Bonaparte, as the author of it; but, Sir, I believe I can venture to aſſert that the project of this expedition was planned by the old French government, and the execution only carried into effect by the preſent. As to the injuſtice of it, Sir, if that is ſtill inſiſted on, and if Bonaparte is to be deemed incapable of negociating on that account; let me remind the Houſe of the irruption of the King of Pruſſia into Sileſia, and wreſting that country out of the hands of a defenceleſs people: let me call to their recollection the groſs violation of the ſame monarch, in taking poſſeſſion of Poland. I do not mean, Sir, in any manner to defend Bonaparte for the blood which he has ſhed in Egypt or elſewhere; but while he is inveighed againſt with ſo much acrimony for the numbers he has ſacrificed in Italy and Egypt, let it not be forgotten by the Houſe that he is not without a parallel; and if he has killed his thouſands, Marſhal Suwarrow has ſlaughtered tens of thouſands in Poland. I beg leave, Sir, once more to mention Bonaparte's letter to the King of England. It has been objected to, that it was out of the line of diplomatic uſage—it may be ſo; but ſtill it does not contain one offenſive or diſreſpectful expreſſion. But the right hon. Gentleman objects to Bonaparte, that he has not diſclaimed the proceedings of the former governments ſince the revolution. Sir, there is one paſſage in Bonaparte's letter to his Majeſty which I have juſt alluded to, which I muſt requeſt the Houſe to attend to. The following is the paſſage I mean: "Theſe ſentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majeſty, who reigns over a free nation, and with the ſole view of rendering it happy."

Here,

Here, Sir, is a fair and unequivocal avowal on the part of Bonaparte, that he thinks this a free nation, and that his Majeſty reigns in the hearts of his people, from which no jacobinical doctrines or principles can ever dethrone him, and certainly deſerved a milder anſwer than was returned to it in the official note of Lord Grenville. In my opinion, Sir, this letter of Bonaparte's is a complete diſclaimer of the decree of the 19th of November, and alſo of the jacobinical principles which have been ſo ſeverely reprehended. Much ſtreſs has been laid upon theſe overtures being for a ſeparate peace; but had his Majeſty's Miniſters ſent for anſwer, we cannot treat but with our allies, I have no doubt the reply would have been, "we are ready to treat with your allies in conjunction with you." In another paſſage of this letter, what I have juſt now obſerved, is ſtrongly corroborated, for Bonaparte expreſſes "his ſincere deſire to contribute a ſecond time to a general pacification." If, Sir, Bonaparte has acted contrary to eſtabliſhed diplomatic forms in his letter to his Majeſty, he has ſhewn every reſpect for them in the ſecond diſpatch of M. Talleyrand to Lord Grenville, which his Lordſhip ſomewhat haughtily anſwered by a ſhort reference to his former official note. Sir, permit me to aſk the Houſe if they think it is the wiſh of the people of England to waſte the blood and treaſure of the country to reſtore the princes of the houſe of Bourbon? What benefits, I would aſk, did this country ever derive from the friendſhip of the reigning princes of that houſe? Or in what is Europe likely to be benefited by the reſtoration of that line of princes? Let us call to mind the attempt of Louis XIV. on Holland. The ravaging and laying waſte the Palatinate; the perfidy of the houſe of Bourbon in aiding and aſſiſting the Americans in the American war, which was the undoubted cauſe of the loſs of that country to this. Mr. Whitbread then warned the Houſe of the ill ſucceſs of the firſt coalition, and to be wiſe from experience. The Emperor Paul declares he is at war for royalty, and ſo are his allies. We aſſert we don't inſiſt upon royalty. Mr. Whitbread then took notice of the diſagreements between the two commanders in chief, and their criminations of each other. He compared the alliance between Ruſſia and the Porte to a rope of ſand; inſtanced the ſuperior policy of the American government over this in agreeing to a treaty after having withdrawn her ambaſſadors: and concluded with reading the words of an amendment moved by an honourable Gentleman not then in his

place (Mr. Wilberforce) on the ſame ſubject, to the following purport: "I think that the preſent circumſtances of France do not preclude this country from entering upon a negociation, and that this country ought to conclude a peace with France whenever it can do ſo upon fair, juſt, and honourable terms."

Mr. *Canning* ſaid, that much as he differed from the hon. Gentleman who had juſt ſat down, in almoſt every argument which he had advanced, and in every inference which he had drawn, reſpecting the paſt conduct, or preſent views and ſituations of this country and of France; there were no points on which he differed from him more entirely, than on the poſition which he had laid down at the beginning of his ſpeech, that the origin and cauſes of the war formed no part of the preſent queſtion; and that which he had inſiſted upon in a ſubſequent part of his ſpeech (and which, coupled with the foregoing, did indeed go to preclude all diſcuſſion upon the queſtion to any uſeful purpoſe), that it was highly unneceſſary and improper to enter into any inveſtigation of the perſonal character of the preſent Firſt Conſul of the French republic. Grant the hon. Gentleman theſe two aſſumptions, and there was an end of our deliberations; there was no longer a ſubject before the Houſe which it could be of the ſmalleſt advantage to examine; there was no longer any teſt by which the propriety or impropriety of the conduct of government could be tried. Take away the conſideration of the aggreſſions of France in the commencement of the war, and her conduct during its continuance; and take away, at the ſame time, the liberty of enquiring freely into the grounds and juſtice of the pretenſions put forward by the perſon now at the head of the French government; and what remained, by which to eſtimate the comparative policy of refuſing, or of having accepted, the overtures for negociation? How were the Houſe to judge of what would be the conduct of France under the preſent circumſtances, but by a review of what had been her conduct hitherto? By what means were they to decide how far the power, and the perſonal diſpoſitions, of the preſent Chief Ruler of France ſuperceded the neceſſity of recurring to the examination of the conduct of France under its preceding revolutionary governments, unleſs they were permitted to enquire, in the beſt way that they could, into the probable ſincerity of thoſe diſpoſitions, and the probable ſtability of the power for giving them effect?

It

It was ſingular, however, that while the hon. Gentleman denied to the ſide of the Houſe on which he ſat the right of reviewing the paſt tranſactions of France with foreign nations, and with this country, and the advantage of contraſting the profeſſions of the Chief Conſul with his former principles and conduct: he had himſelf no ſcruple in taking that liberty with the character of his own country, which he thought unwarrantable in reſpect to that of the enemy; and he felt no delicacy in going back to the crimes and errors of monarchical France, and depicting the dangers which Europe had in former times had to dread from the overweening ambition, and tyrannical uſurpations of Louis XIV. though he thought any ſuch animadverſion upon republican France no way to be juſtified, and conſidered the uſurpation of Bonaparte as privileged to an exemption from cenſure or enquiry.

The conduct of Great Britain in the earlier part of the war, the hon. Gentleman declared to have been ſo unprincipled, and her aggreſſions and inſults againſt neutral and unoffending nations ſo groſs and outrageous, that nothing of what was imputed to France could ſtand in competition with it, in point of enormity. No violation of the law of nations, no infringement of rights, nor infliction of calamities, with which France was charged, could, in the eyes of the hon. Gentleman, equal the glaring injuſtice and oppreſſion of our conduct towards Genoa and Tuſcany. The tranſactions reſpecting Genoa and Tuſcany, Mr. Canning obſerved, had been made the ground of much unjuſt accuſation, and appeared to him to have been wholly miſunderſtood. The ſhort ſtatement of that which related to Genoa was ſimply this: Genoa was conſidered at the beginning of the war as ſtrictly neutral, and as ſuch, was reſpected by his Majeſty's fleet in the Mediterranean, until it was found that, in ſpite of its pretended neutrality, the Genoeſe government allowed France to derive conſtant and large ſupplies of proviſions for its armies, from their Genoeſe territory; and that the repeated friendly remonſtrances of the Commander of his Majeſty's fleet, and of his Miniſter at Genoa, had been employed in vain to prevent the repetition and continuance of a practice, which all the laws of civilized war gave them a full right to complain of as a departure from neutrality. When theſe admonitions had proved ineffectual, recourſe was had, and juſtly to threats; which threats, however, be it remembered, were never carried into execution: and, perhaps, the only

only thing with which his Majeſty's government had to reproach itſelf within the whole of this buſineſs was, that it did not allow the ſyſtem of intimidation to be purſued far enough to anſwer, for any length of time, its juſtifiable purpoſe; nor was there any thing that could be repreſented as contrary to the laws and rights of nations in what was done, or what was threatened on this occaſion; nor any thing that could be conſidered as even harſh and rigorous, except, indeed, by thoſe who conceived that the French had a privilege, uniformly and in every caſe, to exact to the full, not the obſervance of the duties of neutrality towards them, but the violation of them in their own favour, and that in proportion as France was exorbitant in her demands, we were to be humble and ſelf-denying; that we were to take as an excuſe, from every neutral ſtate that might chooſe to conciliate France by favour and partiality, the aſſertion, that truly they could not help it; that France was ſo preſſing, and ſo peremptory, that they were obliged to conſult their own ſafety by conceſſion: in ſhort, that we were to ſubmit to all the diſadvantages of a ſtrict and ſcrupulous forbearance on our part, while France enjoyed all the advantages of unqualified exaction; and that, in compaſſion to the weakneſs of the ſtates who could not preſerve their line of duty towards us, we were to omit every opportunity of doing juſtice to ourſelves. A ſyſtem of miſerable imbecillity which he did not wonder France ſhould be loud in preaching, in order to reſerve to herſelf excluſively, the right of departing from it in every inſtance; but one which he truſted this country would never adopt, so long as it had a juſt ſenſe of its own rights, and power to aſſert and to enforce them.

With regard to Tuſcany, much the ſame obſervations would apply. France had continued to derive every aſſiſtance, and England felt every inconvenience in the conduct of the war, from the ill-obſerved neutrality, and partial policy of Tuſcany; a partiality not more diſadvantageous to the cauſe in which England was engaged, than it was manifeſtly prejudicial in its effects, to the ſecurity of the Grand Duke's government, and to the real intereſts of his dominions. Tuſcany had been from the beginning of the war, the center of the French conſpiracy againſt the peace and independence of all Italy; and even in the councils of the Grand Duke himſelf, it was juſtly apprehended that there had penetrated a degree of French influence, dangerous alike to his own ſtates, and to all his neighbours. Under theſe circumſtances

circumſtances Great Britain was not only juſtified, but was called upon to aſſert her own right to be treated with fairneſs and impartiality, and was warranted in employing the moſt peremptory terms to enforce the reſpect which was due to to her, and in repreſenting amicably, but forcibly, to the Tuſcan government, the double danger in which it was daily involving itſelf, from the reſentment of the allies on the one hand, and the overbearing domination of France on the other. Repreſentations to this effect certainly were made by Lord Hervey, then his Majeſty's Miniſter at Florence: and if, in executing the orders of this court, Lord Hervey was hurried by his zeal for the ſervice of his ſovereign, and for the great cauſe in which England and her allies were embarked, into expreſſions of any thing like intemperance or diſreſpect, it ought not to be forgotten, that upon the ſtatement of this circumſtance, accompanied with the expreſſion of the Grand Duke's diſpleaſure and deſire, that Lord Hervey ſhould be recalled; that deſire was inſtantly complied with, Lord Hervey was immediately recalled, and thus the beſt and moſt ſatisfactory reparation was made to the government of Tuſcany, and the character of the government of England completely cleared. Nor was this, however, all: the conduct of Lord Hervey, though admitted to be ſuch, as to occaſion this complaint of the court of Tuſcany, and to draw down upon him, in conſequence, this mark of diſapprobation of his own court, was yet not entirely ſuch as it is repreſented in certain publications, from which in this, as in other inſtances, the hon. Gentlemen on the other ſide of the Houſe probably derived the information, on which they thought it expedient to ground their charges againſt the powers at war with France. In the ſame collection of ſtate papers, which contains the treaty of Pavia, and the ſecret articles of the treaty of Pilnitz, both groſs and imprudent fabrications, without the ſhadow of foundation, or the pretence of authority; in that ſame publication, reſting on ſimilar grounds of authenticity, is even to be found a pretended note from Lord Hervey, addreſſed directly, and perſonally, to the Grand Duke of Tuſcany, of which it was ſufficient to ſay, that no ſuch note ever was preſented; no ſuch note ever was tranſmitted from Lord Hervey to this court; nor was it ever heard of by any perſon connected with the government of this country, until it made its appearance in the ſame volume with the treaty of Pavia and Pilnitz. [*Mr. Canning here read a copy of a paper, purporting to be a note from Lord Hervey to the Grand*

Grand Duke of Tuſcany, dated September 2, 1793.] He read this note, he ſaid, not as conceiving that the circumſtance of ſuch a fabrication having been contrived, did away all ground of complaint againſt Lord Hervey. The complaint he had admitted to have exiſted; and it had been ſatisfied by Lord Hervey's recall. But he did think that this, coupled with the other inſtances to which he had referred, of the ſpurious treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz, might have the effect of making Gentlemen a little cautious in future how they adopted, and relied upon as authentic ſtate papers, whatever traſh it might pleaſe the friends of France to publiſh as ſuch, for the juſtification of her cauſe.

He had one word more to add upon the ſubject of Tuſcany. The hon. Gentleman had appeared to rely upon the conduct of Great Britain, in this inſtance, not only as a *ſet-off* againſt the outrageous proceedings of France towards neutral nations, but as a ground of her proceedings towards Tuſcany itſelf in ſubſequent periods of the war, particularly in the invaſion of Leghorn, and the ſeizure of Britiſh property there in 1797. He had already, he truſted, done away the impreſſion of the honourable Gentleman's argument in the former reſpect, by ſhewing that Great Britain had not conducted herſelf ſo flagrantly as was repreſented, and that, in the inſtance in which her miniſter had outſtepped the line of his inſtructions, he had, with the condeſcenſion becoming a great country in its intercourſe with a weaker ſtate (whoſe very ſenſe of its own weakneſs might, perhaps, make its feelings the more irritable, and its honour the more jealous), done every thing in her power to atone for the offence. In the other reſpect, France can derive no defence from the conduct of Great Britain: for, ſubſequently to all that paſſed on this occaſion through the medium of Lord Hervey, and, conſequently, to Tuſcany's being conſidered by France as having become a party in the war againſt her, a ſeparate treaty of peace was concluded at Paris between the Grand Duke and the French republic. And it was in violation of this treaty, that the French army under General Bonaparte took poſſeſſion of Leghorn, and ſeized and confiſcated Britiſh property to an immenſe amount, depoſited there under the protection and guarantee of Tuſcan neutrality; a violation of the laws of neutrality almoſt unparallelled in extent and atrocity, except by other examples to be found in the conduct of the French themſelves, and an outrage for which the government that permitted, or (what is in ſtrictneſs the ſame

ſame thing) could not prevent it, is reſponſible to the government whoſe ſubjects have ſuffered by it; which, therefore, gave to his Majeſty, if he had choſen to make uſe of it, full right of repriſal, and which gives to the moderation obſerved ſince in the conduct of Great Britain towards Tuſcany, a character of the greateſt magnanimity, generoſity, and forbearance.

After all, however, if it were in other reſpects proper and reaſonable to retrace the conduct of France at former periods of the war, and if the conduct of Great Britain, in regard to other nations, left them at liberty to do ſo, the hon. Gentleman had contended, that the Miniſters had given up all right to look back, by entering into negociation at Paris, and afterwards at Liſle. And he had further inſiſted, that the declarations publiſhed in his Majeſty's name, at the concluſion of each of thoſe negociations, had bound the government of this country to enter into negociation anew, at leaſt to receive overtures for peace, whenever the enemy might ſhew a readineſs to treat with them. This reaſoning (Mr. Canning ſaid) ſeemed to him to be by no means correct. The pledge given by the declarations of his Majeſty could in no fair conſtruction be made to apply ſo widely and ſo eternally as the hon. Gentleman was deſirous of having it believed. As to the declaration made after the Paris negociation, whatever might be the promiſes held forth in future negociation, they were fully and entirely ſatisfied, and the pledge contained in them entirely redeemed by entering into the negociation at Liſle. And as to that which was publiſhed after the negociation at Liſle, it was not only not of the vague and unlimited nature, which the hon. Gentleman deſcribed, but it was in truth more limited by circumſtances, and more preciſe in the extent and duration of its obligation than the former. For what was the ſtate of the circumſtances under which that declaration was publiſhed? Lord Malmeſbury had been empowered to offer the terms of peace at Liſle, ſo liberal, ſo advantageous, to the enemy, that nothing, in fact, but the real and preſſing neceſſity for peace which (from various cauſes which he ſhould not detail, but which had been alluded to by his right hon. Friend, Mr. Dundas) was felt in this country, could have juſtified the government in foregoing them; and that it was not unreaſonably to be apprehended, that any favourable change in the circumſtances of the country might induce the government to ſeize an opportunity of departing from them. Such, however, was not the intention

or the policy of government. A favourable change had taken place in the circumſtances of the country; for, ſoon after the breaking off of the conferences at Liſle, and the ſending away of Lord Malmeſbury, it had pleaſed Providence to bleſs his Majeſty's arms with a ſignal victory over the fleet of one of his enemies. The effect of this victory was to ſecure, in a great meaſure, the ſafety of the country, and to raiſe the ſpirits of the people certainly in a very conſiderable degree. But ſtill the King's Miniſters thought peace upon the whole deſirable; and feeling this, and apprehending, at the ſame time, that the enemy would naturally conclude that the advantage ſo recently gained muſt of neceſſity have raiſed our terms, they thought it expedient to give them to underſtand that ſuch was not the caſe—that even after the victory of Lord Duncan they were ready to make peace upon the ſame terms which they had offered before; and, for this purpoſe, the declaration was publiſhed. The enemy might have taken them at their word at the time: fortunately he did not. But was it to be argued, that ſuch a declaration, made under ſuch circumſtances, and with ſuch a view, was to be everlaſtingly binding? That becauſe one victory, becauſe a favourable change, in one particular, of the ſituation of this country, did not alter the opinion of Miniſters as to the preferableneſs of peace to war (a choice of evils, God knows, as ſuch a peace muſt have been), and did not affect the moderation of their terms, therefore they were to be held for ever to the words, not the ſpirit, of their propoſition; were never to be at liberty to vary their tone with the variation of circumſtances, both in this country, and in the ſituation of the enemy, but were bound to be always forthcoming, when the enemy pleaſes to call upon them, and to make at all times the worſt terms poſſible for Great Britain, becauſe there had been a period when a peace, even on terms ſo bad, was thought preferable to the continuance of the war? Surely there was not common fairneſs, or reaſon, in ſuch a mode of argument; nor would there be common ſenſe in ſuch a mode of conduct!

As little could it be argued, that the having treated with revolutionary France at all, precluded Miniſters for ever from conſidering the internal ſtate of that country as a diſcouragement to negociation. What! becauſe they had already felt, in the abrupt and inſulting termination of the negociation at Liſle (of Paris he would ſay nothing), what it was to treat with a revolutionary government: were they, therefore,

therefore, of courſe, bound to treat immediately and eagerly with every new government, the inſtant that it preſented itſelf to their view? Was the mere fact of an experiment having been tried, and having failed, of itſelf a ſufficient inducement to try it again? Were the government bound to this, if circumſtances continued the ſame, and afforded, therefore, only the ſame chance of ſucceſs? And were they equally bound to it in caſe of a change? Was there now a change in the circumſtances or diſpoſitions of the enemy, which warranted the expectation that the chance of ſucceſs would now be greater? And if there were ſo, how were they to aſcertain it, but by that very examination and compariſon of the preſent ſituation of France, and the French government with that which had before baffled their endeavours after peace; which examination and compariſon the hon. Gentleman had warned the Houſe not to purſue?

Whether or no any ſuch fortunate and promiſing alteration had been effected in the principles and temper of France, by the alteration of form of government and of perſons, was preciſely the queſtion upon which the government of this country had to make up its opinion, before it could ſafely, or prudently, or conſiſtently, entertain any propoſal for negociation. It was preciſely that upon which it was impoſſible to make up any rational opinion, until they ſhould have ſeen trial of the new eſtabliſhment; a trial only to be decided by what was ſo juſtly inſiſted upon in the official note returned in anſwer to General Bonaparte's letter to his Majeſty, "experience and the evidence of facts."

But this diſtruſt of the new government the hon. Gentleman profeſſed to believe to be in a great meaſure affected; and to be put forward only in order to afford an opportunity for declaring the marked and excluſive predilection of Miniſters for the ancient monarchy of France: and nothing could, in the hon. Gentleman's opinion, be more impolitic, as well as more outrageouſly inſulting, to the feelings of the people in France, than the avowal of a deſire to ſee the ancient monarchy reſtored. Undoubtedly ſuch a deſire was plainly and diſtinctly avowed; and, for his part, Mr. Canning ſaid, he was at a loſs to conceive what there was in the avowal that could irritate the feelings of Frenchmen. If, indeed, it were poſſible to imagine, that there ſtill exiſted in France a large body of ſincere, bigotted, fanatical lovers of republicaniſm, of perſons who gravely believed in the purity and perfection of the republican principle, as applicable, or

as ever having been applied to the government of France, under any of its ſucceſſive revolutions, who ſtill looked with faith and hope to the preſervation and propagation of their principles, and conſidered nothing but the return of monarchy as likely to oppoſe their progreſs, or diminiſh their influence and operation; if ſuch a race of madmen yet were to be found, whoſe eyes and underſtandings the whole ſeries of tyrannies from Robeſpierre and Bonaparte had not been ſufficient to open; with them, he muſt confeſs that the expreſſion of a wiſh for the reſtoration of the old legitimate government might be unpopular; their feelings ſuch a propoſition might irritate. But, he confeſſed, he could not eaſily perſuade himſelf that ſuch a race of men could be very numerous either in France or elſewhere. And if, as was more probable, the general and prevailing feeling throughout France was that of wearineſs and diſguſt at the ſcenes of horror and calamity through which they had paſſed; if they now began to ſee, with regret and compunction, that, after ten years of ſuffe ings and of crimes, of miſeries inflicted upon others, and heaped upon themſelves, after wading through ſeas of blood in purſuit of the empty form of liberty which ſtill eluded their graſp; the ſole reſult of their endeavours to ſhake off the government, which they were once taught to think ſo oppreſſive, had been no other than the ſubjecting themſelves to a tyranny ten thouſand times more galling; that they had ſucceeded only in exchanging the ſceptre for the ſword; that, inſtead of eradicating monarchy, they had ſtripped it of all that made it venerable, and of all that made it uſeful, of all that recommended it in theory, and all that ſoftened it in practice; had ſtripped it of its ſtability, its legitimacy, and its limitations; if ſuch were now the reflections of all thinking men in that unhappy country, what reaſon was there to apprehend that they would ſhrink from the mention of their ancient government? That they would withhold their homage from a known and mitigated monarchy, to pay it to a frightful and jealous uſurpation? That they would hold ſacred their allegiance to a ſhapeleſs mockery of royalty, with "the likeneſs of a kingly crown" upon its head, and refuſe it to that ſubſtantial and protective power, under which they had flouriſhed for ages, in reſpect abroad and in happineſs at home? Was it not rather to be preſumed, that they had now begun to look with anxious deſire for a termination to their calamities, in ſuch an order of things as alone could terminate them in peace and ſecurity? Was it

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not probable—was it not certain—did not every man, who heard him, know from his own experience, that the firſt idea ſuggeſted by Bonaparte's ſucceſsful uſurpation, was, that it was a ſtep to the reſtoration of monarchy? Was it not obvious to every perſon, that from the government of one man, to that of a lawful king, was a tranſition neither ſo ſtrange nor ſo difficult, as from any of the more complicated conſtitutions which had riſen and fallen in France ſince the abolition of the monarchy? And, even now, though to point out the preciſe ſtages by which the change was to be brought about might be by no means eaſy, was there any human being who did not feel that monarchy was brought more within view than it had been at any period ſince the beginning of the revolution? That thoſe who wiſhed it felt more confident in their hopes; that thoſe who dreaded its return yet thought it more probable, and might be more ready to compromiſe with it; and that, therefore, to put the caſe of the re-eſtabliſhment of monarchy as that in which peace would become eaſy and certain, was to ſpecify not only the moſt deſirable but the moſt probable termination of the war, and that which, according to all human calculation, might be moſt near at hand.

But an apprehenſion was expreſſed, that in ſtating the deſire of this government for the reſtoration of monarchy in France, a pledge was given to the royaliſts that peace ſhould never be made at all, until monarchy was reſtored. It was feared, that government were thus making common cauſe with the royaliſts, and implicating the fortunes of this country in the iſſue of a conteſt in which ſubſtantially it had no real concern. No ſo; the language of the official note was guarded carefully in this point; and ſo little did it juſtify the concluſion that common cauſe was made with the royaliſts to the extent deſcribed, that in other comments upon the note, which he had ſeen, a directly contrary effect was ſtated as likely to be produced by it: namely, that the intimation of other poſſible caſes in which peace might be made by this country with France, would prevent the royaliſt party from building any hope at all upon the good wiſhes of Great Britain. The truth, however, lay between both; and it might, perhaps, be ſufficient to anſwer to both objections, that the royaliſts were not deceived as to what was the true intention of government, and that they were ſatisfied with it. The royaliſts of France, and the government of this country, had undoubtedly a common object, but they had different degrees

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of intereſt in the attainment of it, and proportioned to thoſe different degrees of intereſt, might be the degrees of their reſpective exertions and perſeverance in the purſuit. So far, however, as they were both to proceed, they might ſafely and beneficially proceed together. It was a partnerſhip in which the royaliſts had neceſſarily embarked their whole fortune; this country a part only; and the terms of the connexion reſulting from theſe combined, but unequal intereſts, were diſtinctly underſtood. If we could bring the royaliſts through by the ſame efforts by which we were working for our own advantage, ſurely it was highly uſeful, and honourable, and humane to do ſo: but we were not pledged to perſevere beyond what we thought prudent on our own account; we might withdraw at any time, when our own objects were accompliſhed, or when we ſaw, or thought we ſaw that they were unattainable, without greater riſque than it appeared to us adviſeable to incur; and we might withdraw without reproach, and without diſhoneſty. We had no ſhare in bringing the royaliſts into the conteſt, though finding them at our ſide, we were bound in honour, and humanity, to aſſiſt them, as far as our ways lay together; but while we owed thus much to them, we did not, nor did they, forget that we owed *all* to ourſelves.

Next, however, according to the hon. Gentleman's arguments, it was to be conſidered that this country had, in fact, no intereſt whatever in the re-eſtabliſhment of monarchy in France: nay, that it was rather an event to be looked at with jealouſy and apprehenſion. This aſſertion, though he had heard of its being made and maintained in other places, Mr. Canning ſaid, he could hardly believe to be made with ſerioufneſs. Good God! Had Great Britain, had the world no intereſt in the re-eſtabliſhment of order, of a known, defined, underſtood, experienced, legitimate order of things, in the room of a ſyſtem of diſorder, anarchy, and impiety, not more afflicting to France, than it was incompatible, as had been proved by long and painful experience, with the ſecurity of every other government upon earth? Was it nothing to this country, looking to peace as its object, whether ſhe ſhould be able to conclude a peace on which ſhe could rely, and under which ſhe could repoſe with confidence, a peace which ſhould bring with it the renewal of ſafe communication, of commercial intercourſe, of reciprocal truſt and benefit; or, whether ſhe ſhould only reſt on her arms in hourly expectation of being again ſummoned to war, in defence of her

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dearest interests? And did the hon. Gentleman suppose, that such a peace as was alone worth having, as alone could be maintained without all the cost, and more than all the dangers of war, could rest on any other grounds than the restoration of such an order of things in France as might ensure the return of credit and stability to the government, and of security for property and of honest industry, and commercial morality among the people?

The expression, therefore, of an anxious wish for the re-establishment of the French monarchy, did not appear to him to be either so dangerous in the effect that it might produce in France, nor so extravagant with respect to the interests of Great Britain. But here the hon. Gentleman had taken a very extraordinary ground indeed; and in his zeal to combat the idea of restoring monarchy, he had far outstepped the rule of forbearance, with respect to the past conduct of France, which he had prescribed for those who differed from him upon the question, and had gone into a laboured dissertation on the dangers with which monarchy, in the House of Bourbon, had in old times threatened this country and all Europe. The mind of that man must be singularly constituted, who, living in such times as the present, could overlook all the dangers actually impending, and all those which had recently overwhelmed the world, from the profligate aggressions and tyranny of republican France; and who yet trembled with apprehension at the recollection of the ambitious projects of Louis XIV. The hon. Gentleman had referred to the projects of that monarch, which had threatened the independence of Europe, a hundred years ago; and had spoken of them in a tone which shewed, that he thought the independence of Europe matter of concern, and the overweening ambition of France, matter of dread to this country: and he had spoken, in the manner which it deserved, of the stand made by King William in defence of the liberties of this country, and of Europe. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman, in looking back with pride to that distinguished period of English history. He found in that period much to praise; wisdom and firmness in our councils, skill in our generals, valour in our armies: but he found nothing that delighted him more, or that he would rather recommend to the admiration of the hon. Gentleman, and his friends, than the cordial support afforded by the Commons of Great Britain to their Sovereign in the prosecution of a war, carried on for the true interests, the honour and safety of their country, against the rapacious, insolent,

inſolent, and domineering ambition of France. [*Mr. Canning here read an addreſs of the Houſe of Commons to King William in the year* 1696, *the* 8*th year of the war, containing expreſſions of their determination to ſupport his Majeſty to the utmoſt, "till he ſhould be able to obtain by war, a ſafe and honourable peace."*] This example, was, indeed, he ſaid, worthy of being quoted, and worthy of all the praiſe beſtowed upon the exertions of that reign, by the hon. Gentleman. But, after all, what did the hon. Gentleman gain to his argument, by referring to the days of Louis XIV, and by citing the precedent of the noble ſtruggle maintained by this country, during the reign of King William, and his ſucceſſor, againſt France? He reminded us, it was true, what were the efforts, and what were the ſacrifices which the people of England had thought themſelves bound to make in that conteſt. What was the inference? Why that in a conteſt, incalculably more arduous, and involving in its iſſue intereſts infinitely more important, we ſhould make, at leaſt, equal efforts, and diſplay, at leaſt, equal perſeverance? What was at any time the ſpecific danger from the ambition of Louis XIV, that called forth all the energy of this country? Firſt, generally his unprincipled ambition; latterly, war was carried on againſt him becauſe there was a danger that France would acquire an influence in the councils of Spain. An influence in the councils of Spain! Would to God ſuch were the only danger that we had now to apprehend! Yet for this, the hon. Gentleman thought war was juſtly and nobly carried on! And now—Oh! now, there was no reaſon, no pretext for carrying on war at all; no danger now of French influence in Spain!—France intermeddle in the concerns of Spain now! France command the treaſures, diſpoſe of the fleets, direct the policy of the Spaniſh monarchy now! Not ſhe; ſhe did not preſume to entertain projects ſo ambitious. Spain indeed! She had nothing to do with Spain; nor with Holland; nor with the Netherlands; nor with Switzerland; nor with Germany; nor with Italy (with Italy, God be thanked! not much); nor with Egypt. There was nothing now to fear from her power; nothing now to ſuſpect from her intrigues; no danger to the balance of Europe; no hazard to the liberties, the religion, the conſtitutions of the ſeveral ſtates and kingdoms of the world!

If, however, there were no reaſon for carrying on the war, it was not, therefore, the leſs neceſſary to enquire what poſſibility there was of making, and what chance for ſecuring peace.

peace. And this was a queſtion which unfortunately could not be agitated, without touching upon the ſecond topic, which the hon. Gentleman had prohibited, the perſonal character and conduct of the Firſt Conſul of the French republic. On what ground indeed the hon. Gentleman had thought himſelf warranted in precluding ſuch a diſcuſſion, it was not eaſy to conceive. The diſcuſſion was not of our ſeeking. The Firſt Conſul voluntarily forced himſelf upon our obſervation, in a way that made it impoſſible for us to turn aſide, and to pretend not to ſee him. He told us plainly, that if we had to do with France at all, we muſt have to do with *him*, as concentering in his own perſon all that was ſtable, all that was authoritative, all that was reſponſible to foreign countries, in the new government of France. "If there be power in France, it is in me; if there be faith in France, in *me* muſt you look for it; if you make peace with France, *my* word, *my* character, *my* perſonal diſpoſitions muſt be your ſole, and ſufficient ſecurity." Such was the language of the Firſt Conſul to his Majeſty and his government; and when, in compliance with ſuch an invitation, it was propoſed to examine the foundation and validity of the only ſecurity thus offered to us, the hon. Gentleman ſtepped in, and told the Houſe, that ſuch an examination was highly indecorous and unneceſſary. It might give offence, it ſeemed, to the Firſt Conſul; it was perſonal and indelicate; and he knew not what other terms of fine feeling were applied to it. Now, firſt, as to the fear of giving offence to the Firſt Conſul himſelf, or to France: the hon. Gentleman appeared to have very ill underſtood to what degree the temper of France was captious and irritable, in reſpect to the character of its exiſting, or expired governments; otherwiſe the honourable Gentleman, with that delicacy which he profeſſed to wiſh to obſerve, and that fear of offending, which dictated his warning to that ſide of the Houſe, would not have indulged himſelf in many parts of the ſpeech which he had made that day. For did the hon. Gentleman imagine, that it was to their government of the preſent hour, or to that which Bonaparte had deſtroyed to erect this, or to that upon the ruins of which he had erected that which he had now deſtroyed, or to any one of the nine or ten immediately preceding governments that France limited the privilege and ſacredneſs, which made it almoſt blaſphemy to condemn their proceedings? No ſuch thing; the hon. Gentleman, himſelf, in reviling the ambition of the ancient government of France, had as much ſinned againſt the majeſty of the French nation, as if he had preſumed

ſumed to traduce Briſſot, or Robeſpierro, or any of the later tyrants who ſwept them to the ſcaffold, and were ſwept by their ſucceſſors to the ſame ſcaffold in their turn. The hon. Gentleman has, indeed, committed his country moſt raſhly, by ſuch intemperate language againſt Louis XIV. Does he not know, or had he forgotten at the moment, that Rome was ſacked and pillaged the other day, to avenge the manes of *Vercengetorix* (or ſome ſuch name), a king of the Gauls, who flouriſhed ſome time before Louis XIV., and whom Julius Cæſar was diſcovered to have aggrieved in a ſcandalous manner; and that to reclaim the trophies won from the Burgundians, was one of the pretexts alledged for the invaſion of Switzerland? Let not, therefore, the hon. Gentleman imagine, that the lapſe of near a century, ſince the time of Louis XIV., would bar France, in her own good time, from avenging the wrongs done to his memory. France is not ſo forgetful, *nullum tempus occurrit*. Her vengeance might ſleep indeed; but opportunity would awaken it: and could we be caught as fairly off our guard, as weak and as inviting as Rome or as Switzerland (which might readily be the caſe if we would accept the counſel of the hon. Gentleman oppoſite, and make peace, or armiſtice, without examination or delay). The hon. Gentleman's abuſe of Louis XIV. would be as good a plea as any other, for declaring war againſt us, and purſuing it to our ruin.

Forced, however, as we were, at all hazards, to ſift pretty narrowly the character and conduct of the preſent ruler of France; it was ſome ſatisfaction that we had before-hand ſo much of what was the only teſtimony to be relied on, that of "experience and the evidence of facts," to guide our judgment, and aid our deciſion upon the ſubject. Mr. Canning ſaid, he would not follow his right hon. Friend (Mr. Dundas), through the detail of Bonaparte's conduct, with regard to foreign ſtates, in every tranſaction in which he had been engaged, from his firſt appearance at the head of the army of Italy, to his late diſgraceful flight from the army of Egypt. The facts were before the Houſe; they were freſh in every body's recollection. To theſe facts what teſtimony was oppoſed? Firſt, the declaration of Bonaparte himſelf, ſwearing by himſelf, no doubt, as was the cuſtom and the right of ſo tranſcendant a perſonage; and ſecondly, his Miniſter, Mr. Talleyrand. Talleyrand, to be ſure, was an admirable witneſs to character in matter of negociation. Talleyrand certainly had proved, that he knew well how to make a treaty, but he ſeemed to be quite loſt in admiration of Bonaparte's

naparte's talents for keeping one. That was a thing of which he had no idea. "The old Directory and I," ſaid Talleyrand "knew pretty well how to ſet about concluding a treaty; there was the American treaty, which all the world knows; the Portugal treaty too; both were managed cleverly enough in the making; but as to the keeping them—that is quite another thing. There, indeed, we had no ſkill, nor talent: but here, here is a man, who keeps treaties as well as makes them; a perfect phœnomenon in the diplomacy of France."

Such was the teſtimony that Talleyrand could furniſh on behalf of Buonaparte. For that which Buonaparte could give in favour of himſelf, it fortunately was not neceſſary to reſt on conjecture or inference. Fortunately the chance of war had thrown into our hands documents, of which the authenticity could not be queſtioned, and in which the characters of fraud, perjury, treachery, and deliberate breach of faith, were written in Buonaparte's own hand againſt himſelf. He alluded to the letters lately intercepted on their paſſage from Egypt.

And here he muſt take ſome notice of the remarks of the hon. Gentleman, and of thoſe which he underſtood had been made in other places on the publication of thoſe letters. It had been argued that there was ſomething baſe, and illiberal, ſomething contrary to the rights of mitigated war, and to the practice of civilized nations, in publiſhing letters of an enemy, which the chance of war had thrown into our hands. He would not enter into the theory of this queſtion: becauſe being a queſtion of practical policy, it could be much better ſettled by a reference to the conduct of the moſt civilized countries in their beſt times. He apprehended the hon. Gentlemen oppoſite would not diſpute the claim of their own country (for it was the conduct of Great Britain that he meant to quote) to the qualification which he had beſtowed upon it: and he was confident that they would agree with him as to his character of the particular period of our hiſtory, to which he referred; for it was one which they were themſelves extremely fond of citing with expreſſions of high commendation, for reaſons ſufficiently obvious; it was the year 1759, the period of the glorious war carried on under the adminiſtration of the father of his right hon. Friend, who ſat beſide him (Mr. Pitt). The paper which he held in his hand, contained an extract from the *London Gazette, from Tueſday, Aug. 14, to Saturday, Aug. 18, 1759.*

"Among the papers which were taken at Detmold on the 5th inſtant, "by his Majeſty's light troops, an original letter is found from the "Marſhal Duc de Belleiſle, to Marſhal Contades, dated Verſailles, July "23d, 1759, in which there is the following paſſage."

Then followed a paſſage extracted from the letter, with which it was not neceſſary to trouble the Houſe. In the *London Gazette Extraordinary, of Friday, October* 12, in the ſame year, were publiſhed ſome intercepted letters taken in the Eaſt Indies, which were ſtill more in point, from the ſubſtance of their contents, as well as from the precedent of publication. The firſt was,

"Tranſlation of an Intercepted Letter from M. Lally, to M. Lerpit."

Another was,

"Tranſlation of a Letter, intercepted going from Pondicherry to "Maſulipatam."

In which there were ſome paſſages ſo curious, when compared with thoſe letters from Egypt, which have lately been publiſhed, that he believed the Houſe would forgive him, if he took up a few minutes of their time in reading a part of it to them. It was as follows:

"Shall I mention to you our unfortunate expedition to Tanjore? Bad "news is intereſting, but painful to the writer . . . . The army has "ſuffered greatly from hunger, thirſt, watching, and fatigue . . . . Poor "French! what a ſituation are we in! What projects we thought ourſelves "capable of executing, and how are we diſappointed! . . . I pity our "General. He muſt be extremely embarraſſed, notwithſtanding his ex-"tenſive genius, without money or fleet; his troops very diſcontented, his "reputation declining . . . . What will become of us? . . . . They "ſay M. de Buſi is coming. Let him make haſte. Let him bring men, "and eſpecially money, without which he will only encreaſe our miſery. "The country, being ruined, ſcarce affords us any proviſions . . . . . "Above twenty officers of different corps have gone on board the fleet. "If M. Lally had given permiſſion to depart, the greateſt part of them "would have embarked: So greatly are theſe Gentlemen diſguſted with "their ſituation!" . . . . . .

Would not any perſon who heard this, without being told from whence it came, be perſuaded that it was in fact one of the late interceptions from Egypt; when, at leaſt as much as at Pondicherry in 1759, the army have reaſon to be "diſguſted with their ſituation." . . . . . Was there any longer any doubt as to the ſtrict precedented propriety of availing ourſelves of every information of ſuch a ſort, which came into our power? or would a ſtand now be made (it was very poſſible) that againſt France, and eſpecially againſt Buonaparte himſelf, ſuch an advantage was ungenerous? Such, perhaps, might be the argument: for he had heard that in another place it had been gravely declared, that the publiſher

liſher of Buonaparte's letters muſt have a worſe heart than the writer of them. Theſe were harſh words; but when he looked a little farther, and found the ſame orator arguing that the ſcarcity proceeded from the war, he had felt that an imputation, however ſevere from ſuch an arguer was not much to be regarded. But, in truth, did Buonaparte merit for the goodneſs of his heart, a ſpecial exemption from the fair advantages ariſing out of the fortune of war? Had he ſo conducted himſelf as to deſerve ſuch a compliment? Perhaps an extract (a very ſhort one) which he would take the liberty to read from the *Moniteur* of the 19*th Pluvioſe*, 5*th year*, (ſome time in January, 1797) would ſettle this point, as completely as the London Gazette had ſettled the other.

"Copy of a Letter from General Buonaparte, Commander in Chief of "the Army of Italy, to the Executive Directory.

Verona, 1 *Pluvioſe*, 5*th year*.

"Citizens Directors, you will find encloſed ſome intercepted letters, "which are extremely intereſting; as you will ſee in them the obſtinate "bad faith of the Court of Rome."

Then followed the publication at length of a letter from the Cardinal Secretary of State at Rome, to Monſignor Albani, (the Nuncio) at Vienna; and the Houſe would remember that Rome was not then actually at war with the French republic. And this was the man entitled to peculiar delicacy, againſt whom the juſt rights of war ought not to be enforced!

But in defiance of the proofs ariſing out of Buonaparte's own teſtimony, thus fortunately produced againſt himſelf, and in contradiction to all that had been ſtated by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Dundas) the hon. Gentleman thought it ſufficient to maintain that Buonaparte had not in point of fact violated the treaty of *Campo Formio*. Undoubtedly the hon. Gentleman was right. Buonaparte did not violate the treaty of Campo Formio. But what then? what ground for triumph did the hon. Gentleman find in this conceſſion? The hon. Gentleman muſt have miſtaken his right hon. Friend's meaning, if he ſuppoſed that the whole of his argument was liable to be overthrown by the production of a ſingle inſtance of a treaty not broken by Buonaparte. If indeed his right hon. Friend had aſſerted that France had never broken a treaty *without* Buonaparte; if the tenor of his argument had been that Buonaparte was a neceſſary ingredient in every breach of treaty; then, to be ſure, to find one which had been broken by France without his agency, might

might be matter of high controverſial triumph. But his right hon. Friend had aſſerted no ſuch thing. He had merely aſſerted that Buonaparte had never kept a treaty on his part; and that France on her's had left none unviolated: but that ſhe had employed Buonaparte to violate them *all*, that ſhe had been ſo poor in reſources as to be able to find but one inſtrument for ſuch complicated and multiplied acts of wickedneſs, it had never entered into his right hon. Friend's head to aſſert.

He was, however, very glad that the hon. Gentleman had recalled the attention of the Houſe to the treaty of Campo Formio: becauſe, though not affording an inſtance of breach of treaty on the part of Bonaparte, it was much more material to be conſidered as affording the inſtance to which Bonaparte himſelf referred with ſo much confidence, of the diſpoſitions already manifeſted by him, not for peace ſimply, but for a *general* pacification. The Firſt Conſul in his letter to his Majeſty had declared, that his Majeſty "could only ſee in this overture his perſonal deſire to contribute, for the *ſecond* time, to a *general* pacification." Talleyrand in his reply to lord Grenville's note had inſiſted upon the ſame topic, and the hon. Gentleman on the other ſide, who took all that Bonaparte and Talleyrand ſaid for goſpel, had not been ſlow in expreſſing his perſuaſion, that it was for a *general* pacification that treaty was now propoſed. Now, when a man talked of doing a thing for the *ſecond* time, he luckily gave ſome clue for finding his real meaning: for as much as to form ſome idea how he would do it in the *ſecond* time, it was only neceſſary to look back, and ſee how he had done it the *firſt*. In this point of view the treaty of Campo Formio did indeed afford an admirable teſt of Bonaparte's notions of *general* pacification. At the time when the treaty of Campo Formio was negotiated, the powers ſtill at war with France, beſide Auſtria, were Great Britain, and as the ally Great Britian, Portugal.—The preliminaries of Leoben were ſigned by Bonaparte, in April 1797.—The treaty of Campo Formio, founded on theſe preliminaries (he would not here diſtract the attention of the houſe by noticing the wide departure in the treaty from the preliminaries ſigned at Leoben, nor by remarking on the plea by which that departure was defended on the part of France, namely, that in framing thoſe preliminaries, advantage had been taken of the generoſity of the French Republic—theſe were ſhades of faithleſſneſs ſcarce worth mentioning,) the treaty of Compo Formio was concluded

cluded in the courſe of the ſummer. In the ſame ſummer Great Britain propoſed to treat for peace; and the conferences at Liſle were opened. Portugal alſo, beſides that ſhe was included in the propoſals of Great Britain, opened a ſeparate treaty for herſelf. What then was the conquence? peace made with Auſtria, England and Portugal, the only remaining powers at war, actually engaged in negotiation;—one ſhould have imagined that the work of general pacification would have gone ſmoothly on: and that Bonaparte, whoſe influence was paramount in France at that moment, might eaſily have obtained his heart's deſire. But no—the Revolution of the 4th of September took place;—a Revolution, which, be it remarked, could not be brought about without the conſent of Bonaparte, which Barras, then the intimate friend and patron of Bonaparte, planned, which Augereau was ſent from Bonaparte's army to Paris to conduct, and therewith ended the negotiations at Liſle, and the treaty with Portugal;—the Britiſh Miniſter was diſmiſſed, the Portugueſe Miniſter impriſoned;—and threats of renewed and interminable war, were the only anſwers made to the perſevering offers of new negotiation on the part of this country. Such was the conduct and ſucceſs of Bonaparte's firſt, fond attempt at general pacification: and leſt any doubt ſhould be entertained of his perfect ſatisfaction in the iſſue, he ſhortly after purſued his favourite plan of peace, by conducting an army, deſtined againſt the Britiſh poſſeſſions in the eaſt, into Egypt, the territory of a partial and friendly power; and thus both ſecured the continuance of the war with England, and wantonly added a new enemy to the liſt of the enemies of France.

If ſuch was the ſtate of the tranſaction to which we were ſo confidently referred, as containing undoubted proofs of the diſpoſitions avowed by the Firſt Conſul, and as affording the precedent which he meant to follow in the negotiation now propoſed to us—whatever advantage we might have to accuſe ourſelves of having loſt by refuſing to liſten to his overtures, was it reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that of all things in the world, we had thrown away an opportunity of general pacification? was it not rather probable, was it not evident, that as, in the former inſtance, having detached Auſtria from the coalition, the whole force of France was bent againſt the intereſts of this country; ſo now it was intended merely to make ſure of our inactivity by entangling us in negotiation, in order that the undivided efforts of the government of France

France might be directed againſt the court of Vienna?—It was our turn now to have a truce, while the power of Auſtria ſhould be exhauſted;—as Auſtria had formerly been allowed to breathe, while the full vengeance of France was let looſe againſt Great Britain:—and as when that experiment had been tried, Auſtria was ſpeedily forced back into the war—what right had we to flatter ourſelves that our repoſe would have been permitted to be more ſecure, or of longer continuance?

There remained another conſideration perſonal to the Firſt Conſul, which, with the hon. Gentleman's permiſſion, it was impoſſible to leave wholly out of the queſtion; and this was the ſtability of government; without which, it was plain, that there could be no ſecurity for any peace which we might conclude with him at the preſent moment. Upon this point it could not be neceſſary to ſay much. Every probability, every preſumption, was obviouſly againſt the permanence of a power, which reſted on none of the known and intelligible principles, on which a government had ever yet been ſupported:—a power poſſeſſed by republicans, which was built upon the wreck and ruins of every principle of freedom; a power profeſſing to emanate from the people, which no one claſs or deſcription of the people had either a ſhare in creating, or an intereſt in preſerving; a deſpotiſm without the ſanction of preſcription, or the mitigation of eſtabliſhed laws, or uſages, or manners; a military deſpotiſm propoſing to maintain itſelf by univerſal peace:—theſe were anomalies, which it became thoſe gentlemen to explain, and to reconcile to common underſtandings; to reconcile, if they could with paſt experience, or with any reaſonable theory, when they contended for the ſtability of the new government in France—or was there ſome high and myſterious principle of preſervation, ſuch as the vulgar and uninitiated could not comprehend, which would watch over the deſtinies of Bonaparte? was it, that owing his crown, as Macbeth was deſcribed to owe his, "to fate and metaphyſical aid;—it was expected that the "metaphyſical aid" of Sieyes, who had helped him to the crown, would be able, under all chances, to keep it ſafe upon his head? that there was ſome charm contrived by that "weird" abbé, which would baffle all combinations that "man of woman born could bring againſt him?"

But after exhauſting all the inducements to immediate peace, the hon. Gentleman had endeavoured to alarm the Houſe

Houſe by prophecies of the dangers and diſaſters to be expected from the proſecution of the war. On this point, as it was matter upon which much leſs conviction could be attained by argument, Mr. Canning ſaid he ſhould not detain the Houſe long. He would only obſerve in paſſing, that when among thoſe dangers the hon. Gentleman enumerated ſo confidently the deſertion of our allies, and when he inferred the almoſt certainty of this deſertion from a review of the paſt conduct of theſe powers, whom he had ſtigmatized with every opprobrious epithet that his imagination could ſuggeſt to him, he could not help being ſurprized, that the hon. Gentleman ſhould not have reflected, that ſuch a proceeding ſuited very ill with the recommendation which he had ſo often inculcated, in the courſe of his ſpeech, to take no retroſpect, and to abſtain from invective. He wondered that it did not occur to him, that if there was much danger of irritating the enemy by intemperate language in that Houſe, it was not wholly immaterial to conſider whether ſimilar language might not diſguſt our allies. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman thinking their dereliction of us ſo ſure, one time or other, ſaw no harm in quickening it; and would have us get rid of them as ſoon as we could. But this policy ſeemed to him to be a little queſtionable. If a general commanding an army compoſed of many different nations, were to be told, that at a certain period, a month hence perhaps, the ſeveral contingents of the different powers would be recalled; if he were told this when in preſence of the enemy; and if his informer were to add, that he adviſed him, therefore, inſtantly to diſband his forces himſelf, and to make what terms he could for his own ſafety:—the advice, it ſeemed to him, was not ſuch as the general would moſt prudently follow; he would rather conclude that no time therefore was to be loſt, no exertion ſpared, to make the utmoſt advantage of the combination of his whole force while it yet continued unbroken.

But with reſpect to the probability of ſuch an event as the hon. Gentleman foretold, and with reſpect to the dreadful diſgraces and calamities which were to follow it, he would not treſpaſs upon the patience of the houſe (eſpecially conſidering who were to follow him in the debate) by oppoſing his calculations and predictions to thoſe of the hon. Gentleman. It was ſufficient for the vote of that night, if government ſhould be allowed to have acted right under the actual circumſtances of the caſe. It would be indeed hazardous, to

foretell the ſucceſſes of the campaign. But it was ſome comfort to reflect, that the campaign which was juſt cloſed, though at it's cloſe not in every reſpect ſo triumphant as might have been wiſhed, and for a time expected, was yet, upon the whole, one of the moſt brilliant that hiſtory records; ſo much had been done in that campaign, that if any body at it's outſet had ventured to anticipate it's progreſs and concluſion, ſuch as they have in fact proved to be, he would have been conſidered as ſanguine almoſt to madneſs.—He for his part did not at preſent ſee in the ſtate either of France, or of the powers at war with her, any thing to warrant the tone of deſpondency, which the hon. Gentleman aſſumed; and to ſay the truth, when he recollected the many unfulfilled predictions of evil, which had come from the bench on which the hon. Gentleman ſat, he was not diſpoſed to be much caſt down by it. The laſt time that the tripod of prophecy had been brought into that houſe, he remembered (it was in the ſpring of 1797,) the houſe were ſolemnly warned that there was not "three weeks regular government" remaining to the country. That period was long paſt; and, God be thanked, the evils of anarchy had not yet fallen upon them. He doubted not that it was owing to our own exertions that we were yet ſafe; and if we were true to ourſelves, we had yet abundant means to provide for the continuance of our ſafety.

Mr. *Whitbread* explained.

Mr. *Erſkine* ſaid, that if Miniſters upon this occaſion were merely following up the meaſures which had been formerly ſanctioned by the Houſe, and were acting upon the ſame principles which had guided their proceedings at the former ſtages of the war, he ſhould have continued to abſent himſelf, conſcious, from repeated experience, that his attendance could be of no ſervice to his country. But a new æra had arrived; Miniſters would be more inexcuſeable in continuing the war now than at any former period. The purpoſe of their meeting that day ſeemed to be miſunderſtood. It was not to conſider whether we ſhould make peace, whether we ſhould forſake our allies, or whether we ſhould leap into the arms of France; but they were aſſembled to conſider of the propriety and prudence of the anſwers returned to the overtures from the French government. In his opinion they were impolitic in the extreme. We were now in the ninth year of the war, and after all the blood and treaſure which has been expended, we were equally diſtant from our object as when we commenced

commenced it. It had been ſaid by the right hon. Gentleman who moved the addreſs, that the principles of the revolution in its outſet, were dreadful to France herſelf, and fatal to all her neighbours, and that no change had ever taken place. The revolution was one, and till the monarchy was reſtored, we could not treat with ſafety. He would not juſtify the atrocities committed during the revolution, nor the principles on which it was conducted. Still he muſt ſay that France ought to have been treated with, as we could make nothing by continuing the conteſt. An hon. Friend of his, who once delighted and inſtructed that Houſe, had ſaid, on a former occaſion, that he did not applaud the American revolution; but what were they to do with it, what could be made by refuſing to negociate? At the ſame time he muſt ſay, that many, or moſt of the enormities, perpetrated by the French, were occaſioned by the conduct of England. It might have been expected that a nation, paſſing in a moment from the extreme of ſlavery to the extreme of freedom, ſhould be guilty of ſome irregularities. Had France, however, been left to herſelf, theſe would have been trifling. But England raiſed up a powerful coalition againſt her, and declared war without ſpecifying diſtinctly the reaſons for this ſtep. General pretenſions only were alledged, and theſe were always ſhifted, as exiſting circumſtances required. France thus ſaw we were determined on her deſtruction, and became fired with mutual animoſity. Had the grounds been aſſigned, on which we declared war and continued it, many of theſe evils might have been avoided. But when the National Convention ſent letters of credit to the French ambaſſador at our court, he was diſmiſſed with ignominy, and no ſpecific reaſons were ſtated for this raſh and violent procedure. Though the putting to death of the king was ever ſo criminal an action, and he thought that few actions could be more ſo, ſtill we had nothing to do with the internal affairs of a foreign country. But we had not mentioned even that as a cauſe for the diſmiſſal of the ambaſſador. Miniſters had plunged the country unneceſſarily into the war, and had taken effectual meaſures to prevent the return of peace. He had formerly requeſted them not to conſider the ſtate of France as incompatible with being in amity with England. It would have been happy if his advice had been liſtened to. Every time that an attempt had been made at negociation, the country found itſelf in more unfavourable circumſtances than when it had attempted it before; France was always

more formidable. The preſſure which we produced obliged her to make the greateſt exertions, and was the chief cauſe of her greatneſs. Afraid of being conquered herſelf, ſhe called into action all her energies, and made foreign countries the ſcenes of her conqueſts. Intoxicated with victory, ſhe imbibed a thirſt for dominion, and to gratify her ambition, was guilty of the greateſt exceſſes; but ſtill thoſe who originally combined againſt her, muſt be anſwerable for them all. What madneſs to perſiſt in this ſyſtem, which had already proved ſo fatal! But when Miniſters did not heſitate to treat in 1795, with what appearance of reaſon can they refuſe to treat now? The government then ſubſiſting had been but lately eſtabliſhed. It was infinitely more democratical in its conſtruction, and more dangerous in its principles than the preſent. France then poſſeſſed Belgium, Holland, and the greater part of Italy; we had, therefore, much more likewiſe to fear from her arms. Then this country was in danger from the deſigns of the diſſaffected at home, and a peace with France might have then added to their power. Now we have nothing to fear, either from French arms, or French principles, and we ſpurn at all offers of negociation. From the declaration publiſhed when Lord Malmeſbury left Liſle, Miniſters were bound to have liſtened to freſh overtures, had they been made ſoon after that event. The preſent opportunity was much more favourable, and they ſpurn the thought.

He had been told that Miniſters, in conſenting to negociate at that time, only yielded to the popular clamour, and themſelves thought that it would have been unfortunate for the country had a peace been concluded. If this was the caſe, he thought their conduct extremely reprehenſible. They ought to labour for the good of their country, without deviating from what they conceived to be the path of duty, to humour the opinion of any one. They would not be very earneſt in their endeavours however, or make any ſacrifice to procure peace, yet the incapacity of France to maintain the relations of peace and amity was never mentioned as the reaſon for breaking off the negociation; it was the refuſal of France to relinquiſh the poſſeſſion of the Netherlands. Our ſituation was, no doubt, improved ſince that period. He contemplated with pleaſure the growing proſperity of the country, and he would make every ſacrifice to maintain its independence. But let not Miniſters, on account of our improved ſituation, refuſe to treat with ſuch a man as Bonaparte.

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He would not attempt to defend every part of his conduct, but all men had their imperfections; and were peace never to be concluded but when the governments of countries were conducted by men of integrity and diſintereſtedneſs, War, he feared, would be eternal. They muſt not wait till they found a Waſhington in France, whoſe only object was the good of his country and of human kind: every thing called aloud for them to treat. Thoſe even muſt be of that opinion who formerly thought that the war was juſt and neceſſary. The Houſe might now addreſs his Majeſty, praying him to take meaſures for procuring a ſpeedy peace, in perfect conſiſtence with their former votes. The tide of fortune might again turn, and we might have our reverſes as France has had her's. This opportunity was by no means to be neglected. He ſaw no weight in the arguments drawn from the precarioufneſs of Bonaparte's authority. Whatever might be the fate of it, ſuch another opportunity would never recur. If his power was conſolidated, he would reſent the inſults he had received from us, and perſevere in hoſtility. If his authority ſhould not be permanent it muſt be overturned, either by a new revolution at home, or by the reſtoration of the Bourbons. The party which would ſucceed him would certainly be the violent Jacobins, who have ever borne the moſt mortal antipathy to England, and who, from their principles and zeal, would be truly dangerous to us. France would then be exactly in the ſame ſtate in which ſhe was in 1793.

That the Bourbons will be reſtored is an event barely poſſible, and could we by making this a *ſine qua non* of a peace, put it off to an incalculable diſtance; if the Bourbon family were reſtored, all the prieſts and nobles muſt be reinſtated in their privileges, and the whole body of emigrants muſt recover their eſtates. Would the nation ever ſubmit to ſuch things? Every man in it muſt have an intereſt in preventing them. The idea of loſing the property in the Stocks would have a powerful effect in preventing a revolution in this country, many more in France had an intereſt in the confiſcated eſtates. Nothing but force can ever re-eſtabliſh the Bourbons on the throne of their anceſtors, and nothing but force can maintain them upon it. If their authority ſhould be confirmed, they would probably ſoon forget their obligations to us, and plot as formerly for our ruin. But it was probable that Bonaparte would retain his authority. He will make peace with the Chouans, and increaſe the power of the State. Nothing could juſtify the illiberal abuſe with which Miniſters

Miniſters had treated him: it was inconſiſtent with their dignity, and it could ſerve no end, for Bonaparte would only ſmile when he heard of the ſquibs which were thrown at him from the Treaſury Bench. He would conclude by ſaying, that he thought the anſwers returned to the overtures of the French government moſt improper. Had France behaved ſo to us, he would have ſupported the war with his whole ſoul, and would have voted his laſt ſhilling to carry it on. Peace would be advantageous to France, but not more ſo than to England; both were exhauſted, and repoſe was neceſſary to both. By perſevering in the conteſt we ſhould ſquander away millions of money and thouſands of lives, and would probably be in a more unfavourable ſituation for treating than at the preſent moment. When we began a new negociation, we had uniformly been in more adverſe circumſtances than when we left off the preceding.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then roſe, and ſaid, after the ample diſcuſſion which the ſubject has received from my honourable Friends who have already ſpoken, I ſhould not have preſented myſelf to the Houſe at this ſtage of the debate, did not ſome of the grounds upon which the learned Gentleman, who has juſt ſat down, enlarged, called for animadverſion, and the facts which he has ſtated required to be corrected. The queſtion before you appears to me to involve this great conſideration, whether the evils which the French revolution has occaſioned, and which its principle ſtill threatens to produce, are of a nature ſo uncontroulable by any human efforts, that we ought to ſubmit to their infliction without a ſtruggle, and acquieſce in their miſchiefs without a murmur? To me it ſeems impoſſible, in a juſt view of the ſubject, to ſeparate the diſcuſſion of thoſe meaſures in which the Houſe is now to pronounce, from the preceding events, and from the uniform character of the French revolution. The learned Gentleman, however, profeſſing not to juſtify the preceding occurrences of that terrible event, has endeavoured to disjoin them totally from the war in which we are engaged. In ſhewing cauſe upon theſe points, however, he has done little elſe then retail thoſe topics ſo long and ſo frequently repeated in the ſpeeches of the oppoſition within doors, or in the writings of their publiſhers without; he has even thought proper again to bring forward thoſe arguments already circulated in thirty editions of a pamphlet to which the learned Gentleman has given his name. Thoſe who with him contend that we ought to have liſtened to the

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overtures which have been received from the enemy, who are of opinion that it would have been conſiſtent with the ſafety of this country to have accepted the propoſal to treat, can defend their ſentiments only upon the ground that the revolution, either as it does exiſt, or as it has exiſted, contains no principles and no danger that could have rendered negociation either ineffectual in the attempt, or peace inſecure, or pernicious in the attainment; or they muſt contend, that the change which has lately taken place in the men, in the meaſures, and the inſtitutions of France, has given that proſpect of ſafety, of ſtability, and of permanence, which did not previouſly exiſt; or they muſt ſhew, that from the preſſure by which we are ſurrounded, and the difficulties under which we labour, it would be better to have recourſe even to an inadequate and inſecure pacification, than ſubmit to the burdens which the continuance of the war muſt occaſion, and expoſe ourſelves to the riſk with which it muſt be attended. In conſidering theſe queſtions, I ſhall forbear as much as poſſible from treſpaſſing on the patience of the Houſe. But when I hear the original cauſes of the war again called into diſpute, when I hear the learned Gentleman again giving the ſanction of his authority to the opinion that the conteſt is to be aſcribed to the diſmiſſal of M. Chauvelin by the Britiſh government, I cannot help ſaying a few words upon theſe topics, and adding additional illuſtrations reſpecting miſrepreſentations already ſo often overthrown, and arguments ſo often refuted.

Here, Sir, I cannot help obſerving in the ſtatements of the learned Gentleman, that inaccuracy with regard to date, which ſeems incident to ſo many great geniuſes in their ſpeeches, pamphlets, or notes on this ſubject. The anſwer of Talleyrand himſelf (and he ought to have known better) was as defective in this particular as if he had actually truſted for his information to the learned Gentleman's pamphlet. The Houſe, no doubt, will pay attention to the ſhort deſcription given of the character and practice of revolutionary France, as given in the laſt official note of the French Miniſter of Foreign Affairs. This is no leſs than the "reſpect for independent powers, and the diſavowal of conqueſt, with which the revolution announced itſelf to the world." If however this deſcription is the very reverſe of the truth, if under ſuch a character the revolution is no longer to be recogniſed, the learned Gentleman and his copyiſt, the Miniſter of Foreign Affairs, diſcover that the oppoſite conduct which

which France purſued aroſe from the provocation which ſhe received, and from the leagues formed againſt her independence and her integrity; M. Chauvelin was ordered to quit this country; and this inſult was, in their opinion, the true cauſe of the war, and the whole train of perfidious ambition and inſatiable conqueſt by which France has been diſtinguiſhed. Unfortunately for the accuracy of the learned Gentleman, however, far from producing the war which was ſo inconſiſtent with the principles which France profeſſed, it muſt be remembered that the war on the continent had exiſted eight months before that event took place. I am aware that my obſervations upon theſe points of the documents before the Houſe, and the ſtatements of the honourable Gentleman, are thrown together without ſufficiently diſtinguiſhing them one from the other; but it muſt be recollected that I am commenting on the grounds laid down both by the military leader in the correſpondence, and the learned leader in the cauſe. Indeed, upon a compariſon of dates, I am not a little ſurpriſed how it could ever have been advanced that the diſmiſſal of Chauvelin was the cauſe of the war, much leſs thoſe extenſive conſequences aſcribed to it, and I am happy in having an opportunity of diſcuſſing the queſtion *tete-a-tete* with the learned Gentleman. It is neceſſary, then, that I ſhould recall to the Houſe the circumſtances of the caſe. Previous to that event the aggreſſions againſt this country were manifold: they had been made the ſubject of diſcuſſion. The points contained in it were at that period brought to an ultimatum on the part of France, which, if unſatisfactory to the government of this country, was tantamount to a declaration of war. At the moment when things were in this ſituation, the communications between the government and that of France was interrupted by that atrocious murder and regicide, which at the time produced ſuch univerſal horror, and now cannot be recalled without indignation and regret. Yet, ſorry was I to obſerve, that in alluſion to this event, the learned Gentleman referred to it the commencement of what he ſtyled legal government in France. Yet at a moment when, by ſo cruel and bloody a deed, the rulers of France had ſeparated her from all direct intercourſe with this country, at a time when they had given cauſe of complaint, and refuſed ſatisfaction, they demanded that we ſhould admit the new credentials of the perſon who had been inveſted with them by Louis XVI. and been acknowledged as the Miniſter of a lawful ſovereign. In this ſituation,

with

with grievances unredreſſed, and aggreſſions unſatisfied, the government of this country receive credentials from a perſon who had ceaſed to hold a public character, and who could have appeared only as the repreſentative of men who had already committed acts that would have juſtified hoſtilities.

M. Chauvelin then was only a private individual in this country; at a moment, then, when the peace and tranquillity of this country were threatened by the malignant arts of the emiſſaries of the Jacobin rulers, at a time when the legiſlature had paſſed an alien act to veſt his Majeſty with additional means of taking precaution for the public ſafety, M. Chauvelin was required to quit the kingdom. In ſuch circumſtances his preſence was of no uſe for any purpoſe of intercourſe, and his diſmiſſal was required by ſtrong motives of public intereſt.

It is proper, too, that it ſhould be known that the French *ultimatum* already alluded to, contained a direct threat againſt an ally of this country, a threat indeed which, as appeared afterwards, orders had been given to put in execution. It inſiſted on the opening of the Scheldt, a circumſtance which then was, in point of fact, but of little importance to this country, but which in principle carried with it a direct attempt to overthrow that ſyſtem of public law which had hitherto prevailed in Europe. It was a pretenſion indeed ſimilar to that which enabled the French to diſcover that the Rhine and the Alps were the natural boundaries of France. Another circumſtance too then clearly proved the deſigns of the enemy againſt Holland, and it was the order publiſhed for their troops to follow the Auſtrians into any neutral country. At this very time too, with their declaration againſt the independence of nations ſo recent, and their averſion to conqueſt ſo new, they meditated the annexation of Belgium to France, which, under the pretence of liberty, they ſoon effected. With all theſe aggreſſions, with all their diſlike to conqueſt, was Belgium wreſted from the Emperor, and Savoy from the King of Sardinia. They declared war againſt this country, and that in terms of inſult and menace to the exiſtence of all thrones, and the government of all States, as to confirm and to augment every exiſting cauſe of difference. They declared their determination to aſſiſt every nation deſirous of regaining its freedom. They had ſhewn what they thought that freedom was by the atrocious murder of their ſovereign. They had applied the menace to England by openly encouraging the addreſſes and the correſpon-

dence of thoſe ſeditious bodies who favoured the principles, who imitated the forms of regenerated France, who anticipated the ſucceſs of ſimilar attempts, who hailed the auſpicious proceedings of Frenchmen reeking with the blood of their murdered king, and exulted at the proſpect of correſponding with a regicide convention from their own national aſſembly. In ſuch circumſtances, then, how could the government of England, already ſo much aggrieved, proceed? How could they accede to an *ultimatum* full of extravagant pretenſions, of inſulting menaces, and of inſidious reſervations? The claims of juſtice were unſatisfied, and amidſt ſo much to excite alarm and apprehenſion, the explanations required of the exceptionable parts of the declarations of the French government only developed more dangerous principles, and more injurious claims.

But this was not all; after the famous decree of the 19th November, a declaration of hoſtility againſt every eſtabliſhment, the explanations given it by a ſubſequent decree was ſtill more intolerable in its principles and its objects. The French government paſſed another decree that muſt be effaced from the minds of thoſe who doubt whether the cauſe of war was ſubſequent to its exiſtence. This decree required every General, commanding the French armies, to overthrow, wherever he went, every ancient eſtabliſhment, and new model the country according to the democratic faſhion of France. Was not this a condemnation to revolutionary wretchedneſs, pronounced againſt every ſtate with which France was at war. How was this explained? How did this principle operate in practice? We have ſeen that this republic has been at war with every nation in Europe but two, and with ſome out of Europe; we have ſeen theſe declarations and decrees faithfully followed up. We have ſeen what ſeemed the very madneſs of Jacobiniſm methodiſed; and the frantic principles of devaſtation and diſorder reduced to the form of buſineſs with a minute exactneſs; this revolutionary code, this antiſocial principle, has never been a moment ſuſpended. In all the changes, in all the ſucceſſive parties, amidſt every contradiction, every inconſiſtency, this alone has continued to be practiſed with unrelenting rigour, to be enforced with unalterable perſeverance. This and this alone was the permanent policy of the revolution; it went on in the proſecution of it, undeviating and unchangeable. A ſchedule was drawn up, with the blank formula of an addreſs to every nation, announcing the arrival of the republican legions;

legions; and theſe inſtruments of ſedition and anarchy were the inſeparable attendants of the republican arms. To thoſe nations who ſhould be ſo brutiſh, ſo dull as to adhere to their religion, to their laws, to their ancient rulers, was denounced the threat of the exerciſe of every right of conqueſt. Such is the love of peace, ſo exemplified in univerſal war, and the reſpect for the independence of other nations, demonſtrated by the practice of univerſal overthrow.

But even when Chauvelin was ordered to quit this country, there was a door left open for diſcuſſion; but inſtead of any ſincere endeavours to give effect to the alternative, the declaration of war proceeded from France, and yet there are thoſe in this country who join with the enemy in imputing to us the guilt of aggreſſion? But it is ſaid that the government of this country ſecretly favoured the plans that were in agitation againſt the independence of France. But where is the evidence? On the contrary, does not the evidence of dates, the confeſſion of every party in France from Briſſot to Boulay de la Meurthe, agree in acquitting England. I ſpeak not of the treaties of Pavia, and the declaration of Pilnitz. The firſt is undoubtedly ſpurious, and the ſecond declared only the ſentiments of Pruſſia and Auſtria, reſpecting the impriſonment of the King of France, and never had any conſequence. Even Talleyrand himſelf recognized the neutrality of this country when he was the bearer of a diſpatch in which the King of England was thanked for his neutrality. Every fact, every date, every document, proved, that whatever deſigns of hoſtility were meditated by the King of Sweden, or others, againſt France, this country never encouraged or promoted ſuch views. On the contrary, the reduction of the forces of this country in 1791, and during the greater part of 1792, proved that we had fallen into a ſecurity which wiſdom would not perhaps juſtify, that, ſincerely attached ourſelves to the pacific ſyſtem, we had too blindly relied upon ſimilar diſpoſitions in the French government. Our conduct was directly the reverſe of that which men, deſirous to find a pretext for war, would have purſued. During the courſe of 1791 we had no connexion with the emperor. With Pruſſia we had communication, and our invariable language was to avoid any interference with the affairs of France; and I will ſtate it with confidence, that no Foreign Miniſter of this country was authoriſed to make any overtures reſpecting a coalition till after the battle of Jemappe. If we had judged rightly of the revolution, had we diſcovered in it the germ

and principle of thoſe miſchiefs with which it was pregnant, and which have ſince been developed, we ſhould have been juſtified in a different line of conduct. At the time alluded to, however, a communication was made by Lord Grenville to the cabinet of Pruſſia reſpecting the affairs in France, in which it was recommended to endeavour to obtain ſatisfaction for the injurious conduct and declarations of France by amicable diſcuſſion, and if this failed, information was aſked reſpecting the number of forces that might be employed if things ſhould come to extremities. A general concert and explanation was propoſed among the different powers, not for war, but for peace; not for attack, but for negociation, and nothing was required but a repeal of the decrees that ſtruck at every eſtabliſhed government, and a ſecurity for that reſpect towards their independence which other nations had a right to expect. If ſuch propoſitions were not accepted, the powers were to conſider themſelves at liberty to take meaſures for their ſecurity, and to procure indemnity for the ſacrifices they might be compelled to make. Far from proving a deep-rooted hoſtility, this document inconteſtibly demonſtrates a diſpoſition too ſlow to preſume againſt the French revolution the evil with which it was fraught; a diſpoſition not to apprehend without cauſe, but to truſt beyond meaſure; a conduct in which it would be more difficult to defend the exceſſive caution, than to accuſe the forward jealouſy. Miniſters had not then diſcovered the character of the miſchief that threatened Europe. They had not yet found that no courſe but open hoſtility remained to oppoſe the pretenſions of a revolutionary principle, no leſs dangerous from the malignity of its nature than the power with which it was inveſted.

The principle, however, has ſince been but too fatally diſplayed in the practice. Experience has written its character in blood. Neutral powers have been as little protected from its violence as open foes, and perhaps the extent of its fatal operation might have been incalculable, had not this country, with a courage and magnanimity that muſt be recorded to its eternal honour, refuſe to make that compromiſe with the republic which has ſubjected ſo many other nations to ruin and diſgrace. Happy for the cauſe of Europe, and the cauſe of ſociety, that this country oppoſed itſelf a barrier to the enormous ambition, and to the diſaſtrous principles of the republic. Though prefering peace, this government never ſunk to humiliation; never ſought refuge in diſhonour-

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able ſubmiſſion, from a ſyſtem that cannot exiſt with ſafety to other powers, till its principle be extinguiſhed, or its ſtrength comparatively exhauſted.

That France was guilty of the aggreſſion at the beginning of the conteſt, is proved beyond a doubt by a recurrence to dates, and by a review of facts. Can any man forget the deteſtable perfidious machinations which were employed to give a pretext for the ſeizure of Avignon, the territory of the Holy See, the conqueſt of Savoy without the leaſt ſhew of foundation. The war againſt Pruſſia and Auſtria, I contend, were undoubted aggreſſions, as the latter took up arms to ſupport the rights of the princes of the empire, violated by the proceedings of the French in Alſace and Lorraine. Even in theſe caſes amicable diſcuſſion might have removed all grounds of complaint; but war was determined by the Jacobins of France, and the violence of their mobs was employed to defeat all attempts of accommodation, and to render war inevitable.

In the aggreſſion upon Savoy, not a pretext was alledged, but that monſtrous principle which France had made a fundamental part of her new ſyſtem of the law of nature and nations; the declaration that the Rhine and the Alps were the natural boundaries of France. To what extravagant pretenſions the ſyſtem of incorporations led, we ourſelves have experienced. Review the various caſes in which the republic has gone to war, Holland, Spain, Portugal, in every one will be found the characters of her uniform yet various aggreſſion.

But it is ſaid that France was obliged to employ her defenſive means in every direction, and this is alledged in juſtification of her conqueſts and her ravages. How does this correſpond with the fact? When the firſt negociation was attempted by this country, the atrocities of which Italy afterwards became the ſcene, were not begun; Sardinia was not yet ſubjugated; the vaſſal republics were not yet in being. What compelled her then to ſpread her ravages, when peace was offered? What ground had ſhe for pillaging and ruining Venice on pretence of liberty, and afterwards throw her into the hands of Auſtria? I do not juſtify the conduct of Auſtria in that inſtance, but can Auſtria, ſinking under the force of France, be conſidered as criminal in having accepted Venice as a compenſation for what ſhe had loſt; be conſidered as criminal as France, that plundered Venice by every exaction, deluded her by the pretext of liberty, and then betrayed her

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to that power from whom ſhe pretended to have reſcued that ancient republic? Happy for Venice was it, however, that ſhe had thus eſcaped from the infernal embraces of French fraternity, to be placed under what is called the deſpotic government of Vienna.

I am glad that facts ſo ſtrongly teſtify the falſehood of the apology that France, in her own defence, was forced to be the univerſal aggreſſor. She had no pretext for employing the plea that, becauſe attacked on one ſide, ſhe was entitled to indemnify herſelf by ſeizing without diſtinction on the territories that lay moſt tempting to her, without the ſhadow of a right. The learned Gentleman who gave his ſanction to this doctrine ſhould take the trouble again to conſult the law of nature and of nations. For my part I demur to the plea of the learned Gentleman. [*Mr. Erſkine ſaid he had advanced no ſuch doctrine.*] Sir, I am ſure I heard him ſay ſo: I am happy, then, that the learned Gentleman gives me his authority on this ſubject. Review the negociations at Paris and Liſle, and it will be found that, without the leaſt excuſe in foreign preſſure, all the atrocities in Italy were committed; and in all their perfidies, maſſacres, breaches of treaty, and enormities of every deſcription, are directly connected with the name of that Bonaparte who is now held out to us as the ſecurity of peace. What ſhall we ſay to the invaſion of Switzerland; by what preſſure was that frightful tragedy produced; what neceſſity palliates that blackeſt of perfidies that ever ambition committed? What ſhall we ſay when we find that innocent and virtuous people, deluded by an armiſtice, periſh the victims of their unrelenting uſurpers? What ſhall we ſay of military execution let looſe upon a country, above all others, cheriſhed and beloved by every nation in Europe; a country the ſteady ally of France, exempt by the general conſent of princes and ſtates from the claſh of contending intereſts, and the ſhock of ſurrounding war; this land of Goſhen, this aſylum to the unfortunate of every other ſtate, was attacked, and doomed to miſery, when no plea whatever could be urged to colour the treachery? If this ſpirit therefore has been ſyſtematic in its character; if it has been inceſſant in its operation; if it has never been humbled in adverſity, nor ſoothed in proſperity; if, in all circumſtances, and in every fortune, it has uniformly purſued the ſame deteſted courſe, ought it to be charged upon others, or is there ſomething in it which denotes a radical principle, and a neceſſary operation?

Conſider

Conſider too the unprovoked aggreſſions of France to America, review the perfidy of the whole tranſaction, the ſhameleſs corruption, of which this affair exhibited ſo memorable a ſcene. Conſider the invaſion of Egypt, and the capture of Malta, as if this little iſland had been deſtined to ſhow that nothing was too minute for the all-ſearching eye of French republicans for plunder. Reflect upon the falſe pretences which Bonaparte aſſigned for that expedition, ſo glorioufly defeated by the victory at Aboukir, and the animating valour of our troops at Acre. See Bonaparte correſponding with the enemies of this country in the Eaſt, and emiſſaries ſent forth to jacobiniſe the dominions of Tippoo Sultan; and Jacobin clubs vowing hatred to all kings, except Citizen Tippoo, the ally of the French republic at Seringapatam, what Bonaparte was ſpeedily to become at Paris, a military uſurper.

He ſhowed that the whole ſyſtem of the revolution was aggrandiſement and overthrow with regard to other powers; of miſery and diſtraction to France herſelf. That conqueſt abroad was attended by prodigality, confiſcation, and plunder at home; that, from the beginning, there was nothing that could bribe the rapacity, that could ſoothe the violence, that could content the ambition of this monſter. The republic, diſciplined and inſtructed upon the maxims iſſued from the Jacobin cells, marched out, ſpreading deſtruction. He ſtated that, in all the changes in France, none of the new governments had obtained any thing like permanence; nothing to afford ſecurity. The late change was in every reſpect as little calculated for ſtability; a military uſurpation, and nothing in the character of Bonaparte but what was deceitful, cruel, perfidious. How could his government expect permanence? To republicans, to jacobins, to royaliſts, he muſt equally be deteſtable. He could not be ſincere in his deſire of a general peace, for how could he truſt himſelf without that ſole ſupport on which he relied. After going over all the topics already urged by Mr. Dundas, which he illuſtrated with great force and eloquence, the Chancellor of the Exchequer concluded with giving his ſupport to the addreſs.

Mr. *Fox* then roſe, and ſaid, Sir, I am ſure you will do me the credit to believe that, at this late hour, (between two and three o'clock) exhauſted as the patience and attention of the Houſe muſt be, nothing but a deep ſenſe of my duty could have induced me to have troubled you upon this occaſion.

Sir, my hon. Friend ſtated, and ſtated truly, that we had arrived at a new æra of the war; and I would aſk the right hon.

hon. Gentleman himſelf, whether by the time he has beſtowed in anſwering my hon. Friend, by the pains he has taken to travel back to the origin of the war, and by the manner in which he has touched upon all the topics that have been introduced ſince the war, I ſay, I would aſk the right hon. Gentleman himſelf, whether he does not conſider this as a new æra?

Sir, in this the ſeventh year of the moſt burthenſome war in which this or any nation ever was engaged, a new æra is propoſed, upon ideas which have ſo often been held out to us; upon calculations which have ſo frequently miſled us; upon a knowledge of human nature and common ſenſe on which expeditions have been undertaken and have failed; and upon notions of the ſuppoſed ruin of the finances and reſources of the enemy, with which the Houſe have ſo often been deceived.

Gracious God, Sir! Is it leſs than five years ago that we were told, that France was in the jaws of ruin? That we were aſſured ſhe was:—What? Not in the jaws of ruin alone, but in the very gulph of bankruptcy? That ſhe was in ſuch a ſituation, that nothing but making peace with her could enable her to moleſt this country? Upon theſe predictions and aſſurances have we gone on from year to year, and now, at the end of the ſeventh year, we are gravely deſired not only to renew the war, but that no man may be able to ſee an end of it, principles are laid down upon which it may be carried on to all eternity!

Sir, his Majeſty's Miniſters, when they entered into the negociation at Liſle, directed Lord Malmeſbury to ſay, that recriminating reproaches did not evince a ſincere deſire for the reſtoration of peace. I have the authority of Miniſters for ſaying, that being a friend to peace with, I believe, a real majority of this Houſe, and a much larger majority of the nation, I ſhould think it my duty to abſtain from all recriminations. The right hon. Gentleman has thought it neceſſary to enter into the whole charge relative to the war; I certainly ſhall not follow him; but I will ſtate to the Houſe fairly and openly, what my opinion of the war has always been—that it was a war of aggreſſion againſt France.

Sir, that Auſtria and Pruſſia were the aggreſſors, does any one now entertain a doubt? Have not all the perſons who were in the confidence of the unfortunate Louis XVI. proved, that between him and Auſtria there was an intimate connection and correſpondence? Do I ſay that there was a treaty

treaty entered into for diſmembering France? No; but though a treaty of Pavia had no exiſtence, does the right hon. Gentleman deny the authenticity of the declaration aſſerted by M. Bertrand de Milleville to have been entered into at Mantua? Does not that declaration expreſs a wiſh of interfering in the internal concerns of France, with a great army? But there was no treaty, and becauſe there was not, we are deſired to believe there was nothing.

Sir, the beſt way for all of us to conſider the ſubject, is to put it to the boſoms of men what was the declaration which was entered into by Auſtria and Pruſſia at Pilnitz? That they would not interfere till they could perſuade other powers to join them. Now, I would aſk any man in the Houſe whether, if two powers were to declare that they were not ready then, but that they would wait till they could unite all the powers, for the purpoſe of interfering in the internal concerns of Great Britain; I would, I ſay, aſk any man whether he would not conſider that as an act of aggreſſion? But the caſe with reſpect to Great Britain is different—True, Sir; and yet, after all the acts which the right hon. Gentleman has enumerated, there is only one upon which I think much ſtreſs is to be laid—the decree of the 19th of November; a decree which, if conſtrued literally, the right hon. Gentleman ſays, amounted to a declaration of war againſt all the nations of Europe. M. Chauvelin gives an explanation of that decree, and of the tranſaction relative to the navigation of the Scheldt. But that explanation the right hon. Gentleman contends was not a ſatisfactory one.—It might be ſo: and yet I muſt here obſerve, that when the French ambaſſador was diſmiſſed, this unſatisfactory explanation was not ſtated as the ground of his diſmiſſal, but the murder of Louis XVI.

But ſuppoſing the explanation offered not to have been a ſatisfactory one, is it, I ſay, to be aſſerted, that that is to exclude all other explanations? If the explanation offered by M. Chauvelin was inſufficient, why did you not ſay ſo? Did you hold out any ground upon which peace could be preſerved? The navigation of the Scheldt was one of the alleged cauſes of the war. Did you ſay ſo? Did you put it in the power of France to enter into an explanation upon that ſubject?

The right hon. Gentleman has this day read a very important paper, which was never produced before, and of the exiſtence of which I was totally ignorant; I mean the

inſtructions tranſmitted to our Miniſter at the court of Peterſburgh. Of the temper and nature of theſe inſtructions I completely approve: yet I cannot help remarking, that the right hon. Gentleman, ſo far from taking any credit to himſelf for them, but ſeems rather to conſider them as affording matter for cenſure.

'. Quod ſolum excuſat, hoc ſolum miror il illo.

I think the compoſition of that paper excellent, the directions conveyed in it wiſe, and the only thing I regret is, that it never was acted on. The nature of the paper I underſtand to be this; we propoſed to join to prevent a general war, we propoſed terms of peace. Now I would put it to any man, if that communication had been made to Paris as well as Ruſſia, he does not think it would have been productive of ſubſtantial good? I have already ſaid, that I think not only the thoughts, the theory, and the words of that paper to be good, but that the deed was commendable. Acted upon, however, as it was, I can compare it only to the Eaſt India diſpatches. We read them, and every thing appears to be wiſe and juſt; yet the conduct is the very reverſe. How the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues could ſend ſuch a paper, while they were acting ſo oppoſite a part, while they were inſulting M. Chauvelin, by diſmiſſing him, I am utterly at a loſs to gueſs. But France then declared war againſt us. Was the ſending away M. Chauvelin a declaration of war? I know, if I look at books upon the ſubject, I muſt anſwer in the negative; but in this caſe a treaty of commerce exiſted between the two countries. That treaty ſpecified what circumſtances ſhould attend a ceſſation of the intercourſe between them. It ſays—"we ſhall conſider the ſending away the Miniſter of Great Britain from Paris, or the Miniſter of France from London, as a declaration of war." And here let me accuſe the right hon. Gentleman, in his own language, of being over pacific.

If France was really the aggreſſor, how comes it that Pruſſia was never called upon as ſhe might have been? Why Sir, becauſe it was known that on the part of Pruſſia and Auſtria it was the moſt foul and wicked aggreſſion, and is to be ſet againſt any of the external enormities of France.

Of the tranſactions of that period I ſhall not enter into a retroſpective view; but let any gentleman look back, and he will ſee in Auſtria a moſt fixed and hoſtile diſpoſition. Did not ſhe ſtate to the French Miniſter at Paris, not her

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fears of the external aggreſſions of France, but of the clubs and ſocieties at Paris?

Sir, I beg to have it underſtood once for all, that though I am ſtating the inſtances in which France has been falſely accuſed, I am not the defender of the external or internal politics of the French revolution. Their politics was certainly bad. But what does the guilt of France amount to? That ſhe has adopted the politics of the Houſe of Bourbon; that ſhe has faithfully imitated the ambitious principles of the Bourbon family; that ſhe has trod in the ſteps of Louis XIV.

It may be ſaid that this was a long while ago; that Louis XIV. has been many years dead. But has the operation of his principles ceaſed in France for any period ſince his death, except during the adminiſtration of Cardinal Richelieu? My complaint therefore againſt the republic is, that ſhe has cloſely imitated Louis XIV.

We complain not only of the conqueſts of France, but of her making new governments for the countries ſhe has conquered. What was the caſe of Louis XIV.? Have we forgotten that in every territory, in every city he conquered, he eſtabliſhed chambers of claims, to aſcertain what claims that territory, or that city, had upon any other part of Europe.

He went to war with the republic of Holland; the republic had not treated him in a manner conſiſtent with his dignity: that might be a good cauſe of war. He went to war with Spain. As a ſhort exception to the policy of Charles II. he declared war, and formed the triple alliance againſt France, one of the wiſeſt meaſures that ever was adopted. But what did the powers at war do? They did not ſpare Louis XIV.; they called him a monſter of injuſtice.

It was propoſed to force him to reſtore all his conqueſts. What was the language of that great ſtateſman, one of the greateſt that ever lived, De Wit? He ſaid, "No—if you had united, and could have prevented theſe conqueſts, it would have been well; but when the war has been carried on for ſome time, peace muſt be made, not with reference to the origin of war, but to what may be fairly exacted?"

Now, Sir, I maintain this ſhould have been the policy of Ruſſia and this country to France. When the Republic had been attacked by Auſtria and Pruſſia, and had gained ſome advantages; though ſhe had taken Savoy upon ſuch unjuſt, frivolous, and Bourbon-like pretences: I ſay, after ſhe had gained ſome advantages, ſhe ought to have had a compenſa-

tion allowed her, and it ſhould have been firmly ſaid to her, beyond that we will not go. Of the tranſactions reſpecting the capture of Savoy, the right hon. Gentleman has better information than I can have; it was certainly a moſt Bourbon-like act.

Our great hiſtorian, Hume, who is a philoſophical writer, and in many reſpects to be relied on, has an affection, almoſt amounting to childiſhneſs, for princes; he ſpeaks of Louis XIV. in terms more favourable than almoſt any other hiſtorian: but he ſays of that monarch, "he was unfortunate in this, that though he managed his enterprizes with great ſkill, and conducted his plans with great abilities, yet he was unfortunate in never having but one fair pretence for war."

In her ſeizure of Savoy, France had made uſe of the words *convenances morales et phyſiques*, a moſt Bourbon-like phraſe. Did not the Miniſter from Savoy proteſt againſt the act? Yet was there any ſtir here about it? All theſe things were done before 1792; but there was then a moſt decided neutrality in this country, though many of the horrors complained of had been committed, and the king had been during that time kept as a priſoner. But for this neutrality, which made many parts of Europe conſider them as friendly even to the French, I give Miniſters no praiſe. They ſhould have ſaid to France, we do not believe your aſſertion of hatred for foreign conqueſt. You are Frenchmen, and you cannot ſo ſoon have thrown off the Bourbon principles. But we will tell you what we ſhall conſider as an attack upon the balance and ſecurity of Europe. That is the part they ſhould have acted; inſtead of which what did they do? They hung back and did nothing. They did not like M. Chauvelin's explanation, yet they would not receive any other; and when the queſtion of peace or war was to be decided, they would not tell upon what conditions they would make peace, nor what they conſidered to be the aggreſſion.

There is one ſubject which has been ſo much relied upon, that I hope the Houſe will allow me to ſay a word or two upon it; I mean the ſubject of religion. It is not one which I have particularly ſtudied; but if I know any thing at all of it, it is, that he that makes the New Teſtament the rule of his conduct, will not find, in any part of it, religion to be a juſtifiable cauſe of war.

Sir, with reſpect to other countries, it has been ſaid that France has behaved in a manner diſguſting to every part of Europe. True; but to fill up the catalogue, many inſtances might

might have been produced not quite ſo culpable in their nature. The King of Sardinia, when the firſt attack was made upon him, was he not actually a belligerent power, receiving a ſubſidy from Great Britain? Into other inſtances of the injuſtice of France I will not enter—I allow them. But I have ſomewhere read in Sir Walter Raleigh's Hiſtory of the World, that there was once between two nations a dreadful battle, from which no one eſcaped alive; for both ſides uſed none but offenſive weapons.

Now, if the nations of Europe chuſe the war of recriminations; if they uſe none but offenſive weapons, where ſhall be found the ſhield of protection and defence? Ruſſia ſeized Poland. Now, if it is material to know the character of a power with which you are merely about to treat, it is much more material to know the character of an ally with whom you are about to enter into the cloſeſt connection. Sir, let me aſk what in the conduct of the French to foreign powers has exceeded the conduct of Auſtria, Ruſſia, and Pruſſia, to Poland? But the hon. Gentlemen ſays we regretted the partition of that country. True, you did regret it; but that is all you did. You regretted the act, yet you united with the actors; but with thoſe who have committed crimes, not more enormous, you cannot conſent to be upon terms even of common amity. But though Poland was conquered, the manner of doing it was merciful and mild! The hero was as much ſuperior to Bonaparte in fortune and in talents, as in virtue and humanity! Warſaw, and the inhabitants of the ſuburb of Praga! This magnanimous hero, ſuppoſed even to have a bigotted attachment to religion; he enters the ſuburb of Praga, the larger part of Warſaw; he gives it up to the pillage of his ſoldiers; no rank, no age, no ſex is ſpared; men, women, and children ſucking at the breaſt, all mercileſsly murdered!!! And for what? Becauſe they had dared to join in a wiſh to improve that conſtitution, which had been confeſſed to ſtand ſo much in need of it. But I do not mean to contend, that becauſe of the conduct of Ruſſia towards Poland, we ought never to make peace with her? No, Sir; but that we ought not to enter into an alliance with her.

The right hon. Gentleman next ſpoke of Switzerland; of that country to which every man feels a kind of native attachment: but the right hon. Gentleman goes further, and views her as a country reſpected for her love of peace. Yet, who, I would aſk, propoſed to her firſt to abandon that pa-

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cific principle? A noble relation of mine, Lord Robert Fitzgerald, in a note tranſmitted to the Canton of Berne, ſtates, that neutrality, under the preſent circumſtances, is highly criminal. But was this mode of conduct adopted only to Switzerland? What was our language to Tuſcany and Genoa? An honourable Gentleman informs us, that the note to the Grand Duke is all a fable, a mere fabrication. But did not Lord Hervey ſay that neutrality was not to be endured? He went into the cloſet of the Grand Duke. I certainly was not there, and cannot be ſuppoſed to know what paſſed; but it was the general belief at Florence at the time, that his Lordſhip put his watch upon the table, and pointed at the ſpecific time during which the Grand Duke was to decide.

It is true, that Lord Hervey was recalled; but was his miſſion recalled? Was the Duke ſuffered to make peace? He did afterwards certainly make peace with France. It is alſo certain that he was treated at a ſubſequent period with much indignity. But what do I infer from theſe things? Why, Sir, that this war has produced from the great ſtates to the ſmall, from the French as well as the Engliſh, more inſolence of language and of treatment than ever was experienced in any former war. If theſe, then, are the motives for war, it will never ceaſe as long as we have a gun or a guinea left.

But I would aſk firſt, is the account of our treatment of Genoa a mere fable and forgery? If it is, Miniſters are highly culpable in not having publicly declared it to be ſo. Have we not heard that Mr. Drake maintained to Genoa, that neutrality was intolerable? But the French, it ſeems, have behaved ill every where. They ſeized Venice: I do not pretend to juſtify the act. But ſurely it is not quite fair to ſtate only one ſide of the queſtion. The French aſſerted that Venice committed a great outrage upon their ſoldiers. I do not give a willing ear to ſuch ſtatements. But they poſſeſſed themſelves of Venice, and gave it to Auſtria. They ſtole it, and the Emperor received it. But that, it is ſaid, is not the ſame thing. The Emperor might take it as a compenſation. And ſuch is the argument uſed upon a ſubject, which has often been the object of diſcuſſion in this Houſe: I mean the Slave Trade. Enquire of an agent for that trade, when we have imputed to the abominable traffic the horror of tearing the mother from her children, the father from his family; what is his reply? "I did not tear them away: They

They were brought to me in the way of trade: I bought them; they were guilty of crimes—crimes! I have heard of one ſort: witchcraft."

Such is the precious defence of Auſtria: I gave *quid pro quo*. I gave half a million of men to be placed under the Auſtrian yoke in another. This infernal traffic, whether in white or in black, which, I do contend has extended to England, Auſtria, and above all, to Ruſſia, has appeared more enormous in this war than in any other.

Sir, we talk of our allies, I do not know who they are, we are allied with Ruſſia. How have the French attacked her? The magnanimous Emperor Paul is an heretic as well as we are. He ſeizes the Commandery of Malta, he makes himſelf the head of a Roman Catholic Eſtabliſhment. He ſays openly, that he fights for the reſtoration of Monarchy. Are we his allies, and do we go with him in his projects? How does he ſhew his abhorrence of the interference of France in the internal concerns of other nations? He ſays to Denmark, you have ſeditious clubs. No Daniſh veſſels ſhall enter my ports. He holds a menacing language to Hamburgh. Oh! but Spain is much worſe! The Ruſſian Miniſter is recalled from Madrid. The Emperor declares war, the Spaniſh Miniſter is recalled from Peterſburgh, and in the Ruſſian declaration the Emperor ſays to Spain (though the Ruſſian Miniſter had been recalled before), you recalled your Miniſter. This is the principle of ſocial order, and theſe the virtues which we regret the abſence of.

With reſpect to France, it is true that ſhe has committed many acts of injuſtice. But how does this bear upon the queſtion in its preſent ſtate? The right hon. Gentleman ſays, it is true we have entered into negotiation.

Sir, I do deſire the attention of the Houſe to this moſt ſerious warning. He cannot now enter into negotiation. Why? Firſt, becauſe of the Revolution. Why then, we ſay, that in 1796, with a Government as objectionable as the preſent, you did negotiate. Baffled in that negotiation, another was entered into in 1797. Will gentlemen attend to theſe facts?

We have heard this day, for the firſt time, an honeſt account of theſe negotiations. Miniſters confeſs they apprehended much danger from ſucceſs. Sir, I do not mean to miſtake their meaning; what I ſay is, that though they were ſincere in wiſhing ſucceſs, yet that they feared great danger would reſult from it. Sir, that in the ſtate of the world, when

when juſt recovered from war, there is ſtill danger, may be true. But in the preſent caſe they muſt have ſome comparative view, ſomething to convince them that the danger of peace would have been as great as the danger of war.

They ſtate, that they undertook thoſe negotiations from the unequivocal ſenſe of a great part of the people. Sir, I am glad to hear that the unequivocal ſenſe of the people is for peace. Not that I ever doubted it: but if I had ſtated in this place, that ſuch was the ſenſe of the people, I ſhould have been told, you have a petition there, we have another here: petitions are procured in ſtrange ways, and in fact, Sir, there is no period in which I ſhould not have been told, that the people did not wiſh for negotiations at that time. Now, however, we learn, that the unequivocal ſenſe of the people is for peace.

The firſt negotiation went off, as my honourable Friend ſays, on the queſtion of Belgium; as the right hon. Gentleman aſſerts on a queſtion of principle. He ſays, we negotiated to pleaſe the people, and we broke off becauſe of the monſtrous principles advanced by France. But did they tell the people fairly? Did they ſay, that the enemy urged a principle incompatible with all negotiation? No, Sir, they concluded by ſaying, that whenever that Republic, covered with all its enormities, wiſhed to renew a negotiation, they would conſent to renew it. And, in fact, in 1797, a ſecond negotiation was entered into, which was broke off after the Revolution at Paris in September.

I ſhould have expected, when the inſult at Liſle was freſh in their memories, that they would have talked a language more warlike. I ſhould have thought they would have ſaid, the negotiations we entered into in 1796 and 1797 prove that no negotiation can be proſecuted with ſucceſs; but on the contrary, they publiſh a declaration that they were ready to negotiate again whenever ſymptoms of an equal readineſs appeared on the part of the enemy, and though they had gained a great victory, they added, that they were willing to conſent to the ſame terms they had offered. Now mark the reſult: In 1797, they ſay that experience proves the French to be unreaſonable in their demands, but ſtill they are willing to offer the ſame terms of peace. Now, however, having gained two or three more victories, they do not offer the ſame terms, nor any others, but they refuſe to enter into any negotiation at all. What, Sir, does this ſhew? Why that when you are beaten you will negotiate, but that you will not negotiate

gotiate when you are ſucceſsful. What is this, then, but a *bellum ad internecionem?*

I remember, Sir, that in the courſe of the declarations and manifeſtoes publiſhed on the ſubject there was a good deal of explicitneſs. We ſaid, that his Majeſty, by expreſſing his willingneſs to conclude peace on the ſame principles and terms he had before propoſed, had eſtabliſhed a teſt. That teſt declared, that they who returned ſuch an anſwer as the one which had been returned by Lord Grenville, avoided all diſcuſſion. Having made this declaration, I aſk, do they not confeſs that by refuſing Bonaparte's overture, they refuſe all diſcuſſion?

The right hon. Gentleman ſays, his wiſhes are for the reſtoration of the Bourbon family, but only with the conſent of the people. Sir, I wiſh the French may have that family, if they will it themſelves; but, if I am to wiſh that they ſhould chuſe, I muſt, as an Engliſhman, as a friend to my country, and to peace, never wiſh that a Bourbon may be at the head of the affairs of France.

Sir, for the laſt century we have been continually at war, on account of the ambition and perfidy of the Bourbons.

An hon. Gentleman (Mr. Canning) ſeemed to be very much delighted with an addreſs preſented to King William by the Houſe of Commons. In that addreſs the Houſe expreſs their attachment to King William, and he thinks it quite aſtoniſhing how it applies to the preſent time. I ſuppoſe, Sir, ſome previous offers of negociation had been made by Louis, for, if there had not, it is not in point. Becauſe the Houſe of Commons declared their readineſs to ſupport William in a war, when no offer had been made to negociate, the hon. Gentleman finds out that is quite applicable to the preſent period, when an offer has been made.

The hon. Gentleman has alluded to words, which he heard ſomewhere, that the publication of certain letters was as great a diſgrace to the perſons publiſhing them, as to the authors of their contents. Sir, if ever the hon. Gentleman, when younger, had turned his thoughts to the law, he would have learned to find caſes more in point. Former governments have publiſhed letters. It is not the publication that is objected to. It is the manner, the notes, the ribaldry, which is not defended from indignation by its extreme ſtupidity. I beg leave to ſay, with the perſon alluded to, that war increaſes conſumption, and, of courſe, ſcarcity. But

eminently, indeed, muſt it increaſe it, if it be true that corn is in the proportion of two to one dearer here than in France.

The hon. Gentleman, it would appear, has not enough to do here, yet this mode of anſwering things, ſaid in another place, is not quite fair to the perſons mentioning the ſame opinion as he does, particularly as in that place they are in no want of numbers. Perhaps, however, the hon. Gentleman is to be ſent to that place himſelf. He may be ſent there with as much propriety as many of thoſe that have been, and I am ſure I mean not to ſpeak againſt them; but the hon. Gentleman will, I ſhould think, have enough to do with anſwering arguments in this place, without diſparaging one of the beſt underſtandings, I will venture to ſay, in the country.

Sir, the right hon. Gentleman has ſaid, that the negociation of 1797 redeemed the pledge of 1796; but what is to redeem the pledge of 1797? What ſhifts are they now put to? The people were then confeſſedly for peace. Are they leſs for peace now? The hon. Gentleman goes farther, "He ſays queſtions of peace and war are not to be decided upon extremes, but upon a balance and compariſon. He ſays, finding the difficulty of going on in the uſual mode, he was forced to have recourſe to a ſolid ſyſtem of finance, but that that ſyſtem could not ſucceed without the conſent of the people; he had no hope himſelf of ſucceſs from negociation, but he complied with the wiſhes of the people." He entered into a negociation, France uſes him ill; but I have gained my point, he ſays, and have ſhewn my ſincerity. He gets his ſolid ſyſtem of finance, firſt his treble aſſeſſment, then his tax on income. How did he obtain it? By pretending to be a friend to negociation. Now he has carried his point, he is no longer a friend to it. I only, he ſays, negociate by pretending myſelf a friend; but now you have aided me in my ſolid ſyſtem, now I tell you honeſtly there is no ſafety in negociating. Sir, to whom that would be honeſt, I know not, it would not be ſo to the people. The reign of Charles II. has been referred to. He declared againſt France. He might ſay, I wanted a ſolid ſyſtem of finance. The right hon. Gentleman ſays ſo, but that there are no means of getting it, but by pretending to be a friend to negociation, and by being ſo in reality for a time.

And here let me ſtate one thing to the hon. Gentleman, who ſays, we muſt have experience and evidence of facts. If,

If I am to have this experience I ſay we muſt negociate again. He contends, that the negociation at Liſle encreaſed the ſpirit and confidence of the country. To which I reply, that the only way, then, to continue people in that ſyſtem is, to renew the negociation; but the reſtoration of the Bourbon family is what we wiſh, but it is not the *ſine qua non*. Now I would put this caſe—If, in the private concerns of life, I had an eſtate to ſell, and I ſaid, give me 10001. for it; there may be other ways without the 10001. but if you mention no other, and if you refuſe to hear any other, I then ſay, that the 10001. is the *ſine qua non*. You ſay the Bourbon family is not the only way. In your nonſenſical language, which I have nothing to do with, you ſet a limitation to poſſibilities; but ſtill you ſay that the reſtoration of the Bourbon family is what you wiſh, but it is not the only mode. Do you give any other *projet* yourſelf? Do you aſk for a *contre projet?* No, for fear you ſhould have one, you ſuggeſt no other mode but the reſtoration of the Bourbons. Is not this ſaying, that we will fight for the Bourbons? But that, if felt, would be too unpalatable in this country.

The honourable Gentleman then ſays, I will not ſay there may not be caſes in which we will not treat with Bonaparte. But there are ſome conditions. We muſt have experience and evidence of facts. That the French are capable of maintaining the relations of amity will not be denied. But the experience the hon. Gentleman wants is, that they have renounced the wicked acts of their predeceſſors.

Sir, theſe are not conciliatory words. But are they practicable? Do you complain of their conduct in going to war, though you have done the ſame yourſelf? But it ſeems, you want to have evidence of their pacific diſpoſition in time of war; that is, till you have behaved peaceably during a period of war we will not make peace with you. We muſt have a better opinion of you. Is war likely to encreaſe good opinion? In duels, indeed, it happens ſometimes that both parties confeſs each other to be men of honour, and live in friendſhip. There is ſomething, by the bye, ridiculous even in this: but when this is applied to countries, it is more ſo. You are to beat each other into a good opinion.

There are four ways by which we may yet have a good opinion of Bonaparte: Firſt, by a more conciliating mode of conduct—Is this reaſonable to expect? War inflames the paſſions, exaggerates faults, encreaſes animoſities, inflames hatred. Secondly, if the people of France, contrary to our

expectations, ſhould acquieſce in his government. Whether that government is an uſurpation I have no inclination to diſcuſs; but I certainly have not that opinion of the ſenſe of a people to ſuppoſe, that becauſe it is an uſurpation, they will therefore not acquieſce in it. Cromwell was an uſurper. Does the right hon. Gentleman not think that there are many paſſages in his life in which he was inſincere, the ſelf-denying ordinance and exempting himſelf from it. But is there any man of ſenſe who thinks that any nation would have done wiſely in not making peace with Cromwell, merely on account of the character of that great uſurper? The people did acquieſce in the government of Cromwell. It may be ſaid that the ſplendour of his character, and his victories abroad, raiſed the nation ſo high as to induce it to this acquieſcence. Will it be ſaid that Bonaparte is not a man of great abilities? Will it be ſaid that he is not doing that which is moſt flattering to France, holding too high a tone to foreign powers? Will not the people ſee that that peace which Bonaparte might agree to now, he would not agree to hereafter? Is it not poſſible he may feel as the right hon. Gentleman, and ſay in 1800 I wanted the people to acquieſce in a ſolid ſyſtem of finance; and having got it, I find the Miniſter of England perfidious, and that no negociation can be proſecuted with ſucceſs; will he not have then one intereſt leſs to make peace?

The third mode is, if the efforts of the allies ſhould be leſs ſucceſsful than is expected in ſtirring up France againſt Bonaparte. Sir, I have often blamed the right hon. Gentleman for diſingenuouſneſs; but this, I own, is an honeſt confeſſion. He ſays, to Bonaparte, "you may be depoſed, I mean to raiſe the people againſt you; if I ſucceed I may ſend you away, but if I do not, then I will make peace with you." But what ſort of peace can you expect from hopes thus baffled, and projects thus defeated? What permanent treaty can be made from imbecility and diſappointment? The right hon. Gentleman ſaid once on another occaſion:

> Poſſit quæ plurima virtus
> Eſſe fuit, toto certatum eſt corpore regni.

He now, in Engliſh, repeats the ſame principle, and ſays, "we will treat when we find all our efforts of war vain, and all our deſigns of hoſtilities impracticable."

If Miniſters had taken a contrary turn, the benches of this Houſe, Sir, would have reſounded with their praiſes. Perhaps

haps we might not have had an unanimous vote of thanks, for there are many good men, one particularly in the other Houſe, a noble Friend of mine, Lord Fitzwilliam, who, I am confident, would not have concurred in ſuch a vote. But what is the Houſe of Commons come to, if they ſtill ſupport the Miniſter, and yet feel in their conſciences that had he accepted the overture of Bonaparte, they would have been the firſt to thank him? But our paſſions, it ſeems, are to be raiſed by the ſituation of France. If Gentlemen chooſe to inveigh againſt the character of Bonaparte, I am not the man to undertake his defence. Of his conduct I do not judge; he has reformed his country by ſuch reforms as military men generally adopt, that is by taking all the power to himſelf. To ſay that ſuch conduct is unexampled is more than I can contend, but I cannot conceive how perſons in this country can conceive ſuch a violent indignation on the ſubject.

We do not deny that ſome degree of liberty may exiſt with military power. The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland has the power of putting the whole country under martial law, yet ſo far is that country from being enſlaved, that we deem it preciſely in the moſt happy ſituation for conſidering freely and fairly whether it will conſent to a union with this country. It is not, therefore, quite ſo much in character to inveigh in ſuch terms againſt the operation of military authority.

But it ſeems Bonaparte broke his oaths. I am one perhaps, who think it were better, that all oaths of ſuch kind were laid aſide; but ſuch oaths muſt always be conſidered as binding on certain conditions. The illuſtrious patriots who took up arms againſt Charles I. may have been called rebels or traitors; but I never heard that the violation of their oaths was alleged againſt them.—I never heard that the whole country was perjured at the Reſtoration, becauſe they had taken the oaths to the Parliament.—At the Revolution the Earl of Devonſhire was not conſidered as perjured, becauſe he had taken the oaths to the Stuart family. But who brings up this queſtion of oaths? He who wiſhes to reſtore the Bourbon family, and make millions of people violate the oaths they have taken to the Republic. But Bonaparte, it ſeems, after the treaty of Campo Formio, maintained the exiſtence of the republic of France and of the Britiſh government to be incompatible. This is alſo the right hon. Gentleman's opinion; yet except theſe two illuſtrious characters, I do

not know any other man in Europe who entertains it. May not theſe pretences be reciprocated from one ſide to another? Oh! pity the condition of man! Gracious God! that we ſhould live to hear all the old prejudices ſo far outdone as to conſider war to be the natural ſtate of man, and peace to be difficult and dangerous.

Sir, I moſt earneſtly implore the Houſe to pauſe before it gives a ſanction to the proſecution of a war upon the grounds now offered. If it were inſiſted by the Miniſter that it would be wiſe to purſue the conteſt until what he calls military deſpotiſm ſhould be overturned, I beg the Houſe to recollect the military deſpotiſm of Auguſtus Cæſar, a power which originally was an uſurpation, but laſted ſeven or eight hundred years! I cannot, when talking of Generals and great men, help lamenting the virulent abuſe which the Houſe has frequently poured forth on the beſt and moſt worthy characters, whoſe praiſes have afterwards been readily acknowledged by the very ſame perſons who ſo erroneouſly and wantonly calumniated them. I am no advocate for Bonaparte; but ſuch a change of opinion may, perhaps, in future, operate in his favour.

To illuſtrate, however, this obſervation, I believe I may inſtance the caſe of General Waſhington, one of the greateſt and beſt men of the age in which he lived. That illuſtrious perſonage is now no more; he lives, however, in the heart of every good man, and my humble panegyric can add nothing to his immortal fame. General Waſhington, it may be well remembered, particularly by the right honourable Gentleman (Mr. Dundas) who opened the debate, was at one time branded with every harſh and infamous epithet for his perſeverance in the cauſe of liberty and his country; and yet, after ſucceſs had crowned his efforts, he was hailed as the ſaviour of America, and the pacificator of Mankind.

The right hon. Secretary may imagine, that American liberty is not a bleſſing—I differ from him very widely. Had a negociation been then propoſed to Waſhington, it would have immediately been aſked—"What! treat with an American rebel!" No. But fortune completely operated a different opinion, and his memory is now the ſubject of univerſal praiſe.

Louis XVIII. to conciliate the French, has publiſhed a proclamation that he is about to be reſtored to the throne of his anceſtors with as ample powers as any of thoſe anceſtors ever poſſeſſed; he does not promiſe them a conſtitution of

any

any kind which might tend to conciliate their ſupport; he invites their aſſiſtance, with an aſſurance of indulging them with the moſt full and complete enjoyment of the ancient regime, with its happy appendages of baſtiles, lettres de cachet, gabelle, &c."——With this monarch's return into France, the French were alſo to look for the nobility, who would doubtleſs ſeek to re-eſtabliſh themſelves in their domains, and to reſume their privileges, ſo intimately connected with thoſe of the monarch.

It is not now for me to inquire into the juſtice of thoſe claims, the property has been transferred; the practicability of recovering it, when ſo diſtributed, is abſurd to think of; beſides, it could not, in many inſtances, be reſtored to the ancient inheritors, without injuſtice to the preſent poſſeſſors, who had purchaſed it for a fair conſideration.

Much emphaſis had been laid on the conduct and zeal of the Chouans, and on the propriety of ſupporting them. I believe that in the heart of France, where theſe people appear, there exiſts a conſiderable attachment to royalty—how the government of France could contrive to compromiſe with that ſpirit, I cannot pretend to conjecture; but I beg leave to call to the memory of the Houſe the once formidable inſurrection of the Hugonots, and the policy of Henry IV. by which they were conciliated.—If Bonaparte ſhould attempt ſome ſimilar arrangement with the Chouans, he can meet no great obſtacle to ſucceſs in their attachment to their country, for what has our government told them? "We will aſſiſt you while you can contrive to annoy the French government, but we will not make a common cauſe with you." Such is the language held to them, and what reliance can ſuch profeſſions of intereſted, temporary, and precarious aſſiſtance induce them to place on us?

Let me ſtate what has been repreſented to me as a fact, and the truth of which I hope miniſtry will inveſtigate, that a ſtain may be removed from our national character—It is ſtated, that a party of Neapolitans, who had joined the French, were beſieged in Caſtel de Nuovo by a detachment from the royal army of Naples, to whom they refuſed to ſurrender, but demanded that a Britiſh officer ſhould be brought forward, and to him they capitulated inſtantly; with him they did make terms, he promiſing them their perſonal ſafety and property. But, dreadful to relate! this property was ſold, the priſoners murdered, and the cruel and diabolical monſters, who had captured them, are the very fleſh of their miſerable victims!!!

When

When are theſe horrors to ceaſe? Why not make peace now?—Are the bowels and property of Engliſhmen nothing? —Are we, to pleaſe the members of the preſent adminiſtration, to wage a perpetual war? I am ſorry they are inſtigated by hatred and animoſity, by rancour and revenge, and, indeed, by every paſſion that leads to their extinction of civilization and humanity. But they are not, they ſay, to be checked in their deſolating progreſs till the Bourbons are reſtored. We have before boaſted of ſucceſsful campaigns—We were repeatedly told of the capture of Valenciénes, Queſnoy, Condé, &c. which prepared ſome gentleman for a march to Paris, but ſtill more ſanguine hopes of ſucceſs are now conceived than at this period: Where then was the expectation of peace? Since ſucceſs leads only to war, that war may be *ad infinitum*. Good God! what a lamentable proſpect is this for the country—for a mere ſpeculation, or a real experiment, we are to perſiſt in ſpilling the blood, in exhauſting our treaſure, in ſwelling the black catalogue of human miſeries.

Let gentlemen ſuppoſe themſelves in the heat of battle, and contemplate the horrid conſequences of implacable warfare. Had they been at the battle of Blenheim, and aſked the ſoldier what he fought for, he would anſwer it was to reſtrain the ambitious projects of Louis XIV.; but if in any of the deſperate conteſts which may enſue from the deciſion of this night, the ſoldiers would anſwer ſuch a queſtion, that they were wading through blood to ſee if the people of France would give Bonaparte a better character that we may negociate with him—Why not tell Bonaparte at once, in a bold and manly manner, that you cannot make peace without including your allies? I appeal to the feelings of every man who hears me; I moſt earneſtly implore him to aid me in checking the calamities of war; I hope that thoſe who would have voted for the addreſs, had the overtures of the enemy been accepted, will aid me in oppoſing that of this evening, which pledges the Houſe for the proſecution of the war."

The Queſtion was then loudly called for; when the Houſe divided—

Ayes - - -	265
Noes - - -	64
Majority -	201

A Liſt

A Liſt of the Minority againſt the Addreſs of thanks to his MAJESTY for refuſing to Negociate:

Adair R.
Anſon, J.
Aſtley, J.
Aubrey, Sir J.
Barclay, G.
Biddulph, R.
Birch, J. R.
Bird, W. W.
Bouverie, hon. E.
Bouverie, hon. W. H.
Brogden J.
Burdett, Sir F.
Byng, G.
Cavendiſh, Lord G.
Colhoun, W.
Coombe, H. C. Lord Mayor
Copley, Sir L.
Courtenay, J.
Deniſon, W. J.
Edwards, B.
Erſkine, hon. T.
Fletcher, Sir H.
Fox, hon. C. J.
Green, J.
Grey, C.
Hare, J.
Harriſon, J.
Heathcote, J.
Hill, Sir R.
Howard, H.
Jeffreys, N.
Jekyll. J.
Jolliffe, W.
Knight, R. P.
Kemp, J.
Leiceſter, Sir J.
Lemon, Sir W.
Lemon, Colonel
Lloyd, J. M.
Martin, James
Milner, Sir W.
Nichols, John
North, D.
Northey, W.
Plomer, W.
Pultney, Sir W.
Richardſon, J.
Ruſſell, Lord John
Ruſſell, Lord William
St. John, hon. St. A.
Shakeſpeare, A.
Shum, G.
Smith, W.
Stanley, Lord
Sturt, C.
Taylor, M. A.
Tierney, George
Townſhend, Lord J.
Tufton, hon. H.
Vyner, R.
Walwyn, J.
Winnington, Sir E.
Weſtern, C. C.
Wigley, E.

TELLERS.

Sheridan, R. B. Whitbread, Sam.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, FEB. 4.

Sir *John Frederic* brought up a petition from the debtors confined in the King's bench priſon, ſtating their diſtreſſes, and praying for relief.—Ordered to lie on the table.

A petition of a ſimilar nature was preſented by Mr. Tierney from the priſoners confined for debt in the county gaol of Surry, which was likewiſe ordered to lie on the table.

Mr *Roſe* preſented ſeveral accounts relating to finance.—Ordered to be printed.

The order of the day was then read for taking into farther conſideration his Majeſty's moſt gracious meſſage.

The *Speaker* having read that part of it which relates to the granting of ſupplies,

Mr. *Roſe* moved, that ſupplies be granted to his Majeſty, and that the Houſe do, the next day, reſolve itſelf into a committee of the whole Houſe, to conſider of the ſupplies to be granted.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

WEDNESDAY, FEB. 5.

The cauſe of appeal from Scotland, M'Cullock and Allen, which ſtood for this day, was adjourned to Friday ſe'nnight.

Lord *Holland* gave notice, that he would on that day ſe'nnight bring forward a motion on the ſubject of the failure of the late expedition to Holland, and moved that the Lords be ſummoned for that day.

Adjourned to Monday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, FEB. 5.

Lord *Stopford* informed the Houſe that his Majeſty had been waited on with their addreſs of Monday laſt, and that his Majeſty had been pleaſed moſt graciouſly to receive it.

Mr. *Macdowal* preſented a petition from the Provoſt, &c. of Glaſgow, praying for Parliamentary aid for the paving of that city.—Referred to a Committee.

Sir *William Geary* moved for leave to bring in a bill for making a navigable canal to the river Thames, near Graveſend.—Granted.

Mr. *Roſe* moved the order of the day, that the Houſe do reſolve itſelf into a Committee, to conſider of a ſupply to be granted to his Majeſty.

The Houſe having accordingly reſolved itſelf into a Committee,

Mr. *Roſe* moved, that a ſupply be granted to his Majeſty.

Mr. *Nichols* ſaid, that he would oppoſe the granting of any ſupply for the proſecution of the preſent war, on the principles now avowed.

The

The queſtion was then put and carried. After which the Houſe was reſumed, and the report ordered to be received the next day.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THURSDAY, FEB. 6.

Lord *Sheffield* moved for an account of the quantity of wheat, wheaten flour, oats, barley, and rye, imported to and exported from Great Britain, ſince the year 1794 incluſive, diſtinguiſhing the places whence imported, and where exported, as well as the quantity in each year.—Ordered

Mr. *Jeddrel* preſented a petition from certain inhabitants of the town of Yarmouth, praying for leave to bring in a bill for improving the harbour of that port.—Referred to a Committee.

The *Lord Mayor of London* preſented petitions from the debtors confined in the Poultry Compter and the gaol of Ludgate, praying for relief.—Ordered to be laid on the table.

On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, leave was given to bring in bills for continuing the acts of 37 and 38 of the King, enabling his Majeſty to accept of the voluntary ſervices of the Militia.

Mr. *Wallace* preſented ſeveral public accounts from the Admiralty.

SUPPLY.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the Committee of Supply, which was read a firſt and ſecond time, and agreed to.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved, that the Houſe ſhould to-morrow reſolve itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe, to conſider of the ſupply granted to his Majeſty.—Ordered.

Mr. *Wallace* gave notice, that he ſhould move in the Committee of Supply the next day, a vote for the expences of the ſeamen, &c. in the remaining months of the preſent year.

Mr. *Long* moved for ſeveral public accounts preparatory to the ſupply.

The annual indemnity bill was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed the next day.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

FRIDAY, FEB. 7.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* moved an inſtruction to the Committee on the aſſize of bread, that they ſhould take every poſſible method to remedy the deficiency which may have taken place in conſequence of the ſaid failure of the late crop of corn.

A bill for continuing the militia volunteer act to ſerve in Ireland, was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time on Monday next.

A bill for continuing and amending an act of the 38th of his preſent Majeſty, for puniſhing thoſe who ſhall attempt to ſeduce his Majeſty's troops, was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time on Monday next.

Mr. *Wallace* ſaid, that in conſequence of circumſtances which had happened, it was found that the public ſervice could diſpenſe with the ſervices of ten thouſand ſeamen. He therefore moved, that proviſion ſhould be made for the maintenance and ſupport of one hundred and ten thouſand ſeamen for eleven months, commencing from February, 1800, including 22,600 marines.

The Houſe reſolved itſelf into a Committe of Supply, Mr. Bragge in the chair.

SUPPLIES.

Mr. *Nichols*, according to the notice he had given, roſe to oppoſe any ſupply being granted to his Majeſty, for carrying on the war on the preſent terms. He ſtated that his Majeſty's Miniſters had now avowed that the war is henceforward to be carried on for the purpoſe of re-eſtabliſhing the ancient government of France. [*A cry from the Treaſury Bench of No! No! No!*] Mr. Nichols, however, perſiſted In conſidering it in this light, and adverted to Mr. Dundas's obſervation in the debate of Monday laſt, that this country muſt carry on the war either till a different government to the preſent was eſtabliſhed, or till France ſhould be ſo much reduced as not to be able to make any vigorous efforts againſt this country. War, he ſaid, ought never to be waged without an explicit avowal of the object, and that object ought to be of the higheſt importance. To reſtore the ancient government he thought would be impoſſible. That government had always reſted on Corinthian columns of temporal and eccleſiaſtical nobleſſe. The nobleſſe of France and nobility in England were looked upon as ſynonimous terms, being both derived from the Latin word *nobilis*; but in fact they were widely different in each country. In this, talents and ſuperior merit led to nobility; under the old government of France every man was in a degraded ſituation who was not of the nobleſſe, becauſe he had no chance of ſucceeding to any of the high offices of church or ſtate. It had been obſerved, he ſaid, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the late debate, that if property would prevent a counter-revolution, it would have prevented the revolution itſelf: but this was not the caſe;

caſe; the proprietors, under the ancient government, were few, and had no idea of what was about to take place: now they are very numerous, and altogether on their guard againſt any change of government. Under the old government, the oppreſſion of the feudal rights was extreme, and would not be eaſily forgotten. Suppoſe tithes to be aboliſhed in this country for only ten years, is it to be ſuppoſed it would be practicable to introduce them again? And yet, what are tithes when compared to feudal oppreſſion? All thoſe, therefore, who are now poſſeſſed of lands, muſt feel themſelves deeply intereſted in reſiſting the re-eſtabliſhment of the old government. Then hon. Gentleman then ſaid, he believed Ruſſia was ſincere in her declaration of re-eſtabliſhing the ancient government of France, but he was perſuaded Auſtria had no other view than that of aggrandiſement. Pruſſia was intereſted to thwart the aggrandiſement of Auſtria, and to prevent the enfeebling of France. Pruſſia was now relieved from thoſe difficulties under which ſhe laboured while the Jacobin government of France exiſted; if ſhe aſſiſted Auſtria, ſhe aggrandized her enemy; if ſhe aſſiſted France, ſhe aſſiſted a government which avowed hatred to royalty; but ſhe may aſſiſt the preſent Anti-Jacobin government of France with perfect ſafety. He then adverted to the high price of corn, which he believed to be much encreaſed by the war; terminate that and relief is immediately at hand. The difference between the freight and inſurance, paid in time of war, on corn from America, is 22 per cent.; from the Baltic 15. By a peace we ſhould alſo open the corn market of France. Parliament profeſſed a wiſh to relieve the people from the preſent high price of corn, but this profeſſion was a mockery if they refuſed to adopt the only certain and adequate means, namely, the re-eſtabliſhment of peace. He mentioned the application for relief of the Weſt India merchants, to Parliament, as another evil conſequence of the war, and reprobated the aid which government had given them.

Mr. *Baker* ſpoke to order.

Mr. *Hobhouſe* and Mr. *Tierney* contended that Mr. Nichols was correct.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* thought it would be better to let the hon. Gentleman proceed, than that the time of the Houſe ſhould be taken up with the arguments of his hon. Friends behind him in defence of his propriety.

Mr. *Nichols* proceeded, and ſaid, that the riſk conſequent upon

upon the propoſed union with Ireland, was much encreaſed by the continuance of the war. He then mentioned being obliged to have recourſe to paper money. He did not mean to offend any one by the word paper money, but there was certainly great danger in extending the circulation of paper beyond the quantum of ſpecie or gold which the country can command. He begged to know what advantage could poſſibly accrue to this country by re-eſtabliſhing the ancient government of France. Louis the XIVth. had driven out of it 800,000 people merely for a difference of worſhip in religion. The ſmaller princes of Germany were ſo alarmed at his ambitious views, that they united againſt him. He lamented that Belgium ſhould belong to France, but he believed it would be impoſſible to prevent its continuance in their poſſeſſion, whatever might be the government of France. Miniſters, he ſaid, had accounted for their negociation in 1797, on the ſcore of its being the decided wiſh of the people. The ſame reaſon, and the ſame wiſh, on the part of the people, he contended, ſtill exiſted in its full force. He looked upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have been deluded, or he never would have conſented to plunge this country into the war. In his opinion, every thing valuable to this country depended on a ſpeedy reſtoration of peace. He was convinced ſome of his Majeſty's Miniſters had adviſed this war from their own private intereſts. He begged leave to call the attention of the Houſe to the ſtate of this country at the commencement of his Majeſty's reign *(A laugh from the Treaſury Bench)*. The firſt Miniſter of his Majeſty (Lord Bute), found that the king was cramped on all ſides by the combination of great families, and he endeavoured to break this combination. He very much diſapproved his removal of Lord Chatham from the king's councils, but he admired the attempt to break that combination, though it proved unſucceſsful. A king, in a ſtate of thraldom to great families, is not a king according to the principles of our conſtitution. Formerly Whig and Tory were the appellations of contending parties; the Whigs were friendly to the rights and privileges of the people; the Tories, to the extenſion of prerogative. In later times the nobility and great families had uſurped the power of placing perſons in that Houſe; and finding, from various petitions and other circumſtances, that ſuch uſurpation was ſeriouſly noticed by the people at large, they involved this country in the preſent war, with a view to calumniate thoſe who wanted to deprive them of their uſurped power,

power, as Jacobins, Republicans, and men desirous of pulling down the great political institutions of the country.

Mr. *Addington* said, he was astonished that any hon. Gentleman should oppose the supply, especially on the present occasion. An hon. Friend of his (Mr. Dundas), not now in his place, had pointedly stated, that if a peace was concluded this moment, there could be no considerable reduction of our fleets or armies. This statement had not been contradicted by any one, and he would for a moment suppose the hon. Gentleman to be Prime Minister, and ask him whether he would take upon himself the tremendous responsibility of advising his Majesty, at this moment, to conclude a peace with a government from which you had no security, but professions of a pacific disposition? He never gave a vote in which he prided himself more than that which made him one of the glorious majority of Monday last. Negociation would let down the national spirit, and damp the ardour of our allies. It would enable the First Consul to crush those in the western departments who are the greatest enemies of his usurpation. For these reasons he hoped the hon. Gentleman would withdraw his opposition.

Mr. *Bryan Edwards* said, that he did not rise to oppose the measure then before the committee. He would wish the naval strength of the country to remain undiminished. It was the source of our glory, and the pledge of our security. But he begged it might not be inferred from that wish, that he voted for carrying on the war. He thought that Ministers we highly to blame in rejecting the overtures of the enemy. We were now to fight till the House of Bourbon was restored to the throne of France. Notwithstanding all that had been said, no other interpretation could be put upon the expressions used in Lord Grenville's note. We were told besides, that peace could not be concluded till the causes for war had ceased to operate? What was the cause of the war? He would ask, was it not the subversion of the French Monarchy? Till that, then, be re-established, we must continue to lavish our blood and our treasure. He had heard much of the enormities of the French revolution; many things that had happened during it he disapproved of and execrated; yet he would not vote for a war to which there was no prospect of an end, and which raised up one half of a nation to fight against another. By our attempts to restore the House of Bourbon, we strove to make France the scene of civil war, and the victim of all the horrors which attend it. The

French

French were, perhaps, not ſincere in their pacific profeſſions at Liſle, but now they certainly were ſo, and Miniſters had an opportunity of reſtoring peace to Europe, and thus performing an action which would cover them with glory. We were told that France was in a deplorable ſituation; her commerce ruined, her navy deſtroyed, her finances deranged, preſſed on all her frontiers by hoſtile armies, and torn with faction within. Were theſe circumſtances all as they are ſtated, they would furniſh no argument for carrying on the war. France ſtill was unconquerable; her ſpirit never could be broken. Notwithſtanding the brilliant ſucceſs of the laſt campaign, no impreſſion could be made upon the territory of the republic. Beſides, the tide might turn: we had had our reverſes, and we might have them again. After laviſhing millions of money, and loſing the flower of our army in St. Domingo, we had been obliged to leave the inhabitants to be butchered by their ſlaves. What a ſcene preſented itſelf on looking towards Holland! The race is not always to the ſwift, nor the battle to the ſtrong. Beſides, think of the danger of driving a great nation to deſperation. The former deſpair of the French nation was the ſource or all their power and all their greatneſs, and were they again reduced to ſimilar circumſtances, their energies would be again called forth, and they would become again formidable to the nations which ſurround them. He did not intend to ſpeak when he came into the Houſe, but he could not help giving vent to his feelings on the preſent occaſion.

Mr. *Wilberforce* obſerved, that (the extreme importance of the ſubject which had now, for the ſecond time, come under diſcuſſion, had doubtleſs ſecured for it the moſt ſerious conſideration of every Member in that Houſe. It was a ſubject on which he felt moſt deeply, and) not having been able to obtain an opportunity of delivering his ſentiments in the preceeding debate, he would now beg leave briefly and ſummarily to ſtate the conſiderations which chiefly led to the opinion he had formed, the turning point on which his judgment reſted.

He could, with truth, declare, that when he firſt heard of Bonaparte's propoſal, the intelligence gave him the ſincereſt pleaſure. After the bloody and afflicting conteſt which had ſo long raged, the very ſound of peace was gladdening to the heart; but, upon more mature reflection, upon calmly weighing, as it was his duty to do, all the circumſtances of the caſe, he had felt himſelf compelled to relinquiſh the

pleaſing

pleaſing expectations he had indulged, and to confeſs that adminiſtration could not ſafely have acceded to the Conſul's offer to negociate.

In this caſe, however, as well as in every other of a ſimilar nature, the judgment which people would form concerning their conduct, in any given circumſtances, muſt depend, in a great degree, on their previous ſentiments and ſtate of mind. They who had uniformly conceived, that Jacobinical principles were not a juſt object of terror to any neighbouring ſtate; that France, ſince ſhe had acted on them, had not been any reaſonable cauſe of peculiar apprehenſion and alarm; that whether we ſhould be forced to ſubmit to her arms, and acquieſce in her predominant authority; or whether habits of free and friendly intercourſe with her ſhould be renewed, we ſhould have no uncommon ground of diſquietude. Gentleman of this way of thinking need not be ſo cautious in their conduct on receiving a propoſal ſuch as that now made by Bonaparte. But far different, Mr. Wilberforce affirmed, had been his own ſentiments and feelings on this ſubject; and it would be recollected accordingly, that, in a former inſtance, when (whether rightly or wrongly it was not now neceſſary to diſcuſs) he had felt it his duty to recommend a pacific ſyſtem, he had never ſtated that peace would bring along with it ſecurity and comfort. He had frankly avowed, and the conceſſion had been uſed againſt him, that though, upon the whole, he then thought peace preferable to war under all the circumſtances of the caſe, yet that there would be a call for jealouſy and vigilance, in order to guard againſt the greateſt evils which had ever threatened the civil order and ſocial comfort of Europe. With a fixed perſuaſion of the reality and magnitude of this danger, he had come to the conſideration of the preſent queſtion. This, therefore, being premiſed, when a propoſal to negociate was made to us on the part of a nation with which we were at war, it was indiſpenſable to aſk whether the perſon from whom the offer came was authoriſed to make it? Whether it was likely that he was ſincere? Whether his authority had that ſtability which might give us a reaſonable ſecurity for the concluſion of any treaty, for the obſervance of any ſtipulations which might be made? Now, to all theſe queſtions, what anſwers were to be returned in the preſent inſtance?

After many ſucceſſive revolutions Bonaparte ſuddenly appears at the head of a new conſtitutional ſyſtem, and ſends to offer us peace. We ſhould ſurely know that he really poſ-

ſeſſes the authority which he claims; or, at leaſt, we ſhould be ſure that by our admitting his pretenſions to the character of governor of France, we are not merely ſtrengthening him in his unſtable ſituation without a ſufficient ground for believing that his propoſal is intended to anſwer any other purpoſe. For again, ſuppoſing for a moment Bonaparte able to carry into execution any terms he might make, would he be willing to make peace with us on ſecure and honourable terms. It had been well argued that though it was manifeſtly his intereſt to negociate, it was by no means equally clear that it was his intereſt to make peace, at leaſt with all the allies. It had been ſhewn to be his ſettled policy, by offering to treat, to divide the confederacy formed againſt him; and even in the very offer he had now made and repeated, a ſeparate treaty only was propoſed. How knew we but that it was only his object to infuſe among the allies who were known not to be too firmly connected, a principle of diſunion and diſtruſt. Here alſo, came into queſtion all thoſe particulars which had been ſtated concerning Bonaparte's character. Gentlemen had moſt unreaſonably blamed Miniſters for dwelling on theſe, as if it were not their duty when a propoſal of this kind was made, in which the well-being of the country was ſo deeply implicated, to advert to ſuch particulars in the character and former conduct of the man from whom it came, as they might be able to obtain from certain information: or, as if Miniſters attending to theſe particulars in their cloſet, they were not to be honeſt enough to ſtate to the Houſe of Commons, with frankneſs and fidelity, the real grounds and principles of their determination. Bonaparte had appeared verſatile and perfidious, ambitious and intriguing, in a moſt uncommon degree; and were we at once, therefore to receive a propoſal which came from him as if it proceeded from a man of eſtabliſhed truth, and honour, and moderation: or from one, at leaſt, who had ſhewn that he reſted his claim to credit on the poſſeſſion of thoſe qualities? God and nature had provided that falſehood and deceit ſhould excite diſtruſt and apprehenſion, by which we ſhould be inſtinctively prompted to provide for our own ſecurity, and ſhould we at once diſmiſs this provident jealouſy when our national ſecurity was at ſtake, againſt the greateſt danger to which we had ever been expoſed? But leaving this part of the argument, the grand conſideration Mr. Wilberforce ſaid, which weighed with him was, that Bonaparte was in ſuch a ſituation, the ſyſtem which he adminiſtered

miniſtered was ſo new and unſettled, that we could not juſtly judge of its continuance, or calculate concerning the conduct, the policy, the views, and intereſts of the Conſul himſelf. We had not now the ordinary grounds of reaſoning and calculation poſſeſſed in former inſtances of a ſimilar kind, and this led him to mention what had been ſaid concerning the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon. It was not that there exiſted any particular attachment to that family, or any ſenſe of obligation to them, but we meant to ſhew our ſenſe of the enormity of the danger to be apprehended from jacobinical principles and rulers, by ſtating that they were ſo immeaſurably great that the dangers, even from France under the Houſe of Bourbon, were trifling in the compariſon. But it was not ſo much the magnitude of the danger, as its indefiniteneſs which he was now conſidering: we commonly had been able to calculate on the probable intereſts and conduct of the moſt ambitious monarchs. Suppoſe them to make peace with us, we might believe that they would attack us again ſo ſoon as they ſhould be able to do it to advantage; but the amount of their force and revenues were limited. We might be confident that they could only endeavour, during the peace, to be gradually recruiting their ſtrength for a freſh attack, when we alſo might be able again to meet them, with forces and reſources, which in the interval would have been recruited in a ſtill greater proportion: but in the preſent caſe we knew not on what to calculate. Who would dare to ſay what were the foundations of Bonaparte's power, what the party from which he muſt derive ſupport, what the line of conduct he muſt purſue? Who would preſume to affirm, as it had been ſhewn that he appeared to have ſcarce any natural holdings or connection with any conſiderable party in France, but that before the treaty ſhould be concluded, or immediately after it had been made, that he might not court the Jacobins, and acting upon their principles, might again bring into action the ſame revolutionary means of devaſtation and conqueſt, by which ſuch gigantic efforts had been already made, and the ſafety of other countries ſo much endangered? As he had before remarked, in ſpeaking of Bonaparte's ſincerity, it was to fight againſt the nature of things to argue that you ſhould repoſe the ſame confidence in a green and recent uſurpation, as in a government of known and eſtabliſhed ſtability. No one, he declared, felt more ſenſibly than he did the evils and miſeries of war; but it was not

on us that theſe were to be charged, but on him who had put his country into a ſituation in which he could not give the ordinary grounds on which we might judge of his intereſts, and calculate upon his conduct. The right hon. Gentleman who, after many remarks which well deſerved obſervation, offered at an hour too late for diſcuſſion at the time, had now again withdrawn himſelf, had painted an affecting ſcene of a field of battle, where, in the midſt of carnage and deſolation, any one aſking the cauſe of all thoſe horrors, ſhould be told that this was not war—we were only *pauſing*. But might he not alſo paint a picture in his turn? Suppoſing Bonaparte, by his propoſal of negociation, to have lulled aſleep our vigilance, to have tranſported to a neighbouring iſland (a part of the empire but too vulnerable), a body of his choſen troops —ſuppoſe the ſcenes of blood and ſlaughter by which Ireland had been before waſted, to be renewed, but with the fatal addition of our having to contend with the internal traitors, aided and ſtrengthened by a diſciplined and experienced army; then let the right hon. Gentleman's enquirer put the ſame queſtion. Would he not expreſs ſome aſtoniſhment at being told that this was not war—this was an *armiſtice*—this was *peace*? It was againſt ſuch a peace as this Mr. Wilberforce ſtated, that he felt it his duty to guard, and not to ſuffer himſelf to be deluded by the name, if there was not a ſufficient probability of our obtaining the thing itſelf. He declared, that the only object he would ever have in view, would be national *ſecurity*, and he for one, ſhould be eager to embrace any opportunity of negociating conſiſtently with that ſecurity; nor could he believe that this was not the ſentiment of all around him. Surely it would be unjuſt to Adminiſtration not to acknowledge, that when they conceived on the whole that peace afforded the moſt probable ground of ſecurity, they had ſhewn themſelves ready to treat for peace, to a degree of forwardneſs, which had been condemned by many as unworthy of their character. On the other hand, they had now declared partly, reaſoning on the principles he had juſt now ſtated, and taking into view the whole relative ſtate of this country, of the allies, and of the enemy, that it appeared to them ſafer not to liſten to the propoſal which had been recently made, and, however anxious for peace, he felt himſelf bound, on the whole, to acquieſce for the preſent in their opinion. He ſhould feel himſelf bound, however, at all times, to conſider this great ſubject with an impartial mind, and he truſted Adminiſtration

miniſtration would gladly liſten to any overtures for peace, or rather would make them, whenever there was, in ſo doing, a reaſonable proſpect of national ſecurity and honour.

Mr. *Hobhouſe* ſaid, that he would not enter into the queſtion about the origin of the war, as this was not now the queſtion, and as it had been already pretty clearly proved that we were the aggreſſors. To one argument upon that ſubject, however, he would beg leave to anſwer. Much ſtreſs had been laid upon the letter written by Louis XVI. to his Majeſty, thanking him for not taking a part with thoſe princes who had leagued againſt France. But upon examining dates, it would appear that this letter was of no importance to the queſtion. It was dated on the 1ſt of May, 1792, long before the declaration of war. He dwelt much upon the inconſiſtency of Miniſters in aſſigning as reaſons for now refuſing to treat, the inſtability of the French government, and the bad character of thoſe who are at the head of it, when they formerly did not heſitate to negociate with a government a few weeks old, and which was compoſed of men who had voted for the murder of their ſovereign. It was likewiſe inconſiſtent to ſay, that the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon would be an effectual method of putting an inſtant period to the war. Would not their government be much more recent than that of Bonaparte? How could we anſwer for its permanency? How could we even know their inclinations, and what their conduct would be, with no experience and no evidence from facts? Miniſters were not always ſo ſcrupulous: they had not heſitated to form an alliance with a potentate who had received a bribe to deſert the cauſe, and with another who had refuſed to acknowledge the receipt of money which had been ſent him. He contended that eternal war had now been declared againſt France. From all that had been ſaid, it was evident that Miniſters were determined to perſevere in the conteſt till monarchy is reſtored, and it was evident that this could never be effected. We had already uſed every effort to no purpoſe, and our chance of ſucceeding was formerly as fair as it now could poſſibly be. War had a tendency to confirm exiſting governments, and there was a greater chance of the Bourbons being reſtored were France at peace with her neighbours. He was ſurpriſed at the haughty declarations of Miniſters, conſidering how often their pride had been already humbled. They had refuſed to acknowledge the Republic, and had been at laſt obliged to acknowledge it; they proteſted that they would never conſent

ſent to the Netherlands remaining in the power of France, yet they found it neceſſary to make offer to France of retaining poſſeſſion of them. They would yet repent their raſh declarations, and in the hour of misfortune will regret that they have let ſlip ſuch a favourable opportunity of reſcuing the country from the calamitous war into which they had unneceſſarily plunged it.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* ſaid, that thoſe who were of opinion that peace may now be concluded, muſt maintain one of three things, either that the preſent government of France is ſtable, or that its character is good, or that neither ſtability nor integrity in the oppoſite party is neceſſary to the making of a ſecure peace. Seven revolutions had taken place in France in little more than as many years. What was there in the preſent government to lead any one to imagine that it would not ſhare the fate of thoſe which had preceded it? Its character was as bad as the imagination of man could conceive. In regular eſtabliſhed governments, whoſe policy has been guided for years by certain fixed principles, the moral character of thoſe who preſided over them was of ſmall conſequence. But in recent governments, by that alone could we judge of their probable behaviour. Would it be ſaid, then, that we ſhould make peace at all events. He could conceive circumſtances in which to do this would be neceſſary; but he thanked God that this country was not now in theſe. Our proſperity was greater than at any former period. Our agriculture was flouriſhing; our commerce was nearly doubled withing theſe few years; and though many new taxes had been impoſed, the old ones yielded more now than at any former period. To think of treating, then, with ſuch a government, would be nothing ſhort of abſolute madneſs. The difference betwixt our war and peace eſtabliſhments is greater than betwixt thoſe of any other nation. If we were to diſarm, France could at any time ſend over a force to invade us, which we would be unable to reſiſt.

When we entered into a negociation on a former occaſion, there had appeared a ſpirit of moderation in the French councils. Several obnoxious decrees had been been repealed, and there was teſtified an ardent deſire for peace. Perhaps it was then proper that an experiment ſhould be made, but he rejoiced that it had failed. That very government, notwithſtanding all its plauſible profeſſions, had ſince been guilty of the greateſt enormities in its conduct to the Italian republics, in its unprovoked attack upon Switzerland, and in its invaſion

invaſion of Egypt. Yet though Miniſters now rejoiced that they had not ſucceeded, he was certain that at the time they were anxious for ſucceſs. Since then, the ſituation of the country had greatly improved. Our finances, which were then rather deranged, are now flouriſhing beyond example. We ought, therefore, to fight till we obtain complete ſecurity. He wiſhed for the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon, as that would be the ſureſt means of conferring it upon us. He did not ſay that that was the only means, but he eagerly longed for the re-eſtabliſhment of that family. He was bound in honour and in juſtice to do ſo. It would be a moſt fortunate event for Great Britain, for France, and for Europe.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* brought up the army eſtimates for year 1800. Ordered to lie on the table.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* gave notice, that he would on Wedneſday next move for a vote on the army eſtimates, in the committee of ſupply.

The annual indemnity bill went through a committee, and was ordered to be read a third time on Monday next.

The committee of ſupply was ordered for the ſame day.—Adjourned till Monday.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

MONDAY, FEB. 10.

A petition in an appeal cauſe was preſented, after which the Houſe adjourned to the next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MONDAY, FEB. 10.

Sir *Richard Hill* brought up a petition from the priſoners confined in Shrewſbury gaol, praying for relief.—Ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. *Parker Coke* brought up a petition from the priſoners of Nottingham gaol, praying for relief. Ordered to be laid upon the table.

Mr. *Serjeant* brought up the ordnance accounts.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up a report from the committee of ſupply.

The order of the day was read for the ſecond reading of the bill for empowering his Majeſty to receive the voluntary ſervices

ſervices of the militia.—Read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed the next day.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* gave notice that he ſhould, on that day fortnight, open the budget.

The *Attorney General* gave notice that he ſhould on Thurſday next move for the further continuance of the ſuſpenſion of the habeas corpus act.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* brought up the report of the corn committee, which was ordered to be printed, and farther conſidered on Friday.

DUTCH EXPEDITION.

Mr. *Sheridan* roſe and ſpoke in ſubſtance as follows:—Sir, upon the extraordinary meeting of parliament on the 24th of September laſt, an opportunity occurred of diſcuſſing the propriety of reducing the militia force of the country by the introduction of a bill to carry that meaſure farther than had been done by the act of the preceding ſeſſion. The avowed purpoſe of that bill was, to enable miniſters to proſecute the expedition againſt Holland. Unfortunately I then differed from ſome of thoſe Gentlemen with whom I always feel it painful to diſagree upon political queſtions. I did not think that, in the peculiar circumſtances in which we then were placed, it was proper to oppoſe the meaſure. I will repeat the reaſons which then dictated my conduct.—I then diſapproved, as much as I had ever done, that bill as a dangerous violation of our great conſtitutional defence, the militia ſyſtem. When it was propoſed, however, to renew and extend the act, there were inducements to a reluctant acquieſcence in its renewal, which did not exiſt upon its firſt adoption. The law had paſſed, and miniſters had availed themſelves of its proviſions to aſſemble that army which was engaged in the Dutch expedition. We had received accounts of the battle of the 19th of September at Bergen. Our troops were in a critical ſituation, and ſeeing no other means by which reinforcements could be procured, I was unwilling that any thing ſhould be done that could lead our gallant army to think for a moment that they were abandoned by a Britiſh parliament.

On that occaſion likewiſe I aſſumed, that miniſters in proſecuting the attempt which they had begun, acted on the moſt authentic information of the favourable diſpoſitions of the Dutch people. I ſtated that the executive government, in relying upon their knowledge, and proceeding upon their intelligence, incurred a great reſponſibility. Having done ſo then,

then, I ſhould conceive that I ſhrunk from a ſort of pledge I had given, did I not now endeavour to make miniſters anſwer for the confidence which they obtained, and for the courſe which they purſued. I was indeed inclined to entertain no very ſanguine hopes of ultimate ſucceſs in the enterpriſe, after the experience we had of its commencement. My apprehenſions were removed in ſome meaſure when I heard it ſtated by a right hon. Gentleman oppoſite to me, that we had the moſt unqueſtionable information of the attachment of the Dutch to the cauſe we ſupported. I was again damped in theſe agreeable expectations when I found that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Pitt) ſhrinked from any declaration that miniſters proceeded on ſuch ſure ground, when he ſaid that we were juſtified in the proſecution of the plan by a knowledge, not of the actual ſtate and diſpoſition of the Dutch people, but by a knowledge of human nature—a knowledge now recorded in characters of blood and woe upon the coaſts of Holland. When I heard this alledged as ſufficient foundation for our experiment, I again deſpaired of a favourable reſult.

As to the enquiry which I ſhall have the honour to propoſe, few arguments, I ſhould think, are neceſſary to prove that it ought to be adopted. When the news arrived of the total failure of the expedition, a failure ſo diſaſtrous, ſo diſgraceful, ſo humiliating, to thoſe by whom it was planned, while no blame can attach to the conduct of the gallant officers and men whoſe efforts were thus rendered unprofitable, the univerſal cry was, that an enquiry ſhould be inſtituted by the Houſe into the cauſes by which ſo ignominious an event was occaſioned. Whether the public feeling of indignation has cooled in the interval that has elapſed, I will not take upon me to ſay. The right hon. Gentleman, however, did every thing in his power to prevent any motion for enquiry while the diſgrace was yet recent, and the feeling of the country warm. With the intelligence in his poſſeſſion of what amounted to nothing leſs than the overthrow of all our hopes of ultimate ſucceſs, parliament was adjourned, every attempt to inveſtigate was rendered impoſſible, and the reſentment and mortification of the public were left to ſink away of themſelves, or to be diverted by freſh occurrences.

I profeſs, Sir, that in bringing this ſubject before the Houſe, I do not conſider it as a party queſtion. It is one that can admit of no party feeling. It is a queſtion, that in the higheſt degree intereſts every feeling for the glory of the country, every ſentiment of humanity for the loſs our troops

have ſuſtained, for the honour which they have to ſupport. As members of this Houſe we are called upon by the ſacred duty we owe to our conſtituents, to inveſtigate a tranſaction, which, on the face of it, preſents ſo much argument for enquiry; and which, in its conſequences, has been attended with ſuch a waſte of blood, and expence of treaſure.

In treating of this queſtion, then, I ſhall not proceed upon ſuch private information as every gentleman in this Houſe may have had an opportunity to obtain. I ſhall found my arguments and concluſions upon the recorded accounts of miniſters themſelves in their own gazettes, upon the information furniſhed by them in their proclamations and treaties. I ſhall not conſider the advantages of having obtained poſſeſſion of the Dutch fleet. That acquiſition I view, perhaps, as leſs important than others do, and I ſhall take an opportunity of ſaying a few words reſpecting it. Excepting the Dutch fleet then, what have we obtained to compenſate for the loſs of men, for the profuſion of money, for the diſcredit we have incurred? I ſhould be extremely glad to know what arguments will be employed to diſſuade the Houſe from agreeing to an enquiry. I hope we ſhall not to-night hear it urged againſt examining the cauſes of an expedition ſo waſteful in its attempt, ſo ignominious in its failure, that it might reveal what is improper to be known, that it will interrupt the ſervice, or produce thoſe inconveniences which it has been uſual to object to ſuch a motion of enquiry. Arguments like theſe I have heard combated by the right hon. Gentleman during the American war, and I hope he will not rely upon them now. Indeed they have not in this caſe the plauſibility they may have had in others. By inveſtigating the cauſes of the failure of the expedition to Holland, what is there to reveal that can be prejudicial to us in future? What interruption can it give to any part of the public ſervice? I cannot ſuppoſe, ſurely, that it will be contended that there has been no failure. I cannot conceive, that the corrupt and clandeſtine ſurrender of the Dutch fleet will be viewed as the attainment of all our wiſhes, and the ſucceſs of all our views. Yet I ſee, that in the ſpeech of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in opening the Parliament of that country, ſomething like this is advanced. The Marquis Cornwallis tells the Iriſh parliament, that the expedition to Holland has been attended with ſuch mighty advantages, that it will prevent the invaſion of Ireland, and ſo forth, and merely ſpeaks of it as having not quite ſucceeded. He ſpeaks as if the main object of our policy,

licy, and of our efforts, was not the deliverance of the Dutch from the yoke of France; not the reſtoration of the Houſe of Orange to their rights; not the protection of religion, the defence of ſocial order, but the capture of a few Dutch ſhips of war had been the object of ſuch expenſive preparation and extraordinary efforts; as if for ſuch an acquiſition we had ſubſidized the mercenary magnanimity of the Ruſſian emperor, for this called into action our military ſtrength, and ſtrained our financial reſources.

What other advantage than this then I repeat have we obtained from this famed ſecret expedition? Secret, indeed, it was called, till the name became abſolutely ridiculous. Never, indeed, was an undertaking conducted with ſuch oſtentatious myſtery—never did the object of a ſecret expedition obtain ſuch univerſal notoriety. The only thing ſecret in the expedition was the favourable diſpoſition of the Dutch people to our cauſe; a ſecret ſo well kept to be ſure, that to this hour it never has been diſcovered.

But I ſee by the geſtures of the right hon. Gentlemen oppoſite, that they are of opinion that the Dutch fleet is not the only thing we have gained. It may be ſo, to be ſure, in a certain way. It was an expedition of diſcovery not altogether unſucceſsful in this view. We have made three notable diſcoveries:—we have, in the firſt place, diſcovered that there is no reliance to be placed in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's knowledge of human nature; we have diſcovered that Holland is a country interſected by dykes, and ditches, and canals; and we have diſcovered that the weather there, too, is not ſo good in October as it is in June! The inſtruction, which we have thus obtained, is doubtleſs very valuable:—it is a good thing to learn to diſtruſt the knowledge of miniſters in human nature; the topography and climate of a country were good things alſo to be acquainted with. This information, however, may be purchaſed too dear. If we conſider the number of lives which have been loſt; if we reflect that the tenth of every man's income has been ſquandered—that ſo much of our beſt blood has been ſhed in vain, and all by the miſconduct of miniſters, we ſhall have little reaſon to boaſt that our diſcoveries have been eaſily made, and our acquiſitions cheaply bought.

I have already alluded to the capture of the Dutch fleet. I muſt ſpeak out fairly what I think. I do not prize this acquiſition at a very high rate. When we are told that it has prevented the invaſion of Ireland, we are to conſider on

what terms this capture was made. We took poſſeſſion of the Dutch ſhips in the name of the Stadtholder. Are they to be manned with the mutinous crews who ſurrendered them, and employed in the name of the Stadtholder? if ſo, they are no addition to our navy. But it is ſaid, if not an addition to our maritime ſtrength, they at leaſt are a deduction from that of the enemy. Yet if they were to be manned by thoſe ſailors who gave them up to England, they could never have been formidable to us as enemies. This boaſted acquiſition, in every view, appears to be of very little importance.

When I reflect, however, upon the mode in which this acquiſition was gained, I think it not only of little value, I conſider it as of the moſt perilous example; I could wiſh we had won it in ſome other way, or not at all. I do not regret that it was not obtained at the expence of bloodſhed, yet I tremble to ſee a deliberating navy in the face of the naval force of England; I dread to behold the example of ſeamen deciding upon the cauſe of their country, inſtead of fighting its battles. I don't like to ſee mutiny recommended to our ſailors by any example or any approbation. I hope there is nothing in the temper of our navy to catch the infection. I like to ſee the ſpirit of Blake prevail, who told his ſailors, that it was their duty to fight for their country in whatever hands the government might be. This is ſound reaſon, theſe are the ſafeſt maxims. It is not wiſe or politic to encourage any other. When we conſider how the fleet was ſurrendered, I doubted much, whether the conduct of the ſailors afforded any proof of the diſpoſition of the people. We know, by fatal experience, that artifices may be ſucceſsfully employed to delude even our own navy into a conduct which the nation univerſally diſapproves.—What were the means employed to produce that temper in the Dutch navy to which we owe the capture of the fleet? Were they ſuch as can be avowed and juſtified? If miniſters encouraged and promoted a ſpirit of mutiny among the Dutch ſailors, they ill underſtood the intereſts of their own country. They have departed from a great principle to ſerve a particular purpoſe. To gain a partial advantage they have introduced a moſt dangerous precedent. Suppoſe that Admiral Story had reſiſted the ſpirit of mutiny and diſobedience: ſuppoſe he had done what De Ruyter would have done in his ſituation, and endeavoured to maintain his authority and periſhed in the attempt, would you have permitted your ſeamen to welcome the Dutch ſailors beſmeared with the blood of their admiral and officers? Would you have ſanctioned ſuch a deed?

a deed? Would you have applauded the doers? Would you have allowed your ſeamen to become their allies and aſſociates?

Yet was it only the want of vigour in the officers that prevented this cataſtrope; the example is the ſame, and we all know how dangerous ſuch a violation is to the principle of diſcipline. It is not eaſy to guard againſt the contagion. When ſpeaking of the character of our navy, and the neceſſity of preſerving it, I cannot help ſaying a word or two of practices that have long been permitted to diſgrace its character, and corrupt its ſpirit. Every body muſt have heard of the ſyſtem of ſending United Iriſhmen on board the fleet. Culprits and vagabonds of every deſcription, worthleſs wretches of every kind are thought good enough for his Majeſty's ſervice, and people ſpeak of putting them on board ſhip as the fitteſt place in the world for their reception. Is it poſſible to conceive a more groſs and palpable folly a more ſhameful and dangerous abuſe? For God's ſake diſpoſe of ſuch people any where but in your navy. Place them in your public offices. Send them to the treaſury, the exciſe, the cuſtoms. Provide for them in the war-office; feed them with cheeſe-parings and candles-ends, but do not convert your navy into a receptacle for rogues and traitors. Do not diſpoſe of them in a way that makes them more dangerous than they could be any where elſe. What ſhould you think, for inſtance, if your ſhips were to be built in the ſame way they are manned? What would you think if when a rotten beam became turned up it were to be ſaid, O! this will do for his Majeſty's uſe, ſend it to the dock-yard? Yet the abſurdity would be no greater than than which is practiſed every day in the manner I have ſtated. As you build your ſhips of the ſoundeſt wood, you ſhould take no leſs care to man them with the ſoundeſt hearts.

Entertaining theſe ſentiments reſpecting the importance of preſerving the ſpirit of your navy, I can as little approve the mode in which the Dutch fleet was gained, as I can enter into the views of thoſe who repreſent the acquiſition as of ſo much importance.—Take into conſideration the whole of the caſe; weigh what you have loſt and what you have gained, and you will find that there is a fearful balance againſt you. The reſult of the late expedition has thrown diſcredit on your counſels; it has heaped diſhonour on your operations. You cannot again repeat the attempt of reſtoring the Houſe of Orange; you have left the pretenſions of that family more

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deſperate than ever. The confidence of their enemies is confirmed; the hopes of their partizans are overthrown. After this review I confeſs I cannot conceive how any man can contend that the reſult of the expedition has in any degree repaid our ſacrifices, or realized our expectations.

As to the object of the expedition in ſo far as it aimed at the reſcue of Holland from the dominion of France, and the reſtoration of the Houſe of Orange, I moſt readily agree that in as far as it could have been attempted with any hopes of ſucceſs, and with any regard to the actual circumſtances of this country, it was as legitimate a Britiſh object as can be imagined. I admit that it was, in principle, as ſound policy to oppoſe the French dominion in Holland in 1799, as it was to prevent its triumph in 1787. In proportion however, as the object was wiſe and good, muſt be the criminality of thoſe to whoſe miſconduct its failure is to be attributed. If, by their groſs negligence, their ignorance, and their preſumption, we have failed in an undertaking ſo dear to every Britiſh heart, the value of the prize for which we contended only augments the mortification of our diſappointment.

That the Houſe of Orange has ſtrong claims upon the gratitude, nay upon the juſtice of Great Britain, I am ſure I do not deny. They have well deſerved that hoſpitable aſylum which they enjoy in this country. They have ever been faithfully attached to its cauſe. Their expulſion from their hereditary authority in Holland, indeed, is in a great meaſure to be aſcribed to their deference to Britiſh councils, perhaps their devotion to the views of Britiſh miniſters. The reſtoration of that family to their fortunes and their rank was in itſelf an honourable motive for our interference. I cannot at the ſame time agree in the opinion that we had any particular claim to the attachment of the Dutch. I ſee it aſſumed in the proclamations addreſſed to them, that they muſt be ours in their hearts. I doubt the fact very much, and I am at a loſs to diſcover upon what miniſters could have formed this ſuppoſition. I cannot but wonder how it was imagined that our attempt was agreeable to the general will of the people in Holland. When the proſpect of reſtoring the Houſe of Bourbon in France was under conſideration in this Houſe, the right hon. Gentleman aſſured us, that ſuch an attempt could not be ſucceſsful without the general conſent of the people; nay, that it ought not to ſucceed. Why then did he not apply the ſame reaſoning to the caſe of Holland? Why do miniſters in the note, in anſwer to the propoſals from the French government,

government, ſay that his Majeſty does not claim to preſcribe a government for France, if they do not admit the weight of the maxim? They ſurely do not admit the principle in the caſe of France, becauſe ſhe is ſtrong, and deny it Holland becauſe ſhe is weak? What then had we to expect from the concurrence of the Dutch? What influence ought their character and diſpoſitions to have had upon the plan and conduct of the expedition?

It muſt be familiar to every gentleman who is acquainted with the relative connection of this country with Holland, that it is long ſince any cordiality prevailed between the two countries. The French faction had been encreaſing, and poſſeſſed a very powerful intereſt in the United Provinces. In this ſituation, grounds of diſpute have ariſen at no very remote period. In the American war, the Dutch complained bitterly of our aggreſſions. In anſwer to their complaints, the Dutch were repreſented in ſpeeches and proclamations as a dull and ſtupid people. A noble lord, then in the adminiſtration, uſed the extraordinary expreſſion, that the Dutch muſt be "ſtunned into their ſenſes." By ſuch treatment the influence of France was increaſed in Holland. Perhaps too, it is but fair to acknowledge, that the Dutch, in the mere view of promoting their own intereſts, might conceive the connection with France more beneficial to them than that with England. This led to the attempts which were made in 1787, to draw more cloſe the connection with France. This deſign was prevented by the interference of this country and by the efforts of a Pruſſian army. But, was this triumph uſed in ſuch a way as to conciliate the Dutch? At the breaking out of the preſent war the Dutch, againſt their own wiſhes, nay, againſt the remonſtrances of many ſincere friends of the Houſe of Orange, were compelled to abandon their neutrality and take a ſhare in the war. They were engaged in the conteſt by our influence, but we were not able to protect them in the moment of difficulty. From being our allies they became our enemies. But previous to this change, what were the ſymptons of cordiality and good underſtanding when we were endeavouring to defend Holland? Did not our troops leave that country complaining of the people, irritated by their reproaches? After the ſucceſs of the French invaſion, was our conduct calculated to increaſe the number of our friends, and to diminiſh the number of our enemies? Was it right, after the Stadtholder had taken refuge in this country, to conſider him as ſovereign of Holland, which he never

never was; to require his conſent to the ſeizure of ſo much Dutch property. Were ſuch meaſures conciliatory? Did they tend to promote the intereſt of the Stadtholder? Upon the negociation for peace at Liſle, what was the conduct of miniſters? The negociation was broke off, becauſe the French refuſed to allow us to retain, as indemnification for their aggrandizement, the conqueſts we had made at the expence of the Dutch, who had been involved in the quarrel by our obſtinacy and violence. What were the Dutch to think of this proceeding? Smarting under the loſſes they had ſuſtained, muſt they not have conſidered us as groſs hypocrites when lately we affected ſuch a zeal for their intereſts which, in the inſtances alluded to, we had rendered ſo much ſubſervient to our own? If formerly they ſaw us willing to compenſate the conqueſts of France by retaining all their colonial poſſeſſions, could they believe us more diſintereſted, after having ſubſidized the forces of Ruſſia, and increaſed our claims to indemnification by ſo much additional expenditure?

Theſe are circumſtances which could not fail to produce a powerful impreſſion upon the cool and calculating Dutchman. On entering upon the expedition for the deliverance of Holland, what means did we employ to efface the prejudice that muſt have exiſted againſt our diſintereſtedneſs. Look at the proclamations which were iſſued on our landing in Holland. Read that diſtributed by Sir Ralph Abercrombie: It holds out to the Dutch to be ſure delightful viſions of future happineſs under their ancient government; but it ſays not a word of the Cape of Good Hope, of Ceylon, Trincomalee. The gallant officer by whom it was iſſued I acquit of any ſhare in the compoſition. He is not anſwerable for its policy. But what is its ſpirit? We addreſs the Dutch, a people cold, conſiderate, phlegmatic, as if they were a nation of religious fanatics or chivalrous warriors. Religion is dragged in upon all occaſions, and why is it ſo I cannot underſtand. The French did not interfere with the religion of the Dutch. They do not ſeem, indeed, to have prevented religious worſhip in any country where their arms have prevailed, but leaſt of all had they any temptation to interfere with the poverty and ſimplicity of the religious inſtitutions of the Dutch. What influence, then, could ſuch topics produce in Holland? Every thing that could have no effect was urged—every thing that could engage them in our favour was omitted. We tell the Dutch to "Forget and forgive the paſt." But, how will they underſtand this advice?—Will they

they not conſider it as a recommendation to *forget* that they ever had colonies, and to *forgive* us for taking them? The miniſter ſeems to have underſtood very little of Dutch human nature if he expected ſuch proclamations to have any ſucceſs among them. If inſtead of all the fine reflections upon religion, ſocial order, and their former government, he had ſaid we will give you back all your colonies, the argument would have been underſtood, and the effect might have been favourable. Inſtead of this, what did we tell them but this—Be a nation without trade; take back your old government; be a province dependant upon England through the Stadtholder. Theſe are the bleſſings which we promiſe you, and which you muſt co-operate with us to obtain.

Theſe conſiderations I have adduced to ſhow that miniſters had not truly calculated the temper and views of the people of Holland; that they had no reaſon to flatter themſelves with the ſupport of that country; and that they did not purſue the courſe by which it was to be obtained. It was, to the laſt degree, arrogant and preſumptuous to involve this nation in the expence of ſuch an armament as was employed in the late expedition, upon vain ſpeculations. The right hon. Gentleman ſhould not have put his theories of human nature to ſuch a coſtly experiment. He ought to have done what every wiſe ſtateſman ſhould do—act only in matters of ſuch high moment and extenſive concern, upon authentic information, and upon practical grounds.

There is another very material point which I cannot paſs unnoticed; after ſubmitting to the ſacrifice of ſo much blood to ſuch heavy burdens, it is not too much to ſay that we are entitled to plain dealing; but if the plan propoſed had been attended with ſucceſs, was it the intention of miniſters to eſtabliſh the old government of Holland? I confeſs I have doubts on this ſubject. It may be recollected that a noble and vigorous ſtateſman in another place, in arguing upon the Iriſh Union, repreſented the old government of Holland, as feeble, inefficient, incompetent to its own defence, and to any uſeful exertion from the want of unity in its executive authority. Was it then for the re-eſtabliſhment of this piece of imbecility, this form of government incapable of ſelf-defence, incapable of contributing any aſſiſtance to its allies, that the blood and treaſure was to be applied? Or was it intended to ſtrengthen the government, to give it the vigour of deſpotiſm for the purpoſe of ſelf-defence and uſeful alliance? If this was their intention, they meant a uſurpation, and I truſt that

the Stadtholder would have been an unwilling uſurper. Can we conceive that they concealed this deſign, if it was really entertained? if they did not communicate the intention to the partizans of the Houſe of Orange, they were guilty of a ſhameful fraud in inviting them to contribute to the reſtoration of the ancient government, while they were in fact to riſk their lives and fortunes for a new conſtitution. If they did communicate their deſign to improve the former government by an infuſion of additional ſtrength, were they ſure that the Dutch would agree to changes which violated thoſe principles and thoſe forms to which they were obſtinately attached? After the differences, then, which ſubſiſted between this country and Holland during the American war; after the experience of the campaigns on the continent in which we were engaged along with them againſt France; after the known views of domeſtic parties in Holland; after we had forced Holland into the war, and ſhowed, after all, a deſire to indemnify ourſelves by the poſſeſſion of her colonies for the continental conqueſts; after the grounds of ſuſpicion which exiſted againſt our intentions, both with regard to the commercial relations and the political eſtabliſhments of Holland, had we any reaſons to infer a welcome reception, or a cordial co-operation? If their conſent made a neceſſary ingredient in the expedition, had we ſuch aſſurance of their favourable diſpoſition, as to juſtify an enterpriſe, to the ſucceſs of which it was eſſential? Miniſters had no right to calculate upon the diſpoſitions of the Dutch. They are guilty, therefore, of having ſquandered the blood and reſources of this country upon a plan, undertaken without due examination, and concerted without a proper attention to the circumſtances on which its ſucceſs neceſſarily depended.

In conſidering the ſcheme of this expedition from its firſt conception to the period of its execution, we find in it ſuch variation and uncertainty as preclude the ſuppoſition that it was embraced and purſued upon any uniform views of policy. The powers of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, given in his proclamation to the Dutch, are dated in December 1798, from which a preſumption ariſes that the plan of the expedition was in agitation at the time of the firſt treaty with Ruſſia, which was concluded about that period. The declaration of the Emperor Paul in his "zeal for the cauſe of Sovereigns," (and from the inſtance of Poland we may eſtimate this zeal) points at this attempt for the *deliverance* of Holland. If it was then planned and agreed that Ruſſian troops ſhould be employed,

employed, what was the policy of miniſters?—Though they had themſelves admitted that the ſcheme muſt be a *coup de main*, and that its ſucceſs depended upon ſurpriſe, the landing in Holland was not effected till the 27th Auguſt 1799! It appears that expectations had been formed of inducing Pruſſia to enter into the common cauſe againſt France. In June 1799, however, all hopes of drawing Pruſſia from her neutrality were abandoned. A treaty is concluded, in which, beſides the troops to be employed in other objects, 17,000 Ruſſians are to be employed in the expedition againſt Holland. The Emperor Paul too, with that magnanimity which characteriſes all his tranſactions with this country, agrees to employ ſome of his own ſhips to tranſport the forces to England, upon condition of his being allowed ample indemnification for fitting out the veſſels in queſtion, for another expedition. This ſeems to be the firſt ſpecific arrangement of the plan, and the management of Miniſters in this is likewiſe ſingularly conſpicuous! At the time when they expected the co-operation of Pruſſia, no very preciſe reſolution had been taken reſpecting the Dutch expedition. The exertions of the king of Pruſſia were ſolicited to promote objects which, as the event ſhewed, could be attained without his aſſiſtance; that deſign, however, to which he muſt have been well inclined, and for the ſucceſs of which his co-operation was eſſential, was but faintly, if at all, brought into notice. After his determination to remain neutral, Miniſters, as if to ſhew their reſentment of his policy, then determined to proſecute with the greateſt vigour that plan to which, of all others, the concurrence of the Pruſſian Cabinet, and the co-operation of the Pruſſian forces, were neceſſary.

The landing at the Helder was at length effected. I muſt do juſtice to the gallant officers employed in the expedition. No blame whatever attaches to the conduct of the Royal Commander in Chief, and thoſe who ſerved along with him. The expedition was planned upon ſuch ſanguine calculations of co-operation from the inhabitants, that the military efforts were made dependant upon the political views of its authors. The army was ſent to Holland as to a friendly country. Its ſupplies of every kind were arranged upon this preſumption. The Duke of York himſelf, not a member of the Cabinet, had no means of verifying the calculations upon which the Cabinet Miniſters had reſolved upon the expedition. I am aware that Parliament does not know ſuch a body as the Cabinet Council. I do not criticiſe the ſelection which his Ma-

jeſty has made of that body, which may be conſidered as a Committee of that which the conſtitution recogniſes, the Privy Council. Still I cannot help thinking that at a moment ſo critical as the preſent, the Commander in Chief ought to have been a Member of the Cabinet. The Duke of York was unacquainted with the true ſtate of Holland. His military plans and military conduct muſt have been accommodated to the political views and political repreſentations of Miniſters. In ſaying that the Duke of York was a proper perſon to adviſe his Majeſty as a Member of the Cabinet, upon every thing which ſuch an expedition might require, I repeat only what the public voice has declared of his Royal Highneſs's honourable, attentive, and meritorious government of the army ſince he has poſſeſſed the chief command. To his Royal Highneſs I impute no blame. He is not reſponſible for the planning of the enterpriſe, which, framed as it was, muſt have influenced ſo much upon the military execution. It is to the authors of the ſcheme that we are to charge the faults of the deſign, and the diſgrace of the cataſtrophe.

The army then went to Holland as to a friendly country. A ſummons was ſent by General Abercrombie to the Batavian Commander, in a ſtile of haughty menace, which clearly proved that it was not the production of this gallant and reſpectable officer. The conduct of Sir Ralph Abercrombie on every occaſion, his manly and upright proceedings while in Ireland, prove him to be a man not likely to be the author of a production ſuch as that to which I allude. The anſwer of the Batavian officer was ſpirited. What a contraſt, indeed, between the preſumptuous tone with which we addreſſed the enemy at the beginning, and the ignominious eſcape we were at length compelled to ſtipulate for at the termination of the campaign. Miniſters ſay that they cannot make peace with the French government; that the latter never yet obſerved any armiſtice that they concluded. In our own inſtance we know by fatal experience, that if we cannot make peace with France, we can make a convention; we know from the teſtimony of our own officers, that the enemy can obſerve an armiſtice. But what was the caſe when General Abercrombie landed? Did he find the Batavian troops diſpoſed, like the ſailors, to ſurrender without a blow? Did he not meet with the moſt vigorous reſiſtance, even before any Frenchman appeared in action, and our very firſt ſucceſs was purchaſed by the loſs of a great number of

our

our brave countrymen? How did it happen, that after the landing was effected, no attempt was made to follow up the firſt advantage? Was General Abercrombie prevented by his orders, or by the want of neceſſaries, from advancing? It is a matter of leſs importance, indeed, but it tends to explain the want of arrangement in the plan; that the army was for ſome time deſtitute of the means of moving forward. There were no waggons, not even for the wounded, many of whom ſuffered the utmoſt diſtreſs; nay, were expoſed abſolutely to periſh for want of carriages to convey them to medical aſſiſtance. Is it of no importance that ſo little judgment and foreſight were exerciſed in fitting out the expedition, that Britiſh troops were thus, without neceſſity, obliged to ſubmit to ſuch hardſhips? So ignorantly too were the waggons conſtructed, ſo ill ſuited to the nature of the roads in Holland, that a march might have been traced, like a route, by the fragments of broken waggons. No perſonal conſideration ought to ſhield from enquiry the perſons in the various ſituations of Contractors, Purveyors, &c. to whom theſe, and ſimilar inconveniences were owing.

Between the firſt landing at the Helder, and the arrival of the reinforcements under the Duke of York, an opportunity had been given to aſcertain the determined reſolution of the Batavian army to reſiſt our attempts. French troops were pouring into Holland. Was it not known likewiſe that the nature of the country afforded means of defence almoſt inſuperable? Were not all the circumſtances which pointed out the certain concluſion, that the expedition could not be ultimately ſucceſsful, known previous to the ſailing of the Duke of York? If there was not a ſecret motive for perſevering in the expedition, which no common underſtanding can ſuſpect, why did not Miniſters profit by their experience to avoid further diſaſter? If they did not know all theſe circumſtances they muſt ſtand convicted of a negligence no leſs criminal than the preſumption of perſiſting after ſo many warnings to deſiſt. On the 10th of September, the French and Batavians, anxious to make an impreſſion on our troops before the arrival of the reinforcements, attacked Sir Ralph Abercrombie, but were repulſed by the gallantry of our troops, and the ſtrength of their poſition. On the 13th, the Duke of York arrived, and on the 19th, an attack was made upon the enemy, which was ſucceſsful in that part where the Britiſh troops were engaged, and unſucceſsful on the part of the Ruſſians. Of the behaviour of the latter I ſhall ſay but little.

If,

If, however, the accounts of their conduct in the villages where they came be true, it would form the ground, not merely of enquiry, but of an addreſs to his Majeſty, no longer to expoſe the Britiſh troops to the diſgrace ———. The reſult of this action was, that the Britiſh and Ruſſian forces retreated to their former poſition.

Here I muſt beg the attention of the Houſe to what was paſſing at home: on the 24th, Parliament was to meet: Miniſters had intelligence of this diſaſtrous engagement; they were appriſed of the reſiſtance of the Dutch troops, of the backwardneſs of the inhabitants to aſſiſt our cauſe: yet, with all theſe facts in their poſſeſſion, they made his Majeſty come down to Parliament, and expreſs his ſanguine hopes of the ultimate ſucceſs of the expedition! If, then, Miniſters were aware of the true ſtate of our affairs in Holland, a more groſs contempt of truth or more flagrant deception of Parliament was never practiſed by any adminiſtration.

After the action of the 2d October, the army moved forward. This was repreſented as a great victory; there is every reaſon to believe, however, that it was a drawn battle. Alkmaer was ſtated to have opened its gates, as if this had been the act of the inhabitants, and a proof of their friendly diſpoſition. The fact, however, was, that a lieutenant and ſome troops having accidentally advanced near the place, found that it was without means of defence, of which he immediately gave information, and the town was occupied by our troops. In his diſpatches after the action, his Royal Highneſs ſtates, that it had given him the command of an extent of country, and that the inhabitants would have an opportunity to declare themſelves. What was the conſequence? The army attempted to advance; an engagement took place on the 6th, in which we claimed the victory: but ſo little advantageous was the ſucceſs, that on the 7th, in the evening, the retreat was ordered, and the army returned to the old poſition at Shagen Brug. This retreat was conducted ſo precipitately that 400 women and children were left behind: Theſe the French treated with great propriety; nay, theſe cruel and perfidious enemies actually cloathed the children and ſent them back with the women to the Britiſh head-quarters. Thus, at length, inſtead of the deliverance of the Dutch, the hopes of which we had ſo ſanguinely indulged, the army was compelled to enter into a capitulation for its eſcape! What a ſad and mortifying termination of a plan in which ſo much exertion had been employed, and ſo much of

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our hopes had been embarked! I do not cenſure thoſe by whom it was concluded: I believe, on the contrary, that it was inevitable in the ſituation in which the army was placed. Yet how painful a reflection! To find that the inducement held out to the enemy to agree to the convention, was a threat to deſtroy for ever the means of trade, of commerce, of that people whom we had gone to ſave! I am ſure that had circumſtances made it neceſſary to proceed to ſo cruel an alternative, it would have been employed with reluctance. It was a humiliating thing, after ſuch proud expectations, to fail in our deſign, and fail too amidſt ſuch an accumulation of diſgrace. Our army left Holland with ſentiments of indignation againſt the Batavians, by whom they conceived themſelves injured and deceived; with deteſtation of their allies, to whoſe miſconduct they imputed the diſaſtrous termination of the campaign, and with increaſed eſteem for the enemy whom they had been taught to abhor.

Such is the tranſaction which the Houſe is called upon to inveſtigate. Never was there a caſe which *prima facie* preſented ſtronger grounds for enquiry. There are moments when it becomes this Houſe to exerciſe a peculiar jealouſy of its reputation. An opinion has gone abroad, that this Houſe has repoſed too blind a confidence in Miniſters. The rewards which have followed this confidence have thrown more than a ſuſpicion on the purity of the motive. It is neceſſary, on an occaſion like this, to watch their conduct with more than ordinary attention. The public intereſt which it has excited, the univerſal regard which the deciſion of the Houſe will attract, muſt render it the object of more than common ſeverity of reviſion. The ſuſpicion that the Miniſter has nothing to fear from the controuling vigilance of Parliament, muſt either be ſtrongly confirmed, or honourably removed. It is not a conſequence which any Member need fear from the reſult of enquiry, that Miniſters will be obliged to quit their places. It would be no advantage, doubtleſs, to ſhew that the adminiſtration of this country is in the hands of convicted incapacity; but ſtill it would be a far greater evil to prove that Miniſters are too powerful for controul; that error is exempted from enquiry, and miſconduct ſecure from cenſure. The preſent caſe ſhould afford a ſalutary caution to the Houſe how they give their confidence to Miniſters to purſue againſt France that ſyſtem of exploded impolicy which has produced ſuch fatal miſchief and indelible diſgrace. We are at war for the reſtoration of the Bourbons,

Bourbons, and for nothing elſe. All the qualifications with which this propoſition is limited are mere quibbles. This is the *ſine qua non* to immediate peace. It was ſtated in the anſwer of Lord Grenville, that there was a *poſſibility* of negociating with the preſent government of France, but if it be true that what is poſſible is *quid poteſt eſſe*, there was no immediate alternative. We were fighting for the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon. The queſtion reſolves itſelf into three propoſitions; the people of France muſt inſtitute a government which his Majeſty's Miniſters ſhall approve, and then ſubmit to prove its ſtability. In the mean time this ſtability is to be aſcertained by employing every hoſtile means to work its overthrow. Bonaparte muſt ſhew by the evidence of facts, that he is ſincere in his deſire of peace, while it is the policy of Miniſters to employ every effort to diſturb his authority, and every inſult to provoke his reſentment. The only alternative which Miniſters were willing to accept as the price of peace, is the unconditional reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon. But if no enlarged view of policy, no dictate of conſtitutional jealouſy can move a Britiſh Houſe of Commons to inſtitute the propoſed enquiry, they owe it to the reputation of the army, whoſe conduct has never been cenſured in this country, but whoſe honour has been cruelly attacked abroad, to inveſtigate the tranſaction to the bottom, and lay the blame where it ought to fall. Read the report which has been publiſhed in the Peterſburgh Gazette of the different actions in Holland, and ſay whether you are not called upon to vindicate the character of the Britiſh army? Do you feel ſo little for the military fame of your country as to ſuffer them to ſtand in the face of Europe branded with ſuch a ſtigma? Do you eſteem ſo little the reputation of the gallant officers employed in Holland, the Duke of York, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, Sir James Pulteney, General Dundas, that excellent officer, General Moore, and thoſe who ſerved with him, as to allow the aſperſions caſt upon their renown in the libellous letter of General d'Eſſen to remain uncontradicted? You owe it to the character of the Britiſh nation, to the ſpirit of your troops; you owe it to the honour of the living, to the memory of the dead, to go into an enquiry, which will diſtinguiſh thoſe who have been guilty of miſconduct, and incurred diſgrace. I move that the Houſe reſolve itſelf into a committee of the whole Houſe to enquire into the cauſes of the failure of the late expedition to Holland.

Mr.

Mr. *Dundas* ſaid, Sir, in riſing to offer my ſentiments on the preſent occaſion to the Houſe, I do aſſure you I wiſh to give to the ſubject in debate every conſideration that is due to its importance. As much as the hon. Gentleman can wiſh, I do moſt ſincerely wiſh, that this country and Europe may know, whatever it would be prudent to give to the world concerning the expedition to Holland: but the mode now ſuggeſted is very remote from that which it would be wiſe for this Houſe to purſue. Before calling on us for our vote, it was incumbent on the hon. Gentleman to avow an object that would at leaſt render a motion for an enquiry plauſible. I watched him narrowly in the whole progreſs of his ſpeech, but it was only in the concluding ſentences of it, that I could diſcover, for the firſt time, his genuine intention, and the real grounds of enquiry. In former times enquiries have been propoſed on very intereſting, and great national queſtions, but never for the purpoſes avowed this night by the hon. Gentleman. Aſſumed miſconduct in his Majeſty's Miniſters; cenſure for ſuch miſconduct; the ſupporting and vindicating the honour and character of the country; or the removal of incapable Miniſters from office; have, till now, been held out as the only proper objects of inquiry and inveſtigation. But the hon. Gentleman has, on the preſent occaſion, brought forward another motive, and one quite different from any I have named, as that which influenced the motion he had juſt ſubmitted to the Houſe. This motive would be under any circumſtances extraordinary, but it is moſt particularly ſo when we know to whom it is addreſſed. It is recent in the memory of Gentlemen, that it is only a few nights ſince the hon. Gentleman, and thoſe who ſit near him, made an attempt to draw the Houſe into a diſapprobation of the conduct of his Majeſty's Miniſters, on the occaſion of the late overture of the enemy, and alſo to draw from the Houſe a pledge that it would negociate immediately with Bonaparte. No man will ſuppoſe that the attempt ſo boldly eſſayed, was meanly ſupported. All the power and influence and talent, all the vigour and activity and zeal they poſſeſſed, we ſaw, on that occaſion, exerted by thoſe hon. Gentlemen for their common cauſe. The Houſe liſtened gravely to every thing then urged in ſupport of the propoſition to negociate, but determined to carry on the war with increaſed vigour, deciſion, and energy. One might have expected, that a ſolemn vote of the Houſe of Commons of Great Britain, given on a queſtion, yielding in importance

to none that ever came before it, would have ſome effect to diſcourage the hon. Gentleman in his favourite purſuit, namely, that of endeavouring to vilify every meaſure and undertaking of his Majeſty's Miniſters. Perhaps it was too much to expect this. Perhaps we had reaſon rather to look to renewed attempts in the ſame ſpirit, and for ſimilar purpoſes. The motion of the hon. Gentleman this night unfolds that ſpirit, and certainly is intended to fix a foul ſtigma on the Adminiſtration of the country. Here let me aſk, what is the object of the enquiry propoſed by the motion? It is not to procure the diſmiſſion from their offices of his Majeſty's preſent Miniſters, but it is to deal around undiſguiſed charges of incapacity and ignorance, the effect of which, if generally aſſented to, would be to draw the confidence of the country from the government. I maintain, Sir, that no cool and impartial man can infer any other conſequence from the ſcope and detail of the hon. Gentleman's ſpeech. He does propoſe it to himſelf as the effect of his labours this night, that the confidence of the country ſhall be withdrawn from the government, and the neceſſary reſult, as I contend, of ſucceſs would be, that the very worſt evils would inſtantly enſue to the beſt and genuine intereſts not merely of this country, but of all Europe. Conceiving that to be the hon. Gentleman's only object in propoſing the inquiry he has moved for, it cannot any where excite ſurpriſe, if I take the opportunity to ſhew the Houſe how utterly unfounded in truth has been his general aſſertions, while I diſcloſe the real grounds of the expedition undertaken againſt Holland, the circumſtances in which it commenced, the events that aroſe in its progreſs, and the cauſes to which was owing its failure. The hon. Gentleman has not thought proper to confine himſelf to the mere enquiry, but has dwelt on various topics not at all connected with his motion, ſo that much of his ſpeech muſt be paſſed over without comment. He has told us a great deal about treaties entered into ſome years ago by this country, Auſtria, and Ruſſia, and it would take more time than I am willing to caſt away, to explain his inaccuracies on the ſubject. One thing would be felt, however, and acknowledged. The treaty with thoſe powers by which they had mutually engaged to ſupport the intereſts and views of the common cauſe, was neceſſary to the preſervation even of the forms of juſtice in Europe; and it has led to more, it has been the fore-runner of the moſt brilliant and valuable victories over the common enemy. Whatever,

ever, therefore, may be the ſentiments of the hon. Gentleman, I muſt think it eſſentially a part of our duty in this Houſe, to preſerve inviolate our alliance with Ruſſia; to cultivate and improve her friendſhip; to keep up the great relations of amity; to cheriſh the generous ardour and dignified pride of that nation, and of her prince; to keep up good blood and good underſtanding with her; and in every conjuncture of our affairs to recollect that the active malignity of the nation againſt whom we ſtruggle, has already been chaſtiſed and reſtrained by Ruſſian arms. The attempt, therefore, to produce ill blood between us and that power is always to be reſiſted; and ſince the preſent motion, if adopted, would have that effect, I for one muſt reſiſt enquiry. Nay, I will go farther. I ſay that if no other grounds could be ſhewn for reſiſting enquiry, that conſideration alone would be enough to induce me to oppoſe the motion. Having thus obſerved on that part of the ſubject, I will next ſtate, that the object of reſcuing Holland from the dominion of the French republic has never ceaſed to be a favourite object with government; but if it has been a cheriſhed project at all times, I admit that from ſpring laſt it has attracted the attention of his Majeſty's Miniſters in a peculiar degree. It is connected with my object to add, in this place, that our deſigns were, in a general manner, known both in France and Holland almoſt from the firſt moment the expedition was finally determined on; they knew we meditated a deſcent on ſome point of the coaſt of either republic; their public papers confeſs it, and they ſtated, that the preparations going on in this country rendered it neceſſary for them to keep a force ſtationed at certain points ready to oppoſe any invaſion. Here, then, we were preſented with a demonſtration of the effect it had on the enemy even from the beginning, and it was alike evident that the expedition was months in the contemplation of his Majeſty's Miniſters before it ſailed from our ſhores. The object of the expedition was three-fold. It was propoſed, in the firſt place, if poſſible, to reſcue the United Provinces from France; to attempt, ſecondly, to deprive that republic of the fleet of Holland—a fleet on which ſhe depended for no ſmall ſuccour in her projects of diſmemberment againſt Ireland—a fleet which ſhe had kept in thraldom, as ſhe had kept the country; and the third and laſt object was that, as far as our reſources would enable us, we might create on this ſide of Europe a great diverſion of the arms of France, eſſential to the ſucceſs of general projects,

immediately neceſſary to the ſucceſs of that particular expedition. France was to chooſe one of two things. She was to maintain herſelf in Holland, or to direct her whole attention to her armies in Italy, Switzerland, and on the Rhine. If ſhe choſe to do the former, ſhe muſt employ a conſiderable force in the Dutch republic; if the latter were her choice, then, in the defenceleſs ſtate of the the United Provinces, we muſt have attained at leaſt one of thoſe three objects, and the probability would be, that we ſhould ſucceed in all. But if only ſucceſsful in one of them; if the reſult of the determination of France to abandon her Dutch dependency, had only been, in the firſt inſtance, the conqueſt of the United Provinces by the Britiſh and Ruſſian forces, it would have given good reaſon to expect ſucceſs in the other two. Upon thoſe three objects of the expedition, I ſhall now ſay a few words. Of the firſt, indeed, it is hardly neceſſary to ſpeak at all, for the hon. Gentleman has himſelf avowed his approbation of it. He admits that it is at all times perfect wiſdom, good policy, and ſound juſtice to ourſelves, to adhere to the plan of reſcuing Holland from France. He admits, therefore, that it is our duty, if poſſible, to effect that reſcue. So far I can perfectly agree with the hon. Gentleman. But it is worthy remark, that ſcarce did the admiſſion paſs his lips, before, towards the concluſion of the ſentence in which it ſtood, the cauſe of the republicans was eſpouſed, an able, eloquent, and animated addreſs to the United Provinces is uſhered into the world, and the inhabitants of thoſe Provinces are told to beware of the Engliſh; to remember what harm England did them in the American war; to recollect how much they had been abuſed by their Stadtholder, and though it is admitted by the hon. Gentleman, that it would be proper to attempt to ſeparate Holland from France, that, in fact, ſuch policy alone became us, ſtill he tells them, "I, a Britiſh ſenator, warn you againſt the attempts of the Britiſh government to reſcue your country from a galling uſurpation; I think, indeed, that you are oppreſſed, inſulted, enſlaved; yet though theſe iſlanders profeſs to be your friends, be ſure not to liſten to them, credit not any of their moſt ſolemn declarations, nay it may be your intereſt to reſiſt their arms." This was not language to inſpire confidence. It was language that could not now fail to be injurious to the common cauſe, and which, had it been uttered in the early ſtages of our progreſs, might have much retarded the legitimate objects of the expedition. What, however, is the ground of the heavy charges

charges the hon. Gentleman has attempted to ſubſtantiate againſt his Majeſty's Miniſters and the country. He ſhould have recollected, that the greateſt part of the tranſactions to which he alluded, were events of war, the inevitable occurrences of ſuch a ſtate of the countries, and that all the atrocious grievances and injuries of which he complained were in general exiſting, were committed before 1787; and yet the revolution effected in Holland in that year (a revolution of which the hon. Gentleman, in a ſhort ſentence, has approved) was decidedly in favour of Britiſh connexion. I aſk then, Sir, how we are to reaſon in ſuch a caſe as this? I aſk if the people thought Great Britain capable of treachery and injuſtice; if they recollected the atrocities, and grievances, and inſults of the American war, and other periods, how happened it that they permitted that revolution? I ſhall probably be anſwered, that it was effected with the aſſiſtance of a powerful army. It is true a large army promoted that revolution; but does the hon. Gentleman mean to ſay that it was more criminal in us to accept of the aid of the king of Pruſſia at that period? Does he mean to ſay that, becauſe the revolution of 1787 was againſt the old Bourbon race, you are not now to attempt to take it out of the hands of the republic with a powerful army? In both caſes we ſaw great and powerful armies employed, with the ſingle difference, that in one caſe it was the union of Great Britain with Pruſſia to reſcue Holland from the dominion of the Houſe of Bourbon, and in the other, the union of Great Britain and Ruſſia to reſcue Holland from the French republic. Now, whether under the dominion of a monarch or as a republic, in attempting to reſcue Holland from France, it muſt be confeſſed that we were purſuing the beſt intereſts of Great Britain. Read what was held from all time as true policy in this reſpect, what was indeed the creed of the country with regard to our connection with Holland. I have the papers in my hand which contain that creed. The paper I allude to, Sir, is the declaration of Lord Cecil, in 1585. In that year this country judged it to be its beſt policy to aid the inhabitants of the Netherlands and United Provinces in their war with Spain. The objects of Lord Cecil were three: 1ſt, the deliverance of the Provinces from the war and aggreſſion of Spain; 2d, the reſtoration of their ancient liberties and form of government by ſome Chriſtian peace; and the 3d, to afford ſecurity to that people and to Great Britain in mutual intercourſe, to perpetuate alliances and treaties of commerce ſubſiſting between

tween the two countries, &c. Such were the diſpoſitions of the Miniſtry of Queen Elizabeth in 1558, and I will not here detail the good which accrued from it, becauſe during her whole reign, that great princeſs never loſt ſight of the ſame policy; it marked the character and projects of king William, and has not ceaſed to be the acknowledged object of the country ever ſince the acceſſion of the Brunſwick family, from a conviction, that to prevent the connection of Holland with France, is eſſentially to promote the genuine intereſts of Great Britain. On the other hand, France has endeavoured to promote and perpetuate a ſimilar connection; and it muſt be confeſſed, that to do ſo is as much good policy in her as in us. As I have ſtated, we have uniformly purſued the courſe opened by Lord Cecil, with the exceptions, neither deciſive nor of long continuance, of ſome periods in the reſpective reigns of Charles II. and Queen Anne. Thus, then, the reſcuing Holland from the dominion of France was alwas a favourite policy; and I inſiſt on this fact the more, becauſe it was the chief object of the expedition, and his Majeſty's Miniſters have an undoubted right to take the merit to themſelves of undertaking a wiſe, a liberal, and a politic enterprize. Another object was the taking of the Dutch fleet from under the power of France; and really I did not expect to find the hon. Gentleman come down this day with ſo controverſial a ſpirit as not to approve entirely of the conduct of Miniſters in that reſpect. He has had the candour, indeed, to admit that he is almoſt ſingular in his opinion on this ſubject; but there was a manifeſt contradiction in this part of his ſpeech. He did ſay that if we had ſtopped at the taking of the Dutch fleet, we had gained immortal honour. Yet in a moment he tells us, that it holds out a bad example, and that the Dutch ſeamen were all traitors to their country. I will not detain the Houſe on theſe points. To return to the argument. What has the Dutch fleet been in the preſent war? It was by the Dutch fleet that one ſide of the coaſt of our iſland was kept in a ſtate of alarm, and in all the threatened attempts of France on the weſtern part; I never heard of any other way by which they were to attempt, but by means of the Dutch fleet, and although no ſerious ground for much alarm exiſted at any time, yet ſurely it will not be ſaid, that the acquiſition of the navy of Holland, which did create ſome apprehenſions for our ſafety at ſome points—it will not be ſaid that this was a bad ſervice. Though our own coaſts, Eſſex, Suſſex, &c. were never much

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in danger, yet Ireland was expoſed; and Gentlemen would recollect that the French have uniformly carried on their offenſive warfare againſt our colonies with veſſels ſailing from Dutch ports. Is it then nothing to have ſuppreſſed one half of the deſperate attempts of the enemy againſt our country. The honourable Gentleman has allowed that it was a great object. And, indeed, that could be no little object that put into our power ſix or ſeven thouſand Dutch ſeamen, till then under the controul of France, by which we took 1000 guns from the enemy, and from 30 to 40,000 tons of ſhipping. Taking all theſe advantages together, I venture then to aſſume, that great and eſſential ſervice was done to the country, by transferring the fleet of Holland into the ports of England. Thus far the expedition was attended with complete ſucceſs. With reſpect to the degree of ſucceſs with which the third object was attended, I would aſk, did not we powerfully aſſiſt the allies, by producing a diverſion of the force of France. It is notorious that it was for a long time a matter of ſerious conſideration in the councils of France, whether to defend Holland, or march her armies excluſively againſt the allies. They choſe the firſt. What happened? They were obliged to march down large reinforcements, for only a large army could reſtrain the people, and ſuppreſs opinion. But does any man doubt that the drawing forty thouſand men from the armies of France into Holland very powerfully aſſiſted the allies. Looking to the event of the war in Holland, France deferred from day to day giving inſtructions to her generals to reſume the offenſive in Italy; and the reſult of the battle of Novi, the moſt bloody that was fought during the whole campaign, which laid the foundation of the relief of Italy from the Gallic yoke, the relief and fall of Tortona and Coni, ſhewed what might with reaſon have been apprehended had not France been engaged at the ſame time in Holland. I do not ſay that ſhe could have maintained herſelf in Italy, but it would be to deſpiſe the force of cannon, of muſkets and bayonets, were the truth diſſembled that the addition of ſeveral thouſand men to their force, would have given to theſe battles a ſtill more bloody and obſtinate character. The invaſion of Suabia by France in Auguſt, and and even the victory of Maſſena himſelf, were rendered abortive or ineffectual, in a great meaſure at leaſt, by the ſtate of the war in Holland. Maſſena could not follow up his victory, ſuch was the reduced ſtate of his forces. Hence were Novi, Suabia, Philipſburg, the Banks of the Rhine, in a word,

word, every military poſt in Europe was affected by the expedition of England againſt Holland, while the march of armies and the events of battles, were in no ſmall meaſure determined by that great and politic enterprize. In two of the objects of the expedition we were ſucceſsful, but we are told by the hon. Gentleman, at leaſt he has hinted, that becauſe the men diſobeyed Admiral Storey, they were not to be much feared, becauſe they were ſo diſaffected that they would not fight at all. To this I anſwer, they were the ſame ſeamen who fought in the action with Admiral Duncan; and when we know that they wiſh better to the Stadtholder (which the hon. Gentleman regrets) than to the republic, notwithſtanding all circumſtances, this country would have acted an unwiſe part to have declined the expedition. The remainder of the queſtion relates to the poſſibility of reſcuing the United Provinces from France, and I maintain, Sir, that it was poſſible. I have already ſtated ſome of the reaſons on which that opinion is founded, and I here add, that though more proofs exiſt, ſtill ſuch is the reſponſibility and peril of my ſituation, that I cannot diſcloſe thoſe proofs to the world. The hon. Gentleman knows, that it is impoſſible to grant the enquiry he has moved for. He knows well, that againſt the boldeſt aſſertions, the moſt hardy miſrepreſentations, his Majeſty's miniſters cannot vindicate themſelves by enquiry. And why? Becauſe the correſpondence with Holland, and the documents in general on which were founded our hopes of ſucceſs, cannot be publiſhed without the greateſt injuſtice to many individuals. I leave it, therefore, for the Houſe in its wiſdom, in its diſcretion, to judge between miniſters and the country. I do not mean to ſay that we have not correſponded, that we have not received intelligence of a private nature from Holland, of the ſtate, temper, and views of parties, information too which juſtified a reliance on the cooperation of the people; but though I am not to deny theſe things generally, yet is it my duty to reſiſt enquiry, on conſtitutional and politic grounds. The Houſe will therefore exerciſe its diſcretion, but I can declare, that I am one who never will concur voluntarily to adviſe his Majeſty to lay ſuch information before the Houſe. With reſpect to what has been aſſerted, that the diſpoſitions of the people of Holland were unfriendly to the object of the expedition, I do ſay that the inference from the example of the fleet is no mean criterion of the ſtate of the people. With a powerful army to awe them, the people could not take arms or ſhew themſelves in

in force. In no place which the Britiſh arms reached did the inhabitants quit their homes, or move off the cattle; and though it has been ſaid that they ſtaid with their cattle to be near the markets, they had diſcovered more than a mercenary attachment: but I own the whole of the queſtion here reſts on general reaſoning, and muſt. For if even the private correſpondence were put into the hands of the hon. Gentleman, I believe it would not ſatisfy him. He would ſay that they only contained proofs of the ſentiments of the writers, but not of all. However, ſir, we could not convoke Primary Aſſemblies. [A cry of hear! hear! on the treaſury bench, and a laugh in the oppoſition ſeats.] Therefore our view of the ſtate of Holland muſt reſt in general points, and lead merely to general opinions. Yet enough was known of the diſpoſitions of the people, enough was known of the opinion they entertain of their taſk-maſters, to juſtify his right hon. Friend in uſing an expreſſion which has been frequently alluded to. He might well ſay that our knowledge of human nature enabled us to conjecture what would be the deciſion of the people of Holland, and I dare venture to ſay, that Holland, no more than any of the countries where they have ruled, does not wiſh to have the French for its defenders. Do gentlemen think it is in the nature of Dutchmen not to hate thoſe who have ſqueezed them out of their money, who have ſo beggared them that now all their money in their pockets is ſweated down to a ſixpence? From every circumſtance therefore of the ſituation of the whole tranſaction, I leave it to the diſcretion of the Houſe whether they will compel government to grant an enquiry, which muſt be attended with real inconvenience, contrary too to our duty and obligations to other governments, and contrary to experience and the uſage of ſtates. But I can venture to aſſert, that if we have been obliged to abandon the enterprize for a ſeaſon, that what his Majeſty's government undertook was highly agreeable to the United Provinces, and if we could have ſent a ſufficient number of men to check the French army, I have not the ſmalleſt doubt but that ſucceſs would have crowned our efforts. This leads me naturally to that other branch of the enquiry, the inſtructions, &c. to the officers employed in the expedition; but I am equally prepared to reſiſt enquiry on this point. There are many reaſons why I reſiſt it: the chief is, that I will not ſay that it may not again be the object of the policy of this country to attempt the reſcue of Holland. This much I may ſtate without riſk, and the hon. Gentleman will know how to

ſtate it with all his eloquence to the country and the world, deploring the evils of war, and the expences of expeditions. Theſe are ſubordinate reaſons for reſiſting enquiry on this branch. Such as that the correſpondence may contain many particulars which it would not be ſafe to divulge—that the weak points of the enemy would be marked out and diſcloſed, along with ſeveral other objections which the good ſenſe of Gentlemen will ſurely ſuggeſt to them. The hon. Gentleman has ſaid, that we ſhould have undertaken the expedition earlier. I can tell that hon. Gentleman that we could not. We had not an army to undertake it with at an earlier period. At the beginning of the expedition, there were but 10,000 men that could be ſent under General Abercrombie, and they were all collected from the regular force of the country. He could not draft off any of the force then in Ireland, becauſe the fleet of the enemy was in the Mediterranean, and not knowing its deſtination, Ireland could not be left without a ſtrong army. He had not got the command of the militia; but that force being ſoon after placed at the diſpoſal of government, an army was ſpeedily raiſed. Here Mr. Dundas entered on the hiſtory of the expedition, from the day of its ſailing from our ſhores (Auguſt 13), to the period of the convention between his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York and the French General Brune, and contended that the expedition was originally planned with ſkill and wiſdom; that its object was promoted with diligence; that it ſailed under the faireſt proſpects of a ſafe and ſpeedy voyage, but being croſſed on the third day by adverſe winds, and toſſed about in hurricanes for fourteen days, that the landing was effected under painful difficulties, while the period occupied by our fleet off their coaſts gave to the Dutch and the French the ſignal of invaſion, marked out to them the points of attack, and of courſe ſuggeſted the means to be taken for effectual defence. In this part of his ſpeech the right hon. Gentleman marked with diſtinguiſhed preciſion the different events, traced their character and progreſs, and having argued moſt ably the objections of Mr. Sheridan, concluded irreſiſtibly from the whole, that the expedition did produce ſignal advantages to this country. But as the gazettes and public papers of the day detailed very fully the facts ſtated by the right hon. Gentleman, we think it may be ſufficient to note merely the principal points of this diviſion of the ſubject. Sir Ralph Abercrombie had under his command 10,000 men. The ſcarcity of proviſions, and the ſtorm,

ſtorm, made him determine to put back for England on the 26th, but he effected a landing at the Helder on the 27th, but the ſea beating high, and the ſoldiers bearing their muſkets and bayonets, neither artillery nor horſes could be landed. Only nine battalions out of ſixteen were at firſt diſembarked, yet with this inferior force we took the Helder Fort. The diſpoſitions made by Sir Ralph Abercrombie were judicious and able. Had the army, however, been obliged to return on the 26th, how unjuſt would have been any cenſures on the ſoldiers or the Commanders. They have ſhewn that they are intrepid, brave, intelligent; but ſuch who judge of men and human affairs by the ſucceſs of an enterprize, miſerably miſtake the character of true wiſdom. It has been ſaid that we had no waggons, but would Gentlemen recollect that they could not be landed in a ſtorm. We were forced to uſe Dutch waggons, and theſe were ſcarce. [Here Mr. Sheridan appeared to cenſure the making uſe of the waggons of the country]. "I do not really know, Sir, how to deal with Gentlemen; they blame us for not landing our own waggons when we could not; and they blame us for taking the waggons of the country, when they were the only conveyance the army could procure. I wiſh the hon. Gentleman would not take both arguments, but that, at leaſt, in kindneſs, he would leave me the benefit of one of them. [*A loud laugh*]. That he would give Engliſh roads with Dutch waggons, or Dutch waggons with Engliſh roads. It would be aſked, why not reckon on the chances of a ſtorm. We did ſo. I aſked Admiral Mitchell if there was not reaſon to apprehend ſtorms at that ſeaſon of the year. His anſwer was "What man ever ſaw a hurricane in the month of Auguſt going acroſs the Channel." He really laughed at me for aſking, what he appeared to conſider ſuch an unprofeſſional queſtion. Had the troops effected a landing on the third day, the enemy, who had not 2,000 men at the time in North Holland, muſt have yielded unconditionally, and ultimate ſucceſs been rendered almoſt inevitable. It would have been ſome ſource of conſolation if the winds, which prevented Sir Ralph Abercrombie from landing, had brought forward the Ruſſians; but the contrary was the caſe; ſo that we were quite deprived of all our genuine reſources and means of ſucceſs. There is one part of the ſpeech of the hon. Gentleman in which I can have no difference of opinion with him, and to which, indeed, I can add nothing to give added force or brilliancy to his ſplendid panegyric. I will

not ſay much of the character of the illuſtrious Commander of the expedition, but I do aſſure the Houſe, that I who have the means of knowing his real excellence, conſider no part of the character, no part of the panegyric of the hon. Gentleman, but as due to that illuſtrious Prince. Here then we do agree, but how ſoon again muſt we differ? The hon. Gentleman has ſaid, that the expedition was obviouſly impracticable from the day of the 2d, that it was deſperate, and that we ought to have abandoned it, becauſe we had obtained all the fleet on the 4th of September. But Sir Ralph Abercrombie thought otherwiſe. He writes, that he expected to penetrate to the Waal before the end of the campaign. Now an hon. Gentleman ſays, that we ought not to have perſevered, while we have the teſtimony of that officer, of an officer who would not ſacrifice his men madly, whoſe character is not want of humanity, who is not incautious, who is gallant and experienced; we have his teſtimony, that could he be reinforced in time, he would be able to penetrate to the Waal. The weather prevented the embarkation of the Duke's army till the 13th. And every one knew that, added to theſe unfortunate circumſtances, the months of the year on which we entered Holland, were unpropitious to our operations. The Ruſſians arrived on the 18th at the Helder. On the 19th they went into action; but I am ſtrict to truth in ſtating, that it was expreſsly at the deſire of their Commander, General Herman. The letter of General Heſſen, undoubtedly, ſtated things that could not but be read with regret, but I wiſh not to be minute in my comments. Perhaps the impetuoſity of the Ruſſians led them to the attack two hours too ſoon. However, till a late hour, the whole army was ſucceſsful; the village of Bergen was poſſeſſed by the Ruſſians, Sir Ralph was at Hoorn with the flower of the Britiſh army, and but for the unfortunate affair of Bergen, would have been able to advance, leaving the French and Dutch army in his rear, while preſſed on to Amſterdam. On the 19th, there were only 6 or 7,000 French troops in North Holland, and ſome regiments of Dutch, but they received freſh reinforcements every day afterwards. Still they were inferior to the combined Britiſh and Ruſſian army till the day of the 6th, when they had a ſuperiority in numbers. Here Mr. Dundas contended that every thing which could be done was atchieved by the army, and that after a great deal of fighting, being previouſly adviſed to that ſtep by the whole ſtaff, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, Generals Dundas, Pulteney, Moore,

Moore, &c. he judged it right to retreat. This being the caſe, can Gentlemen lay blame on government? They lay no blame on the officers; and ſurely when circumſtances have been ſo clearly ſtated, it is unjuſt to blame his Majeſty's Miniſters. But they would leave it perhaps to reſt on the ground of the original folly of the expedition, and the incapacity of adminiſtration. I ſhall conſider that more fully preſently. I here only wiſh to have it underſtood, that from the moment I ſaw the letter of the 6th, I adviſed his Majeſty to approve of every thing that had been done. Thus I take part in the whole buſineſs, but I do not wiſh the hon. Gentlemen to lay more at my door than is founded in truth. With reſpect to the diſgrace to the country from the convention, let us conſider what it really is, if any. We were ſix times victorious in Holland, and than France (I am confident I ſpeak correctly), no nation in the world is more ſenſible of the bravery and gallantry of the Britiſh ſoldiers, indeed they have confeſſed that they met with their match in our intrepid countrymen. Hence the army returned with its character entire, its bravery unimpeachable, its ſpirit proud, and its mind undaunted. We have alſo to recollect that with the change of character has ariſen an increaſe of force. We have now 50,000 as brave men, of the ſame fleſh and blood as the troops that fought in Holland. He next came to the conſideration of the armiſtice; and here he fully juſtified the whole conduct of the Commander in Chief, paying a juſt tribute to his humanity in not inundating the country, and to his firmneſs in aſſerting the honour of England, by refuſing to treat with General Brune for the Dutch fleet. He could not be forced from the country, yet it was true generalſhip to retreat. Under all theſe circumſtances there was nothing diſgraceful in the armiſtice, but every thing honourable to the Commander in Chief both in his public and private character. I muſt now ſay a few words on the alledged laviſh expenditure of treaſure. Really, Sir, this ſubject has been much miſrepreſented. The hon. Gentleman gave us a moſt eloquent deſcription of the loſs in lives, and the miſery intailed by the calamities of war on deſtitute families. With regard to the waſte of treaſure, ſurely the hon. Gentleman is not ſerious when he ſays that the expence of the expedition has been the whole produce of the income tax, &c. He could only mean by taking credit for 7 millions to give his imagination ample ſcope for the decorations of a figure of eloquence.

quence. If Gentlemen have any curioſity to know the items, I will read them. They conſiſt of

£. 455,335	for	Tranſport Service.
247,391	-	Victualling Department.
180,537	-	Brook Watſon.
140,901	-	Commiſſary Motz.
108,645	-	Ordnance Department.

Thus, in place of 6 or 7 millions, we have only a total of about 1,400,000l. I do not doubt, but I ſupriſe Gentlemen by this ſtatement. It is, however, correct; yet it deſerves to be remarked, that no man ever ſtated the expence at leſs than 5,000,000l. If again we talk of the expedition, not on a large ſcale of national policy, but take it as a mercantile queſtion of profit and loſs, taking that data I ſay, the ſhips, ſtores, &c. and what I am alſo entitled to ſtate, the diminution of our expences by the diſcontinuing a fleet in the North ſeas, inſomuch, that we find the number of ſeamen reduced this year 10,000: when all theſe gains and ſavings are conſidered, I maintain, that in point of expence the expedition was an advantage to the country. Thus, then, if one of the greater objects has not ſucceeded, (ſuppoſe I aſſume that aſſertion) ſtill, as a mere mercantile object, the expedition has been very deſirable; and even as to the 8000 priſoners, we get rid of as many lumber troops, [*a laugh*] and we get rid of 8000 priſoners, who otherwiſe would have continued feeding in our jails. But, in the next place, the loſs in men. The hon. Gentleman appealed moſt pathetically, and with his accuſtomed eloquence, to the Houſe, how melancholy were the events of war, that ſwept away provinces, that divided, ruined, and diſperſed whole families, that imbittered the cup of individual life, and poiſoned the ſources of public happineſs. War has been in all times the theme of poetic fancy, that dreſſes every ſubject in the moſt captivating or in the moſt forbidding garb. I do not attempt to appeal to the feelings of the Houſe. But, I think, that when I appeal to them as men, they will know how to look at the neceſſities of the public ſtate, they will feel that no great national object, and no great national purpoſes can be accompliſhed in war without the loſs of many valuable lives dear to all. If I do not attempt to make the miſeries of war the topics of a crying eloquence, yet I am ſure there was not one ſoldier who went to Holland, there is not one who has returned, who would not conſider I was pronouncing a libel on his character, if I ſuppoſed he made not the miſeries and hardſhips of war take part in his thoughts, yet knowing

knowing that war cannot be carried on without loſs of human life, he is too devoted to his country to ſhrink from a duty, the chief condition of which is, to be expoſed to peril, and to paſs through dangers. Believe me, Sir, I think thoſe who carry on war will be found not more wanting in humanity than the hon. Gentleman. However, I will not have it bandied about, that there were ten thouſand men loſt in the expedition. This ſtatement was originally an impoſition on the public, and through the ſame channels it was the public were told that the expences amounted to 5,080,000l. It was not humane in any writer, whatever might be his party, to publiſh ſuch things. It was no teſt of his humanity to publiſh looſe and unauthenticated reports of the thouſands ſlain. But the beſt way to remove the impreſſion of ſuch falſehoods will be to tell the truth. Now, Sir, I hold in my hand a ſtatement of the returns of wounded and killed from the day the army landed in Holland, to the 1ſt of February inſtant. The numbers are 4088 ſick and wounded who were at one time in the hoſpitals abroad, 89 of whom only died, 1668 were diſcharged and joined their reſpective regiments, &c. 2339 came to England, and were ſent to the different hoſpitals. So that out of the whole only 89 died.* I do not aſk any thing from this ſtatement but ſimple juſtice to Mr. Young, the Inſpector-General, who has ſuffered much from calumny, but who deſerves to be admired for his attention, aſſiduity, and humanity; and, Sir, I would alſo hope that the acrimonious ill-natured things ſaid againſt the planners of the expedition will ceaſe to be repeated; that the public will admit at length, that for much of that calumny and cenſure there was no better foundation than for the accounts which returned more than 89 dead in Holland of their wounds. On the 1ſt of February, indeed, the whole number amounted to 185, who died in the hoſpitals. There died in battle 572, which, added to the number that was loſt in the paſſage, might amount to 846. But it muſt be recollected, that ſome who were returned dead have ſince returned, being only miſſing men. The right hon. Gentleman now recapitulated the ſeveral topics dwelt on by him in his ſpeech, contended that he had ſupported, by facts and fair reaſoning, all his propoſitions, and concluded by expreſſing his perfect approbation

* Sick and wounded admitted into the hoſpitals abroad was only 4,088
Sent home out of theſe - - - - 2,993
The whole who died amounted only to - - 185
And the whole of the killed to - - - 484

of

of the conduct of the officers and men engaged in it, while he claimed it for the government, to be allowed the merit of the beſt intentions, joined to prudence, circumſpection, and activity. I am, ſaid the right hon. Secretary in concluding, determined to oppoſe all military enquiries, and the interference of individuals in military affairs. I know enquiry would not benefit the country or our cauſe, in the preſent inſtance, but hurt both. I therefore reſt perfectly of opinion, that I can only do my duty by oppoſing, with all my heart, the motion of the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. *Bouverie* ſaid, that none of the arguments which had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman could convince him of the impropriety of the motion of his hon. Friend. An enquiry certainly ſhould be inſtituted into the cauſes of the failure of the expedition to Holland. After the conſtitutional force of the country had been demoliſhed to fit it out, it had failed with circumſtances particularly diſgraceful to the Britiſh name. Was it not the duty of the Houſe to inſiſt upon inveſtigating the buſineſs, and aſcertaining whether blame was to be attached to the projectors of the expedition, or to thoſe to whom the execution of it had been entruſted? But the right hon. Gentleman ſaid we had no right to make enquiry, and that, for his own part, he would adviſe his Majeſty not to lay the requiſite papers before the Houſe—and why? becauſe a ſecond enterpriſe of the ſame nature might be ſet on foot. He would not call for any papers which it was improper to make public; but he would not conſent to a ſhameful compromiſe when the honour of the country was at ſtake. An inveſtigation could give no juſt ground of complaint to our allies, and could be objected to at home only by thoſe who are conſcious that it will not turn out in their favour.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, the ſpeech of the right hon. Gentleman who oppoſed the motion for an enquiry, appeared to him one of the moſt extraordinary ſpeeches he had ever heard in that Houſe, but no part of it ſurpriſed him ſo much as that in which he objected to an inveſtigation taking place, becauſe it might offend our allies, the Ruſſians. He ſaid, that were we rigorouſly to ſcrutinize their conduct, and to throw any blame upon it, we ſhould excite jealouſy betwixt them and ourſelves, and thus hurt the cauſe we had jointly undertaken to ſupport. If, when a treaty with Ruſſia was firſt concluded, or before this enterpriſe was begun, a meaſure had been propoſed which might lead to ſomething harſh being ſaid of the Ruſſians,

Ruſſians, and to jealouſies being excited between the two nations, the right hon. Gentleman might have oppoſed it with ſome ſhew of reaſon. But theſe jealouſies already exiſt; each party defends itſelf, and aſcribes the failure of the enterpriſe to the miſconduct of the other. An enquiry into the true ſtate of the affair, by taking away all opportunity for groundleſs recrimination, and fixing blame where blame is due, is the only way to reſtore cordiality between them. Our brave army, who ſuffered ſo much, have a right to inſiſt upon an enquiry. The Ruſſian General caſts the moſt foul imputations upon them. He writes to his ſovereign, that his men were in want of every thing; that they were led into battle, when, from ſickneſs, they were completely unable to fight, and that an important engagement was loſt by the Engliſh being two hours behind the appointed time in beginning the attack. He thus ſlanders, in the face of Europe, the conduct of the Britiſh army, and an enquiry is the only method by which the falſity of his allegations can be proved, his aſperſions can be wiped off, and the faultleſs conduct of our countrymen diſplayed to the world. The right hon. Gentleman himſelf had blamed the Ruſſian General for getting us into the ſcrape; yet he obſtinately ſets his face againſt an enquiry, and pledges himſelf to diſſuade his Majeſty from laying before the Houſe the papers neceſſary to its taking place. Is this to be endured when another expedition is talked of; when the Ruſſians are kept that they may again act with us on the continent in the ſpring? Is it too much to call for enquiry when both ſides break out into mutual accuſations, and when both muſt be eager that their conduct ſhould be examined? No bad conſequences can follow from it; it muſt be deſirable to all concerned, and productive of the greateſt advantages to the country. For this glorious expedition, which has neither been diſaſtrous nor expenſive, which has been rather lucrative in a commercial point of view, and which has raiſed our military character, the right hon. Gentleman ſtated that the grounds were threefold. Its firſt object was to gain poſſeſſion of the Dutch fleet. This, I believe, was an object of it, but a very ſubordinate one, one of infinitely leſs importance than the right hon. Gentleman repreſents it. It is never once mentioned in the treaty concluded with the Emperor Paul, where the grand plan of the expedition is delineated. We might think it a very convenient thing if we ſhould be able to reſcue theſe ſhips from the power of our enemies; but the ſole object of

the Emperor of Ruſſia certainly was to reſtore the Stadtholder to the United Provinces. The ſecond ground on which the expedition was undertaken was for the deliverance of Holland from the yoke of France. The third, for making a diverſion in favour of our allies. A diverſion may often be attended with excellent effects, and perhaps this one was of ſervice. But the right hon. Gentleman can ſurely claim little merit from ſaving an Auſtrian army by the loſs of a Britiſh one. What, however, are the benefits which reſulted to the allies from our landing on the coaſt of Holland? We are told that it operated at Novi. I wonder it is not ſaid that it was the cauſe of the capture of Seringapatam. But, Sir, this battle was fought on the 15th of Auguſt, and on the 10th of September there was ſcarcely a French ſoldier in Holland. General Maſſena defeated the Auſtrians at a time when our troops were on the continent, and when the ſupplies were ſent him which had been aſſiſting the Dutch, he was unable to make much greater progreſs. Thus though the right hon. Gentleman had ſtated, that out of the three objects propoſed in the expedition, two had been gained; it appeared that one only had been ſucceſsfully purſued. I formerly ſtated, that I thought the taking of the Dutch fleet creditable to Miniſtry; but I likewiſe then gave it as my opinion, that we ſhould have been contented with that acquiſition, and have proceeded no farther. The predictions I then delivered, have been mournfully fulfilled. The fleet we have gained we cannot employ: it ſurrendered to us only from the hope of ſoon ſerving under the Stadtholder; and I refer it to any hon. Gentleman, if the ſailors did not teſtify the utmoſt diſſatisfaction upon being brought to this country in the manner in which they were. The right hon. Gentleman does not go quite ſo far as to ſay that we delivered Holland, but he contends that Miniſters had ſufficient reaſon to believe that they would be able to deliver it. We aſk what theſe grounds were which juſtified the attempt; but the right hon. Gentleman ſhrinks from the enquiry. It would be improper to diſcloſe them; and all that he tells us is, that he is a follower of Lord Burleigh, the prime Miniſter of Queen Elizabeth. I do not contend that it would not be of advantage to this country that Holland ſhould be reſcued from the dominion of France; but I contend that government were not juſtified in making ſo arduous an attempt, without being aſſured of the good will of the natives, and that if they had any ſuch aſſurances, they did not avail themſelves of them as they

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ought to have done. What objection can there be to lay before us the favourable intelligence they had from Holland, if any ſuch exiſted. Theſe Dutch friends, in my opinion, do not, from their conduct, deſerve that any very great delicacy ſhould be ſhewn them. But if it is improper that their names ſhould be made public, ſtill this is no reaſon againſt the production of their letters. There is ſuch a thing as a ſecret committee. Before this the affairs of the Bank had been laid open, and with regard to theſe the moſt inviolable ſecrecy had been preſerved. Before a ſecret committee the moſt delicate buſineſs can be tranſacted with perfect ſecurity to all parties. But I will not inſiſt upon their names being produced. Let us only have copies of their letters, with a blank wherever there ſhould be a proper name improper to meet the public eye. This method was ſucceſsfully practiſed in the laſt war, with reſpect to thoſe engaged in the affair of Uſhant. Why then muſt we have merely the aſſertion of Miniſters that preſſing invitations were ſent from the leading men in Holland to come and take poſſeſſion of that country? If they really did, does it not ſeem ſtrange, that when the army landed in Holland, no ſymptoms of affection for the Engliſh were diſplayed? That there ſhould not have been a riſing in this quarter or that, would have been no way aſtoniſhing. But there was not only no general inſurrection in their favour, but, though they remained in the country in prodigious ſtrength for ſix weeks, no one man of any eminence declared himſelf their friend during all that time. I ſhould like, though I have no curioſity to know the names of the writers of theſe letters, to be told their date, for very likely Miniſtry did not accept of their invitations at the proper time, and likewiſe the part of the coaſt where they requeſted us to land. This likewiſe is of importance, for if we were invited to the Helder, we were ſoon ſhewn that we had nothing to expect from the profeſſions and promiſes of the perfidious Dutch, and ought inſtantly to have given up the enterpriſe. If we were invited to other parts of the coaſt, where we would have met with a friendly reception, what did we do at the Helder, of the affections of whoſe inhabitants we were ignorant? Let Miniſters juſtify themſelves if they can, by producing the documents upon which their conduct was founded. It is unconſtitutional and an inſult upon this Houſe to ſay that this cannot be done conſiſtently with the preſervation of ſecrecy. It has been given as an inſtance of the Dutch being well affected to

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Great Britain, that the peaſants did not drive off their ſheep and oxen from the Helder, nor carry away their proviſions; but the right hon. Gentleman ſoon after mentioned another circumſtance which completely accounted for the firſt; every thing which was procured from the Dutch was regularly and fully paid for. The right hon. Gentleman does not need to be told that the Dutch are fond of gain, and that they will never refuſe a ſhilling for a piece of goods from any one, and ſell the ſame for ſixpence. This is not only Dutch human nature, but human nature all the world over. Miniſters ſuſpecting that the inhabitants of this country might not ſcruple to ſell their commodities for a good price even to the French, had ſeveral years ago brought a bill into Parliament, obliging the farmers, upon the appearance of an enemy, to drive their cattle from the coaſt, and to remove their corn with the greateſt poſſible expedition. The right hon. Gentleman ſaid that, from general reaſoning, we were ſure of a friendly reception in Holland; that every nation which had been ſubject to France, longed to throw off her galling yoke. This poſition is not true without an exception: when Switzerland, the country of all others which has received the greateſt injuries from France, was evacuated by Maſſena's army, we do not find that the inhabitants gave the Auſtrians a very warm reception, or that they very eagerly embraced the offer of entering into the ſervice of England; the Dutch had infinitely leſs to complain of from their conquerors: they had only to pay a few contributions, and were left in the quiet poſſeſſion of their property: this was ſufficiently grievous, to be ſure, but by no means to be compared to being obliged to maintain, at their expence, a numerous army. Neither had we any experience of their good will, nor any evidence to that purpoſe from facts. From the moment the army landed, it was evident that the inhabitants were hoſtile to us, and from that moment the enterpriſe ought to have been abandoned. Why, from motives of vanity, obſtinately perſevere in an undertaking which was evidently hopeleſs? Will any man pretend, then, Sir, that there are no grounds for an enquiry, when the expedition was undertaken without any ſufficient reaſon to expect the friendly co-operation of the natives, which was abſolutely neceſſary to its ſucceſs, and when it was perſiſted in after it was clearly proved that they were hoſtilely inclined? My hon. Friend, who opened the debate, aſked, Why the expedition was ſo long put off? and ſtated, that in the end of Auguſt tempeſtuous weather

weather might be looked for. I expected that ſome cogent reaſon would have been aſſigned by the right hon. Gentleman, but no ſuch reaſon was produced; our army was not ſooner ready. But I ſhould like to know, Sir, why the militia bill, which had conferred ſuch benefits upon the country, was not ſooner paſſed? The expedition had been long in contemplation, and the Ruſſian treaty was ſigned on the 18th of June. In this caſe much more good might have been effected by a diverſion, as it might have been made at an earlier period of the campaign. The army would have been in readineſs to act at the beginning of the ſeaſon, when favourable weather might have been expected, and the expedition undertaken with ſome proſpect of ſucceſs. The delay was not the only evil occaſioned by the lateneſs of the period at which the militia act was paſſed. The right hon. Gentleman ſaid that he never would forget the day when he ſaw the Britiſh troops, enthuſiaſtic with the love of their king and country, and fired with a noble deſire for military fame, ſet ſail from the coaſt of England. I did not witneſs the embarkation, but I have heard moſt moving accounts of it from thoſe who did, and from theſe accounts I cannot ſay that I regret my not having been preſent at the melancholy ſcene. I ſhould have ſeen numbers of fine young men who had been entrapped by the lure of ten guineas, ill clothed, unacquainted with their officer, and wretchedly diſciplined, ſhipped off for an inhoſpitable ſhore, there to be ſlaughtered and to ſlaughter one another. Sir, I maintain it, and will prove it at the bar of this Houſe, when it ſhall go into a committe of enquiry, that the ſtate of theſe recruits from the militia was ſhocking in the extreme, and that that was a cauſe, and a principal cauſe, of the failure of the enterpriſe. They were brave, Sir, I allow; none of them teſtified a want of courage; but many, if not all of them, were ill diſciplined, and were always apt to get into confuſion from their ignorance. They ſhot each other in numbers, and to their incapacity to make the common manœuvres, is to be attributed the loſs of ſeveral of the brave officers who fell in the ill-concerted enterprize. They fell frequently into diſorder, and their officers in their attempts to rally them, were marked out by the enemy's riflemen. I put it to the feelings of the Houſe, if this, of itſelf, is not a ſufficient ground for an enquiry? I call particularly upon the colonels of militia, who muſt yet feel a ſtrong affection for thoſe whom they formerly commanded, and muſt conſider them in the light of

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their children. Let them come forward and inſiſt upon knowing the reaſons why time was not given theſe men to be drilled, to be clothed, and to become acquainted with their officers, that they might have had an equal chance in facing their opponents? In another point of view, the affair is diſaſtrous. Can it be ſuppoſed that theſe men will return from ſuffering ſuch unexpected and unneceſſary hardſhips, with the ſame attachment to the Government, and zeal for the ſervice, as when they ſet out? I would beg leave to mention another inconvenience produced by the hurry with which the expedition was fitted out. From one end of the kingdom to the other, for ſeveral weeks, it was impoſſible to travel. Horſes and carriages were every where ſeized indiſcriminately to tranſport the troops, many people were ſtopped upon important journeys and the greateſt diſorder was produced over the whole face of the country. Perhaps all this was neceſſary; let then Miniſters come forward to prove that it was ſo. In my opinion, by paſſing the Militia Bill a few months ſooner, all theſe evils might have eaſily been avoided.

At length, on the 22d of Auguſt, Sir Ralph Abercrombie landed on the coaſt of Holland. Much has been ſaid in praiſe of this general, but not more than he deſerves, all his actions are unimpeachable—his conduct during the whole tranſaction was meritorious in the extreme. With 10,000 men he got poſſeſſion of the Helder. On the 27th, he was reinforced by General Don's detachment, which placed him at the head of 15,000 men, yet he remained in the poſition he had originally taken. Is it not ſtrange that 15,000 men headed by a General, appointed with the beſt officers, and going by invitation, ſhould not be able, or ſhould think it imprudent to advance? If the Dutch were well affected, why did they not they inſtantly declare themſelves? Their expectations muſt have been fully anſwered in the force which was ſent for their relief:—No French troops were in Holland to keep them in awe. Yet no one joined us, or teſtified the ſmalleſt attachment to our cauſe. From that moment, I maintain, that the enterprize was hopeleſs, and the right hon. Gentleman ought to have been ſenſible that it was ſo. He has read us a letter from Sir Ralph Abercrombie, in which that General expreſſes ſanguine hopes of being ſoon able to penetrate to the Waal, and to finiſh the war in one campaign. But had the right hon. Secretary laid before us Sir Ralph's letters, of a date, a few days later, we would probably ſee language of a very different import. It is unfair

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to the Houſe to read a ſingle letter, and not the whole correſpondence. Above all it is unfair to that illuſtrious commander. On his account I wiſh for an enquiry. I am ſure it would turn out to his honour. There are queſtions which he alone can anſwer, and which would probably prove the right hon. Gentleman to be be the firſt of war Miniſters. I cannot but remark that moſt of the expeditions undertaken under his auſpices have been ſingularly unfortunate. St. Domingo, where a few more guineas were expended, and a few more lives loſt than the right hon. Gentleman had been pleaſed to ſtate to have been the caſe in Holland, was at laſt vacuated; Corſica was evacuated; Quiberon was evacuated, with circumſtances no way honourable to the Britiſh name. But when ſuch an expedition was neceſſary and ſtipulated for, why did not his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York ſail at the ſame time with General Don? There is likewiſe another queſtion which I ſhould wiſh to have anſwered. Why were all our forces ſent to one place? There were upwards of 32,000 Britiſh troops, and nearly 19,000 Ruſſians, tho' only 17,500 had been ſtipulated for, in all betwixt 43, and 45,000 men. What an immenſe force to be cooped up in a narrow peninſula, where but few could act at a time. It is ſtrange that the right hon. Gentleman, who is ſo fond of diverſions, did not think of making a diverſion to ſome other quarter. This is a point which only military men can determine, and the Houſe is bound to examine officers, that they may diſcover the truth. I pledge myſelf that there are not three Generals who will ſign a paper approving of the plan. It is ſtrange that Miniſters ſhould not court an enquiry which would clear up all difficulties, and evince their innocence to the world. Forty-five thouſand men were ſix weeks in Holland, and were unable to advance above twenty-five miles. Yet there is nobody to blame! I believe that although the Duke of Marlborough had commanded the army inſtead of his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York, that its operations would have been equally unſucceſsful. But whether his Royal Highneſs concluded the capitulation from inſtructions he had received, or of his own accord, he, in my opinion, ſhould have demanded an enquiry. The matter reſts between him and the right hon. Gentleman. Miniſters refuſe an enquiry; he therefore ſhould have inſiſted upon one. This is the only way in which he can ſhift the diſgrace from himſelf and the gallant officers who ſerved under him, to thoſe upon whom it ought to lie. I have no reaſon to make any

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apology for the liberties I uſe with the name of his Royal Highneſs. Although he ſhould one day be my ſovereign he will not think the worſe of me for having been ſolicitous for the honour of the Engliſh army. The right hon. Gentleman ſees nothing diſgraceful or detrimental in the capitulation at the Helder. We gave up 8000 ſeamen, who were merely lumber. His Royal Highneſs had not been of the ſame opinion, elſe he would have acceded at once to the demand of General Brune, or rather begged the French, as a favour, to take back all their priſoners now in England. The capitulation, Sir, ſeems to me to enfix an indelible ſtain upon the national character—it is ſhameful and diſgraceful; it inflicts a deep wound upon the ſoldiers' honour. A king's ſon, who commanded 40,000 men capitulated to a French General who had only 31,000. We owe it to our ſovereign, and we owe it to our conſtituents to enquire ſtrictly into the cauſes of this unheard of diſgrace. The expedition either failed from unforeſeen accidents, or from the folly of thoſe who planned it. Let theſe circumſtances then be ſtated, or let the guilty be dragged forth to puniſhment. I do not with to harraſs any man; I only deſire to vindicate the military character, and I think it eſſential that it ſhould be vindicated, at a moment when it is openly profeſſed that we have thrown away the ſcabbard; when it is ſaid we are engaged to dethrone a military uſurper, when an eternal war againſt France is declared, thoſe who vote for the war ſhould ſupport the motion; thoſe who vote for the war Miniſters ſhould certainly oppoſe it. The right hon. Gentleman, in ſtating the expence of the expedition, was guilty of a few inaccuracies. Whether it is exact as to the amount of the money paid to contractors for tranſports, &c. I will not pretend to ſay; but I know for certain that a merchant of the city got for his ſhare alone 585,000l. The Ruſſian ſubſidy for 17,000 men he has totally omitted, and that may be ſafely eſtimated at a million ſterling. He ſhould likewiſe have ſtated the levy money given to thoſe who volunteered from the militia, and the expence to the nation of thoſe families who had been killed or wounded. —105, perhaps, only died in the hoſpital, but how many wounded died without being brought to the hoſpital; how many left it uncured; how few of thoſe who left it will be able to gain their daily bread? The other ſide of the account was equally unfair. The Dutch ſhips are not his aſſets, he has them merely in truſt. I queſtion whether the number of ſeamen will be really reduced; Lord Duncan ſtill keeps a large

large fleet in the North Seas. The expedition has been every way diſaſtrous; and it will not be the leaſt of the evils it has brought upon the country if it ſhall be the cauſe of the character of Parliament being hurt, to the degree in which it muſt ſuffer if this motion is rejected. Mr. Tierney ſaid, that though he knew Miniſters would find means to ſcreen themſelves, he did not expect that they would have thus peremptorily oppoſed the motion. He cited ſeveral precedents where an enquiry had been voted upon grounds much leſs ſtrong than had been advanced in the preſent inſtance, particularly in the time of the illuſtrious Onſlow, when an Engliſh fleet had been beat by an inferior one of the enemy. Here Mr. Tierney read the very ſpirited addreſs then voted to his Majeſty, humbly preſſing him to lay the papers neceſſary for an inveſtigation before the Houſe, and concluded by ſaying, I hope, Sir, that it will appear to be the ſenſe of the Houſe of Commons to-night, and that you will ſoon have an opportunity of addreſſing his Majeſty in ſimilar words.

Mr. *Perceval* roſe to make a few obſervations upon ſome points of the ſpeeches of the two hon. Gentlemen (Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Tierney) who had taken a principal ſhare in the diſcuſſion of the preſent queſtion. It was much the habit of theſe Gentlemen to make certain reflections on the conduct of Parliament, which tended to imply that the majority of the Houſe did not ſpeak the ſentiments of their conſtituents; and that Gentlemen on the other ſide alone expreſſed the real opinion and wiſhes of the nation at large. But if it were impartially conſidered, would it not be found that if the Houſe adopted the opinions held out by thoſe Gentlemen they would be adopting ſentiments that had been frequently, almoſt unanimouſly repudiated by the Houſe, and as generally diſapproved of by the bulk of the people? For contrary to their general and repeated aſſertion it ſo happened that whenever the country was appealed to, it always decided in favour of the opinions and the meaſures adopted and purſued by his Majeſty's Miniſters. As to any diſgrace which was inſinuated muſt attach to Parliament from the reliance they placed in the preſent Adminiſtration, upon due examination it would appear, that this diſgrace had no exiſtence but in the biaſſed imagination of thoſe who contended it did exiſt; the voice of the country fully confirmed the oppoſite opinion, for upon every appeal to the public judgment it had been proved, that the plans hitherto acted upon by Miniſters had been generally approved, and that in no occaſion had they loſt a particle of

the credit, the confidence and the eſteem which they enjoyed with the country. But he would now ſay a word more immediately touching the queſtion before the Houſe. He would aſk, for whoſe ſatisfaction was the enquiry to be inſtituted? Both the Gentlemen who had ſo forcibly called for an inveſtigation have allowed that no blame attached to the Britiſh ſoldiers and officers—it was imputable only to the Ruſſian—*(a cry of No, No, from the Oppoſition Bench)*—It was ſomewhat ſurpriſing that theſe Gentlemen ſhould diſclaim their aſſertion; but, ſtill he was ſure he diſtinctly heard the mover of the queſtion ſay, that he exculpated altogether the Britiſh army. The enquiry was then merely to be inſtituted to refute a repreſentation made to the diſcredit of the Britiſh troops by a Ruſſian officer—but was Parliament to be applied to, to ſatisfy doubts which a Ruſſian officer gave riſe to at the Court of St. Peterſburgh, while, no doubt, the ſubject remained in the breaſt of Parliament itſelf? We contend that ſuch a Parliamentary enquiry could be attended with no good; it could only create jealouſy and ill humour. Indeed almoſt every point in diſpute was conceded by the Gentlemen who were ſo eager for an enquiry—it was conceded, that the object of the expedition was a Britiſh object, and, had it ſucceeded, would no doubt, have been approved by thoſe who were now ſo forward to cenſure it—it was alſo conceded, that the character of the Britiſh army never ſtood higher than it did at preſent. Where then was the cauſe of blame? An hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) regretted indeed the manner in which the Dutch ſailors delivered up their fleet, and lamented the bad example which it would hold out to our Britiſh ſeamen. If then the whole of the expedition had ſucceeded, there would be much more treachery and corruption to lament, and conſequently a more pernicious example held out, as the Dutch army would then have adopted the ſame mutinous and treacherous conduct as the Dutch navy. Indeed, the two Gentlemen he had already alluded to, differed as widely on this ſubject as the one of them (Mr. Sheridan), had differed from himſelf in the beginning and end of his ſpeech. This inconſiſtency had already been ably detected and animadverted on by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Dundas), when he obſerved that the ſame tranſaction had been repreſented, as honourable and diſgraceful, or that immortal honour was acquired without any glory. It was alſo aſſerted that if the expedition had ended with the capture of the Dutch fleet, it would have been wholly unexceptionable.

This

This he would deny—in the manner it had been conducted it was entitled to much honour, but if abandoned after the fleet had been taken, it muſt prove highly diſgraceful, and be regarded only in the light of an act of ſwindling, as we ſhould appear to turn our back upon Holland without any attempt to reſtore her government, or reſcue her from the enemy, as ſoon as we got poſſeſſion of her navy, than which nothing in his eyes could be more ſcandalous and diſhonourable. Very ſtrong language was made uſe of reſpecting the manner that the men had been drawn from the militia. They were, it was ſaid, ſeduced by a lure of ten guineas; they were perfectly undiſciplined; they were devoted to certain death. Without offering a bounty, how was the recruiting ſervice to be promoted? The ſame zeal was no longer to be expected from them; yet 10,000 men had ſince been procured without any attempt to entrap them. It was alſo aſſerted that the propoſed enquiry would be attended with no danger; that the names of thoſe who gave information to government might be left in blank; a blank alſo might be left for their place of reſidence; then the whole might thus be filled up with blanks; and conſequently no information could reſult from ſuch an enquiry. But it was ſaid, might not the enquiry be entruſted to a Secret Committee? He would leave it to the Houſe to conſider how much they could depend upon the ſecrecy of a Secret Committee. In every point of view the enquiry appeared to him to be attended with danger, and upon the whole to be uſeleſs. Now, as to the diſgrace that was ſaid to attach to the cloſe of the expedition, he could not well ſee the grounds of it; to capitulate, was certainly not deſirable, or, in the abſtract, was not entitled to credit or praiſe. But after the firſt point was gained, that of taking the fleet, and when the other, the reſcuing of Holland from French oppreſſion had failed, was it not an act of wiſdom to bring back the army as entire as poſſible? To be beat was no diſgrace to any general, eſpecially when the circumſtances of ſituation, or untoward and unforeſeen accidents, had led to that defeat. Such was the caſe of our army in Holland. To have inundated the country, was aſſerted to be more diſgraceful; yet without having recourſe to this ſevere meaſure, or to a capitulation, the rear guard of the army muſt have been ſacrificed; wiſdom, policy, and humanity ſeemed to have dictated the plan that was adopted; for was it not better to give up 8000 French priſoners, than to ſacrifice 1000 Britiſh troops, and that to no purpoſe? On every view he could

take of the ſubject, he could ſee no object to be acquired by granting an enquiry, but much danger if it was entered into: on theſe grounds he would oppoſe the motion.

Mr. *M. A. Taylor* aſſured the Houſe, that the ſupport he was ready to give to the preſent motion did not ariſe from any thing like party ſpirit. He was confident that in ſo doing he acted in conformity with the wiſhes of a great majority of the country, on whom the failure of the expedition, and the capitulation of the Duke of York, had made the moſt deep and ſerious ſenſation. He anxiouſly hoped that Parliament would enquire into the miſcarriage of an enterpriſe which was looked to with ſuch general expectation of ſucceſs, and upon which ſo much of the blood and treaſure of the nation had been expended to no effect. He certainly was happy that to a certain degree it had ſucceeded; but when an army of about 30,000 men had entered Holland without being able to accompliſh any thing like the object they had in view, ſome ſolid ſatisfactory anſwer ſhould be adduced for ſo marked a miſcarriage; Parliament ſhould not reſt ſatisfied with the *ipſe dixit* of a Miniſter; it ſhould be clearly made out to whom the blame juſtly applied. The attempt to reſcue Holland he had always ſupported; and he felt it was eſſential to this country that Holland ſhould not be adverſe to us. His wiſh, therefore, was to be informed upon what ground the expedition was undertaken; why it was not planned and ſent out earlier; for the lateneſs of the attempt was in a great meaſure the cauſe of its miſcarriage. As to the mode in which the militia had been treated, he had always diſapproved of it. It was a meaſure which bereft the militia of all its ſpirit; and ſuch was the opinion of the generality of the militia officers, which he hoped they would now come forward and expreſs. The country gentlemen were driven from the militia; its principal officers were diſguſted with the treatment they had received: in ſhort, the militia was loſt to the country. This, in his opinion, was ſtrong ground of enquiry. But the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), never during his whole adminiſtration would conſent to any enquiry. But if, on an occaſion like the preſent, the Houſe did not ſeriouſly preſs for an enquiry, their inquiſitorial capacity was gone. Blame muſt attach either on the army or on Miniſters. The enquiry would decide on which of them. His hon. Friend (Mr. Sheridan), had ſaid that, though Miniſters were proved to be in fault, the country would not call for their removal.

He

He differed eſſentially from him, and was certain the country would remove them, and replace them by Gentlemen on his ſide of the Houſe. He was not mealy-mouthed when he talked of Miniſters. He was ready to declare they had no talents for carrying on a war *(a laugh)*. Gentlemen might take what he ſaid for a joke; but he did not mean it as ſuch. He ſincetely lamented the loſs of the many brave men that had fallen in this ill-fated expedition; he alſo regretted the fall of the many thouſands employed in it, though not particularly connected with him and this country. He therefore felt himſelf bound in conſcience to vote for the propoſed enquiry.

Mr. *H. Addington* obſerved, that having maturely and diſpaſſionately conſidered the nature of the propoſed enquiry, it appeared to him to reſt upon two grounds: firſt, upon the propriety of forming an opinion of a meaſure from its reſult; and ſecondly, that in conſequence of a conſiderable failure, there ſhould ariſe a neceſſity of enquiry. But thoſe Gentlemen who ſupported the motion had not, perhaps, carefully conſidered that the moſt ill-adviſed meaſures had often produced the moſt brilliant ſucceſs; and that the wiſeſt and beſt planned projects had terminated in diſaſter and defeat. The hon. Gentleman would admit that it was not in mortal man to command ſucceſs, and government could not undertake to controul the elements. Much had been ſaid upon the nature of the Dutch; he certainly did not know, nor did he deſire to know, what might have been the information received from Holland by his Majeſty's Miniſters; but as he believed human nature to be the ſame in every country, it followed that the Dutch, harraſſed, plundered, and oppreſſed, muſt have ſincerely wiſhed for emancipation from French tyranny;

> "The fleſh will quiver where the pincers tear,
> "The blood will follow where the knife is driven."

And it was impoſſible to ſuppoſe that the Dutch would, if favoured with an opportunity, ſupport their ſorrows, their regret, and indignation. He contended that government would have been guilty in a great degree, had it not made the attempt, and concluded with an eulogy on the ſkill and valour of the generals employed in the expedition, and the courage and intrepidity of the army.

Sir *James M. Pulteney* ſaid, he did not wiſh to enter into any detail reſpecting the expedition, but roſe merely for the purpoſe of ſetting the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Tierney), right with

with reſpect to the numbers of the reſpective armies. The Engliſh and Ruſſian army has been ſtated at 45,000 men, and that of the French 35,000. He did not pretend to an accurate knowledge, but he believed the numbers of the forces might be eſtimated at 36,000 men, of whom latterly, there were about 10,000 in killed, wounded, and miſſing. The French might have had 25 or 30,000 men in the action of the 2d; and from the 6th, at the time when the convention was agreed to, the enemy was continually receiving reinforcements. Large bodies of troops had been drawn from the frontiers of France, which were replaced by battalions from the interior, and therefore the force of the enemy, which was ſuperior in numbers, was every day becoming more ſo. Had the army been treble the force of the enemy it muſt have embarked, and the reaſons became more preſſing in conſequence of its inferiority. There was, in his mind, a clear, evident, and abſolute neceſſity for making a ſacrifice in order to embark with ſecurity. With reſpect to the obſervations of the hon. Gentleman on the bounty of ten guineas, and the boys who were ſaid to have been ſeduced, he ſhould ſay that he underſtood the bounty was chiefly taken by men, who had been either in the militia or regulars, and were good men, and ſoldiers. As to the want of diſcipline on the continent, it certainly was not to be expected that men unacquainted with their officers could act with the ſame regularity, ſtrictneſs, and diſcipline, as others who were accuſtomed to their commanders; yet ſome allowance ought to be made, and he could ſay more from ſpeculation than from actual fact, that the men ſo enliſted had conducted themſelves well.

Colonel *Hope* noticed and explained the difference of the paper in Mr. Tierney's poſſeſſion, and that read by Mr. Secretary Dundas, with reſpect to the articles of expenditure; and Mr. Long having alſo particularly explained the cauſe of the apparent difference between both, as in reality the extraordinary expenditure amounted to 180,000l. only. Mr. *Tierney* admitted that he was perfectly ſatisfied with the manner in which the difference was explained.

Mr. *Long* and Mr. *Tierney* ſaid a few words on the ſame ſubject.

Mr. *Sheridan* ſaid, that after having been indulged at ſuch length, he ſhould not treſpaſs long on the patience of the Houſe. He was induced principally to riſe from two alluſions that had been made to him; one by an hon. Gentleman

man near him (Mr. M. A. Taylor), and one by an hon. Gentleman oppoſite (Mr. Addington). His hon. Friend has accuſed him of being mealy-mouthed—an objection which was ſeldom made to him, for in general he was accuſed of being too plain a ſpeaker. But he accuſed him of having taken a line of candour, for which he ought to apologize in ſaying, that he did not wiſh to diſpoſſeſs Miniſters of their places, and that the country would not wiſh to ſee them diſpoſſeſſed, even though they might diſapprove of their conduct in this expedition. He aſſured the hon. Gentleman that he blamed him without reaſon. He had no ſuch candour. He ſincerely wiſhed to ſee Miniſters diſpoſſeſſed for the good of the country, and if any thing that he could urge or ſay would bring this event about, he would exert every effort in his power. What he had ſaid was, that in his preſent motion, he was not prompted to this enquiry *merely* to prove to the country, and to the world, the incapacity of his Majeſty's Miniſters, for it could not redound to national honour or to national benefit to do that, if no other reſult was to come from it. But the hon. Gentleman ſaid, that he was confident the opinion of the country was againſt his Majeſty's Miniſters in this expedition, and he was ſincerely deſirous of turning them out, and of ſeeing the Gentlemen on that ſide of the Houſe paſs over to the other. In this, ſaid Mr. Sheridan, it is truly creditable to the hon. Gentlemen, that he would not paſs over with us; he would reſt in the midway; he would reſt in that chair, which it requires the greateſt talents and the greateſt reſpect to fill. Now, as to the alluſion from the hon. Gentleman on the other ſide, his chief objection to the motion was, that it had not been made in October laſt, before the failure of the expedition was known; or, after it was known, that he had not made it after Parliament was adjourned! He had given notice of his motion on the firſt day after the meeting. It was for Miniſters to anſwer for its being long delayed, ſince they, and not he, had made the adjournment. It had been objected to him that he had made uſe of the word diſgrace. Surely in the uſe of this term he had expreſſed himſelf clearly with regard to all the officers and men engaged in the execution of the enterpriſe, and had limited the word to the planners only. Nothing could be more clear than that the mere failure of a military expedition was not in itſelf a diſgrace: a town might be beſieged and taken, though the garriſon had diſplayed the greateſt courage and perſeverance. Circumſtances

might

might defeat the moſt obſtinate valour; but what he thought neceſſarily brought diſgrace along with it, was, when a country was deluded by promiſes which were not kept; when a people was tempted by offers of protection to ſhew themſelves, to manifeſt their ſentiments; and when, inſtead of the protection held out to them, the planners of an expedition were forced to capitulate for their own retreat. This was what he aſcribed to the character of the late expedition. They entered North Holland, holding out to the inhabitants offers of protection, and inviting them to riſe. It was true, indeed, that the people did not obey the invitation; but ſuppoſe that they had, and that, truſting to the promiſe of Great Britain, they had come forward, and that afterwards they had been abandoned, would not the nation have been diſgraced? Would it not have been reſponſible for all the blood that muſt have flowed from ſuch an iſſue? If France had invaded Ireland with 45,000 men, and had profeſſed, as the Britiſh profeſſed to the Dutch, that they were come to reſcue them from oppreſſion and tyranny—the mere ſuppoſition gave riſe to a melancholy ſentiment; for they had ſeen, with all their pretended knowledge of human nature, that 45,000 men had not induced the Dutch to give up the horrors of French fraternity, or to prefer the friendſhip of Great Britain to the evils under which they groaned; but would any man ſay, that if 45,000 French had landed in Ireland during the inſurrection there, that Britiſh influence would have been as great upon the people of Ireland, as French influence, with all its iniquity, was upon the Dutch? But if 45,000 French had landed in Ireland, had held out offers of protection to the people, and had afterwards been forced to enter into a capitulation for their own eſcape, would any man ſay that they would not have been diſgraced, and that they would not have been anſwerable for all the horrors, the whippings, the half hangings, and the whole hangings that took place after the rebellion, in that miſerable country? In like manner he affixed the term diſgrace upon the men, who, without the certainty of keeping their word, boaſted of their power, and committed the nation to their folly and their incapacity.

Much has been ſaid about the diverſion which this made, and the diverſion was a favourite expreſſion of Miniſters. Three objects were ſtated to have been in view in the expedition, two of which were ſaid to have been obtained: he denied this fact. Two of the objects were incompatible—If it were one of our objects to replace the Stadtholder, it could

could not be our object to take their navy. But it was a diverſion: it forced the French to ſend their troops into Holland, and thus we aſſiſted the allies in another quarter. What, would not the French have ſent troops into Holland but for this expedition? Away, then, with French oppreſſion! They could leave the Dutch then to themſelves. But, if the expedition was meant as a diverſion, Holland, of all other places, was the worſt for a diverſion; ſince, by the nature of the country, a very inferior body of troops could ſucceſsfully reſiſt a greatly ſuperior force. He would agree that it was a fair thing to call a deſcent a diverſion, where, landing on an enemy's ſhore, you drew great bodies of men from other quarters, and kept them in play; but it was quite another thing, when having landed with the profeſſed object of replacing an exiled authority, and having failed, you came home and called it a diverſion. You had no right to call it by ſuch a name. But it was to be repeated; repeated! What, after the trial which had been made, and never was a trial ſo completely made of the diſpoſitions of any people: could inſanity itſelf think of repeating the experiment? After having entered the country not merely with a ſuperior force, but with a force ſo greatly ſuperior that, if the people were in their hearts at all diſpoſed to come over to the Britiſh, they had every temptation; if not a man was found diſpoſed to truſt us, could it be believed that, after the experience they had had, they would *now* come, if the experiment was to be repeated?

Mr. Sheridan concluded by expreſſing his ſurpriſe at the conduct of Miniſters upon this occaſion. He did expect that they would endeavour to have made the enquiry nugatory, but that they would have coloured their indiſpoſition to enter into the inveſtigation with ſome plauſible pretext. He was diſappointed. The Houſe had ſeen the ground they had taken, and the country would ſee their motives. He lamented, for the ſake of the brave army, and for the honour of the nation, that they thought it conſiſtent with common decency to get rid of the ſubject by ſuch means.

Mr. *M. A. Taylor* begged leave to ſay two words in explanation. He certainly did not aſſert that the opinion of the country was either for or againſt Miniſters on the ſubject of this expedition; he expreſſed only his wiſh that they would agree with him; and if ſo, he thought the removal of Miniſters ought to follow; but as to paſſing over to their places, he believed the hon. Gentleman full as anxious for a place as himſelf.

himſelf. As to the chair he never deſired to ſee it more ably filled.

The Houſe divided, and there appeared for the motion,

Ayes	-	-	45
Noes	-	-	216

Liſt of the Minority on Mr. Sheridan's Motion.

Anſon, T.
Adair, R.
Bouverie, Hon. W. H.
Burdett, Sir F.
Brogden, J.
Bird, W. W.
Coke, D. P.
Cavendiſh, Lord G.
Combe, H. C. (Lord Mayor)
Colhoun, W.
Dundas, Hon. C.
Geary, Sir W.
Grey, C.
Huſſey, W.
Howard, H.
Hobhouſe, B.
Harriſon, J.
Jekyll, J.
Jones, T. T.
Kemp, T.
Langſton, J.
Lawrence, Dr.
Lemon, Sir W.
Milner, Sir W.
North, D.
Northey, W.
Oſborne, Lord F.
Patten, Colonel
Plomer, W.
Richardſon, J.
Ridley, Sir M. W.
Robſon, M. B.
Ruſſel, Lord J.
Ruſſel, Lord W.
St. John, Hon. St. A.
Sheridan, R. B.
Smith, W.
Stanley, Colonel
Stanley, Lord
Sturt, C.
Taylor, M. A.
Tierney, G.
Tufton, Hon. H.
Winnington, Sir E.
Weſtern, C. C.

Tellers.

Whitbread, Sam. Deniſon, W. J.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

TUESDAY, FEB. 11.

William Lord Hamilton took the oaths and his ſeat, as Lord Hamilton of Holmedon, in virtue of the patent granted to his mother, the Ducheſs of Argyle.

Adjourned till the next day at four o'clock.

HOUSE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, FEB. 11.

A perſon from the Exchequer preſented accounts of monies iſſued by order of his Majeſty, purſuant to addreſſes of the Houſe, and not made good by Parliament. Ordered to lie on the table.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* brought down a Meſſage from his Majeſty, which was in ſubſtance as follows:

His Majeſty thought it right to inform the Houſe of Commons that there had arrived in this country three ſhips from Mogadore, on the coaſt of Africa, where a plague was known to rage at the time of their departure. That theſe veſſels had goods on board which there was reaſon to ſuſpect had been ſhipped under very ſuſpicious circumſtances. That, to prevent all the evil conſequences that might be apprehended from the expoſure of theſe goods, his Majeſty had, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, ordered the ſaid ſhips and cargoes to be deſtroyed, and recommended to his faithful Commons to conſider if any, and what allowance ſhould be made to the owners of the ſaid ſhips.

The Meſſage being read,

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that it be referred to the conſideration of a ſelect committee, obſerving that a minute and critical enquiry ſhould be made into the motives which induced theſe ſhips to ſail under ſo ſuſpicious a character, and that, after examining the invoices, ſuch reparation ſhould be made to the owners, if nothing appeared to criminate their conduct or intentions, as the juſtice of the Houſe ſhould think proper and adequate. The utmoſt care ſhould, at the ſame time, be employed to enquire into the motives which prompted ſuch hazardous ſpeculations.

Sir *William Pulteney* ſaid, that he was credibly informed that no plague raged at that place when the goods were ſhipped, nor was there any reaſon to believe that any contagion could poſſibly ariſe from them: in his opinion, therefore, it was improper to deſtroy them. No danger was to be apprehended where quarantine had been exactly obſerved, as he muſt ſuppoſe it had been in the preſent inſtance. The meaſure of deſtroying theſe ſhips was therefore rather too haſtily reſorted to. But he would not an that account reſiſt the propoſed enquiry; on the contrary, he approved of it, as it would lead to a diſcovery whether there were ſufficient rea-

ſons for deſtroying the ſhips, &c. and that with ſuch precipitation.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* aſſured the worthy Baronet that his information was erroneous, both with regard to the haſte with which he ſuppoſed the ſhips had been deſtroyed, and to the reaſons for believing that there was no well-grounded apprehenſion of a plague having exiſted at the time and place alluded to. The matter in queſtion had been the ſubject of long and repeated enquiry, and the moſt eminent of the faculty had given it as their opinion, that the precaution that had been uſed ſhould be reſorted to; that the danger of a contagion being ſpread from the opening and expoſing of theſe goods to the air appeared imminent in the extreme; for it was well know that two perſons who had been employed in putting the cargo on board died before the ſucceeding day. It was not, then, too much, or too precipitate, to adopt the precautions that had been taken. He was happy, however, to aſſure the Houſe, that no danger of any kind was now to be apprehended from the circumſtance.

The thanks of the Houſe was then voted to his Majeſty, and a ſelect committee, conſiſting of Mr. Pitt, Mr. Windham, the Attorney General, Mr. Bragge, Sir William Young, Mr. Burdon, Mr. Steele, Mr. Roſe, and Lord Hawkeſbury, were ordered to report the ſame, with their opinions thereon, to the Houſe.

The *Attorney General*, previous to his motion for renewing the Suſpenſion of the Habeas Corpus Act, moved, That an humble addreſs be preſented to his Majeſty, praying that he would be graciouſly pleaſed to give directions, that there be laid before the Houſe a liſt of the names of the perſons now detained in cuſtody, in virtue of an act made to ſecure and detain ſuch perſons as were ſuſpected of conſpiring againſt his Majeſty's government, together with the names of the priſons in which they were detained, and the dates of their reſpective commitments.

Sir *William Pulteney* preſented a petition in behalf of Mr. Macdowal, who, as a merchant, was connected with the iſlands of Grenada and St. Vincent. The mercantile houſe at Glaſgow, to which Mr. Macdowal belonged, had obtained the ſum of 240.000l. out of the loan granted in aid of the merchants belonging to theſe iſlands. The commercial embarraſſments ſtill exiſting that gave riſe to the loan which Parliament had granted, the prayer of the petition was, that further time might be allowed them for the repayment of

their

their firſt inſtalment, it appearing that the petitioners had now funds and property in their poſſeſſion more than ſufficient to make good the ſum which ſtill remained due on their part. The petition was then brought up, and Sir William Pulteney moved that a committee be appointed to examine into the nature of the facts upon which the prayer of the petition was founded.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* expreſſed his ſatisfaction, that the hon. Baronet had confined himſelf to that motion. It was of importance both to the individual whom it concerned, and to the public at large, that the merits of ſuch petitions ſhould be minutely enquired into. Above all, the greateſt caution ſhould be obſerved in committing and eſtabliſhing the principle laid down in the petition. If the circumſtances were ſuch as ſtated in the petition, he ſaw no reaſon for refuſing to accede to the prayer of it, after a ſelect committee ſhould have had ſufficient time to inveſtigate and pronounce upon its merits.

The petition was ordered to lie upon the table,

The Newfoundland judicature bill was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

THE LABOURING POOR.

Mr. *Whitbread* then roſe to make his propoſed motion for leave to bring in a bill to explain and amend the act which regulates the wages of artificers and labourers. When he had firſt the honour of making a ſimilar motion, he had the good fortune to meet with the countenance and ſupport of ſeveral Gentlemen whom he did not now ſee in their places, and his propoſition was aſſented to *nem. con.* After he had brought in his bill, and only upon the motion for its being read a ſecond time, the right hon. Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) objected to the proviſions of it, obſerving that a thorough reviſion of the poor laws was neceſſary, and he pledged himſelf to bring in a bill for that purpoſe. The bill was brought in and printed, but was never brought under the diſcuſſion of the Houſe. He would not now attempt to canvaſs the merits of that bill; it was ſufficient to ſay that all its proviſions were regarded as abſolutely impracticable. Still, in the hopes that the right hon. Gentleman would perſevere in his intention of bringing in his bill, he (Mr. Whitbread) deſiſted from making any further motion that ſeſſion. But now finding that the right hon. Gentleman had wholly given up all idea of proſecuting a meaſure which he formerly ſeemed to have ſo much at heart, he himſelf was determined

to

to renew his attempts, and to revive his bill. Thoſe who knew him would not ſuppoſe that he wiſhed the poor to be overpaid. He well knew that in many places, eſpecially in great manufacturing towns, thoſe who earned more than was ſufficient to provide for their families, uſually ſquandered the ſurplus away in deſtructive and ruinous luxuries. But in every well-regulated community, artificers and labourers ſhould be paid ſo as to be enabled to keep themſelves and families in a comfortable ſituation. It was his creed reſpecting the poor, that no excuſe ſhould be left them for doing wrong, and that when they offended, ſeverity ſhould be employed in puniſhing their offences.

He hoped the Houſe would concur with him in that opinion; and if ſo, how was it to be reduced to practice? The right hon. Gentleman had contended, that nothing effectual could be done by regulations, that all muſt be the reſult of principle; and that, in amending the poor laws, no regulation could be made reſpecting the amount of wages, but that labour ſhould be left to find its own level; it was impoſſible, however, that labour ſhould find its own level, as the laws on that head now ſtood. What firſt gave riſe, in his mind, to the idea of the bill he wiſhed to introduce, was the ſituation to which the poor were reduced in 1795. Their diſtreſſes then were nearly the ſame as they are now; and very exemplary attention was likewiſe then ſhewn by the richer claſſes to alleviate their diſtreſſes; but, before they received that relief, the preſſure under which they laboured was extreme. The farmers would not raiſe the price of labour; he conſulted the ſtatute book, but could diſcover nothing in it that could compel the farmers to do their duty. The juſtices, he found, had no power to grant relief; but they were armed with power to oppreſs the poor. In virtue of the 5th of Elizabeth, cap. 4th, the juſtices had the power of regulating the *maximum* of labour. This was highly oppreſſive and injurious to the labouring poor. A law therefore appeared neceſſary for enabling the juſtices to regulate alſo the *minimum* of labour. In this view he begged leave to ſubmit his motion to the Houſe for reviving his former bill. He wiſhed only that it might be read a firſt time and then printed, and a proper interval allowed for a thorough conſideration of it. Gentlemen might have an opportunity, when in the country, of conſulting whether it might prove beneficial or not. He could not expect that it would meet with that general concurrence which it might receive if it came from the

other

other ſide of the Houſe. All he entreated was, that it might be examined with care and attention. He alſo begged it to be remembered that the bill would go not to compel, but to enable the magiſtrate to do juſtice to the poor. The law, indeed, if enacted, might generally lie dormant, and only be enforced in hard times when the poor were oppreſſed as they now are in ſeveral diſtricts. He had attentively examined the exiſting poor laws, and the more he examined them the more convinced he was that the fault lay not in the laws themſelves, but in the execution of them. Where they were well executed, the poor enjoyed as much comfort as it was poſſible for them to enjoy. But where they were not duly enforced, the poor endured the moſt intolerable miſeries; to prevent theſe abuſes was the object of his bill. He would therefore conclude by moving, that leave be given to bring in a bill to explain and amend ſo much of the 5th of Eliz. cap. 4. as empowered juſtices of the peace to regulate the wages of artificers, labourers, &c.

Leave given to bring in the bill.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that though he diſapproved of the meaſure propoſed by the hon. Gentleman, he would not oppoſe the motion which he had made. The ſubject was not to be lightly treated of; it was of the greateſt importance, and required cool and deliberate diſcuſſion. The hon. Gentleman was certainly right in ſuppoſing that this was not a party queſtion. It intereſted the feelings of every individual, and from which ever ſide of the Houſe it came, it would meet with equal attention. The hon. Gentleman had ſtated, that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had oppoſed the motion when it was formerly propoſed, and that he had brought forward nothing upon the ſubject himſelf. But he oppoſed the meaſure formerly, becauſe he was convinced that it was not calculated to be productive of benefit to the lower claſſes of the community, not becauſe he intended to bring forward ſome preferable plan. When the hon. Gentleman thinks that there is ſuch neceſſity for the bill he propoſes to bring in, and that it will tend ſo effectually to meliorate the condition of the poor, why did he not bring it in ſooner; what ſatisfactory reaſon can he aſſign for delaying it ſo long? If the bill which he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) propoſed to bring in, was completely impracticable, why did the hon. Gentleman not bring forward his own? Whether the bill was as impolitic as it had been repreſented to be, he would not take time to conſider; but

that

that every part of it was not impracticable was evident to every one. Many claufes of it might be inexpedient, but might certainly, with great eaſe, be reduced to practice. Was it impoſſible to give every man an allowance in proportion to the number of his children, or to aſſiſt thoſe who were really in ſickneſs and diſtreſs? He would not argue at length upon the merits of the meaſure now propoſed; but he muſt ſay it ſtruck him as highly improper. It went to introduce legiſlative interference into what ought to be allowed invariably to take its natural courſe. The greater freedom there was allowed in every kind of mercantile tranſactions, the more for the benefit of all parties. It was likewiſe always inexpedient to frame a general law to remedy a particular evil. There was a great ſcarcity at the preſent moment, and ſome individuals of the labouring claſs might ſuffer from it, though he believed that claſs ſeldom felt fewer privations than at preſent: yet would it be expedient to enact a law which would be univerſally binding and eternal in duration? Beſides, the principle of the bill was inefficacious, and though it was adopted, it would have no good effect. It propoſes one ſtandard for the price of labour, without conſidering whether the labourer is young or old, whether ſickly or robuſt, whether an unmarried man, or with a numerous family to ſupport. The diſtreſſes of the poor would be relieved not by any general law, but alone by parochial aid adminiſtered to them by thoſe who were intimately acquainted with their ſituation.

The hon. Gentleman had remarked that the poor laws, in their preſent ſtate, were quite ſufficient if they were ſtrictly put in execution. It rather ſeemed ſtrange, that they ſhould be complete, and not contain within them ſome power to enforce their execution. He himſelf admired the ſyſtem of poor laws in England, though they had of late years greatly degenerated from their original ſimplicity and efficacy. It had not been his intention to overturn them, but to recal them to their original principles, and to give them ſuch ſubſidiary aids, as a change of circumſtances had now rendered neceſſary. Whether he would have the honour to bring that bill again before the Houſe he was extremely uncertain. He was, as formerly, convinced of its propriety; but many objections had been ſtarted to it, by thoſe whoſe opinion he was bound to reſpect. Inexperienced himſelf in country affairs and in the condition of the poor, he was diffident of his own opinion, and would not preſs the meaſure upon the attention

of

of the Houſe. But, ſtill anxious for the good of his fellow-men, he ſhould be rejoiced to ſee any meaſure propoſed which promiſed more effectually to relieve the indigent, and pledged himſelf to give it his warmeſt ſupport.

Sir *William Young* was of opinion, that the bill which the hon. Gentleman had moved for leave to bring in was altogether unneceſſary. By an act which he read, the juſtices were already obliged, under a penalty of 10l. to do nearly what was required by the hon. Gentleman, and was it probable that an act was a good one which, though enforced by ſuch ſevere penalties, had lain completely dormant for many years. The qualifications of the workman ſhould be conſidered as well as his wages. He gave great credit to the hon. Gentleman for his humane and laudable intentions, but they certainly were miſapplied.

Mr. *Buxton* thought that the meaſure would do more harm than good to thoſe for whoſe benefit it was propoſed. It would ſpread the moſt violent alarm among them, and tend to make them diſcontented. They were already extremely well off. The ſcarcity was great, but, from the benevolent attentions of the opulent, at no time was the condition of the labourer more eligible.

Mr. *Lefevre* complained of the inactivity of church-wardens, and maintained, that if the poor laws were executed, they were already ſufficient to anſwer all the purpoſes propoſed by them.

Mr. *Elliſon* roſe to give his decided oppoſition to the motion. It had pleaſed Providence to viſit the country with a greater ſcarcity in 1795 than it now experienced. By the generous exertions of the higher claſſes, the poorer had been comfortably ſupported; why, then, ſhould we think of now introducing a law which is proved to be unneceſſary?

Mr. *Wilberforce* ſaid, that we ſhould be careful leſt, in our attempts to do good, we ſhould be the authors of evil. He approved of the general tenor of the bill formerly propoſed by his right hon. Friend; particularly of that part of it which provides for the better education of the children of the poor, and hoped that the buſineſs would be revived by the right hon. Gentleman, or ſome of his friends.

Mr. *Lefevre* explained.

Mr. *Whitbread* ſaid he had delayed bringing forward the meaſure, from the promiſes of the right hon. Gentleman. The plan propoſed by him was, in every part of it, impracticable, yet had it been diſcuſſed by the Houſe, it

might have been ſo modified and improved as to render his preſent motion unneceſſary. It had been ſaid that great ſenſation had been excited in the country by this motion. The proſpect of its being made had had happy effects in that part of the country where he reſided, and the ſureſt method to keep the people quiet, was to pay attention to their intereſts. It gave him pleaſure to reflect upon the charitable donations of the rich; but it was wrong that one part of a community ſhould depend upon the bounty of another. The habit of taking charity beſides broke the ſpirit, and extinguiſhed every ſpark of independence and generoſity. The object of the bill was, not to fix one ſtandard for wages, but to fix the *minimum* which could be given. He would ſuppoſe two pariſhes, in one of which, from the reſidence of the proprietor, a labourer was able to earn as much as would ſupport his family, and another where, from oppoſite cauſes, a labourer could not earn above half as much. That this was frequently the caſe no one would deny, and was it unreaſonable that a rate ſhould be fixed for both pariſhes, by which the poor ſhould be kept above want? Yet, when he propoſed this meaſure in time of plenty, he was told, why unneceſſarily diſturb the minds of the people; and when in time of ſcarcity, why unneceſſarily alarm their fears. A double edged ſword was preſented againſt him. There were many ſevere laws againſt combinations among ſervants; he thought it not unreaſonable that there ſhould be ſome to prevent maſters from combining to oppreſs their ſervants.

Mr. *Elliſon* ſaid he would give it every oppoſition in his power; the diſcuſſion of the ſubject would alarm the minds of the public. The poor were never ſo kindly treated as at preſent, and ſo far was he from agreeing with an hon. Gentleman (Mr. Nichol) who on a former night talked of people being fed out of ſoup-ſhops; he was happy to find that ſo many were now fed from ſuch places. It was a proof of the liberality of the Gentlemen of this country, who denied themſelves a number of thoſe luxuries they had been accuſtomed to, in order to relieve the diſtreſſes of the poor.

Mr. *Wilberforce* ſaid, he would give the ſubject, in its future ſtages, his moſt ſerious conſideration, and do all he could to promote the object the hon. Gentleman had in view.

Mr. *Whithread* conſidered it a very unfortunate circumcumſtance, that the poor of the country ſhould be obliged to ſubſiſt on charity. It was a bad principle to be eſtabliſhed in

in the country; it broke their minds, and deſtroyed their independence. He conſidered no time more proper for his meaſure than a period of diſtreſs and ſcarcity.

The motion was then put and agreed to, and Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Tierney, &c. were ordered to prepare and bring in the bill.

The bill for continuing the act for the voluntary ſervice of the militia of Ireland, and the bill for continuing the act for puniſhing thoſe convicted of an attempt to ſeduce his Majeſty's troops, were ſeverally committed. The Houſe was reſumed, and the reports ordered to be brought up the next day. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

WEDNESDAY, FEB. 12.

DUTCH EXPEDITION.

The order of the day being read,

Lord *Holland* roſe, and ſpoke in ſubſtance as follows:—My Lords, in riſing to lay before you the motion which you are now ſummoned to conſider, I ſhall trouble you with a little explanation of the motives by which I am actuated, nor attempt to expreſs the ſenſations which I feel. I hope, however, that the part I act upon this occaſion will not be aſcribed to vanity in offering myſelf to your attention, and that at the ſame time I am not deſirous of ſeeming too much to diſparage myſelf, if I ſay that it is with the utmoſt reluctance that I now ſtand forward to agitate this queſtion. I truſted that the ſubject would have been taken up by other noble Lords, whoſe authority would have given greater weight to what they propoſed, and that I ſhould have been ſpared the diſcharge of a painful taſk. It is not pleaſant for me to reflect that it has been ſo frequently my lot to differ from the majority of this Houſe upon points connected with the preſent war. This ſenſation, however, is not accompanied by any regret at the language I have held, and the conduct I have purſued. I am ſenſible only to the diſagreeable feeling of treſpaſſing upon the patience of the Houſe, in urging arguments which appear to be ſo oppoſite to thoſe which are approved of by ſo many of your Lordſhips.

I hope, however, you will believe me when I ſay, that I have reſolved to lay this motion for enquiry into the cauſes of the failure of the late expedition before you, firmly convinced that the honour of this Houſe is deeply intereſted in the

adoption of it; and that, with the ſentiments which I entertain, I ſhould have conceived myſelf culpable had I not given you an opportunity of pronouncing your opinion upon a matter in which the character of the nation is ſo much concerned.

I am fully aware of the difficulties I have to encounter in engaging in this argument. I wiſh, indeed, that the authors and contrivers of the expedition had been equally aware of the obſtacles they had to ſurmount when they embarked in that enterpriſe. I am fully acquainted with the character and climate of this Houſe, when I ſubmit my motion to its conſideration. I wiſh that his Majeſty's Miniſters had been equally acquainted with the ſentiments of the Dutch people, and the climate of their country, when they expoſed the armies of England to ſuch diſaſters on the Batavian ſhores. I have weighed all the diſcouragements and inconveniences attending my motion, but I feel it my duty to ſubmit the ſubject for your deciſion. I thought, indeed, that an event ſo extraordinary as the cataſtrophe of the Dutch expedition, would of itſelf have rouſed all the ſpirit and engaged all the attention of the Houſe. I thought that the very circumſtance of 45,000 Engliſh and Ruſſian forces having landed in Holland, after having gained, as we are told, four victories, and ſuſtained a fifth action, the reſult of which was at leaſt doubtful, were compelled to purchaſe their eſcape by giving up 8000 priſoners from the gaols of this country, would have been ground enough to call for enquiry, without the ſupport of any argument. I thought that a thing ſo unheard of would at once have dictated to every member of this Houſe the motion which I now make. I waited for ſome time, in the expectation that the ſubject would be taken up, and it was not till a few days ago that I deſpaired of ſeeing my hopes realized. Whatever difference of opinion might exiſt as to the cauſes of the failure, I thought that as to the failure no doubt could be entertained, and that to the propriety of enquiry no argument could be oppoſed. I find, however, that it is contended that the reſult of the expedition has been glorious; that it has been profitable; that it has been ſatisfactory! Truly I am at a loſs to imagine how any unbiaſſed mind can acquieſce in ſuch an opinion. Some, indeed, affect to think it, if not diſgraceful, at leaſt diſcreditable. I would aſk, however, what any honeſt man will think, what Europe will think of an army of 45,000 Britiſh and allied troops buying permiſſion to evacuate Holland by delivering up

up eight thouſand French priſoners without ranſom? Is this a tranſaction to excite no indignation? Is this a ſubject to paſs without enquiry? Can any man doubt whether diſgrace has been incurred? Can any man doubt whether our arms have been foiled? Can any man doubt whether our plans have been diſappointed? Is it really to be maintained that there has been no failure? What was the opinion of our enemies themſelves? How did they receive the news of the capitulation? The Preſident of the Batavion Legiſlative Body ſays, that in conſequence of that event the partiſans of England and of the Stadtholder were obliged to hide themſelves: that no ſooner was it known than the public funds roſe, and the price of proviſions fell. Our enemies conſidered it as a triumph, the friends of this country ſaw it with mortification.

It is true, no doubt, that the ſenſation produced by this event has been conſiderably diminiſhed in the interval which has elapſed, as muſt ever be the caſe in ſuch matters; but, was not the univerſal ſentiment when it was firſt announced, indignation? Was not the univerſal cry of the country for enquiry? Here I cannot help obſerving how ill the obſervation of the noble Secretary, that "the French never kept any armiſtice they ever concluded," came from any one of his Majeſty's Miniſters. At the time when the capitulation at Helder was freſh, when the good faith of the French in that affair was confirmed by that excellent officer Sir James Pulteney, how could the noble Secretary, with any ſhew of reaſon, make ſuch an aſſertion? How could he even indulge in perſonal invectives againſt the French Commander (General Brune), with whoſe whole proceedings, reſpecting the capitulation, we had ſo much reaſon to be ſatisfied?

I underſtand it has been ſtated that the loſs of the Britiſh troops in the expedition, was no more than 800 men. I am extremely glad to hear this, and ſhould be happy to ſee it eſtabliſhed on grounds that could not be diſputed. Even this, however, is reaſon for enquiry. It is fit that the nation ſhould be made acquainted with this conſolatory fact in the moſt authentic manner. The public are entitled to ſuch ſatisfaction; at preſent they will not believe the ſtatement implicitly, if it reſts on nothing better than miniſterial aſſertion. It has been ſaid, likewiſe, that the expedition ſucceeded in two points; as a diverſion of the enemy's forces, and in the capture of the Dutch fleet. It muſt be obſerved, however, that whatever

whatever policy, whatever advantage there may be in creating a diverſion of the enemy's forces, this forms no juſtification of a particular expedition, and of a ſpecific attempt. It is quite a different thing to ſay that it is good to diſtract the enemy's attention, and to ſay that you have done it in the beſt and moſt effectual manner. It is not enough that the diverſion was of importance, unleſs it could be ſhewn that it produced the utmoſt effect that could be deſired, with the leaſt inconvenience to ourſelves. This may be an argument generally in favour of keeping up an impoſing force, and purſuing offenſive operations. It proves nothing at all either as to the wiſdom of a particular deſign, or the ability of its conduct. Doubtleſs the Dutch expedition occaſioned ſome diverſion of the enemy's troops, but not ſo much as might have been produced had the attempt been made in ſome other quarter.

It is a fact pretty well known, that our army was oppoſed in a great meaſure by Batavian forces, who, in all probability, would not have been employed in any other operations. When we hear ſo much ſaid of the importance of this diverſion, it is worth while to remark, that at this period the French were moſt ſucceſsful in other quarters. At the very moment when General Brune agreed to the capitulation at Helder, the French army in Switzerland had begun to retrieve its diſaſter. This is a circumſtance peculiarly worthy of conſideration, and it may ſerve to damp our hopes in the effects of any preſſure that may be made upon France. The advantages of this attempt, as a diverſion, however, have nothing to do with the merits of the deſign; they form no argument whatever againſt enquiry. The capture of the Dutch fleet too we are told is of itſelf a ſufficient juſtification of the expedition, and a ſufficient reward for our exertions. Whatever be the value of this capture, it is not to be admitted as a ſet off for the expence and the bloodſhed which the enterprize has occaſioned. If the expedition was undertaken to reſcue Holland from the dominion of France, and to reſtore the Stadtholder to his authority, how can the Dutch fleet be a compenſation for the abſolute failure of theſe objects? But look a little at dates; examine the fact. The Dutch fleet was in our poſſeſſion before our army was put in motion to carry into effect the other objects which Miniſters originally profeſſed to have principally in view. The Dutch fleet, therefore, was not the cauſe of proſecuting the attempt;

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it can form no juſtification for our farther attempts; be its value what it may, it cannot detract either from the faults or the diſgrace which attended or ſubſequent operations.

We are told that the people of Holland were favourable to our cauſe: be it ſo; what is the inference? If with the ſentiments of the Dutch people in our favour, an army of 45,000 men was obliged to purchaſe its eſcape, what ſtronger argument can be conceived for enquiry? The object, I admit, was a Britiſh one, and its ſucceſs deſirable. This, however, is not enough; it was neceſſary that the object ſhould meet with the approbation of the Dutch. Even the claims of the Stadtholder upon this country, ſtrong as they are, would not juſtify the attempt in oppoſition to the ſenſe of the people of Holland. This was a fact, therefore, which ought to have been aſcertained. But even if our army had marched triumphantly to Amſterdam, we could not have retained Holland without the barrier towns: without Breda, Bergen-op-zoom, Maeſtricht, &c. We muſt have been compelled to maintain a ſtrong army during the winter and autumn, in the moſt unhealthy ſituation, in order to ſecure what we might have gained. Beſides the deſirableneſs of the object, therefore, it was neceſſary to calculate the practicability of the attempt, and the conſequences that might reſult from failure. Before we can judge of the wiſdom of the enterpriſe, we muſt conſider how far the inconveniences ſeem previouſly to have been eſtimated.

There are a number of inconveniencies to be taken into view, which, of themſelves indeed, would not have formed ſufficient reaſons for not attempting the expedition, had the great policy of it been clear, and the leading inducements deciſive, though they are of no inconſiderable weight in the balance of a doubtful project. Among theſe the neceſſary expence ought not to have been overlooked; the ſeaſon; the great inconvenience from employing ſo many tranſports, while the metropolis was left unprovided with ſuch a neceſſary as coals; the waſte of proviſion at a time when a ſcarcity was apprehended. It ought to have been conſidered whether it was not dangerous to leave Ireland without a ſufficient defence, eſpecially when the beautiful plan of an union ſeems to have been attended with ſo little effect in reconciling the people of that country to our government. It would have been proper too to conſider the diſadvantages of breaking down the militia of the country, and overthrowing a ſyſtem which it required ſo much time and trouble to rear. It was admitted

mitted by every body that there were great inconveniencies in that meaſure. One noble Lord, indeed, complimented the addreſs with which Miniſters had carried the Militia Bill through Parliament; and what was this addreſs? Why, carrying through that meaſure at a period of the ſeſſion when there was a very thin attendance, and when it was impoſſible to obtain that general concurrence which alone could ſanction ſuch a proceeding. Theſe, I admit, are inconveniencies of an inferior kind, but they are not to be overlooked in deliberation, when the advantages and diſadvantages of any enterprize are to be weighed.

What, then, are the conſequences which ought to have been foreſeen, if the expedition failed? Has not the unfortunate termination of our attempt to deliver the Dutch, and to reſtore the Stadtholder, thrown Holland more firmly than ever into the power of France? It has diminiſhed the confidence of our partiſans in our protection. Beſides, if the allies had been as ſucceſsful in another campaign as they were in the laſt, might not Holland have been obtained by negociation? For this object at leaſt the King of Pruſſia would have lent us his influence. All hopes of ſuch a compromiſe ſeem now to have vaniſhed. We do not find that the French are ready on all occaſions to give up their allies. The negociation at Liſle broke off becauſe the French would not allow us to indemnify ourſelves by retaining the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Trincomale, &c. and I am convinced this example operated as much to render the French popular in Holland as it muſt have done to excite ſuſpicion of our conduct.

But what were the proſpects of ſucceſs which encouraged Miniſters to embrace the project? At one period it appears that Miniſters entertained hopes of the co-operation of the King of Pruſſia. In the treaty with Ruſſia, however, in June 1799, it is expreſsly ſtated, that his Pruſſian Majeſty was determined to perſevere in his neutrality. It was ſomewhat ſingular to find it thus publiſhed to France, that after all our endeavours to detach that monarch from his neutrality, that he had reſiſted every temptation. It is ſomewhat ſtrange that Miniſters, who deſire the evidence of facts for the pacific diſpoſitions of France, ſhould thus give the example of employing every effort to ſpread the calamities of war, and ſhould even prove that they do not heſitate for their purpoſe to hold out every encouragement that can induce a ſovereign to violate his faith and depart from his engagements.

gagements. Was it politic, at ſuch a critical moment, to publiſh ſuch an aſſurance to France, that ſhe might rely on the neutrality of his Pruſſian Majeſty?

Surely too, it was worth while to conſider the difficulty of the country for military operations. That it was ſo nobody could be ignorant. I am well aſſured that the Duke of Brunſwick, who over-ran Holland in 1787, ſaid, that with 10,000 men, and being in poſſeſſion of the barrier towns, he could defend it againſt all Europe. Such were the difficulties which it was eaſy to foreſee, and on which it was neceſſary to calculate.

What, then, are the grounds upon which the attempt was recommended, and by which it is now to be juſtified? What reaſon had Miniſters to ſuppoſe that the Dutch were well diſpoſed to our cauſe? Did they evince any ſuch diſpoſition? But it may be ſaid that they had no opportunity. Take this either way—If they had an opportunity of joining our cauſe, it is evident, by their backwardneſs, that they were not inclined to ſupport it. If they had no opportunity, how did it come to paſs, that with an army of 45,000 men we never could hold out that hope of protection which could induce men to flock to our ſtandard? If the place of landing was ill calculated to diſplay our ſtrength, and to entice partiſans, is not this a glaring proof of the miſconduct of thoſe who contrived the plan of the expedition? From the firſt action which took place at the Helder, we had reaſon to deſpair of any co-operation from the Dutch ſoldiers. Then the action was ſuſtained entirely by Batavian troops. On the action of the 2d of September, indeed, theſe had been joined by French troops, but they diſplayed the ſame obſtinate reſiſtance. We ought, from that moment, to have deſpaired of any advantage from the proſecution of the attempt in this quarter. But, if the diſpoſition of the inhabitants was really favourable, we ought to have employed ſuch means as were calculated to conciliate their confidence, and obtain their co-operation. Was this the manner in which we acted? Theſe are queſtions not to be anſwered by mere aſſertion. They demand ſerious enquiry, and can be ſatisfied by no other means.

One great cauſe, in my opinion, for the failure of the expedition, though other circumſtances had been more favourable, was the employment of Ruſſian troops. I do not mean to diſparage the military forces of our allies; but this I ſay, that the employment of Ruſſian troops was not cal-

culated to conciliate the people of Holland. From the habits of that army, it is not too much to aſſert, that they are not likely to diminiſh the ordinary horrors of war in the country that is the theatre of it. Perhaps, indeed, it was neceſſary to employ the aid of the Ruſſians, if the attempt was to take place at all: but it ſhould no leſs have been conſidered whether their ſervice was likely to promote the great objects which we had in view. It may be true likewiſe, as ſtated by Miniſters, that the Dutch are averſe to the yoke of France; but it does not follow that they are willing to ſubmit to the dominion of England, or to the authority of the Stadtholder. The French are ſtigmatized as perfidious: as atheiſts, oppreſſors, and plunderers: but did they interfere with the religion of the Dutch? did they exerciſe any extraordinary ſeverities in Holland? The Dutch, too, it muſt be conſidered, have grievances to urge againſt this country. For many years they have been eſtranged from our intereſt and connexion. I aſk not which party has been to blame. The fact is unqueſtionable. The proceedings in 1787 proved that a great party was hoſtile to the influence of this country and favourable to that of France. I doubt extremely whether, in the face of that general diſpoſition, the part taken by this country and Pruſſia in the reſtoration of the Stadtholder was juſt, however deſirable it might have been to oppoſe the credit of the French in Holland. That interference might have been uſeful on the principle of Britiſh policy, and yet have rendered the people of Holland at leaſt more adverſe to our party. The Dutch might feel it a galling yoke, to ſee the Stadtholder maintained by Pruſſian armies and Britiſh interference. They were plunged by us into a war, in which they had no intereſt. They may be averſe to the dominion of France, but would they prefer a Stadtholder ſupported by Ruſſian armies, and under the guidance of Britiſh Counſels. Perhaps even it may be more for the intereſt of Dutchmen to cultivate French than Britiſh connection. From all theſe conſiderations, we had little reaſon to preſume that the people of Holland were friendly to our cauſe. There were ſome things too which muſt naturally have inſpired ſome doubts of the purity of our intentions reſpecting the old government we promiſed to reſtore. It is well known that conſiderable jealouſy had always prevailed in Holland reſpecting the authority of the Stadtholder. In a proclamation of Lord Duncan they were invited to return to their duty to their lawful ſovereign. I do not mention this circumſtance in the ſmalleſt degree to reflect

flect upon the conduct of that gallant Admiral, for whom I feel all poſſible reſpect. All I mean to ſay is, that Miniſters ſhould have been extremely careful in inſtructing all the officers employed to be cautious of exciting any jealouſy of this kind, which was of itſelf ſo apt to ariſe in the minds of the Dutch. It ought to have been ſtated diſtinctly that no ſuch pretenſions were entertained as that which the expreſſion alluded to ſeemed to countenance. I am convinced it muſt have done much harm. It gave a plauſible pretence on which to raiſe alarms that more was intended than the reſtoration of the Stadtholder to his ancient prerogatives. Theſe too would be confirmed by a recollection of the expreſſions of the noble Secretary in the debate on the Union with Ireland, in which he called the old government of Holland a miſerable, defective conſtitution. The unfavourable effect of theſe circumſtances upon the minds of the Dutch it is not difficult to conceive.

In ſpeaking of the military operations which took place, I muſt premiſe, that I impute none of the plans to the military commanders; I attach none of the reſponſibility for diſaſters that aroſe from the fault of the contrivers to his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York and the officers who ſerved with him. Much as I reſpect the Royal Commander in Chief, if I thought that any blame attached to his conduct, I ſhould conceive it nevertheleſs my duty to propoſe it for inveſtigation, or if his rank ſhould be conſidered any obſtacle to the proceeding, I ſhould conceive that a ſufficient reaſon for never employing thoſe in his ſituation upon ſimilar ſervices. But in truth I hold Miniſters reſponſible for the whole, becauſe there we are to preſume was the plan and the contrivance. No perſon in this country has uttered a word that can throw any ſuſpicion on the conduct of the gallant commander, the officers, and the whole army. One perſon, indeed, has ventured to ſtigmatize their conduct in the moſt injurious manner, of which I ſhall ſay a word or two by and by. The behaviour of the Britiſh troops has been admitted to have been exemplary. If ſuch is the caſe, we are called upon to adopt this enquiry, were it but to wipe away that diſhonour which has been thrown on the Britiſh army. In the Peterſburgh Gazette, publiſhed particularly by authority, (and there are few publications in that country without it) General D'Eſſen expreſsly ſays, that the Britiſh troops were two hours too late in their attack in the action of the 19th. He likewiſe ſtates, that the Ruſſian troops were in want of every thing.

But it is ſaid by ſome, you muſt not enter upon this delicate queſtion; you muſt ſubmit to ſee your army diſgraced, accuſed, and vilified in the face of Europe; you muſt not venture to take the only means by which the ſtain can be wiped away, becauſe our ally might be hurt. Truly, my Lords, I cannot but think ſuch an argument as diſgraceful to the ſpirit of this country. I do not diſpute that the alliance of Ruſſia may, in general, be advantageous to this country. But, for this reaſon, muſt we tamely acquieſce in outrageous libels upon the military character of the country? Is the honour of our ſoldiers to be thus bartered and compromiſed for any advantage? Are our alliances to be purchaſed by a ſacrifice of what is deareſt to a country: the courage, the honour, the reputation of its army? Are theſe great objects to be meanly yielded up to ſatisfy the whims of any court? Is it tolerable that a ſubject of our ally ſhould accuſe our army of cowardice and miſconduct, and we ſhall not be permitted to enquire and aſcertain to whom cenſure may belong? Are we thus, by a puſillanimous acquieſcence in unjuſt reproaches, to deprive our army of that character which raiſes it moſt highly in its own eſteem, and renders it moſt formidable to the enemy? The Ruſſian government, I am ſorry to obſerve, has got too much influence in this. If there be any law in this country that prevents the preſs from commenting with freedom and truth on the conduct and politics of the Ruſſian government I am ſorry for it. Such a law ought not to exiſt. But if it is not permitted to animadvert on the politics of Ruſſia, ſhall a Ruſſian ſubject be allowed to vent the moſt atrocious libels in the moſt public manner, and with all the ſanction of authority, againſt the whole Britiſh army? The reaſons for the enquiry I propoſe come home to the honeſt feelings of every Engliſhman. You owe it to the troops, who have been defamed—to the country, whoſe character is at ſtake; to your own honour, as its faithful guardians; to enquire into calumnies of ſuch fatal tendency, and to ſhew who are juſtly obnoxious to cenſure.

On the 27th of Auguſt the landing at the Helder was effected, after a ſevere action. Another engagement took place on the 2d of September, after the Dutch troops, who alone had been engaged on the firſt day, had been joined by French reinforcements. Now I aſk, why Sir Ralph Abercrombie did not advance after the advantages he had gained? Was it for want of ſupplies, was it in conſequence of orders, or was it that he deſpaired of any advantage from the proſecution of the

the attempt? Of General Abercrombie I ſpeak not only without cenſure, but with that high reſpect which I entertain for his character. To what is the delay in advancing to be aſcribed? Much will depend on the anſwer to theſe queſtions. The place where the army had landed was neither fitted for employing with effect the force we had, nor for advancing with advantage. For the truth of this I appeal to the military characters whom I am happy to ſee around me. The country, unqueſtionably, was difficult. What reaſon too can be aſſigned for attempting the deſign at ſo late a period of the ſeaſon? It may be anſwered, that every thing was properly arranged, that every thing was well prepared, that every thing was well conducted. To this I reply, enquire. It may be ſo; but can any harm ariſe from enquiry? Can you ſay that you diſcharge your duty if you do not enquire? The public, it is well known, are not only diſappointed, but they are diſcontented at the iſſue of the expedition. They ſee, they feel that it has failed, and that with circumſtances of ſhame and diſgrace. If Miniſters refuſe to go into the enquiry, I muſt believe that they cannot truſt their conduct to an impartial inveſtigation. If the winds and weather are to blame, why ſurely no miſchief can ariſe from convicting theſe elements of oppoſition to the deſigns of his Majeſty's Miniſters. What evil can ariſe from bringing them to trial? If they reſiſt enquiry, no impartial man will acquit them of a principal ſhare in the calamity and diſgrace with which the expedition was attended. I have enumerated ſome of the advantages that muſt reſult from enquiry. You will re-eſtabliſh the character of your army. We know that it is natural to impute the blame of unſucceſsful military operations to the commander, or army. In this country ſuch blame may not be imputed, but in Europe the charge may be made, and it ſtands ſupported by the ſtatements of General D'Eſſen, in the Peterſburgh Gazette. It is neceſſary to demonſtrate the truth by a fair inveſtigation. By no other courſe can you ſatisfy the demands of your national honour and your military reputation.

At a moment too when it is decided that the war ſhall be continued to a period which we cannot fix in idea; when new expeditions are, it is rumoured, about to be undertaken, it becomes you to aſcertain how they are likely to be conducted, by enquiring what has been the ability and the wiſdom diſplayed in other inſtances by thoſe who plan and conduct them. Is it not proper to enquire whether Miniſters may not again be encouraging

encouraging thoſe deluſions by which they have already been miſled? They rely upon the favourable diſpoſition of the French people to juſtify their attempts for the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon. The proportion of the diſaffected in France ſeems, however, to be leſs than it was in Holland.—If the expedition to the Helder failed, by the raſhneſs, the negligence, and incapacity of Miniſters, will you encourage them by your acquieſcence in paſt miſconduct and former diſgrace, to embark in ſchemes ſo much more doubtful in their policy, and likely to be ſo much more perilous in their conſequences? I move therefore, That the Houſe reſolve itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe to enquire into the cauſes of the failure of the late expedition to Holland.

Earl *Moira* ſaid, that he did not riſe either to oppoſe the motion of the noble Lord, or to ſupport it. His object was to endeavour in what he had to ſay, to prevail on that noble Lord to withdraw his motion. He hoped his Majeſty's Miniſters would not deem it neceſſary to go into the queſtion, as they muſt be convinced with him, that the diſcuſſion might be attended, not only with inconveniencies, but with, perhaps, very diſagreeable conſequences. The noble Lord who made the motion, by the delicate manner in which he had ſpoken relative to the illuſtrious perſonage who had the chief command of the expedition, had rendered it unneceſſary for him to take up much of their Lordſhips' time in delivering the obſervations he had to ſubmit to their conſideration. His Lordſhip ſaid that he conceived the diſcuſſion of this queſtion would be attended with great inconveniencies, becauſe it was in a great degree nugatory to diſcuſs the propriety of a meaſure which could not be acceded to, and in his opinion no enquiry could be granted by that Houſe, becauſe if it was, it would, and muſt naturally lead to the divulging of ſecret correſpondence, as well as to that of diſcovering the number and conſequence of the adherents to the Stadtholder in Holland. This muſt of courſe be productive, not only of inconveniencies, but alſo of ill conſequences, which it was of the higheſt importance, if poſſible, to avoid. However unſucceſsful the late expedition might have turned out, it was by no means improbable that at ſome future time another expedition to Holland might not be deemed, not only neceſſary but practicable. An enquiry therefore, in the preſent inſtance would, in all likelihood, tend to render ſuch a meaſure, in many reſpects impracticable, if it did not fruſtrate it altogether. In its very nature alſo it muſt in a degree imply ſome ſort of doubt as to the conduct of the illuſtrious Commander in Chief. The

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noble Lord who made the motion had certainly, as far as his individual opinion went, exculpated that illuſtrious perſonage from deſerving any blame; but the world at large would ſay, blame muſt reſt ſomewhere, and he would not wiſh, by the diſcuſſion of the queſtion in that Houſe, to raiſe the ſmalleſt doubt in the minds of the public upon the ſubject. The public mind of this country, his Lordſhip ſaid, he was convinced, was deſirous to beſtow on that illuſtrious perſonage who had the command of the late expedition, every degree of praiſe for the ardent zeal and active energy he had, on all occaſions, evinced to combat every difficulty, privation and danger, in defence of the ſecurity and deareſt intereſts of his King and Country. His Lordſhip ſaid that he believed that the public mind deemed him in every ſenſe entitled to their warmeſt gratitude for the whole of his conduct and exertions in its favour. He was ſenſible no one perſon in the nation would be more deſirous than the illuſtrious perſonage to whom he had alluded, that an enquiry ſhould take place into that part of the expedition which devolved upon him. He was certain that nothing would have kept that illuſtrious perſonage from that day appearing in his place in the Houſe, but a certain delicacy of opinion that by his preſence he might be the means of preventing any noble Lord from delivering his opinion with that perfect extent of freedom which he might wiſh to do. The ſame reaſons, he believed had operated to reſtrain fraternal anxiety from being preſent on the occaſion. The illuſtrious perſonage to whom he had alluded, knew very well the ſtrong ground on which he ſtood would entitle him to court an enquiry, but the imperious circumſtances that were blended with it, affecting in the higheſt degree the moſt important intereſts of the country, he found it neceſſary to reſt ſatisfied under the conſciouſneſs of having exerted himſelf to the utmoſt of his abilities, and that no blame or miſconduct whatever could be fairly imputed to him. For theſe reaſons his Lordſhip hoped the noble Lord who made the motion would conſent to withdraw it, otherwiſe he ſhould be under the neceſſity, though ſuch a proceeding would be extremely diſagreeable to him, of moving the previous queſtion.

Lord *Holland* not aſſenting to this, Lord *Moira* moved the previous queſtion.

Earl *Spencer* roſe and ſaid, that notwithſtanding what had fallen from the noble Earl who had juſt ſat down, he muſt beg their Lordſhips' patience till he made a few obſervations on what had been ſaid by the noble Lord who made the motion. That noble Lord's motion was for an enquiry into

into the cauſes of the failure of the expedition; and from all the reaſons adduced in the courſe of his ſpeech, he ſeemed to draw an inference that the expedition had altogether failed.—This his Lordſhip begged leave to deny, for in two of its principal objects it had met with the moſt complete ſucceſs.—The obtaining poſſeſſion of the enemy's fleet, and being the means of cauſing that diverſion of the enemy's troops, which would otherwiſe have been employed to great advantage againſt the cauſe of the allies in other quarters. The Dutch fleet, he contended, was a great addition to our own ſtrength, and at the ſame time weakened that of the enemy in an adequate proportion. He attacked the conſiſtency of the argument of the noble Lord who made the motion, inaſmuch as he had admitted that it would be a moſt deſirable object to wreſt Holland out of the hands of France, and yet cenſured his Majeſty's Miniſters for ſetting on foot an expedition which had that event for its principal object. No one could deny but for the obtainment of that deſirable object, one great ſtep towards inſuring its ſucceſs was, if poſſible, engaging the co-operation of Pruſſia; and yet ſpeaking of that attempt, the noble Mover of the queſtion had cenſured the policy of his Majeſty's Miniſters, becauſe it was ſhewing the enemy that we were uſing all our efforts to bring every power in Europe into the coalition againſt them. The only part of the expedition which could at all be ſaid to have failed, was the return of it without effecting its purpoſe; and this, his Lordſhip contended, was owing to weather and other unavoidable accidents, not in the power of either miniſters or commanders to controul. For theſe reaſons he was certain no enquiry was neceſſary, and therefore gave his decided negative to the motion.

Lord *Mulgrave* ſaid that he felt no ſuch difficulty in the queſtion as had ſuggeſted itſelf to the noble Lord who had moved the previous queſtion. Standing as he did, totally unconnected with Miniſters for having planned the expedition, or with the Commanders and Officers who had been charged with the execution of it, he ſaw no reaſon why he ſhould not deliver his opinion with that freedom which his duty as a Lord of Parliament required of him. The expedition had been planned in order to obtain what the noble Lord himſelf had allowed to be an important object. In all Governments there were two reſponſibilities attending every expedition: Government were reſponſible for the proper and efficacious equipment and proviſioning of it: the Commanders and Officers were reſponſible for its due execution. In the late expedition every thing had been done that could be effected towards its complete

plete equipment, id it had been entrusted to Commanders of the higheſt milita' talents and character. The bad weather had delayed theipower of landing ſo long, that the enemy were enabled to dlect a force ſufficient to prevent that gallant and juſtly cebrated officer, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, from marching more tan a ſmall diſtance into the country. If that force had not bee collected before that gallant General was joined by Genera Don with a reinforcement that increaſed his army to 15000 ren, Sir Ralph Abercombie would have been able to have marhed forward, and in that caſe would, in all probability, hav been in that ſtate which the noble Lord had deſcribed the Duke of Brunſwick to have been in the year 1787, in whic he might, perhaps, have ſtood as fair a chance to defend Holand againſt all the troops in Europe. That North Hollaid, when the expedition ſailed, had very few troops was vell known, for General Brune, who had the chief comm:nd, had ſent the greateſt part of them to Zealand, which he knew was a province moſt warmly and zealouſly attached to the Orange Family. The long continuance of bad weather, after our fleet was in ſight, and had thereby diſcovered the exact point of attack, had enabled them to draw their forces from all parts to that particular quarter. Thus they gained a ſuperiority of force, which prevented Sir Ralph Abercrombie from advancing till the whole of the reinforcements arrived; and even after the landing of his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York with ſuch reinforcements, and after the arrival of the Ruſſians, the weather continued ſo unfavourable to military operations as to enable the enemy to pour in immenſe reinforcements of French ſoldiers. Every thing had been done that gallant Commanders and a brave army could attempt; the ſeaſon was far advanced, and the elements aſtoniſhingly adverſe. This Houſe, therefore, ſaid his Lordſhip, cannot grant an enquiry againſt ſtorms of wind and rain—againſt the elements, over which the reſponſibility either of Miniſters who planned, or Commanders entruſted with the execution of the expedition, could not poſſibly have the ſmalleſt controul. He therefore was againſt the motion, as a motion fit only to come from Bedlam.

Lord *King* ſaid he roſe to give every ſupport in his power in favour of the preſent motion. He was decidedly of opinion that the expedition had been diſaſtrous in the extreme to this country; that being ſo much more ſo than any which had preceded it, great blame muſt attach ſomewhere; and therefore he was convinced of the neceſſity of an enquiry, in order to diſcover where and with whom that blame actually lay. This

opinion was conſiderably ſtrengthened by the recollection that their Lordſhips had very recently given their concurrence and approbation to the preſent Miniſter's prolongation or continuance of the War. He begged their Lordſhips would now reflect on the fate of the late expedition, and he thought if they did they would think with him on the ſubject; becauſe an enquiry would convince them whether thoſe who had planned or thoſe who had conducted the expedition were to blame for its failure; and how far they were to be entruſted with the planning and conducting ſimilar expeditions, which a continuance of the war might render neceſſary. In the courſe of the American war, there might have been reaſons for refuſing enquiry, which could not poſſibly apply in the preſent inſtance. The diſtance of that country from this was ſo great, that it would have been impoſſible to form inſtructions to our commanders, which left almoſt an unlimited power in them to uſe their own diſcretion, according as unforeſeen circumſtances might occur. In the late expedition no ſuch object could be ſtarted; the diſtance of the place to which it was deſtined, was not more than forty-eight hours ſail, and if the inſtructions were or were not peremptory in the firſt inſtance, they might eaſily have been changed from time to time with trifling inconvenience. Enquiry, his Lordſhip ſaid, became the more neceſſary, becauſe if any judgment was to be formed of what is to come from what has paſſed, we cannot but entertain the moſt mortifying and dreadful apprehenſions. If their Lordſhips would calmly recall to their recollections the fate which attended all the other expeditions which had preceded the late one, they would find them exhibit a woeful climax of diſaſter and diſgrace. Thoſe of Toulon, Corſica, Quiberon, and Oſtend, had all been deemed highly unfortunate, and in his opinion they proceeded in a progreſſive ratio of additional miſconduct and inability in thoſe who adviſed them. The late expedition to Holland ſo far exceeded them all, his Lordſhip ſaid, both in the quantum of misfortune and diſgrace, that the Houſe, in juſtice to their own dignity, and to the feelings of the country, ought to grant this enquiry.—Another reaſon which preſſed upon his Lordſhip's mind, as particularly requiring it was, he ſaid, becauſe no ſet of Miniſters who had ever governed this country at any period had ever been entruſted with ſuch unbounded confidence, and unlimited power. Every ſupply they had aſked for, however extenſive, had been unceaſingly and invariably granted them.—Every device they could poſſibly ſuggeſt for ſtrengthening their hands had been adopted, and they had acquired a degree of power,

power, which, in his Lordſhip's mind, required the Houſe to look at what they did with the moſt careful and ſcrutinizing eye. In 1798, the financial ſyſtem of the country had undergone a complete change. In 1799, that conſtitutional body of defence to the country, the militia, had been broken in upon in an unprecedented manner—nay, as a conſtitutional body, had been in a manner annihilated, by being ſuffered to become a mere engine for recruiting and reinforcing the regular army. What was the avowed cauſe of this? His Lordſhip begged the Houſe to recollect, that the reaſon aſſigned was, to increaſe the army immediately to ſuch a number of men, as to enable Miniſters to equip and ſend out the late unfortunate expedition; which, notwithſtanding its important extent as to the numbers of men, and the liberality of the ſupply voted towards the expence of it, has turned out far more replete with diſaſter and diſgrace than any of thoſe which had preceded it. If, ſaid his Lordſhip, a judgment of what is to come may be formed from what is paſt, our proſpects in continuing the war are likely to become very gloomy. An enquiry into the cauſes of the failure of the late expedition, could alone, in his mind, tend to brighten them, and therefore he earneſtly gave his vote in ſupport of a motion which endeavoured to procure it.

Lord *Clifton* (Earl of Darnly) roſe to ſay a very few words. He ſhould not attempt, he ſaid, to follow the Noble Lord who had brought forward the original motion, through the vaſt field of argument that he had taken; but he begged leave to object to the enquiry as altogether uſeleſs. He could not admit that the expedition had failed; on the contrary, he contended that it had been of the higheſt advantage to this country and its allies, and that it had been attended with an eminent degree of ſucceſs. After the able and eloquent argument of his noble friend (Lord Mulgrave) and the judicious opinion delivered by the noble Earl (Earl Moira) who had ended with moving the previous queſtion, it would be idle in him to waſte the time of the Houſe by repeating obſervations ſimilar to thoſe already ſubmitted to their Lordſhips; but before he ſat down he muſt, as an individual Peer, enter his proteſt againſt that aſſertion of the Noble Lord who moved for an enquiry, which blamed our force for not coming home from Holland immediately after the Dutch Navy was taken poſſeſſion of, without waiting to attempt any thing further. The capture of the Dutch ſhips was doubtleſs of itſelf a ſingular ſucceſsful circumſtance, and materially important object; but if the troops had immediately returned to England after that great event

was atchieved he ſhould have thought that Miniſters would have had much to anſwer for on accoit of the expence attending the equipment of ſo formidable military force, and that the gallant officers entruſted with thcommand of it would have been diſgraced. His Lordſhip ſaiche certainly ſhould vote againſt the propoſed enquiry.

Lord *Holland* roſe to claim the uſu! indulgence of the Houſe, as mover of the original queſtion to make ſome remarks on the obſervations of thoſe Noble Lrds who had ſpoken ag.inſt it.

The *Lord Chancellor* ſaid, he roſe to ſtatethe queſtion as it ſtood before the Houſe.—A motion had been made for the appointment of a Committee, to enquire intothe cauſes of the failure of the late expedition to Holland, ſine which the previous queſtion had been moved. The Noble Lord (Holland) might ſpeak, therefore, not as an indulgence but as matter of right, on the new ſubject of the previous queſtion.

Lord *Holland* then roſe, and ſaid he wiſhed to obſerve on an argument ſtated by the Noble Earl who had juſt ſat down, and in the firſt inſtance by the Noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty, viz. that the capture of the Dutch ſhips was of itſelf a great and important matter of advantage to the country, and that it would have been highly unadviſable to have brought away the army without attempting any thing further. Lord Holland declared that he neither had denied nor could deny the getting poſſeſſion of the Dutch ſhips was an important acquirement; but the circumſtance of taking poſſeſſion of the fleet in the Texel was one great means of alienating the minds of the Dutch from us, and if the ſeaſon, the nature of the country of North Holland, and the obſtacles it preſented were ſuch as could only entail diſgrace on the army, he muſt continue to aſſert that it would have been better to have brought the army back and not to have ſacrificed the lives of ſo many brave men for the purchaſe of diſgrace or diſcredit (for certainly the being obliged to pay eight thouſand French priſoners for ſecuring the ſafe return of the Britiſh troops to England was highly diſgraceful and diſcreditable); and therefore, notwithſtanding the taking of the Dutch navy, he felt himſelf entitled to ſay the expedition to Holland had failed in its moſt important object. —With regard to much of what had fallen from the noble Earl (Lord Mulgrave), who had paid him the high compliment of declaring that he was fit for bedlam when he brought forward ſuch a motion, as the queſtion muſt turn wholly upon the ſeaſon and the weather, he differed in reſpect to this; he had no intention to blame the elements, but every thing that noble

noble Lord had ſaid, went entirely towards eſtabliſhing a proof that an enquiry was abſolutely neceſſary, both for the ſatisfaction of the Houſe and the Country, and the honour of the illuſtrious Commander in Chief, and the gallant officers employed under him. The noble Earl had told their Lordſhips that the Duke of Brunſwick had declared, that with ten thouſand men he would undertake the defence of Holland againſt any army. He naturally concluded the Duke meant this under the ſuppoſition that he was in poſſeſſion of Amſterdam, Breda, Bergenopzoom, and Maeſtricht; but if the Duke would undertake this protection of Holland with ten thouſand men only, was there not great blame imputable to Sir Ralph Abercromby's delay at the head of fifteen thouſand, for that was his force after General Don reinforced him? Why did he not puſh forward, and get poſſeſſion of Amſterdam, Breda, Maeſtricht, and the ſtrong fortified garriſons, without waiting to afford the French time to pour into North Holland ſufficient reinforcements to ſupport the Dutch troops, and render the expedition impracticable? If what had been ſtated was true, that 20,000 men would have been ſufficient to have maintained the place which the Britiſh army occupied; what occaſion was there for ſending 40,000 men? And if General Abercromby was able to penetrate into Zealand, where the people were ſaid to be favourable to the views of this country; was it not neceſſary to know what it was that prevented him? A noble Lord had objected to the enquiry on the ground of its tending to diſcloſe correſpondence that ought to be kept ſecret. There were precedents in both Houſes of Parliament of ſuch objections having been obviated by giving in blank names. Whether the People of Holland, at the time of the Expedition were ſo tired of the French as to wiſh to get rid of them, he could not ſay; but it was a well-known fact that at the time the French made their firſt attack on that country, the Dutch received them with open arms; and when the Engliſh made their's, they were received at the point of the bayonet. His Lordſhip ſaid, he was far from imputing blame to Sir Ralph Abercromby, or the officers employed; he charged it as a matter of cenſure againſt his Majeſty's Miniſters if the fault were proved, on examination, to be with them, as he believed it would be found to do, if an enquiry were allowed. He conceived that Sir Ralph Abercromby acted upon the inſtructions furniſhed before he left England, by the Miniſter, or ſent out to him while he was in poſſeſſion of the Helder. No diverſion in favour of the allies had taken place in conſequence of the expedition, as repreſented by the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty.

Admiralty. The Engliſh army were oppoſed by troops, which would not have fought either on the Rhine or in Italy. His Lordſhip replied to other parts of Lord Spencer's ſpeech, and obſerved that the noble Earl had not urged much objection to an enquiry, and indeed conſidering the office he ſo ably filled, that of Firſt Lord of the Admiralty, he thought him in the right, rather to wiſh than dread ſuch enquiry, becauſe the capture of the Dutch ſhips was not only an advantageous, but the moſt important circumſtance that attended the expedition, and at the ſame time the moſt honourable to the conduct of our marine. His Lordſhip obſerved that the noble Earl (Earl Moira), who had with ſo much honour manifeſted his zeal for the character of that illuſtrious perſonage, the Duke of York, had intimated that he would have no objection to an enquiry. No man had a higher reſpect for that illuſtrious character than he had, and he was perſuaded the princely Duke governed his military conduct with a due ſenſe of the conſtitutional right of Parliament to inveſtigate every part of it. Lord Holland added a few other obſervations, and concluded his reply with declaring, that from all he had heard in that debate, and from every view he could take of the expedition and its diſgraceful termination, an enquiry, he was convinced, was indiſpenſibly neceſſary.

Lord *Mulgrave* ſaid ſomething had fallen from the noble Lord in his obſervations on the arguments by other noble Lords and himſelf that rendered it abſolutely neceſſary for him to intrude upon their Lordſhips with a few words of explanation. The noble Lord, in fact, had under-rated his arguments as much as he had over-rated the rank he had the honour to hold in that Houſe, having abſolutely miſconceived, and neceſſarily miſtaken what he had ſaid relative to Sir Ralph Abercromby, and ſurely the noble Lord would have the candour to admit, that when one officer was ſpeaking of another officer, it particularly behoved him (Lord Holland) to take care to be preciſely accurate in quoting the argument he undertook to anſwer. The noble Lord had ſtated him to have imputed blame to Sir Ralph Abercromby for not having advanced further into Holland, when he was at the head of 15,000 men. He poſitively declared that he had not ſaid any thing reſpecting that diſtinguiſhed officer, that could warrant ſuch an inference: on the contrary, what he did ſay was, that Sir Ralph Abercrombie's delay, while he was waiting for reinforcements, as well after he was joined by General Don as before that event, was owing to unavoidable circumſtances. He ſaid the exertions of General Abercrombie, his profeſſional ſcience, and the reſources of his mind,

mind, were well known, and it was natural to imagine that with ſo much ſkill, vigour and wiſdom, that diſtinguiſhed officer would do every thing that could tend to attain the object, of attaining which he had undertaken the execution. In his former ſpeech he had ſaid, that the reſponſibility for any project of a military nature, with regard to its probable advantage to the State, or its practicability, and reaſonable proſpect of ſucceſs, lay wholly with Miniſters who held the government of the country, and that the military officers employed in the execution of it were reſponſible only as far as their conduct of the enterpriſe became queſtionable. That the plan of the deſcent on Holland was highly expedient, and to a conſiderable degree ſucceſsful, he believed no man would deny; but every military commander employed in the conduct of it, though directed to achieve a particular object, muſt be allowed the fair exerciſe of his diſcretion, and might be prevented by unavoidable circumſtances from achieving all that was wiſhed. To the exertions and reſources of the mind of General Abercrombie were after ſome ſhort time added the exertions and mental reſources of that illuſtrious character, the Duke of York; it was not therefore to be imagined that two officers of ſuch high rank would have failed to puſh their advantages to the utmoſt, and it was evident the whole army had manifeſted the utmoſt bravery. No man, therefore, could do ſo much injuſtice to the characters of thoſe two great officers, not to give them credit for having done every thing that circumſtances would allow. Far had it been from his intention to ſay one word that could be conſtrued a detraction of their merit. His reaſon for objecting to the propoſed enquiry was, as he had expreſsly ſtated it to be, that the elements were againſt us, and that it was owing ſolely to the winds that blew and the ſhowers that fell, that all the objects of the expedition were not obtained.

Lord *Holland* roſe again to explain, and apologized to Lord Mulgrave for the miſtake he had committed in terming him *an Earl.* He ſaid that noble Lord's explanation had confirmed him in the neceſſity of an enquiry. If General Abercromby's delay was occaſioned by unavoidable circumſtances, an enquiry would ſerve to explain what thoſe circumſtances were, and whether Miniſters were to blame or not; for as yet he certainly could not know the fact, but an enquiry would ſhow. With regard to there being ſubſtantial reaſon to believe the generality of the Dutch were in our favour, or rather in favour of the Stadtholder, he believed, if they reſorted to a teſt much adverted to by Miniſters as a favourite one, a numerical compariſon, the contrary would be found to be the caſe, and the majority

majority would be found to be againſt the Stadtholder, much more againſt his reſtoration with ſuch additional powers, as, in the language of Adminiſtration it was termed, a *ſtrong* government. He muſt again, therefore, aſſert, that the expedition had failed, and that an enquiry ought to take place.

Lord *Clifton*, in explanation, ſaid, that with regard to the noble Lord's ſuppoſition, that if the political opinions of the Dutch people were taken numerically, the majority would be found to be adverſe to the reſtoration of the Stadtholder, he entertained a very oppoſite ſentiment. He was himſelf in Holland in 1787, when the Duke of Brunſwick by his exertions prevented a revolution in the Government of the United Provinces, meditated through the influence of the French democratical party in that country. At that time, to his knowledge, almoſt all the inhabitants of Zealand, and by far the majority of the whole Dutch people, were attached to the Stadtholder and his Government.

Lord *Grenville* roſe, not to enter into any thing like an argument upon the ſubject, but merely to deny that the expedition to Holland had ended in diſgrace or failure. It had that day been proved in that Houſe, not only that there was no failure, but that ſo far from its ending in diſgrace, the direct contrary was the caſe, it ended with credit, and was in every part of it a meaſure that had been attended with great and glorious advantages to this country. His Lordſhip ſaid he had one matter to mention further, and that was to expreſs his hope that the noble Lord who moved the previous queſtion, would have the goodneſs to withdraw it. Whenever the previous queſtion was moved, it was generally to convey a meaning not adverſe to the matter of the motion upon which it was moved, but merely that it was not the proper time to agitate the ſubject. He admitted that there were ſome occaſions on which, for the ſake of the national honour and credit, it was abſolutely juſtifiable and indiſpenſibly neceſſary; but on the preſent occaſion there was no ſuch neceſſity; and ſo far was he from wiſhing that a motion for an enquiry, where there was no reaſon whatever aſſigned nor argument adduced ſufficient to prove that an enquiry was neceſſary, would be got rid of by a previous queſtion, he was anxious to paſs a decided negative upon it. If therefore the noble Earl perſiſted in his motion of the previous queſtion, he muſt, though very unwillingly, vote againſt it, in order afterwards to give the original motion a direct and decidednegative.

Earl *Moira* ſaid, that when he moved the previous queſtion, he conceived it was the common way of diſpoſing of a queſtion deemed

deemed improper. He was not aware that it was liable to the conſtruction that the noble Secretary of State had put on it. He made it from a long ſighted view of the probable conſequences that would reſult from an enquiry like that which the noble Lord had moved to have gone into, and not on account of any particular objection to his arguments, in many of which he concurred entirely. But ſeeing the inconveniencies and the injury to the public intereſt that muſt reſult from ſuch an enquiry, and the difficulty that would be thrown on his Majeſty's Miniſters, if they entered into the queſtion, he had riſen to deprecate their interference, and to intreat their attention to the delicacy of their ſituation, and the extreme caution neceſſary for them to preſerve on ſuch an occaſion. The propoſed enquiry muſt in itſelf, if agreed to, prove fruitleſs, and ſhould it be permitted to be inſtituted, would open a door to the reception of a ſimilar motion for an enquiry into every ſingle military tranſaction of the war; a courſe of proceeding that would greatly embarraſs the public ſervice. There certainly were, as the noble Secretary had acknowledged, ſome occaſions when an enquiry into the conduct and execution of a military tranſaction was not only juſtifiable, but abſolutely proper and neceſſary. In the preſent inſtance, it muſt be wholly uſeleſs, becauſe if the enquiry were allowed to be inſtituted, and their Lordſhips were to call that great, gallant, and diſtinguiſhed officer, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, to their bar, and put, as a firſt queſtion to him: Pray, Sir Ralph, what occaſioned your delay in proſecuting your way to Amſterdam, after you were reinforced by General Don, and after the Duke of York had joined you? His anſwer muſt neceſſarily be: I beg leave to throw myſelf on your Lordſhips' candour, and muſt decline giving a reply, becauſe I could not do ſo, without betraying a correſpondence, which, if once known, would involve thoſe concerned in carrying it on in certain ruin, and do the higheſt injury to the intereſts of the kingdom, by producing moſt miſchievous embarraſſments to the future conduct of the war. Upon that conſideration, his Lordſhip ſaid, he had thought it right to move the previous queſtion; but if the conſtruction which the noble Secretary of State had put upon it, was the true conſtruction a previous queſtion carried with it, he certainly muſt withdraw his motion.

The queſtion was then put "That the previous queſtion be withdrawn?" Agreed to *nemine diſſentiente.*

The queſtion was next put on the main queſtion, for the appointment of a Committee, to enquire into the cauſes of the failure of the Expedition to Holland.

Contents	-	6	*Not Contents*		51
Proxies	-	0	*Proxies'*	-	18

Majority 63.

The Lords who voted as Contents, were the Earl of Somerſet, Lord Ponſonby, (Earl of Beſborough,) Lord Holland, Lord King, Lord Camelford, and Lord Mansfield.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, FEB. 12.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* moved, that a Committee be appointed to conſider of ſuch farther meaſures as may be deemed neceſſary for rendering more commodious, and better regulating, the port of London. Agreed to.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report on the Navy and Army Seduction Bills, and on the Bill for extending the ſervices of the Militia to Ireland. The reſolutions on both were agreed to, and the Bills ordered to be read a third time the next day.

On the motion of Lord Hawkeſbury the conſideration of the report of the Corn Committee was poſtponed from Friday to Monday next.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that Mr. Macdowal's Petition, which was preſented yeſterday, be referred to a Select Committee. Ordered.

SUPPLY.

The Houſe having reſolved itſelf into a Committee of Supply,

Mr. *Wallace* moved, that the Navy, Army, Ordnance, &c. Eſtimates, be referred to the ſaid Committee, which being agreed to,

Mr. *Wallace* roſe to call the attention of the Houſe to certain regulations which had been adopted in the departments of the Admiralty and the Victualling-Office, at the ſuggeſtion and recommendation of the Committee of Finance. Theſe new regulations produced the difference that might be obſerved in the Eſtimates for the enſuing year in the departments to which he had alluded. There would indeed be found an increaſe in theſe Eſtimates rather than a diminution, but when the nature of that increaſe was duly attended to, it would appear that the increaſe of expence was apparent rather than real; and that it would be temporary, not permanent. The total increaſe of the eſtabliſhment in time of war would amount to 8,299l. This, in time of peace, it was propoſed to reduce to 3,617l. and when a peace, ſolid and ſecure, was reſtored (and that alone was the peace which the real friends of the country would look for), a conſiderable diminution would take place in the number

ber of clerks, which the multiplicity of buſineſs now made it neceſſary to employ. [Mr. Wallace here entered into ſome minute details in explanation of the reaſons for increaſing the ſalaries of the higher officers and clerks in the Admiralty, when he took occaſion to pay the higheſt tribute of praiſe to the firſt Secretary of that department, whoſe diſtinguiſhed ſervices and indefatigable labours could be remunerated by no adequate reward]. He would now proceed to the augmentations that had been adopted in the Victualling-Office, and there alſo the expence was not ſo real as apparent. In this department the amount of the old eſtabliſhment was 26,389l. that of the new eſtabliſhment would be 48,199l. upon which a difference of 21,810l. would ariſe; that would however be amply compenſated to the public by the abolition of fees and other expences, which would amount to about 31,000l. The abolition of fees would have the good effect of ſecuring better terms for the public in all contracts; and, upon the whole, he thought himſelf intitled to aſſert that there would be a ſaving to the public of about 10,000l.

He then concluded by moving: "That the ſum of 685,429l. 13s. 11d. be granted to his Majeſty for the Ordinaries of the Navy for eleven lunar months, beginning the 26th of February, 1800."

Mr. *Harriſſon* thought that a longer notice ſhould have been given previous to the diſcuſſion of a matter ſo complicated. He was no enemy to granting liberal ſalaries, where real and great ſervices were performed; but if in ſome inſtances the ſalaries of placemen were too high before, ſo far as thoſe were now raiſed he could not but pronounce the meaſure to be a bad one. He ſaw no neceſſity, for example, in increaſing the ſalaries of the Lords of the Admiralty, becauſe that of the Secretary of the Admiralty was augmented. The ſervices of the Secretary of the Admiralty were of the greateſt importance both to the intereſts and the ſafety of the country, and entitled him to every recompence which a great and liberal nation could beſtow. Scarcely any other office could come in competition with his. He hoped that when a peace would permit this eſtabliſhment to be reduced that Miniſters would bear in mind that no extraordinary number of clerks ſhould be kept employed. As they were looked upon as indiſpenſably neceſſary at the preſent moment, he would not object to their continuing in office, but he held himſelf perfectly at liberty to revive his objection to any ſuch number, when time and circumſtances ſhould juſtify his objections.

Mr. *Burdon*, as Member of the Committee of Finance, de-

clared, that upon due inveſtigation it appeared to the Committee that ſuch increaſe of ſalary was but juſt, and that as ſuch they recommended it to the attention of government.

Admiral *Berkeley* vindicated the claims of the Lords of the Admiralty to the ſalaries they poſſeſſed.

Mr. *Tierney* hoped that, by his not oppoſing the Supplies at the preſent moment, he was not called upon by a ſide wind to ſanction the extent of the future Peace Eſtabliſhment. He had foretold the neceſſity of raiſing the ſalaries of the clerks in office, and he had confeſſed that he ſhould feel great ſatisfaction at ſeeing that increaſe take place, on account of the great increaſe of taxes, and high price of the neceſſaries of life. From the ſame conſideration he had expreſſed a wiſh that officers on half pay, and the lower claſſes of the clergy, ſhould alſo have their ſituation relieved. In that view he aſſented to the principle upon which the propoſed regulations were made, at leaſt to a certain extent. He did not, however, ſee what title the Lords of the Admiralty could fairly advance to an increaſe of ſalary: As to the firſt Secretary of the Admiralty, he was ready to ſubſcribe to every praiſe that was beſtowed upon his meritorious ſervices, but when an increaſe was propoſed in his ſalary, it ought to be recollected that that Gentleman held a place in the Weſt Indies of conſiderable value, which ſhould be taken into account when theſe ſervices were to be eſtimated and recompenſed. As to the abolition of fees, he feared it would prove but of little ſaving to the public, as there was no ſecurity on the part of Government Contractors that they would not enter into a ſecret colluſion to ſtand out for as high prices as they were wont to demand while the fees exiſted. But to the whole of this ſubject he would have another opportunity to advert, and for that occaſion he would reſerve what more obſervations he had to offer.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* allowed that it was fair and candid in the honourable Gentleman (Mr. Tierney) to declare, that by the vote he was now about to give, he did not mean to ſanction the Peace Eſtabliſhment, or preclude himſelf from oppoſing it by aſſenting to the preſent motion. That honourable Gentleman who had expreſſed ſo much feeling and tenderneſs for the ſituation of the public clerks, and who aſſerted that it was not his wiſh to ſtarve the public offices, was however adverſe to the idea of raiſing their ſalaries, though the fees of office ſhould be ſuppreſſed. There appeared to him ſome contradiction in this oppoſition; for if the ſalaries remained the ſame after the fees were aboliſhed, would there be left to the clerks, whoſe ſituation he was ſo much alive to, thoſe

thoſe competent emoluments which that honourable Gentleman was anxious they ſhould enjoy? Upon the whole it would be found that it was of much more importance to pay them liberally, than to have recourſe to a narrow and ill-timed œconomy, and he was ſatisfied with his honourable Friend (Mr. Wallace) that the fees might be fairly ſet off againſt the propoſed increaſe of ſalary, and that upon the whole the increaſe in the expence would be rather apparent than real. But the abolition of the fees is regarded as no ſecurity for better bargains being made in favour of the public; becauſe it is aſſerted that contractors, by means of a ſecret colluſion, will ſtill hold out for as high prices as they demanded before. This it was not natural to expect; for a merchant would rather gain as much as he could than riſque gaining nothing at all; beſides, if it appeared that colluſion was reſorted to, might not official regulations be made to fruſtrate all ſuch attempts? Could it be ſuppoſed that inſtead of 20, they would pretend to inſiſt on 500 per cent.? The principle of competition would obviate and ſilence all ſuch pretenſions. As to what was ſaid reſpecting the place held by the Secretary of the Admiralty, in the Weſt-Indies, he had only to obſerve, that that Gentleman, regarding whoſe diſtinguiſhed merits to the country there was but one voice and opinion, had gone through a variety of ſervices during the ſpace of eighteen years, to the general ſatisfaction of all who were connected with him, and that the place alluded to by the hon. Gentleman was the reward conferred upon him for theſe ſignal ſervices. Would the hon. Gentlemen wiſh, that becauſe that reward had been beſtowed upon antecedent ſervices, that therefore this highly meritorious perſon ſhould receive no remuneration for his current ſervices, ſhould he perſevere in performing the arduous labours in which he is now employed, ſo much to the benefit and the honour of the country? Nothing ſurely could be more unjuſt.

Mr. *Tierney*, in explanation, obſerved, that it was worthy remark, that the Secretary of the Admiralty had 4000l. a year, while the ſalary of the Firſt Lord of the Admiralty was not above 3000l.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* obſerved, that the office of Firſt Lord of the Admiralty was one to which men aſpired with a patriotic ambition, and whoſe fortune rendered the conſideration of a ſalary as little elſe than ſecondary. It was true, nevertheleſs, that that high office deſerved a higher ſalary.

Mr.

Mr. *Tierney* again explained.

Mr. *William Smith* was ſurprized that perſons in office ſhould be the only perſons who, in conſequence of hard times, ſhould think themſelves entitled to relief from the burdens which preſſed ſo heavily on the reſt of the country. He wiſhed for an open competition for the offices of government, which would give to talent and real merit a fair chance of juſt diſtinction.

Mr. *Baker* thought their claims founded in perfect juſtice, and ridiculed the idea of open bidding, and aſked if the hon. Gentleman wiſhed government to advertiſe for candidates to fill offices of the firſt diſtinction and reſponſibility. [*A loud laugh*].

Mr. *Wallace* now moved the ſeveral reſolutions in their ſucceſſion, viz.

656,515l. for Repairs, Wear and Tear, &c.
1,300,000l. probable Expences of Tranſport Service.
500,000l. Priſoners of War in health.
90,000l. Sick Priſoners of War.

And the other ſundry votes for the different heads of expences in the Naval Departments; which being read were agreed to.

ARMY EXTRAORDINARIES.

The *Secretary at War* next roſe to move the extraordinaries of the army. On theſe eſtimates he had little more to offer than what might appear from the mere recital of them. The Committee, however, might be deſirous to learn the general compariſon between the eſtimates of this year and thoſe of preceding years; they would have the ſatisfaction, therefore, of finding that the number of men to be voted this year was leſs by 32,000 than that voted laſt year. This diminution would fall upon the leſs diſpoſable force, the militia, for example, and the fencible cavalry. Notwithſtanding this diminution, the regular army would be encreaſed by 48,000 men. The whole amount of the number he propoſed to be voted was 192,000 men, which was 32,000 leſs than that of laſt year, and leſs than what had been been voted for the three preceding years. The expence in ſome articles would be found to have encreaſed, but that encreaſe would be counterbalanced by a diminution of expence in other articles. Some reduction had been made in the military ſtaff, which would have amounted to 20,000l. were it not found neceſſary to encreaſe the expence of the medical ſtaff by an addition of 9,000l. There were ſome new heads of expence, ſuch as a corps of waggoners and of pioneers,

pioneers, which had proved of infinite ſervice in the late expedition; theſe, therefore, it was thought proper to retain. The whole to be voted was, as he had already ſtated, 192,000 men; to provide for which he would now move that there be granted to his Majeſty the ſum of 8,854,700l.

After a few obſervations from Mr. W. Smith, that reſolution, and ſeveral others connected with the army extraordinaries, were moved and agreed to; and the report of the Committee ordered to be received to-morrow.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved, that an humble addreſs be preſented to his Majeſty, praying that he would be graciouſly pleaſed to direct that there be laid before the Houſe a copy of the proceedings of Privy Council reſpecting the ſhips from Mogadore, relative to which he had the preceding day brought down a meſſage from his Majeſty.

The other orders of the day were then diſpoſed of, and the Houſe adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THURSDAY, FEB. 13.

Lord *Grenville* brought down the following meſſage from his Majeſty, which was read by the Lord Chancellor.

GEORGE R.

His Majeſty is at preſent employed in concerting ſuch engagements with the Emperor of Germany, the Elector of Bavaria, and other Powers of the Empire, as may ſtrengthen the efforts of his Imperial Majeſty, and materially conduce to the advantage of the common cauſe in the courſe of the enſuing campaign; and his Majeſty will give directions that theſe engagements, as ſoon as they ſhall have been completed and ratified, ſhall be laid before the Houſe. But, in order to enſure the benefit of this co-operation at an early period, his Majeſty is deſirous of authoriſing his Miniſter to make (proviſionally), ſuch advances as may be neceſſary, in the firſt inſtance, for this purpoſe; and his Majeſty recommends it to the Houſe to enable him ſo make ſuch proviſion accordingly. G. R.

Lord Grenville moved that the ſaid addreſs be taken into conſideration the next day, and that the Lords be ſummoned.

The appeal cauſe from Scotland, which ſtood for hearing the next day, was adjourned till Monday next.

After waiting ſome time in vain for the Members of the Houſe of Commons, who were expected to preſent ſome bills that had paſſed their Houſe of Parliament, the Lords adjourned.

HOUSE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THURSDAY, FEB. 13.

The *Maſter of the Rolls* ſaid, that he was deſired by Mr. Abbot to give notice that, owing to indiſpoſition, he would not make his promiſed motion for a Committee to enquire into the ſtate of the public records till Tueſday next.

Several petitions were received from inſolvent debtors confined in priſon, which were ordered to lie on the table.

Lord *Stopford* informed the Houſe that the addreſs voted on Tueſday had been preſented to his Majeſty, and graciouſly received, and that his Majeſty had ordered the required liſts to be laid before the Houſe.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the Committee of Supply, which was read, and agreed to.

The *Secretary at War* moved for leave to bring in a bill to puniſh thoſe found guilty of mutiny and deſertion.—Leave granted.

The militia and ſeduction bills were read a third time, and paſſed.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* preſented a liſt of thoſe now in cuſtody under the ſuſpenſion of the Habeas Corpus Act, with the places of their confinement, and the dates of their commitment.

Upon the motion of Mr. Sheridan, this liſt was read, and then ordered to lie on the table.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* brought down a Meſſage from his Majeſty [the ſame as that delivered in the Houſe of Lords].

He then moved, that his Majeſty's moſt gracious meſſage be taken into conſideration the next day; and gave notice that, in the Committee of Supply on Monday, he would move that the ſum of 500,000l. be granted to his Majeſty to make good his engagements.

Mr. *Sheridan* wiſhed to know whether, ſince we were to take into pay the enſuing ſeaſon a large number of Germans, we would continue to employ the ſame number of Ruſſians which we did the laſt?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* made anſwer that, owing to the great difficulty of at preſent correſponding with every part of the continent, they were not perfectly acquainted with the intentions of the Emperor of Ruſſia, but he rather thought we would not employ the Ruſſians to the ſame extent as laſt campaign. He took this opportunity to ſtate, that he had every reaſon to believe that monarch was ſtill cordial

dial in the cauſe in which he had embarked, and that his troops, now more immediately under our direction, would continue to act with us. But the object of the preſent engagements was to inſure a more reſpectable force being brought into the field againſt France this campaign than had gained the glorious ſucceſſes of the laſt, although his Majeſty the Emperor of Ruſſia ſhould not chooſe to co-operate.

Mr. *Tierney* brought up a bill for empowering the juſtices of the peace to fix the rate of the wages of labourers, artificers, &c. which was read a firſt and ſecond time, and ordered to be printed.

Mr. *Long* preſented ſeveral public accounts.—Ordered to lie on the table.

SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS.

The *Attorney General* roſe according to notice to move for leave to bring in a bill to continue, for a limited time, the act of the 39th of his preſent Majeſty, cap. 4, by which the Habeas Corpus Act is ſuſpended. He thought it unneceſſary to trouble the Houſe on the preſent occaſion. A report had been made out laſt ſeſſion of the plans of the diſaffected; the Houſe had then almoſt unanimouſly voted for the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* Act, and ſince that no change had taken place; perhaps we had now leſs to fear from French arms, but no one could read the report of the Secret Committee of the Houſe of Commons without being convinced that we had ſtill much to fear from French principles. There were ſtill many perſons diſpoſed to be ſeditious, and who, were it not for the ſalutary regulations of that act, would diſturb the peace of the community. He therefore hoped that no oppoſition would be made to its continuance.

Mr. *Jones* declared that the motion ſhould have his moſt decided oppoſition; it went to overturn the conſtitution: it might appear to be but a trifling violation of it, but a rock was waſhed away, not by the violence of the current, but by the frequency of its friction. It appeared from the liſt which had been read that there was no longer any occaſion for the act; if it is uſed as a meaſure of prevention it muſt be eternal.

Mr. *Buxton* ſaid, that though jacobinical principles had become leſs prevalent in England, they ſtill flouriſhed on the continent of Europe, and might again be introduced. To the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act gentlemen owed the power of then debating in that Houſe.

Mr. *Sheridan* ſaid, that the hon. Gentleman who had juſt

ſat down had brought the queſtion to an extraordinary iſſue. However quiet we are at home, as long, according to him, as a ſeditious ſpirit exiſts in any part of Europe, we muſt continue to ſuſpend the *Habeas Corpus* act. Although the French ſhould diſavow every Jacobin principle, ſtill, if ſome remote country ſhould nouriſh theſe opinions, we were to remain deprived of our moſt valuable privileges. Was the diſtinguiſhed loyalty diſplayed by every claſs of ſociety, the patience of all in bearing the moſt intolerable public burthens, their alacrity to enter the ſervice, and maintain the war, not ſufficient to ſatisfy Miniſters that the preſent government is ſecure? Did all theſe convincing proofs go for nothing, and muſt we keep our eyes fixed upon foreign ſtates, and not upon the ſituation of our native country? If this is to be the caſe, it were better to repeal the act altogether, than thus to ſuſpend it from year to year. But this argument of looking to the principles of another country might, with equal propriety, be applied to the crown. Since there are deſpots and tyrants abroad, we ſhould deprive our ſovereign of every poſſibility of ever becoming deſpotic or tyrannical: ſince ſome monarchs have appointed ignorant and corrupt judges, we ſhould no longer permit his Majeſty to name the adminiſtrators of juſtice. Since ſome potentates have declared war, unjuſtly invaded Poland for inſtance, we ſhould wreſt from the King the power of the ſword. All that we might do with equal propriety; becauſe ſome nations had abuſed their liberty, ſhould we deprive the people of Great Britain of all their valuable privileges? It was ſaid that no change had taken place; but it was incumbent upon thoſe who ſupported this meaſure to prove that it was neceſſary. No ſuch neceſſity exiſted. In 1798 many people had been taken up on ſuſpicion, and in cold damp dungeons, obliged to undergo the moſt dreadful hardſhips; but, ſince the ſpring of 1799, no one had been apprehended but one Iriſhman and a Swediſh Baron. He was ſorry that he had mentioned this, as Miniſters might ſeize fourteen or fifteen innocent men, that they might have a plauſible pretext for carrying through the bill. But it was evident, from that circumſtance, that the meaſure was unneceſſary. It could not be ſuppoſed that Miniſters had become remiſs, or that they had diſbanded the ſquadrons of their ſpies. Was it reaſonable, then, that ten millions of men ſhould be reduced under the directorial power of his Majeſty's Miniſters, becauſe an Iriſhman and a Swediſh Baron had thought fit to conduct themſelves improperly?

Mr.

Mr. *Buxton* ſpoke a few words in explanation.

The *Secretary at War* ſaid, that the hon. Gentleman ſeemed to have forgotten that there was ſuch a thing as the French revolution. The principles of that revolution had ſpread from country to country, and wherever they had operated, had extirpated religion, had rendered property inſecure, and had produced unſpeakable calamities. It was the duty of Parliament to prevent their growth in Great Britain, and though they were not at preſent prevalent here, ſtill they flouriſhed in the ſiſter kingdom. If the examples of deſpotiſm and of unjuſt warfare were dangerous, he thought we ſhould look with a ſuſpicious eye to the prerogative of the Crown; but as theſe examples could have no bad effect, the argument of the hon. Gentleman had no weight whatever. The preſent greatneſs of the country was to be aſcribed to the operation of the meaſure, and if it were not perſevered in, the former diſturbances would be renewed. Becauſe there was at preſent an appearance of tranquillity, it by no means followed that we were in perfect ſecurity. Forty-eight hours before the Iriſh rebellion broke out, no danger was apprehended. Republican France was the cauſe of ſedition, and till the cauſe was removed, the effect would remain.

Sir *F. Burdett* ſaid, that from the arguments of the hon. Gentleman oppoſite, he could deduce no other inference than that what they called Jacobin principles were neither more nor leſs than the principles of liberty; and, as he did not think the principles of liberty could ever be extinguiſhed in the hearts of Britons, he ſaw no reaſon to hope why this ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act might not become perpetual. It was, he ſaid, truly alarming to the friends of freedom in this country. It was the great barrier of the conſtitution, and if once trampled under foot, every veſtige of freedom expired with it. It was ſtrange, indeed, that Miniſters ſhould have thought it neceſſary to impriſon ſo many perſons for near two years, and yet ſhould not have been able to adduce evidence of their guilt ſufficient to bring them to trial. The moſt arbitrary and unconſtitutional meaſures had been reſorted to in arreſting the ſeveral perſons who were now in cuſtody. The idea of a man's houſe being his caſtle was done away. The idea that the cottage was as ſafe as the palace was entirely fled. The cuſtom had been eſtabliſhed by the preſent Miniſters to break into the houſes of private characters in the dead of night; to tear maſters from their families, huſbands from

their wives, and perſons in other ſituations from all that was valuable to them; to load them immediately with irons, and thus drag them to that infamous priſon in Clerkenwell. This was the caſe of the people arreſted in Mancheſter. He appealed to the forcible eloquence of the late Earl of Chatham (the father of the preſent Chancellor of the Exchequer) on this ſubject, and ſaid, that if, at that moment, he was preſent in that Houſe, and it was known to the people of this country that he meant to hurl the thunder of his eloquence againſt the meaſure now in debate, that the avenues to the Houſe would be ſo crowded, and the ſpirit of the people ſo rouſed by his inſpiring powers, that Miniſters, he believed, would be glad to make their eſcape in ſafety from the ſeats in which they then ſo exultingly ſat. Sir Francis made ſome remark on the nature of the majority in that Houſe (which raiſed a cry of *Chair, Chair, Chair*).

The *Speaker* thought the hon. Gentleman was diſorderly.

Sir *Francis Burdett* proceeded, and ſaid he had ſeen an Attorney General, who, for many years paſt, had been in the habit of bringing in bills of this nature, who was now advanced to one of the firſt ſituations in the kingdom, and likely to be advanced to the very firſt, with an income of ſeveral thouſands a year, and a peerage, and the hon. Gentleman who brought in the preſent bill was in the *ſame track* to preferment. Againſt ſuch arguments he did not ſuppoſe any thing he could advance would much avail, and he ſhould therefore content himſelf at preſent with dividing the Houſe upon the queſtion.

Mr. *Canning* thought that if it was poſſible to entertain a doubt as to the propriety of the motion, that doubt muſt be removed by the ſpeech of the hon. Baronet. He lamented that a Gentleman of ſuch talents, and of a rank ſo high, that it might well ſtimulate the ambition of obſcure adventurers to attain to it, ſhould be ſo far miſled by his party attachments as to doubt the exiſtence of jacobiniſm, but eſpecially to ſuppoſe that by jacobiniſm could be meant liberty. Jacobiniſm was not liberty, but it was that fever and foul diſtemper of the moral and political world, which, deranging and corrupting the vulgar mind, with the authority of ſome talent, and ſome rank to give it currency, had overthrown ſtates, had ravaged thoſe nations of Europe moſt which were moſt the aſſerters and the defenders of genuine liberty. But the danger was not to be treated as unimportant, when the character of jacobiniſm was conſidered in all the latitude of its

its application. He expatiated on the riſe and progreſs of jacobiniſm, and obſerved, that the miſchief done to Europe might yet inflict ſtill greater evils on the world, if in this ſingle nation at leaſt ſedition was not oppoſed, and its mad emiſſaries reſtrained and ſuppreſſed. The number of the ſeditious was few, but a profligate minority was always dangerous, becauſe they always endeavoured to aſſume the tone and weight of a majority. The uſe which Bonaparte had made of his influence and power ſhewed clearly, that if ever a time exiſted when the path of frantic ambition was the path to glory, the preſent was that period. Bonaparte, though at preſent a deſpot, was ſtill in his heart a jacobin, and intent on the eſtabliſhment of a jacobin government. He next commented on the obſervations of Mr. Sheridan, whoſe arguments he combated with much force of reaſoning, and ridiculed the ſcruples of the hon. Baronet (Burdett), reſpecting midnight arreſt. The deſcription of that tranſaction, in the pathetic language of the hon. Baronet, might do well enough to heighten the horror of night in a novel, but it would not become a grave aſſembly to vote a grave queſtion on ſuch miſrepreſentations. The hon. Baronet had ſaid the cottage was not as ſafe as the caſtle; but from the jacobin principles ſpread through all Europe, when the principle was avowed of war againſt the caſtles, and peace to the cottage, it was at leaſt neceſſary now to ſee that the caſtle ſhould meet with equal protection as the cottage did. Having enforced theſe and other obſervations, he concluded by giving his hearty aſſent to the motion.

Mr. *Wilberforce* ſpoke in favour of the motion.

Mr. *Sheridan* obſerved, that he well knew the cuſtom was to riſe in explanation if a member found himſelf miſrepreſented; but ſo much had been ſaid to which he wiſhed to reply, that the forms of the Houſe would not, perhaps, allow of his ſtating it as explanation. He ſhould, however, move an amendment. He accordingly moved for leave to bring in a bill "for the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act, whenever it ſhould appear manifeſt to the Houſe that ſuch a ſuſpenſion was neceſſary."

Mr. *Speaker* obſerved that, conformable to the orders of the Houſe, and indeed to uſage, no proviſional order could be made. It was ſuch a motion the hon. Member had propoſed. Hence the preſent motion could not be entertained, becauſe every order muſt be abſolute.

The

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* was of opinion, that no member who had ſpoken already againſt the queſtion could make a new motion, evidently with an intention of again ſpeaking on the ſame queſtion. He did not doubt but that the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) wiſhed for an opportunity to reply, but ſurely, as his deſire of ſpeaking was ſo ſtrong, he might have aſked any of his friends near him to move an amendment.

The *Speaker* ſaid, that the Houſe was not to preſume before-hand that the hon. Gentleman would ſpeak in reply. He could not, however, ſupport any opinion he might entertain by references to exiſting caſes, but it was fitting to be remarked, that any hon. Member might move an adjournment of a debate in which he had already ſpoken.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* wiſhed to know, whether the hon. Member could move an amendment.

The *Maſter of the Rolls* thought the rules of the Houſe only gave the hon. Member the right of explaining.

The *Speaker* repeated, that Mr. Sheridan might move to adjourn the debate; but preſſed no opinion as to the motion propoſed. In fact, he did not think it could be in ſtrictneſs entertained by the Houſe.

Mr. *Sheridan* obſerved, that one thing, at leaſt, was admitted, that he might move an adjournment; and certainly if he had to conſult his good wiſhes for the hon. Member (the Maſter of Rolls) who ſpoke laſt, he would do ſo, as it would be but kindneſs to that learned Gentleman to move an adjournment till he knew better the nature of ſuch queſtions. He would not, however, move any adjournment; but he challenged the hon. and right hon. Gentleman oppoſite to him, to debate the whole queſtion with him on their own principles, on the ſecond reading.

Mr. Sheridan's motion was withdrawn.

The queſtion was then put on the original motion, when the Houſe divided.—

Ayes	- -	69
Noes	- -	9
	Majority	60

The bill was afterwards brought up, read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time on Wedneſday next. Adjourned.

Liſt

List of the Minority on the Queſtion for continuing the Suſpenſion of the Habeas Corpus Act.

Bouverie, Hon. E.	Martin, J.
Harriſon, J.	Nicholls, J.
Hobhouſe, B.	St. John, Hon. St. A.
Jones, T. T.	Tierney, G.
Jolliffe, W.	

TELLERS.

Sheridan, R. B. Burdett, Sir F.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

FRIDAY, FEB. 14.

MOTION FOR A COMMITTEE ON THE SCARCITY OF GRAIN.

Lord *Auckland* ſaid, that he wiſhed to make ſome mention of a moſt intereſting ſubject. He was ſure that the anxiety reſpecting it could not exceed what muſt be felt by every one of their Lordſhips. The Houſe would at once perceive that he was alluding to the inconvenience (perhaps he ought to uſe a ſtronger word), which many parts of the kingdom are ſuffering from the deficiency in the laſt crop of grain. He was not prepared to offer any opinion as to the degree and extent of that deficiency. But it was in the recollection of all, that a long ſucceſſion of wet weather had prevailed in all Europe through the whole of the laſt ſummer, and alſo during the harveſt. It was alſo well known that the actual prices of every kind of grain are high, and are encreaſing. The Houſe of Commons had thought proper to enter into an inveſtigation, both as to the nature of the evil, and as to any practicable ſuggeſtions which might be brought forward for the purpoſe of alleviating it. Their Committee had juſt made a report, accompanied by an intereſting ſtatement of evidence. It was his object, in the firſt place, to put their Lordſhips in poſſeſſion of that report; but in order to obtain it, the forms of the two Houſes would require that the ſubject ſhould be regularly before their Lordſhips. With this view he intended to move the appointment of a Committee, and then to ſend a meſſage to the Houſe of Commons, that their Lordſhips, having the high price of corn under conſideration, wiſhed to have a copy of the report in queſtion. The Committee thus opened, would be ready for any inveſtigation that circumſtances might make expedient: but as an individual

individual he wiſhed to be underſtood not to pledge himſelf to move farther in the buſineſs. Generally ſpeaking, he had little hope of public advantage from Parliamentary interference with the produce and diſtribution of the neceſſaries of life. On the other hand, he was not ſo attached to bookiſh ſyſtems, and to the cold principles of political œconomy, as to preſume that it could be practicable, or indeed deſirable, to keep a ſubject of national anxiety from the cognizance and diſcuſſion of the guardians of the nation. One ſtep, indeed, might be taken by Parliament towards leſſening the actual preſſure, and towards averting any extremity of diſtreſs. Certainly much benefit might reſult from their Lordſhips' example, if in their wiſdom and generoſity they ſhould think proper to make a great and timely reduction in the conſumption of wheat within their reſpective families. Such an example would have due influence with other claſſes and deſcriptions; and every one would concur in chearfully ſharing a privation which a viſitation of Providence had made neceſſary. In ſhort, if the evidence given to the Committee of the Commons be thought deſerving credit, the kingdom may be compared to a large veſſel at ſea, with a numerous crew, and with a known inſufficiency of proviſions for the ordinary ſervice and length of the voyage. The officers of a veſſel ſo circumſtanced, would be the moſt culpable of men if they neglected to enforce, both by precept and by example, a great and timely reduction in the general conſumption.

It would be ſeen in the evidence annexed to the report of the Houſe of Commons, that perſons very converſant in the ſubject, eſtimate the laſt year's produce at little more than half a crop; which words are explained to near half the quantity neceſſary for the ordinary conſumption of the kingdom. The ſame perſons eſtimate that the ſtock in hand at the period of the laſt harveſt might be equal, at the utmoſt, to two months conſumption. It would alſo be found in the evidence, that barley and oats, from which great aid had been derived in the emergency of 1796, are at preſent ſcarce and high priced. Lord Auckland ſaid, that he was not prepared either to admit or to controvert the accuracy of theſe ſtatements; but it required little obſervation or reflection to be convinced that the laſt crop of grain had fallen far ſhort of what is wanted for the average conſumption of the kingdom. The only reſources againſt ſuch a deficiency are an increaſed importation, and a decreaſed conſumption. With reſpect to the firſt of theſe reſources, he was ſorry to be of opinion, from

from every account that he had ſeen from foreign countries, and from a reference to our former importations, that we muſt not expect to obtain between the period of the laſt and next harveſt a larger quantity than 660,000 quarters; being about one twelfth part of our annual average conſumption.

The remaining deficiency, whatever it might be, could only be ſupplied by a diminution in our conſumption. Such a diminution would be forced to a certain degree by the natural effect of high prices, and alſo by the partial or occaſional want of grain in ſome diſtricts to ſupply the uſual demand. It cannot, however, be doubted, that in private families better circumſtanced than the labouring claſſes, and poſſeſſing various kinds of nouriſhment, a reduction in the uſe of bread might be made to the extent of a fourth, or perhaps of a third, and with little inconvenience. Their Lordſhips would recollect that there are in the kingdom above 700,000 houſes which pay aſſeſſed taxes. If a conſiderable proportion of theſe houſes could, by their Lordſhips' example, be induced to adopt the meaſure of reduction, the effect would be great, and might avert a calamity, to the mere poſſibility of which every provident mind muſt look forward with uneaſineſs. Having urged theſe conſiderations, and having again aſſured their Lordſhips that he was not prepared either to admit or to reject the evidence ſtated by the Houſe of Commons, he felt himſelf in ſome degree relieved from that ſmall ſhare of reſponſibility which belonged to his parliamentary ſituation, and he had only to thank their Lordſhips for their obliging and ſerious attention; and concluded with two motions:

1. That a Committee be appointed to enquire into the cauſes of the failure of the late harveſt; and to endeavour to diſcover the moſt effectual means of preventing the inconveniences that may be produced in conſequence of the ſaid failure. That all the Lords who have been preſent in Parliament in the courſe of this ſeſſion be of the ſaid Committee.

2. That a meſſage be ſent to the Houſe of Commons, requeſting them to lay a copy of their laſt report, ſtating the facts relative to the ſcarcity of corn before this Houſe, and alſo to acquaint them with the proceedings of this Houſe, in appointing a Committee for the purpoſes before mentioned.

Theſe reſolutions were read, and ordered *nemine diſſentiente*.

Lord *Holland* then roſe, and was beginning to ſpeak, when the Lord Chancellor told him the reſolutions had paſſed.

Lord *Holland* declared he had not heard the queſtion put, and therefore craved the indulgence of the Houſe while he ſpoke a few words. Lord Grenville and other Peers ſaying *Go on, go on*—

Lord *Holland* ſaid, he did not riſe to oppoſe either of the reſolutions moved by the noble Lord, but if the country was, as the noble Lord deſcribed it to be, in the ſituation of a ſhip at ſea, the crew and paſſengers of which were put upon ſhort allowance, he begged leave to aſk the friends of thoſe noble Lords who were at the head of the government, how they could anſwer for having ſuffered the country to be placed in ſo perilous a ſituation as to bear out the alluſion of the noble Lord who moved the reſolutions, to both of which he gave his hearty concurrence. If we were in the ſtate of a ſhip at ſea, the crew of which were put upon ſhort allowance, he begged to know from his Majeſty's Miniſters, why they had been ſo ſhamefully negligent of their duty, as to endanger the exiſtence of the country, in its firſt and moſt eſſential domeſtic intereſts, while they were ſquandering millions, and ſhedding the beſt blood of Britiſh ſubjects in a moſt expenſive and ruinous war? They had not for their excuſe that the ſcarcity came upon the country of a ſudden; every body knew, or might have known, ſo long ago as laſt autumn, that the harveſt had failed; why then did not Miniſters, whoſe duty it undoubtedly was, take ſuch meaſures as ſhould ſerve early to adminiſter the means of relief, that the coming ſcarcity would obviouſly require, do their duty? And if the reſolutions now moved were deemed neceſſary now, why had Miniſters adjourned the Parliament for ſo long a period in winter, when the ſcarcity was moſt likely to preſs with ſeverity on the poor? The noble Lord himſelf who made the motions, ought ſurely to have come forward with them ſooner, if he had found a fit opportunity, for we were now in the middle of February, and the poor muſt have ſuffered materially from the growing price of bread, and all the articles of life, ſince the winter commenced. His Lordſhip made ſome farther remarks, and concluded with returning thanks to their Lordſhips for their indulgence.

Lord *Auckland* in reply ſaid, he felt ſome difficulty in riſing, from his conſciouſneſs that it was extremely irregular to explain or reply to a ſpeech made upon the reſolutions he had ſubmitted to their Lordſhips, and which had received the deciſion of the Houſe. He would however ſay, that he thought it unneceſſary to explain to their Lordſhips, that on his part there had not been either a culpable neglect in not bringing this matter forward at an earlier period, nor any ill conſidered or premature alarm in mentioning it that day. Their Lordſhips had heard the whole of his ſpeech: the noble Lord happened

happened to have come late into the Houſe, and to have heard only the concluding part.

The *Lord Chancellor* left the Woolſack to obſerve that the ſpeaking upon the ſubject of reſolutions, which had been diſtinctly read and regularly paſſed, was altogether diſorderly, and contrary to form; and it was pretty evident that it was unavoidably productive of further diſorder and irregularity, as his noble Friend had felt the neceſſity of riſing to reply, though he expreſſed his conſciouſneſs of the violation of order of which he was guilty in ſo doing, but ſuch ever would be the conſequence of one noble Lord's coming in while another noble Lord was on his legs, hearing a part only of his ſpeech, and riſing to reply to it, without being maſter of the context of his whole argument, from which alone he could fairly form a correct idea of its amount.

Lord *Holland* ſaid, when he roſe before, upon being informed that the Houſe had decided on the reſolutions, he had claimed their indulgence, and upon underſtanding that they conſented, he had ventured to make a few obſervations upon ſuch parts of the noble Lord's argument as he had heard; and he appealed to their Lordſhips whether what he had ſaid did not apply in anſwer to what had fallen from the noble Lord.

HIS MAJESTY'S MESSAGE.

The order of the day being called for, it was read, as was likewiſe his Majeſty's Meſſage relative to his negociations with the Emperor of Germany, the Elector of Bavaria, and other German Princes.

Lord *Grenville* roſe and ſaid, he conceived from the uniform votes of the Houſe, on the ſubject of proſecuting the war with vigour, that it would be an idle waſte of the time of their Lordſhips, were he to enter much into detail on the matter of the meſſage under conſideration. While the country felt the neceſſity of proſecuting the war, it had been generally underſtood and admitted by Parliament, that it was the trueſt policy of Great Britain to procure the aſſiſtance of the forces of continental ſtates, by ſubſidizing their ſovereigns, and upon that received principle it was that his Majeſty had thought it neceſſary to negociate with the Emperor of Germany, the Elector of Bavaria, and other German Princes, for a certain number of military forces to be furniſhed by each for the ſervice of the enſuing campaign. Indeed theſe treaties were in ſuch forwardneſs, that although he could not officially ſtate that they were concluded, he could take upon himſelf

declare to their Lordſhips, that by that time the principle of them was finally ſettled, and upon ſuch terms, as upon a compariſon with former treaties, were highly advantageous to the country. His Lordſhip explained, that the ſending the treaties over here, and the return of them previous to their receiving a final ratification, unavoidably coſt much time, and as it could not be recovered, its loſs would be productive of great national diſadvantage, and have an injurious effect on the fate of the enſuing campaign; his Majeſty's Miniſters had therefore thought it their duty to recommend it to him to apply to Parliament, to authoriſe them to make ſuch advances proviſionally to his German allies mentioned, as the conditions of the reſpective treaties might require. His Lordſhip ſaid further, that as ſoon as the treaties now under negociation were mutually ratified, his Majeſty would give his orders, that copies of them ſhould be laid before that and the other Houſe of Parliament. He added, that he would not treſpaſs longer on their Lordſhips' patience, but would content himſelf with moving an addreſs to his Majeſty, thanking his Majeſty for his gracious communication, and aſſuring him that the Houſe, conſcious of the neceſſity of proſecuting the war with vigour, would readily concur in the wiſhes of his Majeſty, and give their ſupport to ſuch meaſures as ſhould be deemed moſt likely to make good his engagements with his allies.

Lord *Holland* ſaid, the noble Secretary of State had attempted to found the preſent meaſure upon the former votes of the Houſe, and eſpecially upon the approbation they had lately expreſſed of the rejection of the overtures of peace from the Chief Conſul of the French Republic; no man could certainly lament more deeply than he (Lord Holland) did the reſolution to which that Houſe had come to that night; but whatever had induced the Houſe to approve the continuance of the war, ſurely a conviction of the probability of its ſucceſs was one of its motives, and how far ſucceſs was probable, muſt depend on the means of carrying on the war; and when the means were brought down to that Houſe for their ſanction, were they not even to diſcuſs how far thoſe means met their expectations or not? Surely they were; and the more ſo becauſe, on the debate upon the addreſs, which the Secretary of State cited as the grounds of this meaſure, many noble Lords, even of thoſe who had ſupported that vote, expreſsly declared, that in ſo voting on that night they did not conceive themſelves as pledged to ſupport all the conſe-

conſequences of the rejection of peace, or even the rejection itſelf. But would any man ſay that the meaſures now propoſed, that is, a ſubſidy to the Emperor of Germany and other German princes, was what they expected? Did they not collect from the nature of that demand, and from general report, if not from notoriety, that a material alteration had taken place in our proſpects? Was it not notorious, and did not this meaſure confirm it, that the two Imperial courts acted no longer with concert? When we had the expectation of the aid of the Emperor of Ruſſia, in the moſt important ſcene of the war, we had ſome reaſon at leaſt to ſuppoſe that the principal actor in that ſcence, if he had not exactly the ſame views and objects, yet went as far as ourſelves. If, indeed, the purport of the preſent meaſure was merely to exchange Ruſſian for German mercenaries, to that he not only ſhould have no objection, but he ſhould even think we gained by the exchange. In the firſt place, in point of conſolation, we ſhould gain in knowing that thoſe we employed rendered the horrors of war leſs heart-breaking, leſs diſguſting than thoſe we expected to employ. We ſhould alſo gain in point of ſoldiers; for he was happy to ſay that experience had proved that, notwithſtanding the marked diſtinction, the excluſive eulogium with which the Miniſters ſpoke—with which even they made his Majeſty ſpeak from the throne in the commencement of the ſeſſion; he ſaid he was happy to find that, notwithſtanding this, the troops of more enlightened and civilized nations—of Auſtria, of Pruſſia, of France, of England, were evidently and greatly their ſuperiors in diſcipline, in courage, in military ſkill, and all the qualifications neceſſary to form a powerful army. He ſaid he was happy to find it ſo, and he would tell their Lordſhips why; it was becauſe, however advantageous it might be to the immediate views of Miniſters, or, he would even ſuppoſe, to the immediate and temporary intereſts of Great Britain if it were otherwiſe, yet, for the general good of civilized ſociety in Europe, it was matter of ſincere and heartfelt ſatisfaction to him to find that ſkill and civilization had ſo decided a ſuperiority over ignorance and barbarity, that the enlightened nations of the ſouth had not ſo much to fear as had often been thought from the inroads of thoſe ſavage and ignorant barbarians of the north. But it was not a mere exchange of troops: we were, indeed, to ſubſidize and employ Geman troops inſtead of Ruſſians: but were German troops ready to contend for the ſame objects—were they ready to ſhed their

their blood in the ſame cauſe as the Ruſſians, and ourſelves? Was the Secretary of State prepared to aſſure the Houſe that the views of Auſtria coincided with his own? Did the cabinet of Vienna cordially approve of all the principles laid down in his anſwers to Bonaparte? Did the Emperor of Germany really think, and if he did, where had he declared it, that the ſpeedieſt and ſureſt means of reſtoring peace would be the reſtoration of the Bourbons? He did not know that that monarch might not rather imagine that the ſacrifice of the territories of his fellow-hireling, the Elector of Bavaria, to his ambitious projects, would be the ſpeedieſt and ſureſt means of reſtoring tranquillity. At the ſame time, he did not doubt but the ſtateſmen of Vienna had too much wiſdom to limit the poſſibility of peace to the ſucceſs of their favourite projects. Like our prudent Miniſters, they would allow that other events might poſſibly lead to that deſirable end: a ſlice of Switzerland perhaps; a great portion of Italy, or any other ceſſion of territory, might be among the events, and the Imperial court of Vienna did not, he would venture to ſay, *lay claim to preſcribe* exactly what territory, and what ſacrifices on the part of France would gratify her ambition, and reſtore the bleſſings of peace. That ſhe did not conſider the reſtoration of the Bourbons, or even of royalty, as a *ſine qua non*, or even as a means of peace, he had at leaſt a right to conjecture; ſhe had never ſaid ſo, ſhe had never acted as if ſhe thought ſo. She had ſtudiouſly avoided giving any opinion on the ſubject, but as far as opinion was to be collected from her actions, ſhe ſeemed to feel no anxiety for that event. She had already made one peace with the Republic, and provided ſhe could make it on terms that ſeemed to her advantageous and ſecure, ſhe was, no doubt, ready to make another. With this view of the component parts of the coalition, and when we were called upon to put our truſt in this particular part of that coalition, he really ſolicited the attention of the Houſe. He begged them to pauſe, not to pauſe in a ſtate of war before they made peace, but to pauſe before they entangled themſelves in engagements, before they voted away their money, before they pledged themſelves to an undertaking ſo difficult in its accompliſhment, ſo dangerous, he had nearly ſaid ruinous, in its failure: he entreated them to conſider what they were about; he entreated them to look upon the preſent meaſure as an earneſt of the weapons and means to which they had to truſt. A few nights ago, upon the motion he had

had the honour of ſubmitting to the Houſe, he had laid down certain principles which he had contended were conſiderations upon which every wiſe ſtateſman decided, before he engaged in any great undertaking. When he enumerated what ought to form their preliminary conſiderations, the Houſe ſeemed to acquieſce in the neceſſity of ſo doing. Now let them examine the propriety of continuing the war by theſe rules. He meant by the deſirableneſs of the object, by the effect of ſucceſs towards the attainment of that object, by the conſequences of failure, and by the probability of ſucceſs. He would firſt examine in caſe of ſucceſs. He would ſuppoſe the armies of our allies triumphant every where, in Switzerland, on the frontier towards Italy, on the Rhine, in ſhort, in every quarter of the war; were the Miniſters certain that even theſe triumphs would lead, or even tend to reſtore royalty in France; or even that the reſult of ſuch events would be the annihilation of the power and influence of France? Would they ſtill, in caſe of ſucceſs, anſwer for the conduct of Auſtria? Well, but to make the ſuppoſition complete, he would ſuppoſe a ſincere and real converſion in the cabinet of Vienna (compoſed, by the bye, of the ſame perſons, the ſame ſovereign, the ſame miniſters, as at the time of the treaties of Leoben and Campo Formio; of the ſame men who had negociated with us for a loan, of which they had never paid the intereſt, who had formed the moſt ſolemn treaties with us for the proſecution of the war, and had then, without any conſultation with us, ſigned a peace), yet he would ſuppoſe them, for the ſake of argument, reclaimed, and their arms attended with the greateſt ſucceſs. He would ſuppoſe them in poſſeſſion of Switzerland, entering on the French territories, fighting in Alſace and Lorraine; well, let us at leaſt examine, if with ſuch extraordinary and unexpected ſucceſs and good faith, our point would be gained. He conjured the Houſe to reflect on this, and to diſmiſs, for one moment, that childiſh feeling, too prevalent in this country, that foreign ſtates and princes were moral or immoral, politic or impolitic, in exact proportion to the degree in which they furthered or they thwarted the intereſts of Great Britain, or even the views of the Miniſters of the day. Let the Houſe for one moment reflect that the King of Pruſſia was not bounden, by any oath of allegiance, to promote our deſigns, or render his power ſubſervient to Britiſh objects; but that he was bounden by that duty which all ſovereigns owed to their ſituation, their country, and people,

people, to maintain their independence, to ſecure the intereſts of his ſubjects, and the power and influence of his ſtate; and then he would aſk of any man, at all converſant in the intereſts of continental powers, at all candid or impartial, whether, if he were Miniſter to his Pruſſian Majeſty, he could, conſiſtently with his duty to his prince, and his attachment to that country, adviſe that prince to ſit tamely by and ſee the hereditary rival of his houſe, the power moſt formidable to his own, from its ſituation, and its general politics, cruſh and diſmember the country of France, which could alone operate as a check to that rival; which could alone protect him from the effects of that powerful houſe, directed by ancient animoſity to the object of annihilating his influence, and deſtroying his power in Germany and in Europe? Why, then, what would be the conſequence even of ſucceſs attendant on our arms and good faith on the part of our allies? It would be (unleſs the councils of Pruſſia were ſuddenly to become at once baſe and ſtupid) the immediate interference of that power to reſcue France from our deſigns, and to defeat the accompliſhment of that object to which we were ſacrificing ſo much. He would now look to the other ſide, the more melancholy, though he feared not the more improbable ſide of the picture; he would ſuppoſe us and our allies beaten; he would ſuppoſe the armies of Bonaparte triumphant; what had once happened might happen again; and he would ſuppoſe the Auſtrians, driven by the victorious French from country to country, defeated, routed, and deſtroyed in every quarter of the war; what would be the conſequence of this; what would be the reſource of Miniſters? He knew enough of their character from paſt experience, from former conduct, not to know and acknowledge that they would then have recourſe to negociation, to what Mr. Burke happily termed their *mendicant diplomacy*. He made no doubt that when well beaten and defeated in all their deſigns, they would then pretend to have had experience of Bonaparte's government, and then ſee other poſſible and ſpeedier means of peace than the reſtoration of the Bourbons. But he made no doubt that they would be as mean and crouching in their overtures of peace to Bonaparte, as they had been inſolent in their anſwers to his overtures lately; but could they expect, they who had treated him as the moſt inſolent and violent of mankind, that he would be actuated with ſuch equity and moderation as to grant to their ſupplications, when defeated, that peace which

which they had refuſed to him with diſdain when they imagined him in adverſity? But, was he in adverſity? He had heard it maintained with great ſurpriſe that the proſpect of this campaign was infinitely more encouraging than the laſt. He would venture to examine what circumſtances of improvement had taken place in either; he would aſk if the campaign had ſo reconciled the two Imperial courts that there was every reaſon of looking forward to a more cordial co-operation between the two powers than before? It was notorious to the world that, either from a difference of object, or from diſputes originating in the courſe of laſt campaign, the Ruſſians and Auſtrians were not likely to act cordially together; and here he muſt obſerve that, of our two moſt important allies (Ruſſia and Auſtria), the court of Peterſburgh had two qualities, thoſe of ſincerity and extravagance, extravagance in her projects he meant, not in the other ſenſe of the word (that was our lot in the diſtribution of qualities), but what, if he were not afraid of ſuch a word, he would call abſurdity. On the other had, Auſtria was very clear-ſighted; ſhe had no abſurdity whatſoever; ſhe was extremely wiſe and extremely inſincere; we, as the middle term, were formed out of theſe two courts, and leaving wiſdom to Auſtria and ſincerity to Ruſſia, were contented with being as abſurd as the one, and as inſincere as the other. He muſt own, indeed, that we had lately become rather more ſincere; that we had lately reſembled the magnanimous court of Peterſburgh more nearly; but yet we had "limited poſſibilities," and a thouſand other remains of our former want of deciſion and inſincerity. But, to return, did theſe different views, theſe jealouſies, theſe variances, augur well of the improvement of our combined armies? On the other hand, was there not every reaſon to conjecture that the plans, that the armies, that the military conduct of France was likely to be materially improved? At the opening of laſt campaign, we found them with a diſorganized and inferior army, with bad commanders (he meant Scherer in particular) with a corrupt and ignorant, and incapable government; and yet, even in the courſe of that campaign, their armies ſeemed to be in a progreſs of improvement. The battle of Novi was the beſt fought; and, at the cloſe of the campaign, they ſeemed every where to have regained new vigour and ſpirit. But had nothing happened ſince that to improve their proſpects? Whatever our opinion of Bonaparte's government, or of his mode of acquiring it, may be, will any one ſay, that in exchanging

Rewbell, Barras, &c. &c. for Bonaparte and his ſtaff; that in recalling Carnot; that in poſſeſſing the ableſt projectors of a campaign, the beſt and greateſt military commanders in the world, the proſpect of military ſucceſs has not improved? In addition to this, they have another great and incalculable advantage, that is, the Secretary of State's irritating and haughty letters, and rejection of peace. Whether it were right or wrong ſo to reply to that overture was not now the queſtion; but was there a man who doubted that ſuch an anſwer would have roufed many Frenchmen to ſupport with vigour and energy the government of Bonaparte? Could any man doubt that ſuch an anſwer muſt at beſt have had the effect of reviving the enthuſiaſm of all Republicans againſt us? Could any man doubt that many were now willing to employ exertions againſt the coalition, from which, till the rejection of peace, they would have ſhrunk? But, above all, could *they* who, from the inſult the people of England thought, and thought juſtly, they had received at Liſle, derived for a time the ſupport of the country, who, from the conduct of the French there, derived a *ſolid ſyſtem of finance*, as it was called, and who really were enabled to raiſe ſupplies beyond all example in our hiſtory, could they of all men in the world doubt the operation of the inſolence and haughtineſs of an enemy, upon a large, independent, and powerful enemy? He was at a loſs to account for the elevation of Miniſters and their friends. He confeſſed that it ſeemed to him little ſhort of madneſs and infatuation that the proſperous event of laſt campaign had diminiſhed the danger to which Europe ſtood expoſed. That it had improved our ſituation, and removed the immediate evils which we then apprehended, was very juſtly a cauſe for elation; but that they ſhould think that thoſe events had afforded any hopes of their ſoon attaining their object, whether it be the reſtoration of royalty, or the annihilation of the great power of France, did ſeem to him little ſhort of madneſs and infatuation. Good God! (ſaid Lord Holland) does not this Houſe recollect that, at the commencement of this dreadful conteſt, when we were proclaiming Lewis XVII. in one part of France, and robbing him of his towns in another, that the ſame noble Lords and Gentlemen that now ſeem to think the laſt campaign a ſtrong indication of the probability of ultimate ſucceſs, talked to the country at that time of France being on the brink and gulf of bankruptcy, and told them that we were marching to Paris? I will aſk the Houſe, if I,

or any other man, had at that moment been gifted with prophecy, and had ſtood up and ſaid, My Lords, from Divine inſpiration I will inform you, that theſe ſame noble Lords and Gentlemen, will ſtand up in ſix years time, in the ſame places, and ſtate it to your Lordſhips' and their country, as matter of conſolation, as ground of ſerious hope of ultimate ſucceſs, that that France, on whoſe territory you are now fighting, has been reduced by the moſt glorious of campaigns to the poſſeſſion of Flanders, of Holland, of the left bank of the Rhine, of Switzerland, of Savoy, of the alliance of Spain, and the neutrality of Pruſſia? What would you then have thought would be your ſituation, to whom ſuch a ſtate of affairs was matter of congratulation and glory, to whom the enormous remains of ſuch acquiſitions in the hands of your enemy, were to be quoted as the harveſt of your future ſucceſs? He proceeded to ſtate the inconveniences of ſubſidies, the little faith that was to be placed in the promiſes of courts: he would not again remind the Houſe, that we had ſubſidized almoſt every German prince, and that almoſt every German prince had deceived and betrayed us; but he muſt confeſs, that when he reflected on the amount, the conſequences and the little advantage this country had hitherto derived from ſubſidies; when he reflected on what, in the committees of enquiry upon the failure of the bank, had been ſtated to have been the chief cauſes which led to the event; when he reflected on the ſenſation which the repeated defection of our ſubſidized allies had made on the public, and the effect the immenſe ſums exported had had on our credit, he had hoped that a ſubſidy was one of the few meaſures to which Parliament would not, without much deliberation and reluctance, conſent. For his part, he could not ſee, without regret and alarm, large ſums of money go out of the kingdom, which, in his apprehenſion, would purchaſe nothing for ourſelves but treachery and diſappointment, and perhaps to the Houſe of Auſtria additional territory and aggrandiſement. On the affair of ſubſidies, it had whimſically been remarked to him, that it would be deſirable for this country that theſe ſubſidized powers would engage by the job inſtead of the day, that they would allow us to defer the payment till the work was done, and that they would be paid for the *accompliſhment*, not for the undertaking of an enterpriſe. The idea had ſtruck him as excellent in general, but more particularly in this inſtance, and he was happy to ſay that if this ſyſtem could be adopted upon the preſent occaſion, the Miniſters ſhould find him for

one a moſt liberal granter of ſubſidies; if they would ſay to the Houſes of Auſtria and Bavaria, "reſtore the Houſe of Bourbon, and when you have accompliſhed the job we will pay," he, for one would promiſe on that condition, one million, two millions, three millions, four, five, ſix millions, any thing they liked, any thing they demanded, and in ſo doing he ſhould be ſatisfied that he was not ſquandering the public money, and that this conditional engagement would never make the country one penny the poorer, becauſe he was convinced the job could never be done, and therefore the payment could never be called for. But as ſubſidies were now conducted, he contended the expence and loſs were certain, the advantage and profit in this inſtance more than doubtful, and at any rate depending upon the faith, or rather upon the co-operation of an ally who had before this deſerted us, nay, who, when ſhe was bounden by moſt ſolemn treaties, and moſt ſacred engagements, had broken them and made a ſeparate peace; and who had not (at leaſt to his or the Houſe's knowledge) entered into any engagement, treaty, or promiſe, which would render ſuch deſertion now a dereliction of principle, or a violation of faith. He conjured the Houſe, therefore, ſince they had that night learnt that reliance upon that cabinet was to be one of their chief hopes of ſucceſs, to reflect again, and not to engage in an undertaking ſo deſperate in its appearance, in which ſucceſs itſelf ſeemed only to lead to new wars, new expences, and new embarraſſments, and in which failure, which ſeemed but too probable, was little ſhort of diſgrace and ruin.

The *Duke of Montroſe* ſaid moſt of the noble Lord's obſervations might poſſibly have been applicable to ſome former queſtion debated, or would apply to ſome future one, but they did not appear to him to apply to the preſent queſtion. He, however, by no means intended going through the variety of topics the noble Lord who ſpoke laſt had touched upon, but merely to advert to the ſingle queſtion that appeared to him to ariſe out of the proper conſideration of his Majeſty's meſſage and the addreſs now moved, viz. Wether, during a war with France under ſingular and unprecedented circumſtances, it was wiſe in this country to ſubſidize the princes of the continent, and purchaſe the aid of auxiliary troops, in order to harraſs the enemy near their native country; or let them have an opportunity, for want of a politic diverſion, to bring the war into the Britiſh Channel and upon the coaſts of this kingdom or Ireland? The hiſtory of England proved

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by a variety of precedents that it had always been the policy of Great Britain, when engaged in foreign war, to avail herſelf of the aſſiſtance of auxiliary troops. If the wiſeſt of our ſtateſmen in former periods, and during former wars, uniformly adopted that practice, it ſurely was the true and beſt policy of this country to walk in the ſteps ſo wiſely trod in by their anceſtors, and benefit themſelves by the help of auxiliary forces.

Lord *Grenville* ſaid, he did not mean to treſpaſs on their Lordſhip's patience but for a ſingle moment; he roſe merely to obſerve, that how far it was fit for him, or for any noble Lord, to introduce the ſtrain of invective the noble Lord, who objected to the motion, had indulged in, that noble Lord could beſt judge, but he believed the Houſe would agree with him in thinking that it was wholly foreign to parliamentary uſage for any noble Lord in his ſpeech to treat our allies with ſo much perſonal diſreſpect, much more to be guilty of ſo groſs a violation of parliamentary decorum, as to term any ſovereign of a foreign ſtate in alliance with us a *hireling:* perſonal reſpect to foreign ſovereigns had hitherto been preſerved in that and the other Houſe on all occaſions; but it was under a new ſpecies of arguments, which the noble Lord had himſelf introduced into that Houſe, that ſuch indecent language had been indulged in. To prevent, however, the poſſibility of thoſe abroad, who only read the unauthenticated reports of the oppoſition ſpeeches of noble Lords, collecting from them falſe ideas, and being led to imagine, that either he or any of his Majeſty's Miniſters could act ſo improperly, as to forbear to treat their allies with the fulleſt reſpect, or to adviſe his Majeſty to praiſe one ally at the expence of another, he begged leave to read from the Houſe a copy of his Majeſty's ſpeech, the paſſages of which the noble Lord had alluded to, and ſo groſsly miſrepreſented. The words of the ſpeech were "the abilities and valour of the commanders and troops of the *combined* Imperial armies had been eminently diſplayed." On this occaſion he had thought it neceſſary to reſort to the original document, as the beſt conviction of the noble Lord's miſtake.

Lord *Holland* roſe again, and declared he was ready to acknowledge himſelf guilty of an incorrectneſs in the inſtance juſt alluded to; but that noble Lord might reſt aſſured he ſhould conſult his own judgment ſolely, as to what he ſhould ſay, or what line of argument he ſhould purſue in that Houſe.

Whatever

Whatever he felt, he had a right, as a Peer of Parliament, to ſay, and that he ſhould continue to ſay without reſerve.

The queſtion being put, the Houſe divided,

Contents 28—Non-Contents 3.

The Non-Contents were Lord Ponſonby (Earl of Beſborough), Lord Holland, and Lord King.

Adjourned to Monday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

FRIDAY, FEB. 14.

Mr. *Eſtcourt* moved for an account of the expenditure of the grants of Parliament by the Board of Agriculture, for the years 1797, 1798, and 1799.—Ordered.

Mr. *Hobhouſe* moved, that there be laid before the Houſe an account of the debentures and annuity bonds iſſued in the name of his Imperial Majeſty, in conſequence of the loan of one million ſix hundred thouſand pounds.—Ordered.

HIS MAJESTY'S MESSAGE.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved the order of the day for taking into conſideration his Majeſty's meſſage; and the meſſage being read, he moved that his Majeſty's moſt gracious meſſage be referred to the Committee of Supply. Ordered.

Mr. *Eſtcourt* brought up an account of the expenditure of the grants of Parliament by the Board of Agriculture for the years 1797, 1798, and 1799.—Ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. *Whitbread* moved, that the bill for amending the poor laws, which had been read a firſt time, ſhould be read a ſecond time on the 28th of April. This brought on a converſation between him and Sir William Young, Mr. Elliſon, Lord Sheffield, the Secretary at War, and Mr. Buxton, who all contended that the bill, inſtead of aiding labourers, would be of diſſervice to them; and that ſuffering it to be circulated through the country for two months, would be raiſing in that deſcription of perſons hopes which would never be realized, and on that account might raiſe a ferment in their minds that might be attended with miſchievous conſequences.

Sir *William Young* moved an amendment, that it now be read a ſecond time.

Mr. *Whitbread* inſiſted that thoſe Gentlemen either had not read the proviſions of the bill, or were miſtaken in the principle of it; and he thought them not entirely in order to

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go into the principle in this ſtage of the buſineſs. Every Gentleman preſent, he believed, would do him the juſtice to ſay, that in bringing in this bill at this particular time he had not the ſmalleſt idea of creating a ferment in the minds of the people—far from it. He had in the year 1795, which was a time of great ſcarcity, brought in a ſimilar bill, which had been printed and circulated round the country, and had not created any diſagreeable ſenſation in the minds of the people. The ſtrangers were ordered to withdraw; but, with leave of the Houſe, Mr. Whitbread withdrew his motion. and the Amendment was carried *nem con.*.

The Houſe reſolved itſelf into a Committee of the whole Houſe on the expiring laws bill—reſumed. The report was brought up, and the bill was ordered to be read a third time on Monday next, if then engroſſed —Adjourned to Monday.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

MONDAY, FEB. 17.

Earl *Stanhope* took the oaths and his ſeat. Before the Houſe roſe, his Lordſhip gave notice that he ſhould on Thurſday next bring forward a motion reſpecting the war. He alſo moved that the Lords be ſummoned for that day.

Mr. *Bragge* and others brought up a bill from the Commons.

The Maſters in Chancery reported that they had preſented the meſſage of the Houſe reſpecting the ſcarcity of corn, &c. to the Houſe of Commons, and that that honourable Houſe had ordered a copy of their report to be laid before their Lordſhips.

Read the bills on the table, and ſome petitions for bills.—Adjourned to the next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MONDAY, FEB. 17.

The expiring laws bill was read a third time and paſſed.

The Aberdeen paving bill was read a firſt time.

The diſtribution paper, or the account of how the public money had been diſpoſed of for the year 1799, was preſented from the Treaſury.

A meſſage from the Lords informed the Houſe that their Lordſhips had under their conſideration the great ſcarcity of corn under which the country now laboured, and the beſt meaſures

meaſures that might contribute to the relief of that ſcarcity; as they underſtood that the Houſe of Commons had gone into an inveſtigation of the ſame ſubject, their Lordſhips requeſted that that Houſe would communicate to their Lordſhips a copy of the report which had been brought in by the Committee of the Houſe of Commons.

On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer the Meſſengers were called in, and

The *Speaker* acquainted them that the Houſe would communicate to their Lordſhips a copy of the report mentioned in their Lordſhip's meſſage.

Mr. *Long* preſented ſeveral accounts which had been moved for by Mr. Hobhouſe, reſpecting the Imperial Loan, &c.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* did not think it neceſſary to trouble the Houſe at any length, with obſervations on theſe papers, as the ſums advanced to his Imperial Majeſty in 1795 and in 1797, and which formed a part of a former loan, had already been the ſubject of an enquiry with the Houſe; he had, therefore, only to refer Gentlemen to the journals of the Houſe for the ſtatements that were then made. It was true, and every one was acquainted with the fact, that the Court of Vienna did decline ratifying the convention that was to have been entered into on that ſubject; but the reaſons which induced his Imperial Majeſty to refuſe that ratification had ſince been removed, and recent intelligence enabled him to have the ſatisfaction of informing the Houſe that the convention had actually been ratified. But as this intelligence arrived but very lately, the Houſe would not be ſurpriſed that an anſwer had not ſooner been given to the queſtions put to him upon that ſubject.

Mr. *Hobhouſe* ſaid, that the object of his motion had been to aſcertain how far ſecurities had been depoſited in the bank for the payment of the intereſt on the Imperial loan, and what induced his Imperial Majeſty to fly in the face of a ſolemn convention. He had been unable to procure ſatisfactory information on either of theſe points; perhaps on the latter it might be improper to afford him the information he required; but as he now underſtood that the ſecurities he had alluded to were depoſited in the bank, he would remain ſatisfied with the anſwer he had received, and ſo far he had attained the object of his motion.

Mr. *Tierney* wiſhed to know if it was in the contemplation of his Majeſty's Miniſters to furniſh the Emperor with any further

further loan, ſhould his Imperial Majeſty call for it; and if ſo, what were the meaſures taken to ſecure a punctual payment of the intereſt?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* profeſſed himſelf unable to ſay at the preſent moment what aſſiſtance it might hereafter be neceſſary to afford to his Imperial Majeſty; that was a point which would be ſettled in the courſe of the negociations now carrying on. He was ready, however, now to ſtate that it could not well be expected that the Emperor ſhould be required to pay the intereſt on ſuch loans during the continuance of the war. For if we continued to avail ourſelves of the co-operation of the Court of Vienna, for which co-operation we were to give a pecuniary conſideration, would it not be a circuitous road to payment to be taking from the Emperor with one hand while we were giving him with the other. The ſolemn manner in which the convention had now been ratified was in his mind a ſufficient pledge of the good faith of his Imperial Majeſty, and could leave no room for apprehenſions reſpecting his future punctuality.

Mr. *Tierney* obſerved that the intereſt had already accumulated to a large ſum, and wiſhed to know what was the ſecurity for the intereſt now due?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that as yet no arrangement had been ſettled reſpecting that point.

On the motion of Mr. Tierney the accounts preſented by Mr. Long were ordered to be printed.

One of the Sheriffs of London appeared at the Bar, with a petition from the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council, praying for a pecuniary aid towards widening and improving the entrance into the City by Temple-bar.

The petition was referred to a Committee.

The Marine and Army Mutiny Bills were read a firſt time.

IMPERIAL SUBSIDY.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved the order of the day, that the Houſe do reſolve itſelf into a Committe of Supply, which the Houſe having done accordingly, the Chairman proceeded to read his Majeſty's meſſage. After it was read

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* roſe and ſaid, that he did not think it neceſſary to ſay much in order to convince the Houſe of the propriety of adopting the meaſures recommended in his Majeſty's moſt gracious communication. A great majority of the Houſe had already pledged themſelves to a vigorous proſecution of the war; and thoſe who thought

with him that it was acting wiſely and prudently to decline entering into negociation under the circumſtances in which it was propoſed, could not well refuſe their aſſent to the adoption of every means that appeared likely to enſure the ſame advantages to the common cauſe which attended it the whole of the laſt campaign. It was only by following up theſe advantages that we ſhould be enabled to bring the arduous conteſt in which we are engaged to an honourable termination. It was by a well combined co-operation with our allies, that we could even afford to France herſelf, a freſh opportunity of reſcuing herſelf from the galling and degrading bondage under which ſhe at preſent laboured. By theſe efforts might France acquire repoſe for herſelf, and ſecurity to Europe. There were alſo many parts of the continent which remained to be delivered, the deliverance of which had not been achieved during the laſt campaign. Theſe were among the great objects which we muſt endeavour to accompliſh. Above all, we had to cruſh and diſable the ſyſtem of Jacobiniſm, or if we even failed in completely deſtroying that monſter, we ſhould at leaſt perſevere till we had weakened the inſtruments and engines by which it propagated its principles; for it was generally agreed that there could be no ſafety for Europe as long as jacobiniſm remained ſtrong and triumphant. He ſhould on the preſent occaſion even hope that thoſe who oppoſed him on the queſtion of peace or war, and who were forward in recommending negociation, would now feel the neceſſity of vigorous preparation; for even they did not ſeem to entertain any great confidence in the effect of any attempt at a ſecure pacification. They muſt now be perſuaded that a great majority of the country agreed to carry on the war, and that it was to be carried on no man, he believed, would deny; but that it ſhould be proſecuted on that ſcale, and with that enlargement of means, which might promiſe to bring it, if poſſible, to a ſpeedy, and at all events, to a ſecure concluſion. After what had been achieved during the laſt campaign by the Imperial forces, we might naturally expect the moſt beneficial reſult from the co-operation of the Emperor and the Empire. On their glorious achievements reſted the beſt foundation of our hopes, far better than any which he could raiſe by an unavailing attempt to praiſe them. The ſecuring of the joint efforts of the empire ſhould moreover remove the doubts and fears of thoſe who began to be alarmed for our ſucceſs, becauſe the preſſure upon France was expected to be in ſome degree leſs than what it

was in the laſt campaign. Theſe apprehenſions aroſe from the determination of Ruſſia not to continue to act in concert with Auſtaia. Ruſſia certainly was not to co-operate to the ſame extent, if to any, as during the laſt campaign; but as far as his Ruſſian Majeſty was to act with this country, he was ſure he would act with the moſt cordial co-operation. The Emperor Paul was determined not to acquieſce in the preſent ſyſtem of France. But were theſe apprehenſions juſtly to be entertained, would they not afford an additional reaſon for deriving from among the powers of Germany every poſſible reinforcement to ſtrengthen the combined army. Theſe reinforcements would make that army more numerous and formidable than it was laſt year; it were therefore only waſte of words further to attempt to prove the propriety of the meaſure. The exact amount of the ſum to be advanced, he could not as yet preciſely aſcertain; the treaties and details from which he was to form his ultimate judgment upon that point, he was prevented from receiving by the late interruption of communications from the continent; but he ſtill thought it incumbent upon the Houſe to make ſuch advances as might enable the combined army to ſtrengthen itſelf as ſoon as poſſible, and to be early in commencing the operations of the campaign. Theſe were the two great points which his Majeſty's meſſage contained, and they formed the principles upon which his motion was founded. There was only one point more on which he thought it neceſſary to touch, and that was the probable amount of the advances it might be expedient to make. He could now only glance at a general ſtatement, and he thought that the pecuniary aſſiſtance that the Emperor, &c. might ſtand in need of, might amount in the courſe of the year to two millions and a half. He would at preſent only move for an advance of 500,000l. He could not well anticipate any objection to this motion when he had the ſatisfaction to aſſure the Houſe that, by means of theſe advances, we ſhould ſecure a more numerous and effectual co-operation than we enjoyed even laſt year, and that the confederate army would be ſuperior to any force that France was likely to be able to bring into the field.

Mr. *Nicholls* roſe, not directly to oppoſe the motion, but to ſuggeſt ſome obſervations that might ſhew how dangerous it was in the preſent ſtate of the country to acquieſce in it; at leaſt, before it was agreed to, he thought it would be prudent to aſcertain three facts:—1ſt, What was the quantity of corn now in the country, and whether it would ſuffice till

the enſuing harveſt; 2d, What quantity of corn it might be neceſſary to import, and from what countries it was to be procured; and 3d, What might be the ſum neceſſary to pay for the quantity of corn to be imported. In his opinion two million of quarters would not be more than was required to remedy the preſent ſcarcity, and this would require no leſs a ſum than twelve million ſterling. When Gentlemen added that ſum to the ſubſidies that were now propoſed to be paid to foreign powers, they would do well to aſk the governor and directors of the bank, if it was ſafe to permit ſo much money to be carried out of the kingdom. This was a ſerious view of our preſent ſituation, and was ſuch as ſhould make the Houſe pauſe before they entertained the preſent motion; at leaſt, he thought they ſhould adjourn it till the facts he alluded to had been aſcertained.

Mr. *Jolliffe* approved of the plan for employing foreign troops in preference to our own. He denied that there exiſted in the country any thing like the alarming ſcarcity which the honourable Gentleman had ſpoken of. There was, on the contrary, ſuch a quantity of corn in the country as would amply ſuffice till the next harveſt. It was the general opinion of the nation that the war ſhould be continued, and after the continuation of it had been ſo ſolemnly determined upon by a large majority of the Houſe, he could not ſee how it could become any individual, or any ſet of individuals, thus to oppoſe the general opinion.

Mr. *William Bouverie* reprobated the inſolent and arrogant manner in which the pacific propoſals on the part of the enemy had been rejected; it neither became the dignity of Miniſters or the dignity of the country. He was but an individual, and he thought himſelf bound in conſcience to reſiſt the preſent motion; every man in the Houſe, he conceived, had a right to vote as his conſcience bid him, and for that vote he was anſwerable to his country, and without hypocriſy he might ſay, that he felt himſelf anſwerable for it ſomewhere elſe. If every man had not a right to vote according to the beſt of his judgment, of what uſe was it to bring the preſent, or any other queſtion before the Houſe? He could not conſcientiouſly vote for it, but it was, however, with reluctance that he oppoſed it.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid he felt little inclination to ſpeak upon the preſent ſubject, but he could not remain quietly upon his ſeat after ſome obſervations which had been made by Gentlemen on the other ſide of the Houſe. It had been ſaid, that neither

any

any individual, nor any ſet of individuals, had a right to oppoſe the ſenſe of the majority of that Houſe. This language was inſulting and unparliamentary. The minority had as great a right to ſpeak their opinion, and as great reſpect was due to that opinion, as if their number was ever ſo great. The majority of the Houſe of Commons did not always declare the wiſhes of the Britiſh nation. It was not above a week ſince a right hon. Gentleman had declared, that he entered into negociations at Liſle becauſe the country deſired an experiment to be made. The voice of the Houſe then was for war, and the idea of treating was reprobated as deſtructive. Yet Miniſters had yielded to the voice of the minority, and had attempted to make peace. It was certainly conſtitutional, and no way derogatory to the honour of the right hon. Gentleman; but it proved that the minority ſometimes ſpoke the ſenſe of the people, and that Miniſters were guided by their advice. He affirmed, that at the preſent moment the inclinations of the people run more contrary to the war than they did then, although the majority for continuing it had encreaſed. From one end of England to the other, the greateſt anxiety prevailed for concluding a peace. Labouring under accumulated burthens, which they are no longer able to ſupport, perceiving no reaſon why they ſhould thus wantonly be deprived of their comforts, and ſeeing no end to the ſanguinary conflict, they were diſcontented with the conduct of Miniſters, and eagerly deſired that an attempt ſhould be made to procure them the bleſſings of peace. The only argument he had heard for the preſent meaſure was, that the Houſe had already pledged itſelf to proſecute the war. Had no change of circumſtances taken place ſince that vote, he would have thought that the argument had ſome force; but if public report was to be credited, the Emperor of Ruſſia had altered his views, and withdrawn his forces from the theatre of war. He would be told, that though the Ruſſians would not act upon the continent, they would ſtill, under the direction of this country, continue to uſe their efforts to annoy the common enemy. He could place little faith in the generous intentions of that monarch. He had never furniſhed a ſoldier for whom he was not paid. He was paid for raiſing and tranſporting all the troops he had ſent againſt France. He was at a loſs to conceive what the common cauſe was in which we were embarked. The Emperor Paul had unequivocally declared it to be the reſtoration of royalty in France; but the Emperor of Germany had

clearly

clearly ſhewn, that his only object was perſonal aggrandizement; what our object was it was difficult to determine; ſometimes it was ſtated to be one thing, and ſometimes another. Had the right hon. Gentleman come down and ſaid, that what was meant by the common cauſe was now clearly defined, he might, with ſome degree of reaſon, have called for ſupport; but upon that ſubject we were left in a ſtate of doubt and uncertainty. He firmly believed that the object for which Miniſters carried on the war, notwithſtanding all their qualifications and equivocations, was the reſtoration of monarchy. He could gather nothing elſe from the ſpeeches of the right hon. Gentleman for two years paſt, and Lord Grenville's note placed the matter beyond all doubt. The only meaning of the other conditions mentioned there, upon which peace could be concluded, was to leave Miniſters a loop-hole through which they may eſcape. They will fight vigorouſly for royalty; but though they ſhould be unſucceſsful, they may ſtill remain in their places. He would not ſtop to conſider the bleſſings or the curſes which would flow from the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon; but he never would vote a farthing for the purpoſe of reſtoring it. In the preſent circumſtances of the country, he ſhould think himſelf very wanting in his duty to his conſtituents and to his country, if he did not ſtrenuouſly oppoſe a farthing being voted. He could not conceive what impropriety his hon. Friend had been guilty of, who mentioned the preſent alarming ſcarcity of corn, as an argument againſt continuing the war. He had ſaid that he was well informed that a ſupply of corn would be neceſſary for three months conſumption, and had expreſſed his ignorance of the manner in which it could be procured, except peace was concluded. What was there in this ridiculous or abſurd? Where then was the reaſon for the ſneer with which theſe obſervations were received? Would it be proper to ſend ſo much money out of the country, when the balance of trade muſt, from our neceſſary remittances to the continent for grain, be ſo much againſt us? Would not all the commercial difficulties be brought upon the country formerly experienced by purſuing ſimilar meaſures? At former ſtages of the war he had heard much of its being juſt and neceſſary; but though theſe two words had coſt us two hundred millions, he now heard of them no more; they had died a natural death. The war was indeed neither juſt nor neceſſary. If it was to reſtore the Bourbons, it was unjuſt; if to check jacobiniſm, it was no longer neceſſary.

ceſſary. It was neither juſt nor neceſſary when we had refuſed to liſten to the pacific propoſals of our enemies. Upon theſe grounds he muſt ſtrenuouſly oppoſe the preſent motion. But the right hon. Gentleman would ſay to others, becauſe you have voted for war, you muſt vote for theſe 2,500,000l. to carry it on. Before he ſpeaks in this ſtyle he ought to lay the treaties before the Houſe, that Gentlemen may know the terms of this bargain which they are called upon to conclude. Will the co-operation be adequate to the expence? What powers are to receive our money, and in what proportion? He was ſure that the Emperor would accept of no part of it on the terms upon which it would be offered him. His views were very different from thoſe of his Majeſty's Miniſters. But why ſhould we hire theſe mercenaries at all to fight their own battles? It was ſaid that German Powers had abundance of zeal, but they wanted pecuniary reſources. Formerly the Emperor took our money and made a ſeparate peace; after having been at war for five years, he began it anew, and has carried it on with the utmoſt vigour and ſucceſs without our aſſiſtance. Strange that he ſhould never diſcover his reſources till we refuſed to ſubſidize him any longer! Continue to leave him to his own exertions, and he will continue to exert himſelf ſucceſsfully. Advance him money, and he will again leave us in the lurch. Would the Houſe then vote away 500,000l. which would probably tend to prevent the co-operation of any ally? Would they vote it away without knowing the extent of the co-operation which he promiſes to afford? What ſecurity had we for his fulfilling any engagements he may enter into? The Emperor had formerly betrayed us, and had never yet expreſſed any contrition for his miſconduct, or made any promiſe of amendment. Though Gentlemen had voted for the war when they were ignorant of the defection of the Ruſſians, they ſurely would not ſquander away large ſums of money, of the application of which they were ignorant, and the probable effect of which would be to accelerate a peace betwixt the Emperor of Germany and the French Republic. He was not an enemy to ſubſidies. If blood muſt be ſpilt, better let it be German than Britiſh blood. But he objected to the preſent ſubſidy becauſe there was no neceſſity for bloodſhed at all. Peace, ſecure and honourable, might unqueſtionably be now obtained. We were told we muſt fight while the jacobin principle remained in France. For his part he was at a loſs to conceive what was meant by the jacobin principle; it

ſeemed

ſeemed to him merely a pretext for carrying on the war, and a mean of enabling Miniſters to make peace when they were no longer able to perſevere in the conteſt. True jacobiniſm no longer exiſted. The preſent government of France had proved that it did not lead to liberty, and it had been univerſally abandoned. But follow the ſame courſes by which it at firſt was engendered, ſhew a total diſregard to honour, to principle, and to humanity; ſtruggle only for encreaſe of power and extenſion of dominion; try to ſtifle every generous feeling and every independent ſentiment, and you will again revive this formidable monſter. It was ſaid we ſhould try to weaken France. Conſider at what expence we make the attempt; we did it at upwards of forty millions a year. The relative ſtrength of France, at this rate, would not be at all diminiſhed; perhaps it would be encreaſed: ſhe raiſed her reſources by revolutionary means, ours were drawn from the moſt uſeful claſſes of the community. We had likewiſe much more to loſe: the commerce of France cannot be hurt by continuing the war, nor had ſhe any great evil to apprehend from it. To what point muſt France be weakened to enſure our ſecurity? Let the right hon. Gentleman mark out this, and then we ſhall know when to expect peace, and the object for which we are called upon to make ſuch ſacrifices. But he defied the right hon. Gentleman to define the object of the war. Whether he ſays it is for royalty, or againſt jacobiniſm, he will limit and qualify both declarations, he will introduce ifs and buts, and leave us in as great perplexity as ever. He was conſcious that the ſole object of Miniſters was the reſtoration of royalty in France, and he would never conſent to vote away Britiſh money for a purpoſe ſo foreign to the intereſt of the country.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, though it is with reluctance that I riſe to take up the time of the Houſe on the preſent occaſion, yet there are ſeveral things in the ſpeech of the hon. Gentleman who has juſt ſat down, and in thoſe of his friends beſide him, that I cannot ſuffer to paſs without animadverſion. The hon. Gentleman defies me to explain the object of the war.

To expreſs the whole, Sir, not in one ſentence, but in one word, I ſay that our object in the proſecution of the war is *ſecurity*. Security againſt the greateſt danger with which the civilized world was ever threatened; a danger which, as it equally menaced every nation of Europe, every nation has, with more or leſs vigour and perſeverance, found it neceſſary

to oppoſe. That danger indeed, this country has the merit of having reſiſted with moſt ſucceſs, becauſe we oppoſed it with the greateſt energy. To its pernicious principle, to its hoſtile operations we oppoſed the moſt effectual reſiſtance; becauſe that reſiſtance was the moſt vigorous, the moſt determined, and the moſt perſevering. This country alone, of all the nations of Europe, preſented barriers the beſt fitted to reſiſt its progreſs. We alone recognized the neceſſity of open war, as well with the principles, as the practice of the French revolution. We ſaw that it was to be reſiſted no leſs by arms abroad, than by precaution at home; that we were to ſeek protection no leſs to the courage of our forces, than to the wiſdom of our councils; no leſs to military effort, than to legiſlative enactment. At the moment when thoſe who now admit the dangers of jacobiniſm, while they contend that it is extinct, uſed to palliate its atrocity, and extenuate its miſchief, this Houſe wiſely ſaw that it was neceſſary to erect a double ſafeguard againſt a danger that wrought no leſs by undiſguiſed hoſtility than by ſecret machination. But how long is it ſince the hon. Gentleman and his friends have diſcovered that the dangers of jacobiniſm have ceaſed to exiſt? How long is it ſince they have found that the cauſe of French revolution is not the cauſe of liberty? Is it not only ſince the principles of jacobiniſm have been concentered and enthroned in the perſon of a man who, in a particular manner, is their child and their champion; a man who, above all others, has had the largeſt ſhare in ſpreading their influence, and increaſing their deſolation? In theſe circumſtances the hon. Gentleman tells us that the dangers of jacobiniſm are no more, becauſe we ſee its principle more than ever condenſed, when we ſee that unity of action is combined with uniformity of deſign, and when, from the ſimplicity of the organ, there has ariſen an increaſed facility of miſchief, and additional means of execution are added to the original tendency to deſtruction.

But the hon. Gentleman aſks, What is our intention? He aſks, Whether the war is to be carried on till jacobiniſm is finally extinguiſhed? If he means that war is to be carried on till jacobiniſm has either loſt its ſting, or is abridged in its power to do evil, I ſay that this is the object of our exertions. I do not ſay that we muſt wage war until the principle of jacobiniſm is extinguiſhed in the mind of every individual; were that the object of the conteſt, I am afraid it would not terminate but with the preſent generation. I am afraid that

a mind once tainted with that infection never recovers its healthful ſtate. I am afraid that no purification is ſufficient to eradicate the poiſon of that foul diſtemper. Even thoſe, we ſee, who ſo loudly tell us now that the danger of jacobiniſm is paſt, are endeavouring to diſarm us of the means of carrying on the war we now wage againſt its remnant, by thoſe arts which they employed to bend us down before its meridian ſplendour. They tell us again, that by reſiſting that peſtilent miſchief, we are promoting diſtreſs, that we are deſpiſing humanity. They tells us that we have ſpent two hundred millions for a phraſe—for the words "juſt and neceſſary." I hope, Sir, that the people of this country will not be governed by words. No, Sir, the people of England will not be ſo miſled. We have ſpent two hundred millions; but what has been the object—what have been the fruits of this expenditure? If this country has ſpent two hundred millions, they have been ſpent to preſerve the ſources of its proſperity, its happineſs, its glory, its freedom. Yes, Sir, we have ſpent that ſum; and I truſt we are ready, as I am ſure we are able, to ſpend two hundred millions more for purpoſes ſo great and important. I truſt this country is ready to exert its efforts to avail ourſelves of the aſſiſtance of our allies, to obtain real ſecurity, and to attain ſolid peace.

It is true that in this conteſt different opinions may exiſt as to the means by which the danger is to be reſiſted: the Emperor of Ruſſia may approve of one courſe; the Emperor of Germany may adopt another. But is it not ſtrange that the hon. Gentleman ſhould be ſo particularly diſpleaſed that we ſhould be deſirous of the co-operation of the Emperor of Germany, who has not gone ſo far in his declarations on the ſubject of the war as the Emperor of Ruſſia? Is it a ground of objection with the hon. Gentleman, that we ſhould avail ourſelves of the aſſiſtance of thoſe who do not declare themſelves in favour of that object which he profeſſes himſelf particularly to diſapprove? If, as I do not believe, the Emperor of Germany did not ſee any danger in French principles; if, as I do not believe, the Emperor of Germany conſiders it as no deſirable object to overthrow that government by which they are embodied and organized, yet are we to refuſe the co-operation of that power which may ſo eſſentially contribute to promote that ſecurity which we have in view? Without changing our own objects, may we not avail ourſelves of the aid of other powers, though the motives of the co-operation may not be thoſe which dictate our own exertions?

exertions? Admitting that the Emperor of Germany has no other view but to regain poſſeſſion of the Netherlands, to drive the enemy back to the Rhine, to recover the fortreſſes which it was for a moment forced to abandon, are theſe objects which we have no intereſt to promote? are theſe deſigns which have no relation to Britiſh policy—no connection with Britiſh ſafety? Whatever be the profeſſions of Auſtria, ſhe muſt dread the hoſtility of French principles, ſhe muſt diſtruſt the ſecurity of republican peace. Why, then, ſhould we be unwilling to employ the co-operation of Auſtrian arms for objects in which we ourſelves are ſo nearly concerned? It is our duty, it is our higheſt intereſt to encourage the exertions, and to promote the views of Auſtria, with which our own ſecurity is ſo materially concerned.

The hon. Gentleman ſays too, that the war is not juſt or neceſſary, becauſe he diſapproves the attempt to reſtore monarchy in France, and becauſe we have refuſed to enter into any immediate negociation. He dares to affirm that the reſtoration of monarchy is the only object we have in view, and he oppoſes all explanation we might give by the general charge that it muſt be mere ſpecial pleading. In truth, Sir, I have no partiality for that which the hon. Gentleman calls ſpecial pleading; and have little inclination to reſt my juſtification upon *ifs* and *buts*. Without expoſing myſelf, however, to the cenſure of cavilling or ſophiſtry, I will aſſert that, though I conſider monarchy in France as one of the ſureſt pledges of the ſecurity we deſire, yet we do not limit it entirely to that ſtate of things: if there be any other mode by which ſecurity can be attained, we are ready to embrace it. We are unwilling to exchange the proſpects which a vigorous perſeverance in the conteſt preſents for an inſecure peace. *But* the ſecurity is to be compared with the danger of war. *If*, then, it can be ſhewn that ſecurity is now attainable; *if* there be really no danger to be apprehended from jacobiniſm, doubtleſs peace is the courſe we ought to purſue. *If*, on the other hand, the continuance of the war preſents us a chance of either extinguiſhing the principles of jacobiniſm or diminiſhing their power; *if* our commerce in this ſtate of war enjoys an unexampled proſperity, inſtead of threatening the exhauſtion of our means, ought we to prefer a deluſive truce to a vigorous war? Theſe are the *ifs* and the *buts* which I conceive it important to conſider. On this plea, ſo recorded, am I content to be tried by God and my country.

The hon. Gentleman ſays, that we reduce our own means in the ſame proportion that we exhauſt thoſe of the enemy. Is this, indeed, the concluſion which we muſt draw from a ſurvey of the reſpective ſituations of France and England, ſince the negociation at Paris, and particularly thoſe at Liſle? Does the hon. Gentleman really think, that the means of this country have been exhauſted in the ſame proportion with thoſe of the enemy? Does he think that the expence of a new campaign will produce that effect? On theſe grounds of compariſon the queſtion is to be decided, and not upon thoſe topics which are adduced to create a prejudice againſt the war, and thoſe inſidious repreſentations employed to render it unpopular. It is, indeed, to become the allies of jacobiniſm; to connect, as ſome affect to do, the preſent ſcarcity with the ſubject of the war. It is, indeed, to reſort to its moſt deſtructive weapons, thus to appeal to the feelings of the multitude, and call upon them to decide on ſuch a ground upon a queſtion, of which, in their cooleſt ſtate, they are, perhaps, unqualified to judge. When we ſee ſuch arts employed, I think it pretty ſtrong proof that jacobiniſm is not extinct. If indeed we find, that it is ſtill alive even in the minds of ſpectators, what influence muſt it not poſſeſs, who are involved in its ſcenes, and who rule by its influence?

It is ſaid, however, that I endeavour to prevent the freedom of deliberation, by ſaying, that Parliament, by its former vote, is pledged to this particular meaſure. Moſt certainly, however, I have no ſuch intention; on the contrary, I ſtated only, that thoſe who think the war ſhould be continued, muſt approve of every means by which it can be carried on with vigour and ſucceſs. The queſtion then is, whether the meaſure is calculated for that end? if it is, it would be to ſuppoſe Parliament guided by no conſiſtent view, if it did not meet with its approbation. That the hon. Gentleman and his friends ſhould oppoſe the meaſure, I ſhould be diſpoſed to aſcribe, not ſo much to their diſapproving it, as to their oppoſition to the war itſelf. I took it for granted, indeed, that even ſome of thoſe who oppoſed the war itſelf, might acquieſce in this meaſure, becauſe I truſt their ſentiment is ſincere; they cannot prevent the war—they muſt be deſirous to ſee it carried on with vigour and ſucceſs. If they had no other object but to palſy our efforts, to diſarm our force in the proſecution of a conteſt, which their votes cannot prevent; their objects would be criminal, their language would be

be miſchievous. I hope, however, that the feelings, which in candour I ſuppoſed Gentlemen on the other ſide to poſſeſs, will not be belied by their conduct.

It was ſtated by an hon. Gentleman, who ſeldom makes his appearance in this Houſe, that the minority repreſented the ſentiments of the great body of the people of this country. But if ſuch arguments are admitted, I think there is little reaſon to conclude that the principles of jacobiniſm are extinct. It was repreſented, too, as if I had ſaid that the ſenſe of the country had made it neceſſary to open the negociation of Paris and Liſle. The people of this country never were for a peace that might be broken to-morrow. They were for peace, as I am for peace, whenever it promiſes ſecurity and permanence. I thought it right to open negociation, not becauſe I was inſenſible to the dangers of jacobiniſm, but becauſe, on a view of the dangers of war, as it muſt then have been proſecuted, peace was, upon the whole, the leaſt of the evils that preſented. The compariſons which then influenced in favour of negociation no longer exiſt. At that moment the ſtate of parties in France tended to an order of things which promiſed far greater ſecurity; which evinced a greater departure from jacobiniſm than any thing which has appeared ſince. If, then, the grounds which decided in favour of peace, either in the ſtate of the enemy, or our own, no longer operate, am I inconſiſtent if I, on other circumſtances, act with other views, and purſue a different courſe?

We are told, however, that our policy ought to be changed, as the Ruſſians are no longer to co-operate with Auſtria. But may not the Ruſſians be employed with advantage in the common cauſe, though they no longer act immediately in conjunction with the Auſtrians? It is not for me to point out the particular way in which their force may be directed in conjunction with the moveable maritime force which this country poſſeſſes. I need not ſay how, while the frontiers of France are inveſted by a powerful military force, the Ruſſians may co-operate in ſupporting thoſe inſurrections which actually prevail, and which threaten to break out in every part of France. May not theſe efforts produce a great and valuable diverſion for the Ruſſians? This is ſufficient to ſhow that their co-operation may ſtill be extremely valuable. To ſay more would be no leſs improper than unneceſſary.

If, however, the Ruſſians are not to aſſiſt the cauſe by their efforts upon the continental frontier of France, does it not become the policy of England, does it not conſiſt with the wiſdom

wiſdom of Parliament, to employ every means to ſupply the loſs which their departure will occaſion? The meaſure in queſtion aims at that object. It aims at procuring ſuch reinforcements to the military exertions of our allies as promiſe a vigorous and ſucceſsful campaign. Upon a compariſon, indeed, of the forces of France, with thoſe which our allies will be enabled to bring againſt her, we will find that the latter are greatly ſuperior. I cannot abſolutely pledge myſelf that the forces of France ſhall not be encreaſed in ſuch a manner as to equal, if not outnumber thoſe of the allies, but on every ground of conjecture, the allies will maintain that ſuperiority which they poſſeſſed laſt campaign. The meaſure in queſtion is intended to ſecure that effectual co-operation, thoſe military exertions which promiſe ſucceſs, and if the propriety of perſevering in the conteſt be admitted, as it has been, by the Houſe, I cannot conceive what argument can be uſed againſt that which ſeems ſo neceſſary to its favourable iſſue.

An hon. Gentleman ſtated with a gravity which ſeemed to teſtify his ſincerity in what he advanced, that twelve millions will be neceſſary to procure that ſupply of grain which this country requires. I truſt that it will appear in the conſideration of the report of the corn committee, that there has already been a very conſiderable ſupply of corn obtained, and that there is not ſo much to be apprehended on the ſcore of ſcarcity as ſome ſuppoſe. But, beſides that the hon. Gentleman exaggerates the ſupply that will be required, he infers that we ſhall not be able to find pecuniary reſources both for the war and to obviate the danger of ſcarcity. Doubtleſs, however, there is no difficulty in ſupplying both demands. No man who thinks the war right and politic will ſuppoſe that we ought to withhold thoſe ſupplies which are neceſſary to ſupport the conteſt with vigour, and bring it to a ſucceſsful termination, becauſe there happens to exiſt a ſcarcity which has no connexion with the war, and which the proſecution of it can in no way affect. The fallacy of aſcribing that ſcarcity to the war is no leſs unfounded in reaſoning than it is miſchievous in its conſequences.

It is for the Houſe, then, to decide whether, in ſupporting this meaſure, we have judged on good grounds. If any man thinks he ſees the means of bringing the conteſt to an earlier termination than by vigorous effort and military operations, he is juſtified in oppoſing the meaſures which are neceſſary to carry it on with energy. Thoſe who conſider the

war

war to be expedient, cannot, with conſiſtency, refuſe their aſſent to meaſures calculated to bring it to a ſucceſsful iſſue. Even thoſe who may diſapprove of the conteſt, which they cannot prevent by their votes, cannot honeſtly purſue that conduct which could tend only to render its termination favourable to the enemy. God forbid I ſhould queſtion the freedom of thought, or the liberty of ſpeech, but I cannot ſee how Gentlemen can juſtify a language and a conduct which can have no tendency but to diſarm our exertions, and to defeat our hopes in the proſecution of the conteſt. They ought to limit themſelves to thoſe arguments which could influence the Houſe againſt the war altogether, not dwell upon topics which can tend only to weaken our efforts and betray our cauſe. Above all, nothing can be more unfair in reaſoning, than to ally the preſent ſcarcity with the war, or to inſinuate that its proſecution will interfere with thoſe ſupplies which we may require. I am the more induced to teſtify thus publicly the diſapprobation which ſuch language exacts in my mind, when I obſerve the inſidious uſe that is made of them, in promoting certain meaſures out of doors; a language, indeed, contrary to all honeſt principle, and repugnant to every ſentiment of public duty.

Mr. *Tierney* replied. He ſaid that he thought he would not be a good ſubject if he did not riſe to vindicate his character from the imputations which had been caſt upon it. The right hon. Gentleman was that night in a ſtate of conſiderable irritation, which, though perhaps not to be wondered at, had made him go into a ſtrain of invective which he would find it difficult to juſtify. He was enraged at the preſent ſcarcity being adduced as an argument againſt the war, and had ſeverely cenſured thoſe who adduced it. Was it unbecoming to ſay, that becauſe the people were in want of the common neceſſaries of life, it would be impolitic to ſend large ſums of money out of the country, to conſider the ſtate of the nation, when we were deliberating upon the courſe it ſhould purſue? He at any rate might have eſcaped blame, ſince he had not ſaid one word upon that ſubject. He was no enemy to granting ſubſidies; but he objected to aſſiſting the Emperor to carry on his ſchemes of ambition. With the report of the corn committee on the table, would Gentlemen vote 2,500,000l. for ſuch a purpoſe? Mr. Tierney here recapitulated and enforced his former arguments, to ſhew the majority in the Houſe did not always ſpeak the ſenſe of the public. No one, he continued, reprobated jacobiniſm more than

than he did, and though the right hon. Gentleman had accuſed him of it, and had ſaid that it had broken out afreſh, he defied any man to produce any ſentiment of that nature which had ever iſſued from his lips. The right hon. Gentleman had much at ſtake in promoting the belief that jacobiniſm ſtill was dangerous. Jacobiniſm was his beſt friend; to that he owed his elevation, and when that failed him his fall would quickly follow. He would, then, be ſtripped of his power, and muſt look to his perſonal virtues. Notwithſtanding the right hon. Gentleman's ſpecimen of ſpecial pleading, he had not yet given a clear definition of the object of the war, and had ſtill interſperſed his ifs and his buts. What it was he himſelf had little doubt. He had no objection to accept of the ſervices of the Emperor of Germany, although his views were different; but he could not conſent to pay him for that aſſiſtance. Was there nothing diſgraceful in granting this ſubſidy, and thus being inſtrumental to the enſlavement of independent countries? Our ſituation was greatly improved, it was ſaid, ſince the negociations at Liſle. Be it ſo; but had not the French ſtill immenſe armies? Was not property more ſecure and land more valuable now than before the late revolution? The ſpirit of the country was raiſed then, but it was chiefly by the declaration that was publiſhed by the Britiſh government. This Mr. Tierney read and commented upon, and ſhewed that no one reaſon there aſſigned for continuing the war any longer exiſts. He ſaid that Miniſters, by now following a contrary conduct, would produce contrary effects, and make the people, with one voice, cry aloud for peace. The proſperity of the country was more apparent than real. The diſtractions on the continent had thrown almoſt the whole trade of the world into our hands, but at a peace it would ſubſide into its natural channels. We raiſed the ſupplies with ſeeming eaſe, but with great diſtreſs to the community. He put it to the Members of the Houſe, if the middling ranks were not dreadfully oppreſſed. London ſhowed ſigns of proſperity, but it was far otherwiſe in the country. The gentry were reduced to poverty, and thoſe whoſe anceſtors had lived in ſplendour, ſaw themſelves eclipſed by contractors and commiſſaries. It was by looking at theſe circumſtances that the proſperity of the country was to be eſtimated, not by looking at the amount of the exports and imports. Who had haraſſed the Miniſter? It appeared by the Journals that 27 millions of money, 110,000 ſeamen, and 192,000 ſoldiers, were lately voted without oppoſition.

Was

Was it then that the Miniſter was haraſſed? Yet he was now accuſed of a wiſh to embarraſs the operations of government, becauſe without a treaty being produced, without any promiſe of fidelity on the part of the Emperor, he heſitated to vote for a ſubſidy to that monarch. The right hon. Gentleman was the only man who, in theſe circumſtances, would have made ſuch a demand. Mr. Tierney concluded by inveighing againſt the conduct of Miniſtry in rejecting the overtures of Bonaparte. There could not be a doubt that peace might have been concluded. The people of France have long eagerly deſired it; it is their intereſt to procure and maintain it, and then they would not have ſuffered Bonaparte to ſhuffle or prevaricate. If he was really inſincere, Miniſters had loſt a ſure opportunity of ruining him, but they had acted as his beſt friends, and ſeated him firmly on the throne of France. It appeared, from a paſſage in the intercepted letters, that Bonaparte would not have heſitated to relinquiſh Egypt; and he was confident there would have been no bar to a ſucceſsful negociation. Had peace been unattainable, he would, with alacrity, have voted for the preſent motion; but as he conſidered the war as unneceſſary and impolitic, he muſt give it his decided negative.

Mr. *Wilberforce* ſaid, that he deemed it an act of juſtice to himſelf, to clear himſelf from the miſrepreſentation which Gentlemen on the oppoſite ſide of the Houſe always made it a point to bring forward againſt him and his right hon. Friends with whom he acted. He denied that we were now at war for the purpoſe only of reſtoring royalty in France. The government in France, he aſſerted, was in ſuch a ſtate, that no calculation could poſſibly be made of its ſtability, and therefore it was idle and ridiculous to attempt to make a peace with it. He inveighed againſt the jacobin principles of France; and accuſed the oppoſition of giving their conſent to a general ſupply, and then endeavouring to embarraſs government, by diſputing particular articles of that ſupply. After commenting at conſiderable length on theſe topics, the hon. Gentleman gave his hearty aſſent to the motion.

Mr. Sheridan ſpoke nearly as follows:—Sir, the hon. Gentleman who has juſt ſat down, and who ſaid that he roſe only to ſave himſelf from miſrepreſentation, has declared that he has no objection to peace. Now, I ſhould have expected a warmer declaration from that honourable Gentleman, when I recollect his conduct on a former occaſion; I recollect a time when he came to rebuke the Miniſter for

his violence. (Mr. S. then read a motion made by Mr. Wilberforce, for an addreſs to his Majeſty, praying that the government of France might not be made an obſtacle to peace, when an opportunity ſhould arrive to treat. After which he thus continued)—Now as the honourable Gentleman is anxious to eſcape from the charge of inconſiſtency, I ſhould expect that he would ſtate the reaſon for this difference in his preſent conduct. At the period alluded to the French government was a proviſional government; a government from its nature not deſigned to continue; a government of furious Jacobins; yet the honourable Gentleman implored the Houſe to ſupplicate his Majeſty, that that circumſtance might not be ſuffered to ſtand in the way of peace; but now, when it is of a leſs objectionable deſcription, he attempts to juſtify his right honourable Friend from the charge of having ſent an arrogant, violent, inconſiderate, and he hoped he would not find, an unfortunate note, refuſing to accept peace from ſuch a government.

An hon. Gentleman who ſpoke in the debate put a very juſt queſtion, namely, whether or not the country will endure to be governed by words, and not by facts? I admit that it is right that it ſhould not be ſo governed, but unfortunately I have the authority of the preſent government that it is. The honourable Gentleman ſpoke with great eloquence, I may ſay irritation; but never did I ſee eloquence ſo miſapplied. He has ſhewn his dexterity in driving the ſubject from its proper baſis; he guides, urges, and inflames the paſſions of his hearers by dilating on jacobinical principles, but he does not ſhew how they bear on the preſent queſtion. He has not dared to aſſert, that ſo far as reſpects the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon, we have ſuffered by the defection of Ruſſia; what that power may ſtill do with regard to La Vendee, or reconciling the people of Ireland to the Union, I do not enquire; but with reſpect to the great object, the reſtoration of Monarchy in France we are *minus* the Emperor of Ruſſia; that power may be conſidered extinct. Is it then to be endured that the Miniſter ſhall come down to the Houſe and aſk for a ſubſidy under ſuch circumſtances? Is it to be endured that we ſhall be told, that we are at war for the reſtoration of Monarchy in France; that Ruſſia is pledged to the accompliſhment of that purpoſe; that Ruſſia is the rock on which we ſtand; that the magnanimous Emperor of Ruſſia, the gallantry of whoſe troops, and the ſkill of whoſe generals, place them

above

above all the troops and generals in Europe, is all we have to reſt upon? Is it to be endured, I ſay, that this rock ſhould prove as brittle as ſand, and that thoſe who held ſuch language ſhould come down in a week after, and ſay, "give us two millions and a half to ſubſidize Germany, and then we ſhall have a better army than we had from Ruſſia?"—After ſuch unqualified praiſe of Ruſſia, and after her defection, is not ſuch language inconſiſtent, abſurd, and prepoſterous? If Germany poſſeſſed theſe wonderful forces before, why were they not called into action? And if not, why are we to ſubſidize the *poſſe comitatus*, the rabble of Germany? And who is the perſon that applies for this ſubſidy? As to the Elector of Bavaria I leave him out of the queſtion; it is the Emperor of Germany. Is there any thing in his conduct and character to induce us to liſten to him? I think not, and for theſe two reaſons: firſt, he applied once on a falſe pretence; and ſecondly, he failed in performing his ſtipulated engagement. What was his falſe pretence? He ſaid that he could not open the campaign without the pecuniary aſſiſtance of this country; and yet he did open it, and diſplayed more vigour, energy, and reſources, than ever.—If to this we add experience and the evidence of facts, when, though bound to this country, he dared to break faith with her and make a ſeparate peace, does it not furniſh a reaſonable cauſe for declining to grant a ſubſidy to ſuch a power?

The honourable Gentleman is offended at our connecting the ſituation of this country and the preſent ſcarcity, with the queſtion of war. I do not know to what extent this principle is to be carried. I ſee no greater objection to ſtate the preſſure in this particular from the continuance of the war, than it would be to advance the ſame with reſpect to the increaſe of the public debt, the ſtate of the finances, or any other of theſe reaſons ſo often repeated without it having been ever objected that they were of an improper kind. There is no more impropriety in arguing this argument, than in urging miniſters not to preſs the people too far, but to apportion the burthen to their ſtrength to bear it. What has my honourable Friend ſaid? We ſee an opulent, commercial proſperity, but look over the country and do we not behold barracks and broth houſes, the cauſe and the effect, the poverty and diſtreſs of the country? for ſurely it will not be contended, but that among the calamities of war are to be reckoned families left without ſupport and thrown

upon charity for ſubſiſtence. That the war is unneceſſary, as being uſeleſs, is ſelf-evident and nobody can deny it. But, ſay they, Buonaparte has taken us at an unguarded moment; we do not object to peace, but we have a fear and jealouſy of concluding one, unleſs with the Houſe of Bourbon; in a peace concluded with it we ſhall have confidence, but we can have none in the preſent Government of France. I ſay that when that event arrived and the Houſe of Bourbon was ſeated on the throne, the Miniſter who diſbanded a ſingle ſoldier ſhould be impeached, and that it would be equally criminal to make peace under a new King, as under a republican government, unleſs her heart and mind were friendly to it. France, as a republic, may be a bad neighbour; but than monarchical France a more foul and treacherous neighbour never was. Is it then ſufficient to ſay, let monarchy be reſtored and peace be given to Europe?

I come now, Sir, to the object of the war as expreſſed in the note; it is therein ſtated, that the reſtoration of monarchy is the *ſine qua non* of preſent negociation; and then it proceeds to ſay, that it is poſſible that we may hereafter treat with ſome other form of government when it ſhall have been tried by experience and the evidence of facts. What length of time ſuch trial may require, it is impoſſible to aſcertain; yet we have, I acknowledge, ſome degree of experience here by which we may form a kind of conjecture. At the time of the negociation at Liſle, the then republican government had ſtood two years and a half. Previous to that time, it had been declared improper to enter into negociation with it; but from experience and the evidence of facts, Miniſters diſcovered that it was then become good and proper to treat with; and yet ſo it happened, that immediately after this judgment in its favour, it crumbled to pieces. Here then we have a tolerable rule to judge by, and may preſume, on the authority of this caſe, that ſomething more than two years and a half muſt elapſe before any new government will be pronounced to be ſtable. The note, Sir, then proceeds to pay a high compliment to the line of Princes who maintained peace at home, and, to round the period handſomely, it ſhould have added, tranquillity abroad; but inſtead of this, are ſubſtituted reſpect and conſideration, by which we are to underſtand, exactly what is meant by the conſideration with which the note is ſubſcribed, being equivalent to "I am, Sir, with the higheſt reſpect "and ſincereſt enmity, yours;" for this conſideration which the

the line of Princes maintained, conſiſted in involving all the powers within their reach and influence in contention and war. The note then goes on to ſtate that this reſtoration of monarchy would ſecure to France the uninterrupted poſſeſſion of her ancient territory, by which, I ſuppoſe, is to be underſtood, that we would renounce our Quiberon expeditions. In this note, the gentlemen ſeems to have clubbed their talents; one found grammar, another logic, and a third ſome other ingredient; but is it not ſtrange, that they ſhould all forget that the Houſe of Bourbon, inſtead of maintaining peace and tranquility in Europe, was continually the diſturber of both? In the very laſt tranſaction of monarchical France, I mean her conduct in the American war, his Majeſty's ſpeech begins thus, "France, the diſturber of the tranquillity of Europe." But were a perſon to judge hereafter, from the hiſtory of the preſent times, of the war we carried on, and the millions we expended for the monarchy of France, he would be led to conclude that it was our neareſt and deareſt friend. Is there any thing then in the knowledge of human nature, from which we can infer, that with the reſtoration of monarchy in France, a total change in the principles of the people would take place; or that the Miniſters of the new King would renounce them? What ſecurity have we that a change of principles will take place in the reſtored Monarch, and that he will not act upon thoſe cheriſhed by his anceſtors? But if this ſecurity be effected by maiming France, does the right hon. Gentleman imagine that the people of France would ſubmit to it? Does he not know that even the emigrants have that partiality for the grandeur of their country, that even they cannot reſtrain their joy at republican victories? With regard, however, to the practicability of the courſe to be purſued, the right honourable Gentleman ſays, he is looking forward to a time when there ſhall be no dread of jacobin principles. I aſk, whether he does not think that from the fraud, oppreſſion, tyranny, and cruelty, with which the conduct of France has marked them, they are not now nearly dead, extinct, and deteſted? But who are the jacobins? Is there a man in this country who has at any period oppoſed Miniſters, who has reſiſted the waſte of the public money, and the proſtitution of honours, that has not been branded with that name? The Whig Club are jacobins *(a general ſilence)*, of that there can be no doubt, for a right hon. Gentleman *(Mr. Windham)* on that account ſtruck his name off the liſt. The friends of the people are jacobins

jacobins *(a cry of hear! hear!)* I am one of the friends of the people, and conſequently am a jacobin. The right hon. Gentleman pledged himſelf never to treat with jacobinical France until we had

Toto certatum eſt corpore regeri.

Now he did treat with France at Liſle and at Paris, but perhaps there were no jacobins in that country at either of theſe periods. You then, the friends of the people, are the jacobins. I do think, Sir, that jacobin principles never exiſted much in this country; but even admitting that they had, I ſay that they have been found to be ſo hoſtile to true liberty, that in proportion as we love it, and whatever may be urged, I muſt ſtill regard liberty as an ineſtimable bleſſing, we muſt hate and deteſt thoſe principles. But I do not think that they even exiſt in France; they had there died the moſt proper of deaths; a death I am more pleaſed to obſerve than if it had been effected by foreign force—they have ſtung themſelves to death, and have periſhed by their own poiſon. The honourable Gentleman however, arguing from experience of human nature, tells us that jacobin principles are ſuch, that if the mind be once affected with them, no quarantine, no cure, can cleanſe it. If that be the caſe, and there are, according to Mr. Burke's ſtatement, 80,000 incorrigible jacobins in England, we are in a melancholy ſituation indeed. The right hon. Gentleman muſt continue the war, while one of the preſent generation remains, and conſequently we cannot for that period expect thoſe rights to be reſtored to us, to the ſuſpenſion and reſtriction of which the right hon. Gentleman attributes the ſuppreſſion of thoſe principles; a pretty conſolation this, truly! I do contend, that they do not now exiſt in France to the ſame extent as before, or nearly; and if this be the caſe, what danger can be apprehended? But if it be true that they do exiſt, and that Buonaparte, the child and champion of jacobin principles, as he is called, be reſolved to uphold them, upon what ground does the right hon. Gentleman preſume to hope for the reſtoration of the Houſe of Bourbon? Thus far I have argued on the probability of the object; but the right hon. Gentleman goes on and ſays, that there is no wiſh to reſtore the monarchy without the conſent of the people. If this be the caſe, is it not better to leave the people to themſelves? for if armies are to interfere, how can we aſcertain that it is a legitimate government, eſtabliſhed with the pure conſent of the people? As to Buonaparte, whoſe

whoſe character has been repreſented as marked with fraud and inſincerity, has he not made treaties with the Emperor and obſerved them? Is it not his intereſt to make peace with us? Do you not think that he feels it ſo? and can you ſuppoſe, that if peace were made he has not power to cauſe it to be obſerved by the people of France? and do you not think, that the people of France are aware that an infraction of that peace would bring with it a new order of things, and a renewal of thoſe calamities from which they are ſo deſirous to eſcape?

But, Sir, on the character of Buonaparte I have better evidence than the intercepted letters. I appeal to Carnot whether the inſtructions given with reſpect to the conduct to be obſerved towards the Emperor were not moderate, open, and magnanimous? (Mr. S. read an extract from Carnot's pamphlet.) With regard to the late note, in anſwer to his propoſal to negociate, it is fooliſh, inſulting, and undignified. It is evidence to me, that the hon. Gentlemen themſelves do not believe his character to be ſuch as they deſcribe it, for if they did, they muſt know that ſuch language would irritate ſuch a mind: the paſſions will mix themſeves with reaſon in the conduct of men, and Miniſters cannot ſay that they will not be obliged yet to treat with Buonaparte. I am warranted in ſaying this, for I do believe in my heart, that ſince the defection of Ruſſia, Miniſters have repented of their anſwer; I ſay ſo, becauſe I do not believe them to be ſo obſtinate and headſtrong as to perſevere with as much ardour for the reſtoration of monarchy, as when they were pledged with Ruſſia.

There was not a nation in Europe which Miniſters did not endeavour to draw into the war. On what was ſuch conduct founded, but on jacobinical principles? By negociating indeed at one time with a jacobinical government in France, they plainly proved that they were not ſo hoſtile to its principles as they wiſhed now to appear. Pruſſia and Auſtria have acted alſo on jacobinical principles. The conduct of this country to Ireland has been perfectly jacobinical. How then can we define theſe principles, when thoſe who would moſt diſavow them fall by ſome fatality into an unavoidable acknowledgment of them? The objections that have been raiſed to peace have been entirely jacobinical. If we ſeek for peace, it muſt be done in the ſpirit of peace. We are not to make it a queſtion, who was the firſt aggreſſor, or endeavour to throw the blame that attaches to us on our enemy; ſuch

ſuch circumſtances ſhould be conſigned to oblivion, as tending to no one uſeful purpoſe. France in the beginning of the revolution, had conceived many romantic notions, ſhe was to put an end to war, and produce, by a pure form of government, a perfectability of mind which had never before been realized. The monarchs of Europe ſeeing the prevalence of theſe new principles, trembled for their thrones. France alſo, perceiving the hoſtility of kings to her projects, ſuppoſed that ſhe could not be a republic without the overthrow of thrones. Such has been the regular progreſs of cauſe and effect; but who was the firſt aggreſſor; with whom the jealouſy firſt aroſe, need not now be matter of diſcuſſion. Both the republic and the monarchs who oppoſed her, acted on the ſame principles; the latter ſaid they muſt exterminate jacobins; and the former that they muſt deſtroy monarchy. From this ſource have all the calamities of Europe flowed; and it is now a waſte of time and argument to enquire further into the ſubject.

Now, Sir, let us come to matter of fact; has not France renounced and reprobated thoſe jacobin principles which created her ſo many enemies? Are not all her violent invectives againſt regular governments come into diſeſteem? Has not the Abbé Sieyes, who wrote in favour of monarchy, has not Buonaparte condemned the jacobinical exceſſes of the revolution in the moſt pointed manner?—the men who have had ſo large a ſhare in the formation of the preſent government. I maintain, however, that Buonaparte himſelf is a friend to peace. In his correſpondence with the Miniſters of this country, there is a total renunciation of jacobinical principles; in the dread, therefore, of theſe, I can ſee no argument for the continuance of war. A man who is ſurpriſed at the revolution of opinions in individuals or nations, evinces but little experience; ſuch inſtances occur every day. Neither would a wiſe man attach to principles always the moſt ſerious conſequences; left to themſelves, the abſurd and dangerous would ſoon diſappear, and wiſdom eſtabliſh herſelf more ſecure on their ruins. I am a friend to peace at this time, becauſe I think Buonaparte would be as good a friend and neighbour to this country as ever were any of the Bourbons. I think alſo there can be no period when we can hope for better terms. Should the King of Pruſſia join France, ſuch an alliance would greatly change the ſtate of things; and from her long and honourable neutrality, in ſpite of the remonſtrances and entreaties of this country, an event of that kind

is

is by no means improbable. It muſt be conſidered alſo that the firſt Conſul of France muſt feel no little portion of reſentment towards this country, ariſing from the indignity with which his overtures of negociation have been treated; it is not improbable that, to ſatisfy his revenge, he would make large ſacrifices to the Houſe of Auſtria, that he might more ſucceſsfully contend with this country.—Such are my fears and opinions; but I am unfortunately in the habit of being numbered with the minority, and therefore their conſequences are much diminiſhed. There have been occaſions, however, on which the ſentiments of the minority have been thoſe of the people at large; one, for inſtance, when a war was prevented with Ruſſia concerning Ocza-kow. The minority told the Miniſter that the ſentiments of the country were contrary to thoſe of the majority, and the fact juſtified them in the aſſertion; the diſpute was abandoned. In the year 1797, the opinions of the minority on peace were thoſe of the people, and I believe that the ſame coincidence on the ſame ſubject exiſts at preſent."

Mr. *Nicholls* ſaid, he had only ſtated facts, and denied that he ought to be in the leaſt reſtrained from ſtating the calamitous circumſtances of the country when ſo large a ſum as two millions was about to be ſent out of it.

The *Secretary at War* uſed many ingenious arguments to ſhew that the Gentlemen of the oppoſition had always purſued a line of policy diametrically oppoſite to the ſenſe of the Houſe. They wiſhed the French Republic, one and indiviſible, to exiſt; they wiſhed the coalition againſt France, of courſe, to be broken; and the inſtrument which they knew to be moſt effectual for that purpoſe was *negociation*. Seeing that that inſtrument was made uſe of, and wiſhing that the military combination againſt the republic might have as few men as poſſible, they on that day oppoſed the plan which they knew to be moſt effectual for procuring men. When Bonaparte had been driven to Vienna, they wiſhed all ſupplies to be ſtopped, and patriotically deſired that the country might defend herſelf without any allies. This was like the patriotiſm of men who, while the city was on fire would run and cut the pipes. They next tried to raiſe ſuſpicions as to the object of the war, and inſinuated that Miniſters had dark and terrible deſigns in view. For his part he thought it would be to the intereſt of this country that monarchy ſhould be reſtored in France; he was ſure we then could have peace on our own terms, and ſo far from dreading the ambition of the

Houſe of Bourbon, his only fears would be that the combined powers would be grinding it down to hard terms, and curtailing its ancient authority. As to the diſpoſition of Bonaparte towards peace, it was worth while to conſider for a moment how far he was entitled to praiſe on that ſcore. If his whole conduct was examined, it would appear that he, as well as the other governors of France, had always made peace with a view to make war. When peace had been made with Spain, what was the conſequence, but that of engaging Spain to join them in the war with England. In the offer lately made for negociating with Turkey, it was obſerved, that it would be a fine thing if Turkey would go to war with Ruſſia. The arguments uſed to ſhew that men who purſued this ſyſtem were of a peaceable diſpoſition, put him in mind of the man who turned his ſhirt and cried out, "Oh, the comforts of clean linen!" The perſonal character of Bonaparte had a great deal to do in this queſtion: he was that very character whom, had he been a king, the Gentlemen of oppoſition would have abuſed as a monſter whoſe trade was murder and deſolation. He defied the Gentlemen oppoſite him to ſhew him any thing like an attachment to the ſyſtem that prevailed there: but there were many in this country who wiſhed for the eſtabliſhment of that government, while every thing done by Miniſters was imputed to their love of monarchy. The next topic which oppoſition had recourſe to was the inability of the country to defray the charges of the war. This was one of the practices ariſing from jacobinical principles; for it was the property of jacobiniſm to avail itſelf of the diſcontents of all mankind, and to convert them to its own purpoſes. That was a weapon wholly unlawful and criminal.

Mr. *Tierney*, in explanation ſaid, that he had not uſed the argument of ſcarcity with the ſmalleſt intention of embarraſſing government, or of exciting diſcontents in the people.

Sir *William Pulteney* wiſhed the public ſhould know his reaſons for voting this night in favour of the ſupply. He blamed Miniſters for refuſing negociation. No man could ſay that France would have refuſed to give up Belgium, if ſhe had been treated with.—He did not agree with the opinion of reſtoring monarchy. He thought it could never be poſſible. No doubt there were many royaliſts in France, but he was convinced the great maſs of the people were decidedly on the other ſide of the queſtion. As the Houſe had, however, been of opinion that the war ought to be proſecuted with

with vigour, he would vote for the ſupply on that account, and that only.

Mr. *W. Smith* thought it very ridiculous that England ſhould be paying other powers for fighting their own battles, and doing their own buſineſs.

A diviſion took place—Ayes 162—Noes 19.

Adjourned.

List of the Minority on the Queſtion for ganting a Subſidy to the Emperor.

Adair, R.	Milner, Sir W.
Biddulph, R.	North, D.
Bird, W. W.	Plomer, W.
Bouverie, Hon. W.	Richardſon, J.
Brogden, J.	Saville, C.
Copley, Sir L.	Sheridan, R. B.
Hobhouſe, B.	Tierney, G.
Kemp, T.	Tufton, Hon. J.
Knight, R.	Weſtern, C. C.
Martin, J.	Teller.—Smith, W.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

TUESDAY, FEB. 18.

The bills on the table were read a ſtage each.

The Committee appointed to ſit on an enquiry into the cauſe of the ſcarcity of corn, and the beſt means of providing againſt the inconveniences it may occaſion, did not meet the preceding day.

Adjourned till the next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

TUESDAY, FEB. 18.

Mr. *Roſe* moved, that the Speaker be deſired to iſſue a writ for a member to ſerve for the city of Canterbury, in place of George Gibbs, Eſq. deceaſed.—Ordered.

Mr. *Abbot* moved, that there be laid before the Houſe an account of the amount of the public funded debt due on the 1ſt of February, 1800; and an account of the progreſs made in the reduction of that debt, by the Commiſſioners appointed for that purpoſe, from the year 1786.—Ordered.

Mr. *Tierney* wiſhed to be informed whether the Chancellor of the Exchequer included the Ruſſian ſubſidies in the 2,500,000l. he intended ſhould be ſent to the Continent?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* replied, that theſe affairs had not been finally arranged, but that as ſoon as they were, he would be happy to give the hon. Gentleman every information in his power.

Mr. *Tierney* roſe to give notice, that he conſidered it his duty, from what had lately happened, to take the ſenſe of the Houſe upon the propriety of continuing the war to reſtore royalty in France. It was proper that the Houſe ſhould come to ſome diſtinct reſolution upon that ſubject, and he meant to make a motion with regard to it on Friday ſe'nnight.

PUBLIC RECORDS.

Mr. *Abbot* ſaid, that in conſequence of the notice which had been given for him by his right hon. Friend, the Maſter of the Rolls, he wiſhed to call the attention of the Houſe to the ſtate of the public records of the kingdom. And that whoever had reflected upon the importance of preſerving the public records and archives in any country which enjoyed the bleſſings of a ſettled conſtitution and government, and looked to the condition of our public records in this country, with a view to their practical utility in matters of legiſlation, ſtate, or judicature, would certainly find them in ſome of the principal repoſitories, preſerved with ſufficient order and regularity, and in ſome few, with a method and care which are exemplary; but that in numberleſs inſtances, and in many of the moſt important departments, they were wholly unarranged, undeſcribed, and unaſcertained; ſome of them expoſed to eraſure, alteration, and embezzlement, by intereſted parties, and others lodged in places where they are daily rotting by damp, or incurring the continual riſk of deſtruction by fire.

That this ſtate of things had come to paſs, was not owing to any intentional diſregard of this ſubject, on the part of the Crown, or Parliament, but to a variety of events, all of which had contributed, in different ways, to produce this reſult.

The public attention had always been directed to this object, from early times. And in ſome of the very firſt petitions upon the rolls of Parliament, the public records of the kingdom are emphatically ſtiled the people's evidences, and it is ordained that they ſhall be made acceſſible to all the king's ſubjects. At ſome periods, the ſovereign alone, at others, the Houſe of Parliament ſeparately; and at others, the King and Parliament conjointly had interpoſed, to make ſpecial proviſions and regulations for their due preſervation

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and arrangement. But unfortunately, almoſt all the proviſions eſtabliſhed by the vigilance of ſucceſſive reigns, were broken down by the civil wars of the laſt century, and no effectual meaſures were adopted to retrieve the miſchiefs produced by thoſe times of confuſion, until the reign of Queen Anne. At that period Lord Hallifax, in conjunction with the then Speaker Mr. Harley, (afterwards Lord Oxford), projected, and carried into effect, the deſign of collecting that magnificent compilation of ſtate papers and records, which the public now poſſeſs under the name of Rymer's Fœdera. But as that great national work chiefly related to the foreign tranſactions of this country, Lord Hallifax afterwards, with the zealous co-operation of Lord Somers, propoſed to the Houſe of Lords to inveſtigate the ſtate of our domeſtic records, as connected with our internal laws and government. That inquiry was proſecuted without intermiſſion, and with many ſalutary conſequences, through the reigns of Queen Anne and George the Firſt, down to the commencement of the reign of his late Majeſty; at which time this Houſe was induced, after the fire which happened to the Cottonian Library, to ſet on foot another enquiry by its own authority, ſtill more extenſive and effectual; and the very valuable report made at the concluſion of that proceeding, together with an earneſt and unanimous addreſs of the Houſe of Commons, in ſupport of the meaſures which it recommended, was laid at the foot of the throne.

Since that tranſaction a period had now elapſed of nearly ſeventy years, during which, ſome of the meaſures recommended by that report had been adopted very effectually; although others of them had not been fully executed. And not only the very lapſe of time had progreſſively ſuperadded a large accumulation of materials in every department to which that inveſtigation extended, but many other repoſitories of great national importance, ſuch as the Courts Maritime and Eccleſiaſtical, had not fallen within the ſcope of the former enquiries, nor had they extended to Scotland. And beſides that, the Cathedral and Univerſity Libraries were not then explored, the public had ſince acquired other collections equal in value to any of thoſe already enumerated, ſuch as the Royal, the Harleian, and the Sloanian, which now conſtitute the Britiſh Muſeum. Thus the difficulties of introducing method and arrangement had multiplied with the increaſe of materials, in addition to which, a new ſource of embarraſſment had been created by the change which took

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place, during the ſame interval of time, in the language and written character of judicial proceedings; a change, which, without queſtioning its utility in other reſpects, had altered the mode of education of thoſe perſons, whoſe profeſſional habits ſhould have made them moſt converſant with theſe matters; ſo that few, very few perſons poſſeſſing, even by tradition, the technical knowledge belonging to theſe ſubjects, are now to be met with.

It was obvious that the practical evils reſulting from the train of circumſtances muſt be very conſiderable. And ſome of them were ſo ſtriking and ſingular, and of ſuch oppoſite ſorts, that the ſtatement of them would prove the urgency of ſome parliamentary interpoſition. Within the walls of the Houſe of Commons itſelf, there were loads of records, noticed in the reports of Parliament nearly a century ago, and of which no man knew the contents, though they were ſuppoſed to belong to the Courts of Common Law; but nevertheleſs they ſtill remain in their preſent ſituation, for want of ſome proper authority to remove them, or to receive them elſewhere. In the Courts of Common Law themſelves, thoſe rolls which are called the Docquets of Judgments, and materially concern the titles to landed property, ſo far as they belong to the Court of King's Bench, are expoſed to the daily riſk of being burnt; and thoſe of the Common Pleas, beſides ſuffering an equal riſk of fire, are actually periſhing by damp. In the Exchequer of Equity, ſuch is the defect of eſtabliſhment, that any of the antient decrees relating to tithes, boundaries, cuſtoms, and other rights, of the moſt valuable nature, may be falſified, or removed by any perſon whatever, almoſt without check or reſtraint; and there were were perſons at this time within hearing, who knew that ſuch abuſes had been practiſed. In the office of the Lord Treaſurer's Remembrancer the evil was of a different ſort; and there, for want of accommodation, the records were utterly inacceſſible, ſo that queſtions of public moment were now ſuſpended for the want of documents, known to be lodged here, but which could not be produced, or ſelected from the general maſs of confuſion. In the Pipe-Office, another branch of the Exchequer, where by law every public accountant ought to have his quietus recorded, it had been repreſented three years ago to a Committee of this Houſe (the Finance Committee), that no perſon, however deeply intereſted in the affairs of any public accountant, either as principal or ſurety, could obtain a certificate

tificate of the ſtate of his final balance or diſcharge. An evil of a ſtill different ſort occurred in the inſtance of ſpecial commiſſions for the trials of treaſons; and however ſtrange it might appear it was ſtrictly true, that the proceedings under the commiſſion executed in the north after the rebellion in 1745, and thoſe in London in 1794, and at Maidſtone in 1798, remained now in the unathorized cuſtody of private perſons, without any blame whatever being imputable to them, but for want of proper proceſs to remove them to their proper place of depoſit. And that as to the affairs of Scotland or Ireland, ſo broken and disjoined were all the documents relating to thoſe countries, that there was no place in which any man might not ſearch for them with ſome expectation of ſucceſs, and no place where he could be certain that his ſearch would be ſucceſsful.

He next ſtated, that although this was the real condition of the public records, he was by no means confident that ſome perſons might not be of opinion, that no great harm would enſue if all theſe parchments and papers were left to periſh in their duſt, or were fairly diſpoſed of by one general conflagration; and he was diſpoſed to apprehend this the more, becauſe it was well known that the levellers in the laſt century had actually propoſed that expedient; and there might be ſome men now, who not unwiſely for the ſame ends, might hold the ſame opinions. But this was perfectly clear, that there could be no rational medium whatever, between adopting that ſummary expedient, or taking the moſt effectual means for their arrangement and preſervation. Many ſtrong reaſons of perſonal intereſt and public policy, muſt prove this to every man, who had either landed property to defend, or who felt a value for the conſtitution under which he lived. And whatever might be the indifference with which thoſe things were regarded in the abſtract, he would aſk any land-owner either in the Houſe or out of it, whether, if his title came to be litigated, he would not reſort to thoſe repoſitories with the greateſt anxiety, and think himſelf moſt ſecure if he found it was warranted by ſome royal grant, ſome ancient perambulation, or public ſurvey? That corporate franchiſes, and many of the moſt valuable rights of the church had no other ſolid foundation, and that in Parliament itſelf, beſides the periodical diſcuſſions which ariſe before Committees upon election rights, which are often deeply involved in theſe reſearches, whenever the two Houſes unhappily differ; it is by the recorded tranſactions of their anceſ-

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tors that their conferences muſt be guided; for they have no other umpire to which they can reſort: and even Parliament, in its entire capacity, has at no very diſtant period, and upon occaſions of the moſt ſolemn concern, looked to thoſe repoſitories for the moſt certain ſtandard of its proceedings, in times, and upon queſtions the moſt arduous. He truſted, therefore, that it was not too much to aſſert, in the language of Lord Hallifax's report, "that it will be a public damage, and diſhonour to the kingdom, to ſuffer ſuch monuments of antiquity to periſh."

He then proceeded to ſtate the leading points, to which he propoſed that the preſent enquiry ſhould be directed. In the firſt place he propoſed to call upon the proper officers of every principal repoſitory in England, who was entruſted with any records or inſtruments in which the public has a concern, requiring him to ſtate the ſorts of inſtruments in his poſſeſſion, and the periods of time to which they relate; extending this enquiry alſo to Scotland, where matters of this nature had been in all times regulated with the moſt exemplary care; and meaning that the contents of all theſe returns ſhould be afterwards methodized and digeſted by competent and experienced perſons, to be authorized and employed for the expreſs purpoſe of furniſhing the Houſe with the moſt correct information in the moſt convenient form. In the next place he ſhould propoſe to aſcertain the ſtate of the buildings in which the public records are lodged, as to their ſecurity and accommodation; with a view to have thoſe public buildings repaired which may require it; and in ſome inſtances poſſibly to render other buildings public property, which are at preſent inconveniently holden by private tenure; but in no caſe to diſturb any poſſeſſion, or change the cuſtody of any records, except, perhaps, in ſome very few inſtances of moſt evident right, and upon the moſt cogent reaſons of unqueſtionable utility. And in the laſt place, for the purpoſe of rendering the acceſs to theſe repoſitories moſt complete, to call for an explanation of the ſtate of their catalogues and calendars, and alſo of their eſtabliſhments and regulations for conducting ſearches, with a view on this head to provide more effectually for the ſecurity of the records themſelves, at the ſame time that the uſe of them might be rendered more convenient to his Majeſty's ſubjects.

From this courſe of proceeding, beyond the execution of theſe particular details, there were alſo other conſequences likely to follow, and which ought not to be wholly unnoticed.

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The very event of a parliamentary viſitation would impreſs the officers of each department with a ſtronger ſenſe of their duty, knowing that their conduct, if meritorious, would not be unobſerved, and that any culpable negligence might not eſcape animadverſion; and this ſalutary impreſſion would not endure long after the event of this particular enquiry, becauſe the period when a ſimilar viſitation might be expected to occur muſt always be indefinite. Another conſequence which might probably follow would be the diſcovery of many valuable monuments of the policy of our anceſtors, which it might not be unprofitable to keep in view hereafter; and if the ſurvey of this country contained in the books of Domeſday, has been always truly accounted a work of great public importance, it would be gratifying to the Houſe to know that other ſurveys may be found, which were executed in the reigns of Edward I, II, and III, (for ſome of them the hon. Member had ſeen), which would be of infinitely greater value than Domeſday itſelf, if they ſhould be found complete, inaſmuch as they come two or three centuries nearer to our own times, and contain more curious and comprehenſive views of the civil and eccleſiaſtical ſtate of this country, at the periods to which they relate. But there was ſtill one object beyond all theſe, upon which he could not but entertain a ſanguine hope; that every new light thrown upon this ſubject would convince Parliament at laſt of the neceſſity and facility of eſtabliſhing a general regiſtration of all inſtruments affecting landed property. In Scotland this ſyſtem has already prevailed for ages, with the happieſt conſequences to thoſe who belong to that part of the united kingdom; in Ireland the ſame ſyſtem has obtained for near a century, with the ſame beneficial conſequences; and in the two moſt populous diſtricts of England, namely Middleſex and Yorkſhire, where the ſame plan has been eſtabliſhed for the ſame length of time, though upon a narrower ſcale, it has been found to add a diſtinct and ſpecific value to the property which it ſecures; many recent events have contributed to diſſipate the prejudices which once hung upon this queſtion, and it now remains only by tranſcribing one ſhort and approved law to extend the ſame benefits throughout the reſt of England. This conſidered merely as an improvement of our juridical ſyſtem, would be one of the greateſt which could be deviſed. But as a meaſure of ſtate policy, it was demonſtrably clear, that whatever eſtabliſhes ſecurity and good faith between man and man in tranſactions reſpecting

landed property, tends to facilitate the reciprocal exchange and conversion of the landed and monied capital, and the giving to capital an increased activity, will necessarily increase its total amount. Nor was it altogether to be disregarded, as offering a new and reasonable source of revenue; for no man would have to pay for recording his title, without receiving at the same time a specific and corresponding benefit, by the additional security given to his possession; and the produce of such a revenue would be continually rising with the multiplied population, and encreasing prosperity of the country.

He concluded with stating, that although he had dwelt upon these latter topics, because they made part of his general view of the subject, it was not his intention to propose any examination of what might be politic for the House to adopt, in respect of any new institution, or any extension of former systems, but only to ascertain the state of those already established. He therefore moved

"For a Committee to enquire into the state of the public records of this kingdom, and of such other public instruments, rolls, books, and papers, as they shall think proper; and to report to the House the nature and condition thereof, together with what they shall judge fit to be done for the better arrangement, preservation, and more convenient use of the same."

The *Master of the Rolls* said that the public was highly indebted to the hon. Gentleman who had made the present motion. After the able and eloquent speech with which it had been introduced, nothing was left for him to do but to second it, which he most heartily did.

The motion was then put and carried *nem. con.* A Select Committeee was accordingly appointed, consisting of

The Master of the Rolls,	Sir William Scott,
The Attorney-General,	Mr. Douglas,
The Solicitor-General,	Mr. Percival,
The Lord Advocate of Scotland,	Mr. Charles Yorke,
Lord Hawkesbury,	Mr. Charles Ryder, &c. &c.

And it was further ordered—That all persons authorized by the said Committee may freely search and have view in all offices and places where any of his Majesty's records are kept, and have such copies as they shall require, signed by the proper officer, &c. &c.

A message from the Lords announced that the Newfoundland

land Judicature Bill, the Navy Seduction Bill, and the Militia Volunteer Bill, had been agreed to by their Lordſhips.

Mr. *Bragge* brought up the report of the Committee of Supply, which was read and agreed to.

The bill for preventing and puniſhing mutiny in the royal navy was read a ſecond time, and ordered to be committed the next day.

CORN.

The order of the day being read for the Houſe to take into farther conſideration the report of the Corn Committee.

The Houſe reſolved itſelf into a Committee, Alderman Sir John William Anderſon in the Chair.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* roſe and ſaid, that in conſequence of the report of the Select Committee appointed to take into conſideration the deficiency of the crops of laſt year, it was his intention to ſubmit a certain propoſition to the Committee which it would be ſeen was founded on that report. But before doing ſo, it was his wiſh to ſuggeſt ſome obſervations on the preſent ſtate of the country; and what in a more detailed manner it would be the duty of the Houſe and the country to do in ſuch a criſis of difficulty. It might not be improper here to mention in a curſory way, what was on another occaſion done when the attention of Parliament was alſo called to the ſubject of an apprehended ſcarcity. In the early part of this reign, a queſtion was brought forward in which very great conſiderations of national policy were deeply involved. At that time an opinion had been countenanced that legiſlative interference might be uſeful in removing the difficulty, and accordingly the 13th of the king was paſſed, commonly called Pownal's Bill, for regulating the buſineſs of the Millers, Bakers, &c. But in 1773 other meaſures were adopted, and it was declared not adviſeable to interpoſe the authority of the legiſlature. This precedent might not be thought to go far enough. Thoſe who believed that the inconvenience was to be removed by particular laws, would ſtill perhaps retain their particular opinions; but he was one who thought no legiſlative interference could produce much good. The caſe was indeed one on which example would do more to correct the evil than any law. Still, it was certain that ſome good might be done by the legiſlature, and uniting with the influence of example the force of poſitive enactment, we might happily be ſucceſsful in our endeavours to remove the inconvenience. He was deſirous, however, of taking ſome notice of an argument which had been uſed on a recent occaſion,

caſion, and which it would be well to refute before entering on the principal queſtion that evening. It was an argument of the moſt miſchievous tendency, and could only have been uſed by a man wholly ignorant of the ſubject. He meant that aſſertion of an hon. Gentleman, that the ſcarcity of corn is an effect of the ſtate of the war. Did Gentlemen mean to ſay, that the ſtate of the war prevented importation. This was not true: for during the laſt ſeven years of war, the importation had been as great as ever; nay, in 1796, the quantity imported was the greateſt ever known. Was it meant to ſay that any importation was prevented laſt year by the war? The fact, however, would appear to be, that there was imported into England and Scotland as large a quantity as ever was known in an equal period. From the 26th of September, 1799, to the 8th of February, 1800, there were imported 206,291 quarters of wheat, which, added to the flour imported, made the quantity procured by importation in that period amount to upwards of 250,000 quarters. Hence it muſt be manifeſt, that the war had not operated in any way whatever on the importation of wheat. But Gentlemen might anſwer, that if it did not affect importation directly, it had obſtructed it indirectly. Here they would find themſelves as little ſupported by the facts of the caſe, as in any of the inſtances he had already alluded to. In fact, the countries at war ſupplied at any period but a ſmall quantity of corn to this country, while the neutral ſtates, thoſe along the ſhores of the Baltic, and America, always furniſhed the principal part of our importation. We never did import much from France: and even in the time of the monarchy, that nation did not grow much more than was neceſſary for her own feeding. Under theſe circumſtances then, what fairneſs was there in aſcribing it to the war that a temporary ſcarcity was experienced? The ſcarcity was owing entirely to the cauſes he had ſtated; and if owing to the ſtate of the ſeaſon, the inclemency of the weather or the actual deficiency in our own crops, that ſcarcity could not be in one day obviated, ſurely Gentlemen would not think they beſt performed their duty to their country by exciting or encouraging extravagant and unfounded alarm. The next obſervation he would notice was, that of one of the ſame hon. Members to whom he had ſo often alluded, namely, that corn in France is cheaper than in this country. It was only neceſſary to peruſe the report on the table to diſcover, that though the fact was ſo, the cauſes were but little underſtood by the hon. Gentlemen oppoſite

oppoſite him. A very reſpectable corn merchant (Claude Scott) ſaid that he believed the low price of corn in France was owing to the poverty of the people, and the difficulty of exportation. Now he alſo was of the ſame opinion. However, he was far from thinking that it might not be even practicable to procure a ſupply even from that country. Here the noble Lord had urged the neceſſity of individual exertions, and the examples of families, of the forbearing economizing regulations of all, and warned the Houſe againſt miſrepreſentation. The ſcarcity was manifeſt, it was confeſſed, but if proper precautions were ſpeedily adopted, if due vigilance were conſtantly exerciſed, the ſcarcity, much as it was to be lamented, was not ſuch as not to yield to proper meaſures, it was not ſuch as might not be ſo effectually provided for as to enable the country to hold out till the next harveſt. In forming a ſatisfactory opinion on ſuch a ſubject, much would however depend on the pains Gentlemen might be willing to take to collect the neceſſary facts. He would not ſay that the report of the committee was full on every point, but it did contain uſeful information. In ſtating the reſult to the Houſe, he thought it right, however, not to pledge himſelf for the truth of that information. What was ſtated as to the conſumption of bread, was very dubious and very vague. In general, the reſult of the evidence in this place would be found to be, that the number of perſons who uſe wheaten bread depends partly on the ſtate of the harveſt; and it appeared that there is one-third of the inhabitants of this country who do not live on wheaten bread. The laſt of theſe opinions is founded on a calculation of the extent and population of thoſe parts of Scotland, of the counties of Cumberland, Northumberland, of Yorkſhire, and other northern counties, as well as Lancaſhire, the north of Devonſhire, and Wales, where wheaten bread is not uſed. In thoſe parts of the kingdom, they chiefly eat bread made from barley and oats, but moſtly of the former. The quantity of wheat conſumed is at the rate therefore of one quarter per man. There were uſed annually 8,000,000 of quarters. Some indeed ſtated it at ſix millions, but writers in general agreed in fixing it at eight. Now as to the ſtate of the crops this ſeaſon, the reports of the ſcarcity were rather exaggerated. This would not excite much ſurpriſe, for Gentlemen well knew that in every period of difficulty the degree of danger was always over-rated. It was inſeparable from men, acting in bodies, to magnify whatever, of evil or of good preſented

preſented itſelf to his fancy, and in the preſent inſtance even ſound policy might have recommended that the deficiency ſhould not be rated lower than it really was. This was certain, the Secretary of the board of agriculture might wiſh to ſtate the probable deficiency as high as poſſible, in order that our meaſures might be proportionate to the real exigency of our ſituation. This year the crop had not even come up to an average crop, which is a third leſs than what is conſidered an abundant crop. An average crop does not, therefore, feed the country. There was a deficiency of three months' feed. With reſpect to the means of ſupplying this deficiency, there was on hand of the ſtock of the year about one month's feeding, the probable quantity to be procured by importation, was food for one month more, namely, 6 to 700,000 quarters of wheat, which, conſidering the importation of the winter months, we might reaſonably expect to be able to procure, when the ports of the Baltic ſhould become acceſſible, and whenever we could import from America. It was not too much to aſſume, that that quantity might be procured, eſpecially when it was conſidered, that in 1796, 870,000 quarters we imported. The third certain means of ſupplying the deficiency was by a ſaving regulation reſpecting new bread, which would produce a fortnight's feeding. Thus there would be ſtill rather more than a month to provide for, which would, he truſted, be eaſily ſupplied by reduced conſumption, and ſuch economical regulations as would be hereafter adopted. Nor would it be forgot, that eminent millers gave it as their opinion, that more might be extracted from the corn for man's ſuſtenance than was now extracted. The introduction of ſubſtitutes would alſo furniſh means of ſupply. Taking, then, the actual deficiency at ſomewhat more than one month, he truſted the means he ſuggeſted would amply meet every emergency. There was no reaſon to deſpond: there was no danger of any ſerious ſcarcity. It was, nevertheleſs, incumbent on the Houſe, not only to conſider of the effects of the preſent ſcarcity ſuch as it is, on the country now, but alſo to turn their thoughts to the evils of ſuch periods in future. In doing ſo, it muſt not be overlooked, that for the laſt thirty years this country was not able to feed itſelf from its own produce; more than 400 quarters of wheat were imported annually on the average of the laſt ſeven years. Here the noble Lord entered into a detailed view of the queſtion, to ſhew that it was not the effect of decayed agriculture; for, during the laſt ſeven

years

years the number of inclosure bills passed by Parliament was four hundred and seventy-nine, whereas, during the previous seven years of peace, a period of peace the most prosperous the country ever experienced, the number of those bills passed was only two hundred and twenty-seven, the general proof of our increased prosperity, in this respect, were to be seen in the highly improved districts of East Lothian in Scotland, and in many parts of England. This prosperity was not confined to agriculture only, it extended to every national pursuit. The scarcity, therefore, was to be ascribed to increased population, and to all the classes of society using more wheaten bread in proportion as the wealth of the country was increased. And this had been always observed of a country growing powerful, and populous, and rich. The Roman republic, in the days of its greatest glory, could not supply itself from Italy, but was obliged to draw supplies from Tuscany; and if we would look to every state of Europe, it would be seen that the poorest states were those that exported corn to the more wealthy and powerful. Poland and America, for instance. The noble Lord here adverted to his observations respecting the quantity that may be imported, and recapitulated the means of supply. He said that considerable portions of Great Britain and Ireland were not grain countries, yet there being an increase of population, the knowledge of that circumstance added to the necessity of increased vigilance. He was aware habit could not be changed in a moment: it was only to be corrected gradually, but substitutes might nevertheless be used with great success. He observed, that the system of living in this country was less economical than that of any other country of Europe, but the writings of Count Rumford had shewn, that without abridging from the luxuries of the rich, the quantity of animal food now used might be much diminished. Luxuries were not to be condemned, for they gave the rich opportunities of benefiting the poor; but it was necessary to introduce economy in the use of wheat, and the different charities, parochial, &c. might do much good in this way. If we continued to go on as we had done, this was not the first year of scarcity, and it would not be the last. We had two such trials in five years. Inclosing the waste lands was desirable; it would add to the power and resources of the country; but this would not do alone. However the subject was attended to. He was happy to see the higher orders attend so much to it; and the lower classes also conducted themselves with

with great propriety. His Lordſhip concluded by obſerving, that, added to the motion he was about to ſubmit, there were other meaſures which had been recommended to the ſelect committee, and to which it would be well to give every conſideration. He now moved that the Chairman have power to report to the Houſe a reſolution for leave to bring in a bill to prohibit bakers from exhibiting for ſale any bread that has not been baked 24 hours.

Mr. *Hobhouſe* ſaid that he was glad to ſee that the ſubject had been at laſt taken into conſideration, and that he conceived great hopes from the exertions of the committee; but was ſurpriſed that Miniſters had not ſooner taken meaſures to ward off the evils of famine. It was known long ſince that the harveſt had failed, and that ſcarcity muſt enſue. He admitted that the war did not produce the deficiency, but inſiſted that it prevented that deficiency from being ſupplied. He approved of the meaſure propoſed by the noble Lord, and rejoiced to hear that others were in contemplation. He agreed that little could be expected from poſitive laws, and that more was to be expected from exhortation and charity, properly diſtributed. He concluded, by ſaying, that it was the duty of every one to ſtrive to alleviate the preſent diſtreſſes of the poor, and that he himſelf would make every effort for that purpoſe.

Mr. *Addington* (the Speaker) hoped that if he ſhould diſſent from ſome parts of the report which lay on the table, the reſpectable Gentlemen who had made out that report, and to whom the country was ſo much indebted, would excuſe him. He certainly had not the ſame means of information which they had; and they muſt certainly be more competent to form a correct judgment on this ſubject than he could be. But he entertained a different opinion from that which was ſtated in the report of the committee, that little or no ſaving would ariſe from making a coarſe kind of bread. This country was now in a ſituation far more embarraſſing than it was in 1795, when the failure was confined to wheat only; but not to other kinds of grain. At preſent, however, there was a general deficiency, and the country could not avail itſelf of the practice adopted in 1795, of mixing barley with wheat. On that account it was neceſſary to expreſs to the Houſe the extreme importance of extracting from wheat all the aliment of which it was capable. He was convinced that excellent bread might me made of wheat ground into flour without taking any bran from it. His conviction aroſe from

from experiment. He ſaw that very day a loaf prepared by the direction of a Mr. Samuel Wyatt, made of the entire wheat, and of an excellent and nutritive quality. But he had an authority ſtill higher than the gentleman he had juſt named; a perſon to whom he had been connected by every duty and every tie of affection, and whoſe memory he ſhould ever revere. This perſon had ſome years ago given a treatiſe to a friend upon the ſubject under the conſideration of the Houſe. He lately made enquiries after it, but it could not be found. He was, however, fortunate enough to find the notes from which the treatiſe had been compoſed; and he would take the liberty of reading a part of it to the Houſe. The paſſage quoted by the right hon. Member conſiſted of a chymical diſſertation on the properties of bran, which was ſaid to contain a fine oil and ſpirit of the moſt ſalubrious and nutritive kind, much ſuperior to any thing that reſided in the flour alone? and from theſe qualities it was contended, that the beſt bread which could be made, would be from the flour and the bran together. Theſe opinions came from a perſon who was not likely to take up opinions on light grounds. He did not know how any compulſory ſyſtem could well be adopted. But the public ought to be convinced of the neceſſity of ſubmitting to temporary ſacrifices, and perſons of rank and fortune ſhould take a fellowſhip with them; and then there would be no occaſion for compulſion; and he would recommended it to the Houſe to cauſe all the nutriment to be taken from grain that it was capable of yielding. Every encouragement ſhould alſo be held out to the cultivation of potatoes, which conſtituted the beſt auxiliary to wheat that could be. The feeding of ſwine ſhould alſo be encouraged, in order to replace, in ſome manner, the deficiency cauſed by the encreaſed conſumption of meat at this time. He would alſo recommend it to the Houſe, and to government to adopt ſome effectual plan for the importation of rice from Bengal, where it might be purchaſed at the rate of one farthing per lb. and if ſold in this country for 1½d. a lb. would defray all the expences of importation. A meaſure of this kind muſt be undertaken by government; it could not be left to ſpeculation, becauſe no hope could be entertained that private adventurers would ſend ſo great a diſtance for rice, and then run the riſk of having the market lowered at the time of its arrival in this country. This article, though not fit for the ſupport of the laborious, would make excellent food for perſons whoſe ſituation was chiefly ſedentary. He

thought it neceſſary to mention one circumſtance with reſpect to potatoes; in order to cultivate them more effectually, it would be deſirable to break up new ground. Conſiderable portions of the commons in this country were very well adapted to this purpoſe. He was told, that the principal reaſon why the potatoes were not more generally cultivated was the high tythes which the cultivators were obliged to pay. He was ſure that that reſpectable claſs of men, who derived their income from tythes, would chearfully conſent to an alteration, by which an acre of potatoes would pay no more than an acre of wheat. Such a plan would be productive of the moſt eſſential ſervice to the country. He conſidered the ſeveral incloſure bills that were paſſed every ſeſſion as highly uſeful to the public. But many Gentlemen were deterred from applying for ſuch bills on account of the great expence incurred in obtaining them. He could ſpeak in regard to the officers of that Houſe, that none of this charge was imputable to them; and it frequently happened that the parties themſelves, through inattention, permitted their ſolicitors to ſwell their bills to an enormous amount. An incloſure bill often coſt a party 240l. It had been ſaid, that a bill for a general incloſure of all waſte lands was prevented from paſſing by the authority of perſons who gained by the fees paid for ſeparate incloſure bills. For his own part he was happy to ſay he was relieved from all imputation on this ſubject: and he was ſure it could not apply to the high character in another place, who had magnanimouſly relinquiſhed all fees as Speaker of the Houſe of Lords. He partook of the feelings of the noble Lord, when ſpeaking of the charitable acts that ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed the people of fortune in this country at preſent: and he differed from thoſe who thought that they would produce a bad effect on the minds of the people. He was ſure that the relief they received would ſoften their minds, and connect more cloſely thoſe ties which bound the rich and the poor together.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* in explanation ſaid, that the committee did not mean to ſtate that bread might not be made out of the whole of the wheat; but that no compulſion ſhould be uſed to cauſe that to be done; and when they conſidered that bran ſerved to feed poultry and ſwine, they did not think it any kind of ſaving to convert it into bread.

The *Speaker* ſaid, it was better to apply that which was now the food of ſwine, to the food of man.

Mr. *Wilberforce Bird* maintained, that if the war did not occaſion

occaſion the ſcarcity, it was at leaſt a means of continuing it. Would Gentlemen make nothing of the ſtoppage of agriculture on the banks of the Rhine, in Switzerland, and other countries; of the conſumption of the armies employed there, as well as in the expedition to Holland, &c.? Was there nothing in the ſupply of thoſe priſoners whom a right hon. Gentleman denominated *lumber?* And did not all theſe cauſes in a great meaſure contribute to the want of proviſions in this country? In his opinion, the committee began at the wrong end. It was not ſufficient for them to put the people upon eating ſtale bread; for were men of property to abſtain from the uſe of it altogether for three months, and have recourſe to the numerous and luxurious ſubſtitutes they had the means of providing, it would be ſufficient to do away every evil, and remove all apprehenſions.

Mr. *Douglas* ſaid, that brown bread was uſed in moſt parts of the country of England, and therefore there was no occaſion for a compulſory law. And if the flour ſent from a great diſtance to London was not fine, it would ferment, and be ſpoiled before its arrival.

Sir *William Young* ſaid, the committee were ſenſible of the advantages which might be derived from the adoption of the means recommended by the late Dr. Addington, but was at the ſame time unwilling to propoſe any thing compulſory, which could not fail to be diſagreeable to the habits of the people. To ſhew that no ſupply could be obtained from France, were we at peace with it at this moment, he ſtated the information given him by a very well informed perſon, that ſo far from wheat being at preſent plentiful in that country, the harveſt had fallen ſhort of one third of its average crop in the laſt year.

Sir William Young alſo defended the meaſure of the committe, on the ground that it would have been improper to have recommended legiſlative proviſions which were repugnant to the general habits of the people, but they ſhould rather be perſuaded by the influence of example.

Mr. *Wilberforce* obſerved, that no apology could be requiſite for troubling the Houſe in a diſcuſſion on which it were to be wiſhed that every gentleman ſhould take a part, and endeavour to furniſh his quota of information and ſuggeſtions; and not having been himſelf a Member of the Committee, he would the rather begin by vindicating it from the ſevere treatment it had received from an honourable Gentleman over the way. In delivering opinions on the ſubject, an indivi-

dual, and a Committee of Parliament, were in very different ſituations: The individual, might throw out any ideas which ſeemed to him worthy of notice, to be conſidered, diſcuſſed, and matured by the wiſdom of Parliament, or to be rejected if they were not approved of; but a Committee of the Houſe of Commons, knowing the weight which would be given to its opinions, ought to expreſs them with caution, it ought to tread on ſure ground, and be at leaſt certain that the plan propoſed would do no harm, if it ſhould fail of producing the expected meaſure of good; for this reaſon the Committee in the preſent inſtance had only ſuggeſted that meaſure which all the witneſſes called before them had concurred in recommending, they gave this as their firſt ſuggeſtion, not waiting till they ſhould have made up their minds on all the topics of their enquiry. And, though the propoſitions might be treated with ridicule, on account of the familiar nature of the ſubject, yet let it be remembered that health, and riches, and even happineſs itſelf, depended more on the repetition of little particulars each in itſelf trivial, than on greater matters which ſeldom occur. And if it were true, as had been ſtated unanimouſly, that by keeping bread till it ſhould be 24 hours old, a fortnight's ſaving would be procured, this was perhaps almoſt as much as we could expect from importation. Yet he would be thought very unreaſonable who ſhould laugh at the latter ſource of ſupply, though the former excited a ſmile upon its appearing to drop below the dignity of legiſlation. Mr. Wilberforce ſtated, that he feared the actual ſcarcity was greater, and the foreign ſupply to be expected leſs, than the noble Lord had calculated; but yet he thought there was no juſt cauſe for deſpondency if proper meaſures were uſed to avert the threatened evil. He thought his noble Friend had aſſigned too great a ſhare of this calamity to our increaſed population, (an increaſe which he did not however deny) as others had aſcribed too much of it to the war. Unqueſtionably the grand cauſe of our difficulties was, the viſitation of Providence in the extraordinary bad ſeaſon, for the whole of laſt autumn. And he thought that our chief care at preſent ought to be, not ſo much to ſettle our plan on permanent policy, as to get rid of the immediate preſſure. Three ſources of ſupply preſented themſelves: the firſt, importation; the ſecond, œconomiſing the ſtores we already had; thirdly, production and growth of new ones. Of importation he would only ſay, that he truſted means would be taken to bring in as much as could be had of every article

article of proviſion. In œconomiſing our preſent ſtores, he muſt firſt decidedly expreſs his opinion in favour of bread made of all the wheat, except, perhaps, a very ſmall quantity of bran, and he was happy to find his ſentiments on the ſubject concurring with thoſe of the right hon. Gentleman (the Speaker) whom he had heard with the greateſt ſatisfaction. The next ſpecies of œconomiſing which he muſt ſtrongly preſs upon the Houſe was, the duty of ſtopping, or at leaſt abridging, in the whole of the country, or in certain diſtricts, for the uſe of brutes, all food that was applicable to the uſe of man. He then read a calculation he had received from a very well informed man, from which it followed that the quantity of oats grown in this country was ſuch, that if it were practicable to confine the entire ſupply of oats to the uſe of man, except only for our cavalry and mail coach horſes, that our commerce might not ſuffer, the quantity would be more than enough to ſupply the whole deficiency; and in any degree in which the meaſure ſhould be adopted, in the ſame degree would be the benefits derived from it. He threw out the idea for the conſideration of gentlemen, and wiſhed them to turn it in their minds. The next mode of œconomiſing which he would mention was, that of extending to a ſtill greater degree the eſtabliſhments for ſoup, which, perhaps, ſhould be ſet on foot in all places, having more than a given number of houſes. The next point on which he would touch was, the propriety of checking a mode of relieving the diſtreſſes of the lower orders, which had prevailed in many country pariſhes, of giving bread or flour at a cheaper rate, or money to purchaſe them, thereby preventing that reduced conſumption of the article, which was the natural conſequence of the great increaſe of price. Another matter not unworthy of attention was, the ſtopping of all thoſe fancy biſcuits, rolls, and other ſuch articles, in which the very fineſt parts of the flour were uſed, and which were almoſt an inſult to the feelings of thoſe who were in real want. Beſides, the remainder being the coarſe parts of the wheat, only were made into London brown bread, and this it was which brought brown bread into diſrepute. The third ſource of ſupply was, that of production; and he ſtrongly recommended every poſſible encouragement to the extenſive cultivation of potatoes and peaſe. But the grand ſupply which we might derive from the bounty of Providence, a bounty which we had hitherto a good deal neglected, was from the article of fiſh. In conferring and correſponding with

with perſons from many different parts of the country where the fiſheries had been carried on, he found that an immenſe quantity, both of herrings and mackarel, could be caught almoſt in any proportion, to the number of boats and men which ſhould be employed. But, above all, if it ſhould be found neceſſary we might import from Newfoundland any quantity of cod which we might deſire, 7 or 800,000 quintals being ordinarily taken there. After ſome other remarks, he obſerved, that he had felt it his duty to ſtate the reſult of his inquiries, and he would only add, that he truſted the Houſe would give that ſteady attention to the ſubject to which its importance entitled it. He would conclude with making a motion, tending to promote the extenſive cultivation of early potatoes and peaſe.

Mr. *Buxton* roſe to anſwer the objection that Government did not apply a ſpeedy meaſure. In fact they did. In September laſt they opened the ports for a general importation.

The motion was then put and carried, and leave given to bring in the Bill.

The *Maſter of the Rolls* obſerved, that as the meaſure muſt derive great part of its efficacy from its ſpeedy effect, he truſted that gentlemen would not object to its paſſing through the Houſe with all poſſible expedition.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* ſtated, that the Bill would be ready the next day, and it was propoſed to carry it through the Houſe on that day. Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

WEDNESDAY, FEB. 19.

The expiring laws bill, the militia offers bill, and the marine ſeduction bill, received the royal aſſent by commiſſion.

The Engliſh appeal cauſe, the Attorney General *verſus* Trinity College, Cambridge, was heard in part, and the further hearing adjourned till the next day.

The bill to continue in force for three weeks after the meeting of the next ſeſſion of Parliament, containing regulations to render it unlawful for any perſon to ſell, or expoſe to ſale, any wheaten bread, before it is a certain number of hours (24) old, was brought up by Lord Hawkeſbury, Mr. Bragge, and others.

Colonel Elford and others brought up a road or eſtate bill.

The bread regulation bill, juſt brought up from the Commons, was read a firſt time, when

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The *Earl of Liverpool* roſe, and ſaid, that when he ſtated the ſecond reading of the bill immediately to be of the utmoſt importance to the country, he was perfectly aware that it was not uſual to preſs the paſſing of bills of ſo new and ſingular a nature through all their ſtages on one and the ſame day, and that ſometimes an oppoſition was made to their principle; but on this occaſion the Houſe of Commons had concurred in the urgency of the neceſſity to which the bill applied, and its great probable public utility, if paſſed with the ſmalleſt delay, and had therefore paſſed it through all its ſtages that day. Every noble Lord, alſo, whom he had found an opportunity to conſult on the ſubject, had been ſo entirely of the ſame opinion, that he ſhould not heſitate to move, That the other ſtages of the bill be gone through immediately.

The bill was accordingly read a ſecond time, the committee negatived, the bill read a third time and paſſed *nemine diſſentiente*, and ſent down to the Commons to acquaint that Houſe with the concurrence of the Houſe of Lords.

The bill brought up by Colonel Elford and others, was read a firſt time.

The Houſe adjourned to the next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

WEDNESDAY, FEB. 19.

The *Speaker* acquainted the Houſe that he, and ſeveral Members, had been to the Houſe of Peers, to hear the Royal aſſent given by commiſſion to the militia volunteer bill, the army ſeduction bill, together with the Newfoundland judicature bill.

Mr. *Manning* moved for leave to bring in a bill for the further improvement of the port of London, by eſtabliſhing wet docks. Ordered.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* brought in a bill to prevent any baker, or other perſon, from ſelling bread that has not been baked a certain number of hours; which was read a firſt and ſecond time.

Mr. *Nichols* ſaid that he had been ſtated to have ſaid that the war the occaſion of the ſcarcity. This he denied: what he had ſaid was, that the continuance of the war deprives us of the means of relief. He ſaid we had but two markets now; America and the Baltic. He adviſed the adoption of a ſtoppage of the corn diſtillery, and the conſumption of oats by

by horſes, as meaſures which would create leſs alarm and diſcontent.

The Houſe reſolved itſelf into a committee of the whole Houſe on the bill to prevent any baker or other perſon from ſelling bread not baked a certain number of hours. This bill is to take place within ten miles of the Royal Exchange on the 26th inſt. and in all other places on the 4th March—The time of the bread being baked to be 24 hours. Every offence againſt the act liable to a penalty of 5l. to be recovered before any magiſtrate; one half to go to the informer. The act to continue in force till ſix weeks after the commencement of the next ſeſſion. The Houſe was reſumed, the report brought up and agreed to, and the bill read a third time and paſſed, and ordered to be carried to the Lords by Lord Hawkeſbury.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that the Houſe ſhould take into conſideration, in a committee, the bank charter act on Friday next; that they ſhould then diſcuſs the ſubject; and that the reſult ſhould be referred to a committee of ways and means on Monday next. Ordered.

Mr. *Alderman Luſhington* preſented a petition from Meſſrs. Aſhwell and Johnſon, Grenada-merchants, for leave to extend the period for paying their inſtalments. He then moved, that it be referred to the ſame committee as Mr. M'Dougall's was. Ordered.

SUBSTITUTES FOR CORN.

Mr. *Wilberforce* roſe to call the attention of the Houſe to a ſubject which, though he could not profeſs perfect knowledge of it, was yet of too high importance not to claim great conſideration. He had the authority of Mr. Arthur Young for what he was about to ſtate. Every Gentleman, perhaps, knew that the growing of potatoes was not ſo much encouraged in England as in ſome other countries, and not ſo extenſively any where as their real uſefulneſs ſeemed to make deſirable. What he had to ſubmit to the Houſe was, a propoſition for giving a bounty for raiſing early crops of that root, and he was aſſured, on the ſame authority, that, if done without delay, it would not at all impede huſbandry for next harveſt to give ſuch a premium. An objection to the meaſure was to be apprehended from thoſe Gentlemen who thought that there would not be enough of feed, but he was on this point alſo of opinion, that no inconvenience could ariſe. He concluded by moving that a committee ſhould be appointed

appointed to conſider of the propriety of encouraging the early growth of potatoes.

Lord *Hawkeſbury* wiſhed the hon. Member to defer making his motion until the bread bill ſhould have paſſed all its ſtages.

Mr. *Wilberforce*—"I can have no objection."

The new bread prohibition bill was now read a third time, paſſed, and ſent to the Lords.

The queſtion was next put on Mr. Wilberforce's motion.

Mr. *Joliffe* approved of the propoſition.

Mr. *Buxton* unwillingly oppoſed any thing that came from his hon. Friend, but being of opinion that legiſlative interference was in all ſuch caſes to be as much as poſſible avoided, he conſidered it his duty to oppoſe the motion.

Lord *Sheffield* thought the motion tended to uſeful regulation, and would therefore give it his ſupport.

Mr. *Burdon* did not approve of the ſubject of ſcarcity being ſo often agitated. It was long the wiſh of the lower claſs that the legiſlature would give a bounty for raiſing potatoes, but he believed it would be impolitic to do ſo. He did not think the ſcarcity was ſo great, or ſo general, as ſome Gentlemen were willing to imagine. In the northern counties corn was comparatively cheap, and they expected great ſupplies on the opening of the Baltic.

Lord *Sheffield* ſaid, that to give a bounty would not impede the harveſt.

Mr. *Eſtcourt* oppoſed the motion.

Mr. *Shaw Lefevre* was of opinion, that the meaſure would not be of great benefit if adopted.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that he was very ſorry, to object to any motion made by his hon. Friend, to whoſe active and laudable zeal for the intereſts of the community he wiſhed to bear teſtimony, and to give every degree of praiſe it ſo well merited. He thought, however, a meaſure of the kind propoſed ſhould not be adopted without a more mature inveſtigation. He could not ſay whether the meaſure was over-rated or under-rated, but he hoped the Houſe would make it a rule to have ſuch a meaſure diſcuſſed but in a committee of the whole Houſe. He ſaw, however, no reaſon for preſſing the buſineſs at preſent. There was a ſpecial committee now ſitting on that buſineſs, and he would adviſe his hon. Friend to have his name added to that committee, by which he would attain every information on the ſubject,

and ſee what might hereafter be neceſſary to propoſe to do further.

Mr. *Wilberforce* acceded to the advice of his hon. Friend, and ſaid he could promiſe the Houſe that the growth of early potatoes would not interfere with any other crop.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* then moved, that the queſtion be adjourned to Tueſday next. Ordered.

A meſſage was delivered from the Lords, ſignifying that they had given their aſſent to the bill for preventing the ſale of bread till baked a certain number of hours, and to the indemnity qualification bill.

SUSPENSION OF THE HABEAS CORPUS ACT.

The *Attorney General* moved the order of the day for continuing the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act. He then moved that the report of the committee of ſecrecy be now read, which being done,

Mr. *Joliffe* ſaid, he roſe with reluctance to oppoſe a motion of his honourable and learned Friend, but he thought the preſent act ought to be ſuffered to expire, if it were but for a ſingle day, that it might not appear to be a meaſure of courſe, like the mutiny bill. He moved an amendment, that the bill be read a ſecond time that day ſix weeks.

Mr. *H. Laſcelles* ſpoke in favour of the bill, and ſaid, that he conſidered the peace and tranquillity at preſent exiſting in this country, to be chiefly owing to the operation of that bill.

Mr. *Hobhouſe* ſaid, he roſe to oppoſe the ſecond reading of the bill. The hon. Gentleman did not aſſert at preſent that any evidence of facts exiſted to prove that any conſpiracy was to be apprehended at this moment, as had been done on all the former occaſions. The hon. Gentleman did not pretend to ſay that the ſpirit of the times was the ſame now as when the report of the Secret Committee was made. Government, he believed, had not been leſs diligent than formerly in detecting every thing of that nature, and yet only two perſons had been arreſted in ſeven months. He objected to it alſo becauſe the hands of government had been ſtrengthened by ſome ſevere bills which had paſſed into laws ſince the report was made. He noticed the recurrence of Miniſters on all occaſions to the prevalence of jacobin principles in France, but ſaid, they ſeemed to forget that the power of the preſent chief ruler there had been founded in the ſuppreſſion of jacobiniſm, which had ſhewn itſelf in the Council of Five Hundred.

Hundred. The hon. Gentleman had better endeavour to eradicate jacobin principles out of this country by removing the misfortunes of the country, and introducing meaſures to remove abuſes. Mr. Hobhouſe ſaid, that the preſent Adminiſtration were famous for exciting falſe alarms; reviewed their meaſures from the year 1792, in which he pointed out ſome inſtances to prove this. Speaking of the priſon in Clerkenwell, he ſaid, that by the rules of it ſtate priſoners had not ſo good an allowance as convicts; ſome of the perſons arreſted had been confined upwards of two years, and it would be impoſſible to make them an adequate compenſation. He ſeverely cenſured Miniſters for ſeizing on the preſent time to take away one of the greateſt bulwarks of the conſtitution.

Mr. *Sturgeſs* uſed ſeveral ingenious arguments to ſhew that the principles that had rendered it neceſſary to ſuſpend the *Habeas Corpus Act* were not yet extinct; nor could he ſuppoſe that the late revolution in France had removed the ſame principles in that country, unleſs the Gentleman who had inſiſted ſo much on that point ſhould ſhew that a ſucceſsful uſurpation was a good antidote againſt treaſon and rebellion. The degrèe of confidence that ought to be repoſed in Miniſters by this bill, ſhould depend on the diſpoſition they had ſhewn to abuſe it. In order to ſee how far Miniſters had abuſed the confidence already repoſed in them, let Gentlemen look at the perſons now in confinement, conſider their rank and ſituation in life, and then aſk themſelves if they were men againſt whom it was poſſible Miniſters could have harboured any kind of prejudice; and the few who had been taken up ſince the paſſing of the laſt bill, was the cleareſt proof that Miniſters had exerciſed the power entruſted to them with moderation. But the ſeverity ſaid to have been exerciſed againſt theſe men was ſaid to be a violation of the principles of the conſtitution. To ſhew how far that aſſertion was true, he would mention a circumſtance which happened ſhortly after the eſtabliſhment of this conſtitution. A conſpiracy had been formed againſt the life of King William, in conſequence of which the *Habeas Corpus* act was ſuſpended, ſeveral perſons were taken up, and an act was paſſed to enable King William to confine them during their lives. They remained in confinement till his demiſe. On the acceſſion of Queen Anne, a ſimilar power was granted to her; the ſame was granted to George the Firſt and Second: and it was not until the year 1737 that the laſt

of theſe men was, at the advanced age of 82, liberated by death. It was, therefore, material in diſcuſſing the preſent queſtion, that the Houſe ſhould look to what the practice had been during the adminiſtration of the beſt of men, and in the beſt of times; that Lord Somers held the ſeals at the time theſe men were put into confinement, and Lord Hardwicke at the time of their death.

Sir *Francis Burdett* ſaid, it was not his intention to follow the hon. Gentleman who ſpoke laſt, through the whole of his extraneous argument, but he was ſorry for the ſituation of the country when the word jacobiniſm was uſed as a term, by which it ſeemed the wiſh of ſome perſons to hunt down every ſpecies of liberty. He begged leave to have the proviſo read in the act for ſuſpending the *Habeas Corpus* act in 1798, and ſhewed that by that proviſo it was promiſed, that after the 20th of May, 1799, perſons arreſted ſhould have the benefit of all laws made for the ſecurity of the ſubject. He mentioned the caſe of Sir William Windham, who, he ſaid, was admitted to bail on a charge of high treaſon, becauſe four terms and one aſſize had paſſed without his being brought to trial. Nothing but the deepeſt neceſſity could, in his opinion, juſtify long impriſonment, which was a cruel torture. He would be glad to be informed what part of the conſtitution remained, and had not been broken in upon by the preſent Adminiſtration? He knew of none: he would not, however, treſpaſs longer on the patience of the Houſe than to give his decided negative to the ſecond reading of this bill.

The *Attorney General* ſaid, in anſwer to the objection urged againſt him, that in opening the preſent queſtion, he had entered into no ſtatement of the grounds on which it reſted, obſerved, that he had given a long notice of the time when it was to be brought on, an interval fully ſufficient for Gentlemen to prepare their objections; at that time he referred the grounds on which he intended to ſupport his motion; thoſe grounds he derived from the report that had been given ſome time back, ſtating the urgent neceſſity of adopting a meaſure ſimilar to that now propoſed, and the reaſons detailed in that report muſt be ſtill freſh in the recollection of the Houſe. Since the introduction of that report no change in his opinion had taken place ſufficient to juſtify Adminiſtration in altering what was laſt year deemed neceſſary; he therefore thought it a mark of reſpect to the Houſe not to detain their attention upon topics which muſt ſtill be familiar to every Gentleman's mind and memory. As to the propoſal

poſal of an hon. Member (Mr. Hobhouſe) to delay the meaſure for ſix weeks, it was ſufficient to obſerve, that ſuch a delay muſt defeat the object of the meaſure altogether, as the bill now in force was to expire on the 1ſt of March. If, therefore, that propoſal was acceded to, not only all thoſe who are here in priſon in virtue of that act muſt be liberated, but alſo thoſe who have been ſent hither from Ireland; a circumſtance of which the hon. Gentleman who made the propoſal does not ſeem to be aware. The Gentlemen oppoſite him ſay the grounds adduced are not ſufficient; a great majority of the Houſe ſay they are; and to their opinion he, at leaſt, thought proper to aſſent. The learned Gentleman then read part of the report, ſhewing that it was the deſign of France to connect herſelf with traitors in this country, in order to overturn our laws and conſtitution, &c. &c.—on the exiſtence of that deſign he reſted the neceſſity of the meaſure he propoſed. Thoſe who believe that ſuch a deſign exiſts would ſupport the meaſure; thoſe who would not, no argument or evidence could convince. An hon. Baronet (Burdett) ſaid, that ſoon after the revolution the Habeas Corpus was ſuſpended in the reign of King William. But, if there be any truth in the report to which he had already alluded, there was no compariſon between the nature of the dangers that exiſted in theſe two conſpiracies: one aimed at re-eſtabliſhing a prince in power, the other aimed at overturning every thing that was dear and ſacred to man: thoſe who engaged in it were of the loweſt condition and the moſt profligate manners, and therefore have neither judgment to direct, or morality to controul their conduct. The power that is now called for is only a power to check and fruſtrate the career and ſucceſs of ſuch perſons, and the moſt effectual means of attaining this object was, in his mind, to deprive them of the leaders by whom they were deceived. The learned Gentleman then proceeded to prove that this power might be ſafely entruſted in the hands of the Miniſters; the lenity with which they uſed it appeared from the ſmall number of thoſe who had been taken up. It was impoſſible, he was ſure, to impute to Miniſters any motive perſonal to themſelves or protective of their power, that could inſtigate them to exerciſe any cruelty againſt ſuch a deſcription of perſons as thoſe now confined; they were of ſo abject a condition that no Gentleman in that Houſe could be ſuppoſed to know any thing of them but from the liſt on the table. From ſuch men, therefore, Miniſters moſt aſſuredly could have nothing perſonal to apprehend.

apprehend. As therefore it was the opinion of the Houſe that there ſtill remained a neceſſity for continuing that power in their hands, he was confident that there were grounds amply ſufficient to eſtabliſh the propriety of the meaſure.

Mr. *Martin* wiſhed that thoſe who were really guilty ſhould be ſeverely puniſhed, but that no innocent perſon ſhould be puniſhed wrongfully. He was therefore anxious to know, if upon trial it ſhould appear that the perſons now confined were innocent, what atonement and compenſation would be made them for the confinement which they had undeſervedly endured.

Mr. *Tierney* contended that the manner in which the preſent bill had been introduced in all its ſtages, went to teach the Houſe to regard it as a mere matter of courſe. He believed, nay, he might venture to aſſert, that there was no one inſtance of ſuch a bill having ever been introduced without ſome ſpecific reaſon having been aſſigned as a foundation for it; yet now it ſeems that on the bare aſſertion of an individual, this large portion of our liberty, the main ſtay of the conſtitution, muſt be ſurrendered. Miniſters had no authorities but their own to reſort to for ſuch practice; but he wiſhed for more weighty and reſpectable authorities. The report ſo much relied upon, he thought of very little weight; the very perſons who were before induced to acquieſce in this meaſure from the impreſſion made upon them by that report, might now view it with very different feelings, with very different opinions, and conſequently adopt a very different conduct. But it is ſaid Miniſters will not abuſe the power. The perſons who have been taken up are too low and inſignificant to excite their fears or provoke their reſentment. Be it ſo: but will that prevent a miniſterial underſtrapper, who is equally low and inſignificant, from gratifying his enmity or his intereſt, by repreſenting to his employers as dangerous, his equals, and perſons with whom he may have had dealings in life. No condition was therefore ſafe from this oppreſſion. But what induced him more than ever to reſiſt the preſent motion, was, there was reaſon to think (for it never had been denied) that the perſons who were confined under this act, had been taken up without any information upon oath againſt them. Should ſuch a practice be ſanctioned? Surely the vote that would aſſent to it, cannot be juſtified before the country or before God. If it was not denied that perſons had been ſo impriſoned, he, for one, ſhould never grant a power which, in the ſuppoſition he had alluded

alluded to, muſt have been moſt groſsly, moſt ſcandalouſly, and moſt inhumanly abuſed.

Lord *Belgrave* ſaid, that every objection that was urged againſt the motion, had already been ſo ably anſwered that he would content himſelf with ſtating the grounds of his own vote. What had happened in Ireland, at the inſtigation of France, every internal and external circumſtance, which was connected with that treaſonable ſyſtem, were more than ſufficient to convince him of the neceſſity of the meaſure. Much had been ſaid about jacobiniſm, and it had been aſked, what was a jacobin. He would anſwer, that the man who renounced his religion and his moral probity, was a jacobin, and that ſuch was Bonaparte. As a jacobin, therefore, the French Conſul would ſtill endeavour to propagate his favourite principles, and the preſent meaſure was the moſt effectual remedy to counteract their infectious propagation in this country.

Sir *Gregory Page Turner* was convinced of the propriety of the meaſure: he had felt the neceſſity of it on former occaſions: he therefore gave it his ſupport, and he would continue to give it his ſupport, becauſe he was ſenſible that neceſſity ſtill continued. He never would give up the principles that gave him a ſeat in that Houſe; it was by ſupporting the conſtitution that he continued to enjoy that honour. He adopted the arguments of the noble Lord who ſpoke laſt; they were enough to eſtabliſh his conviction. The meaſure propoſed was the true remedy for the diſeaſe; it therefore ſhould be perſiſted in. He was conſcious that he was an independent man, but he would ſtill ſupport Miniſters as long as they acted well, and he would be always proud to ſupport the conſtitution and the King. Under the impreſſion of theſe principles he would now ſit down.

Mr. *Sheridan* ſaid that he had heard very little that could be conſidered argument in favour of the motion. He had indeed heard ſtrange arguments advanced; but nothing that tended to ſhow the neceſſity of the meaſure to which the Houſe again was called upon to give its concurrence. He was ſurprized indeed to hear it ſtated by an honourable Gentleman oppoſite, that the loyalty of the country was encreaſed, and yet the inference from this was, that the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* ſhould be continued, becauſe the great majority of the ſound inhabitants of England were entitled to the protection which this meaſure would afford. This he conſidered a very whimſical argument. It was juſt

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as extraordinary as it would be when the oppoſition in parliament formed a very ſmall minority, it ſhould be propoſed to gag them, that they might not have it in their power to give any ſort of trouble to Miniſters. The argument, if followed up, went to this, that in proportion as the number of the well affected was great, in the ſame proportion would be the claims of the government to extraordinary authority. An honourable and learned Gentleman (Mr Sturges) whom he had never heard before, but who, he hoped, would often favour the Houſe with his ſentiments, had ſtated the caſe with great candour, liberality and eloquence; he inſiſted on the dangerous character of the French revolution. Doubtleſs the French revolution was an event of an extraordinary nature; but the queſtion now was, whether or not the example of the French revolution would not operate as a warning againſt innovation and diſturbance? He conceived, that no rational and humane mind, and ſuch were the minds of the people of England, could contemplate the progreſs of the French revolution, in many of its ſcenes, without horror and deteſtation. This being the caſe, what new proviſions, what extraordinary authority was requiſite to guard againſt dangers where contagion was ſo little to be apprehended? An hon. Gentleman had ſaid, that he knew nothing ſo bad as jacobiniſm on earth and even alluded to a certain plan, not often mentioned in the Houſe, the evils of which there was little danger that the honourable Gentleman himſelf, and he hoped no other Member of the Houſe, would ever know from experience. But what did all this prove, but that jacobiniſm was ſo deteſtable that in this country it could not have partizans. Indeed, it was evident that the principles of jacobiniſm had loſt all their force. In fact, every thing in this country ſhowed that there was a more than uſual coldneſs to reform, a more than uſual indiſpoſition to any thing that could be conſidered as innovation. What ſymptoms of danger then exiſted? The right hon. Gentleman had ſaid that the principles of jacobiniſm could never be eradicated from the mind where they had any hold. If the argument was well founded, how far was precaution to be carried? when would the neceſſity of the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* ceaſe? The right hon. Gentleman himſelf was an example that men might change ſentiments which they had long profeſſed and inculcated. As he had yielded to the evidence of facts on the ſubject of parliamentary reform, might not men, who had once thought that French principles were favourable to liberty,

berty, renounce that opinion when they ſaw their evil tendency, and their pernicious practices? Another right hon. Gentleman oppoſite was an example too how men might change their ſentiments. *He* had conſidered the right hon. Gentleman as unfit to be Miniſter; now he held him to be the only perſon worthy to be a Miniſter. Why then might not men, from the evidence of facts, change their views reſpecting the French revolution? Beſides, he conceived that no compariſon could be made between this country and France, with regard to the operation of any political opinions. The French had juſt thrown off a grinding degrading deſpotiſm, and there the danger of popular exceſs was to be apprehended. Here the people had been accuſtomed to liberty and were not in the ſame danger of running into licentiouſneſs. It was utterly falſe in reaſoning, therefore, to argue as if the caſes were the ſame. A right hon. Gentleman oppoſite had made ſeveral ſimiles on this ſubject about *changing* of *coats*: no, *ſhirts* it was; of wolves, and ſo forth. But, if the ſimile of the wolf is to be kept up, ſurely becauſe the wolf may have got looſe, it is not neceſſary to ſhoot the houſe-dog! In talking of French principles, and the danger to be apprehended from them, it ought never to be forgotten that in the character of the Engliſh people there is a ſure defence againſt the danger which is apprehended. It had been ſaid that we owed the maintenance of the Conſtitution to the meaſures in queſtion; but he ſhould ever contend that our ſafety was owing to the good ſenſe, to the ſound morality and the diſcernment of the people themſelves. The great majority of the people had always been ſound. There had indeed been ſome fooliſh mimicry: an abſurd mimicry of French proceedings. There were, indeed, reports of the Houſe on the ſubject. Of them he muſt ſpeak with delicacy; but at the ſame time the verdict of various Juries had eſtabliſhed concluſions different from thoſe of the reports. The Judge who preſided on the trials alluded to, had ſaid that the parties arraigned were "inſignificant: that they were without leaders, money, or even zeal!" What danger, indeed, could have ariſen from men whoſe magazine conſiſted of ſeven muſquets, whoſe diſcipline was carried on in a back-garret by the light of a farthing candle, and whoſe whole treaſury conſiſted of 10l. 15s.? It was eaſy to conceive that it might be the intereſt of Miniſters to give a greater importance to ſuch alarms than they deſerved, as at all times ſuch expedients had been practiſed. A gentleman had once

ſaid (with ſome confuſion of metaphor, to be ſure), that "the breath of the noſtrils of the Conſtitution was in the Miniſter's tongue!" For his part he conſidered the breath of the noſtrils of the Conſtitution to be in the *Habeas Corpus* Act. For this reaſon he was againſt continuing its ſuſpenſion. He was againſt furniſhing new precedents for ſuch a meaſure, eſpecially precedents ſupported by no neceſſity. The caſes in King William's time were far different from the preſent: then perhaps the majority of the country were averſe to his dominion; his enemies were great, noble and powerful, ſome of them afterwards ſuffered for their principles, and ſeveral rebellions were afterwards their conſequences. Surely there was nothing like this at preſent. The diſaffected are of the loweſt order, without means, money, or even zeal. Were, then, ſuch legal precautions now neceſſary to guard our Conſtitution? But it was ſaid that, perhaps, the tranquillity which now prevailed was deluſive: in proof of this, was adduced the inſtance of the Iriſh rebellion breaking out on the arreſt of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, when every thing was ſuppoſed to be tranquil. But, was every thing ſuppoſed tranquil? Had not the reports of the Houſes of Parliament ſtated the danger, and even, as it appeared, exaggerated the means and reſources of the rebels? Had not Lord Fitzwilliam predicted what would be the conſequence of the ſyſtem of government purſued in that country? As to the uſe which had been made of the power thus entruſted to Miniſters, this much he would only ſay, that this was not a conſideration that ought to weigh, when a great principle was to be given up. He was ſorry even to ſee that great power did not always produce the evils which it was in its nature to produce; men were put off their guard as to its danger. Great power had a neceſſary tendency to corrupt. It was different from mercy. It was twice *curſed*. It curſed him that poſſeſſed and him that was the victim. The treatment in ſome reſpects he had thought beyond what mere cuſtody required. To ſhow the danger of veſting great power in the hands of any Miniſter, he mentioned that under the Alien Bill perſons were ſent out of this country without any charge of treaſon, or ſedition, particularly he alluded to a caſe where a foreigner was ſent out of the kingdom, becauſe he had paid his addreſſes to a young lady, and whoſe friends availed themſelves of the Alien Act to get him ſent out of England. He likewiſe mentioned, under the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus*, the caſe of a perſon at Mancheſter, named Paterſon. Paterſon had put upon

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his cart the words *Pitt and Paterſon*. Being aſked why he did ſo, as he had no partner, he replied that he had a partner, one indeed who had no ſhare in the buſineſs, but who took an abundant ſhare of the profits. For this practical joke the poor fellow was taken up and thrown into Cold-Bath-Fields, and was liberated only on condition of not going within thirty miles of Mancheſter. Upon the whole, Mr. Sheridan concluded that there was no ground whatever in the ſtate of the country, no caſe laid before the Houſe, to juſtify parliament in giving up the great ſafeguard of freedom, he therefore oppoſed the motion.

Mr. *Elliſon* ſaid, he ſhould not be miſled by the wit or the eloquence of the hon. Gentleman who ſpoke laſt; he would expreſs himſelf in plain terms, for his feelings were ſincere; and he would ſupport the motion, becauſe he conſcientiouſly thought it his duty ſo to do; and becauſe he knew, by ſupporting it, he would act in concert with the opinion and the wiſhes of the majority of the country, as well as of the Houſe. He approved of Miniſters propoſing to ſuſpend the *Habeas Corpus* but for a ſhort period at each time. This ſhewed that they wiſhed to take the ſenſe of the people upon the propriety of the meaſure; for they applied to parliament for their advice and aſſent, and by that application they applied to the people, by thus conſulting their repreſentatives. He alſo contended that the power which this meaſure veſted in the hands of Miniſters had never been abuſed; on the contrary, every thing proved that it was reſorted to with reluctance, and exerciſed with mercy.

Mr. *Canning* ſpoke in reply to Mr. Sheridan. He contended that though the majority of the people of this country were attached to their King and Conſtitution, yet there were a few diſaffected, who, without the vigilant coercion of law, might be able, with the aſſiſtance of a deſperate army abroad, to diſturb the public tranquillity. He could not conceive how his honourable Friend (Mr. Sheridan) could pay ſuch deference to the reports of the Iriſh Parliament, and refuſe it to our own. As to the deciſion of the Juries here in 1794, certainly they had not, in the minds of impartial men, proved that the perſons accuſed were free from all moral guilt; nor had they invalidated the ſtatements in the reports of the two Houſes of Parliament. He could not help thinking that the words of the Judge who preſided at the trials had been inaccurately quoted. Certainly, what appeared on theſe trials, was ſufficient to ſhew that danger had

exiſted, and to prove that precaution was neceſſary. He contended that there was not ſufficient reaſon to believe that thoſe who had been the partizans of the French revolution had recanted their errors. The maſſacre of September; the atrocity of Robeſpierre had not opened their eyes. What then was there now to produce that effect? Jacobiniſm itſelf was not extinct in France. It had reached its perfection in the perſon of Bonaparte. It was the principle of jacobiniſm acting upon his particular character that ſtill ruled France. It was now ſtated, that jacobiniſm was no more, becauſe in the argument for peace, it was neceſſary to hold this inducement in the preſent government of France But in fact, jacobiniſm had only aſſumed a new modification ſuitable to the character of the individual in power, and as to its favourers being extinct here, he could not believe that thoſe would give it up for the uſurpation of Bonaparte, who were not convinced by preceding atrocities. It was neceſſary, therefore, to continue this precaution, to ſecure us againſt any new attempts of the jacobiniſm that ſtill exiſted abroad and lurked at home. The precedents in the time of King William, a period which gentlemen on the other ſide ſo much profeſſed to approve, he contended, went a great deal farther than this meaſure. As to the argument, that there was no reaſon to fear that ſimilar exceſſes would take place in England, even from a change, to thoſe which had happened in France, it proved too much, for it proved that there was no danger to be apprehended from revolution. The horrors which had happened in Switzerland, among a people free and happy, ought to convince us what dreadful evils ariſe from revolution, where the moving principle of it is French jacobiniſm. It was true that the people of England were true to their Conſtitution, but ſtill it was neceſſary to preclude our enemies, abroad and at home, from the opportunity of renewing thoſe dangers, which happily were in a great meaſure cruſhed. The voluntary force had been of great ſervice. He truſted it would not merely ſerve a temporary purpoſe, but that called forth by our wants it would for ever continue to be the protection of our liberties. He truſted indeed, that the ſtruggle with foreign enemies on Britiſh ground, or with the rebellious few at home, would never occur; but ſtill we ought not to truſt to their protection while we had ſtill the advantage of legiſlative proviſion. It had ſometimes been ſaid, that the liberty of this country had been ſealed with blood: this was not hiſtorically true. This Houſe

was

was the ſcene of the triumph of liberty; this was the field where its battles were won. On that ground, he truſted, we ſhould continue to be victorious. By the wiſdom of Parliament, he truſted, all the dangers that threatened our empire would be defeated; by its wiſdom and firmneſs, he truſted, that we ſhould, as we had already done with ſucceſs, combat that foe which had menaced our happineſs and proſperity, and againſt which it ſtill was neceſſary to guard.

Mr. *Sheridan* ſaid a few words in explanation. He was willing to allow the eloquence with which his honourable Friend had anſwered his arguments. He would not now examine how far they had been reſumed, but he muſt mention one or two of them which had been miſrepreſented. He did not ſay that the report of the Iriſh Houſe of Commons had not been confirmed, but that the report of the *Britiſh* Houſe of Commons had been falſified. Notwithſtanding the alarming repreſentations given there, we had remained in a ſtate of tranquillity, which proves that there never was any ground for the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* Act, and that there was much leſs now than ever. He had not recommended revolution, as his honourable Friend had alledged, but rather cautioned the Houſe againſt any innovation. Neither had he expreſſed a wiſh that the volunteer corps ſhould be called in to keep the people in ſubjection, as they had in Ireland, but merely ſaid that the volunteer corps had been raiſed ſince the firſt ſuſpenſion of the Act, that they gave additional ſecurity to government, and this rendered it ſtill more improper that the people ſhould be deprived of their liberties.

Mr. *Canning* ſaid that he did not mean to aſſert that his honourable Friend abetted revolution, but merely to ſhew that his argument went this length, if it proved any thing.

Mr. *Buxton* was clearly of opinion that the *Habeas Corpus* Act ſhould be ſuſpended, not, as he was repreſented to have ſaid, till jacobin principles had totally ceaſed to exiſt in France, but as long as there was a jacobin government in France. Much miſrepreſentation had been made with regard to the ſufferings endured by thoſe confined in virtue of the ſuſpenſion. It was an undoubted fact that Colonel Deſpard, of whom ſo much had been ſaid, refuſed to go into a room where he would have had fire and every comfort, and that he preferred his ſolitary dungeon to living amidſt the other priſoners. The people taken up from Mancheſter had likewiſe been treated with the utmoſt attention and tenderneſs.

Sir *W. Milner* ſaid that he oppoſed the ſuſpenſion of the Act,

Act, because he was instructed by its constituents so to do. These he considered himself in duty bound to obey. He had learnt a portion of English history that night, of which he was formerly ignorant. However, though a man in former times might have been confined for many years upon suspicion, he was confident that such a proceeding would not be tolerated now; and that great as was the influence of the right hon. Gentleman, if he were to attempt to abuse it, he would be unable to carry through the House a Bill for that purpose.

The question was then put, That the Bill be read a second time, when there appeared:

Ayes 98. *Noes* 12. *Majority* 86.

[A fuller and more correct Report of the Speeches of Lord Belgrave and Mr. Sturges, will be found in the subsequent Pages, after the next Debate.]

The other orders of the day were then read, when

Mr. *Rose* moved that the House do resolve itself into a Committee of Supply and of Ways and Means, on Friday next; and that the Marine Mutiny Bill be committed the next day. Ordered. Adjourned.

List of the Minority, who voted against renewing the Bill for suspending the *Habeas Corpus*.

Adair, R.	Plumer, W.
Barclay, G.	Richardson, J.
Copley, Sir L.	Sheridan, R. B.
Jolliffe, W.	Smith, W.
Martin, J.	Tierney, G.
Milner, Sir W.	Western, C. C.

TELLERS.

Burdett, Sir F.	Hobhouse, B.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

THURSDAY, FEB. 20.

The Royal assent was given by commission to the bill for preventing the sale of bread that has not been baked a certain number of hours; and to the indemnity qualification bill.

The commissioners were the Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the first Lord of the Admiralty.

SCARCITY OF CORN.

The Archbishop of Canterbury addressed the House in saying that he had been desired by several persons to bring a subject of

of high importance before the Houſe, and, as the Houſe had permitted him to introduce it, he ſhould beg their Lordſhips' attention while he did it in as few words as poſſible. It was, he had ſaid, matter of the higheſt moment that the Houſe ſhould, as early as poſſible, evince to the public that they were feelingly alive to the great ſcarcity of corn, which, it was not to be denied, prevailed at this moment, and which, he was ſorry to ſay, there was too much reaſon to fear was likely to increaſe. The other Houſe of Parliament had already taken the ſubject into conſideration, and after all due inveſtigation had publiſhed a report on it, which was then lying on their Lordſhips' table. On a former occaſion, when a ſimilar calamity had befallen this country, their Lordſhips had interfered as ſpeedily as poſſible to convince all ranks of people that their Lordſhips were willing and deſirous to do every thing in their power to leſſen the conſumption, not only in their own families, but by recommending it from ſuch examples to be followed by all claſſes whatſoever. The right Reverend Prelate then ſaid that he held in his hand ſomething in the form of reſolutions on the ſubject, which he requeſted to ſubmit to the conſideration of the Houſe, and which he then read; the purport of which ſtated the exiſtence of the grievance, and the importance of providing as early a remedy as poſſible to it. His Grace ſaid, he did not mean to aſk the Houſe to come to either of his reſolutions as a legiſlative act of the Houſe; he was afraid the interference of the legiſlature in any meaſure of this kind might be productive of greater deficiencies than thoſe intended to be remedied. All that he had therefore to propoſe was, that the Houſe ſhould agree to adopt his reſolutions, if they approved of them, as the act of ſo many private individuals forming the firſt Houſe of Parliament in this country, from the example of which he hoped for the moſt advantageous reſults. His Grace then read his ſecond propoſition, which was to the following purport: Reſolved, that we the underſigned will, in our reſpective families, uſe the utmoſt influence in our power to reduce the conſumption of corn and bread, and that we will alſo do all we can to promote the uſe of ſuch other articles as may be found or deemed the ſubſtitutes for that neceſſary of life. His Grace ſaid, he had no doubt but their Lordſhips, one and all, felt the neceſſity of ſome ſteps being taken to meet the evil, and leſſen the effect as much as poſſible, and therefore declined at that time any further treſpaſs on the time of the Houſe.

Lord

Lord *Clifton (Earl of Darnley)* ſaid, he could not conſider the ſpeech and propoſitions of the right Reverend Prelate, however well intended, as likely to be of the leaſt efficiency, and indeed he was perſuaded that all legiſlative, or parliamentary interference upon ſuch ſubjects was more likely to do harm than good. He had not been in the Houſe a few days ſince, when he underſtood, a noble Lord (Lord Auckland) had thought proper to introduce the topic, and to ſound the trumpet of alarm upon the apprehended ſcarcity of wheat, and wheat flour, in conſequence of the ſuppoſed failure of the laſt harveſt. He had not been preſent to hear the noble Lord, but from as much as he could collect from the newſpaper accounts, that noble Lord had made the Report of the committee of the Houſe of Commons reſpecting bread, corn, &c. the ground of his argument, and had thence very incautiouſly declared, that the crops of the laſt harveſt had failed to an extent, far exceeding what, upon further enquiry and better information, would, he was perſuaded, be found to be the caſe. With regard to the Report, it appeared to him to reſt entirely on the teſtimony of two of the perſons examined before the committee, one of them a Gentleman with whom he was acquainted, and much reſpected, Mr. Arthur Young; the other, a gentleman, whom he did not ſo well know, Mr. Claude Scott, an eminent corn factor, and he believed to be a worthy character, though perhaps he poſſeſſed leſs knowledge of agricultural ſubjects than Mr. Arthur Young. Theſe Gentlemen were both of them as liable to error as other human beings, and he could not help thinking, from what had come within his own perſonal knowledge, that Mr. Arthur Young was extremely miſtaken, not only in ſtating the deficiency of the laſt crop to amount to more than one third, and in ſome caſes to half of the average produce, but alſo in his aſſerting that ſomething between twenty-two and twenty-four buſhels, was an accurate computation of an average crop. In other reſpects alſo, he had great doubts of the correctneſs of Mr. Arthur Young's ſtatements; and ſurely, ſuppoſing for a moment that Mr. Claude Scott's examination was well founded in every part of it, before the whole country was to be told that the ſcarcity was ſo great, that there was every reaſon to dread an approaching famine, the fact ſhould not depend ſolely on the teſtimony of two witneſſes, and one of them himſelf a corn factor, and conſequently not to be ſuppoſed free from prejudices. In his own neighbourhood, in the county of Kent, he

he did not believe the crops had fallen ſhort in any thing like the proportion ſtated by Mr. Arthur Young. He could not ſpeak to eaſt Kent, but where he lived, and all around him, he had enquired, and been informed that if the crops had fallen ſhort of an average produce, it had been ſcarcely in any caſe more than a fifth. And from what he had heard of the crops in the eaſtern parts of the county, he had every reaſon to believe that the deficiencies in thoſe crops had been much overſtated. With regard to the propoſitions of the right reverend Prelate, he was ſorry to differ from ſo high an authority but they appeared to him to be too feeble and inefficient to do any good; on the contrary, they would tend to occaſion an artificial ſcarcity, and raiſe the price, which was always the caſe when Parliament interfered in ſuch matters. In what had been done three or four years ago, in the dear winter of 1795, when a ſimilar agreement as that now propoſed, had been entered into, inſtead of having any good conſequences, it was well known that it produced a very unfavourable operation; if, therefore, the Houſe now came into the agreement, the moſt probable effect would be, that it would influence the farmer, in expectation of higher prices, to withhold his wheat from the market, and bread would be ſtill dearer than it was at preſent. If Parliament interfered at all, they ought to do ſomething ſtill more effectual; but the firſt ground of it ſhould be evidence given at the bar of the Houſe, and in that caſe he had little doubt, but it would be found and eſtabliſhed upon undeniable proof, not only that the crops had not failed to the extent ſtated by Mr. Arthur Young and Mr. Claude Scott, but that the real ſcarcity was nothing like ſo great as it was repreſented to be in the report. He therefore moved the order of the day.

The *Earl of Liverpool* agreed in opinion with the noble Lord who ſpoke laſt, that any legiſlative act, made by way of interference in an exigency of this nature, might be attended with miſchievous conſequences; but he could not conceive that ſuch a Report as that publiſhed by the Houſe of Commons, on the evidence of two Gentlemen whoſe characters ſtood ſo high in the world for their ſuperior knowledge in agricultural concerns, could be attended with any ſuch conſequences. He thought the right reverend Prelate, who had ſo feelingly come forward with the propoſition now ſubmitted to their Lordſhips, deſerved the thanks both of the Houſe and of the country for his humane and early interference. The prices of wheat had riſen rapidly, in ſome counties it was as as high as twenty-five ſhilling per buſhel. The

calamity unfortunately exiſted, and ought to be met by every means in our power as ſpeedily as poſſible. At the ſame time he was free to confeſs, that the danger ſeemed to be exaggerated, and that the country was not ſo far behind hand as to require any other than meaſures of precaution. The meaſure of the right reverend Prelate met with his approbation, and was, except as to a few words, nearly in his opinion, a ſimilar meaſure to that which had been adopted a few years ago. If the right reverend Prelate would conſent to the alteration or omiſſion of thoſe few words, he ſhould have his entire conſent to the propoſition. His Lordſhip then paid a very high elogium to the univerſal liberality which all ranks of people had ſhewn in their endeavours to ſupply the wants of the pooreſt claſſes in ſo trying a criſis, and deſired to bear honourable teſtimony to the patience, loyalty, moderation, and peaceable diſpoſitions of the great body of the people, in a ſtate of calamity and privation which preſſed ſo hard upon them.

Lord *Clifton (Earl of Darnley)* ſaid, he wiſhed to be underſtood as lamenting the high price of wheat, as ſtated by that right reverend Prelate, as much as he did, and on that account as being anxious to avoid what he conceived had a manifeſt and direct tendency to raiſe it ſtill higher.

Lord *Auckland* ſaid, that he would not preſs for attention in preference to the noble Earl (Lord Suffolk) who was preparing to riſe, if he did not feel himſelf perſonally called upon by the ſpeech of the noble Baron, and alſo by that of his noble Friend who had juſt ſat down. The noble Baron accuſed him of having, on a former day, ſounded the trumpet of alarm upon the momentous queſtion of the deficiency of the laſt crop of grain. He would anſwer to the accuſation, that if he had ſounded the trumpet of truth, he had diſcharged a ſacred and eſſential duty to his countrymen; and certainly he would not be diſcouraged by the admonitions of thoſe who were perſuading themſelves, and were endeavouring to perſuade others, to go forwards towards a precipice with a thoughtleſs ſtep, and with cloſed eyes. Parliamentary reaſons and ſilence were, in ſome caſes, neither deſirable nor poſſible under ſuch a conſtitution as ours. The enormous and increaſing price of bread muſt neceſſarily occupy the attention not only of the people who were ſtruggling under the preſſure, but of the repreſentatives of the people, whoſe office it was, in all caſes of emergency, to give uſeful advice grounded on due enquiry and information. It was, however, an entire miſtake to ſuppoſe, that when he firſt mentioned this

this ſubject to the Houſe a few days before, he had expreſſed any opinion as to the ſpecific failure of the laſt crops. He had merely adverted to the evidence ſtated in the Report of the Houſe of Commons, according to which the deficiency had been from one-third to one-half below an average crop. What the noble Baron had been pleaſed to aſſert with reſpect to the goodneſs of the crops in a part of Kent might be admitted to be correct, and yet it would afford little or no conſolation. He (Lord Auckland) was diſpoſed to think and to ſpeak reſpectfully of the county of Kent, but the produce of ſelected diſtricts in that county, whatever that true produce might be, was ſurely a contemptible object in compariſon of the general produce of Great Britain. It would give neither help nor comfort to thoſe parts of Scotland, and of the north and weſt of England, which are now almoſt entirely without bread, to be told that there had been good crops on the eſtates of ſome Kentiſh Lords. It might be true (as had been ſtated) that an alarm reſpecting the ſuppoſed inſufficiency of crops might create an increaſe of price, and it was alſo true that high prices were in themſelves an evil. But if it ſhould appear in the reſult, that the high prices were founded in real ſcarcity, how fortunate, how infinitely fortunate, would it be, that a timely alarm had been given? Such an alarm might avert the dreadful calamity of famine, in compariſon of which a temporary increaſe of price was of ſmall conſideration. Such an alarm might prevent the ſuſpicion of artificial ſcarcity, and all the wild popular exceſſes which are often occaſioned by ſuch ſuſpicions. But, above all things, it would promote that diſpoſition to economy which the reſolutions propoſed by his good and venerable Relation were meant to improve and to make efficient. It was a ſhort-ſighted objection to thoſe reſolutions, that their impreſſion on the public mind might alſo tend to increaſe the high prices of grain, the ſcarcity of which ſome individuals were pleaſed to conſider as in a great degree artificial. Why they ſhould ſo conſider it in oppoſition to their own recollection of a ſummer and autumn wet and unfavourable almoſt beyond example; why they ſhould ſo conſider it in oppoſition to the notoriety of an actual want of both wheat and oats in ſome parts of the kingdom; and with what ſenſe or propriety they can ſuppoſe that a ſtarving village in the north or in the weſt is to be conſoled and ſatisfied by a cold aſſurance, that it is not right to talk about ſcarcity, and alſo that there is great plenty in ſome particular villages in the ſouth, he would not diſcuſs.

He would only remark, that when the incredulity of noble Lords, under the circumſtances juſt deſcribed, was made the motion for rejecting all precautions againſt a calamity at leaſt very poſſible, it reminded him of an anecdote which he believed might be found in the Spectator. "How much wiſer am I than you?" ſays a thoughtleſs profligate to a good biſhop. "I enjoy all the gratifications and pleaſures of my preſent exiſtence without limit and without reſtraint; becauſe I do not believe that there is a future ſtate." "Young man," replies the biſhop, "I purſue the conduct which my firm perſuaſion of a future day of judgment enforces on me. If my creed ſhould be ill founded, I ſhall, at the worſt, have made no ſacrifices that are not amply compenſated by conſcious rectitude, and by the ſelf-ſatisfaction attendant on virtue and on religion. But if you ſhould be miſtaken in your pretended incredulity, the conſequence will be moſt terrible to you."

Lord Auckland next adverted to ſome remarks which had been made by the noble Earl (Lord Liverpool), not as objections to the propoſed reſolutions, but with a wiſh to aſcertain their practicability and probable effect. It was meant, he ſaid, by recommendation and example to induce the high and middle claſſes to diminiſh the uſe of bread in their families, not in a vague and fallacious proportion below the ordinary conſumption, but a limited and ſpecified quantity. On a full enquiry there was reaſon to believe, that in times of plenty the ordinary conſumption, excluſive of paſtry, and of waſte in many ways, is about a quartern loaf and a half quartern loaf per week for each individual, or nearly fifteen ounces per day. It was now propoſed that, till the next harveſt, the families of the claſſes above mentioned ſhould conſume only one quartern loaf (ſixty-nine ounces), per week for each individual, being at the rate of about ten ounces per day. He could venture to aſſure their Lordſhips, that in all families which are above the labouring claſſes, and poſſeſs the uſe of ſubſtitutes, this reduction would be eaſily practicable. To this it was propoſed to add the diſcontinuance of all paſtry. In many families theſe reductions would be more than a half of the ordinary conſumption; he would, however, ſuppoſe it to be only a third.

There are 750,000 families which pay aſſeſſed taxes. To them may be added many others not paying aſſeſſed taxes, but in eaſy circumſtances, and of the claſs which conſumes wheaten bread. If then their Lordſhips example ſhould operate

operate through the kingdom, and ſhould be generally and fairly adopted, the benefit of the meaſure might be adequate to the whole embarraſſment; it might ſpeedily produce a lowering in the price of bread, and a certain ſufficiency. And even if he were to ſuppoſe the reduction to extend only to 600,000 houſes, or to three millions of inhabitants, the ſaving per week would then amount to one million and a half of quartern loafs per week. Such were the notions and views which originally led him to ſuggeſt and urge the expediency of the reſolution now ſanctioned by ſuch venerable authorities; not only for the ſake of example, but for the efficient and important ſaving which it would produce. And ſurely it was the meaſure beſt calculated to reduce the high price of grain, if the ſcarcity were artificial, and what alone could obviate and prevent the dreadful calamity of famine if the ſcarcity were real. Under theſe impreſſions he would confeſs that his mind was provoked and agitated, when he ſaw the indifference of ſome (he hoped they were few), reſpecting a meaſure of ſuch extreme importance. They reminded him of the French Farmer General, who ſaid, that "he could not conceive how any man could poſſibly die of hunger, becauſe, for his own part, the price of bread was no object to him, and he was ſure that, every day of his life he was in the habit of eating twice as much as was good for his health."

Lord Auckland concluded by aſſuring the Houſe that, though he ſo warmly promoted this meaſure of œconomy, as the beſt and ſureſt means of reſiſting ſcarcity, he was not attached to any meaſure excluſively. He was ready and deſirous to ſupport any other ſuggeſtions which might contribute to reſtore and to maintain a plentiful ſupply of the neceſſaries of life. It was yet uncertain whether Providence might extend to us the bleſſing of a good harveſt in the preſent year, but that harveſt, whatever it might prove, was ſeven months diſtant from us, and ought alſo to be met with a ſtock in hand equal, at leaſt, to one or two months conſumption: he was much ſurpriſed, therefore, at the levity with which ſome individuals, both in and out of parliament, inveighed againſt farmers and factors for not hurrying all the corn to market. It was become neceſſary, though painful, to compare the ſcarcity of 1800, with the ſcarcity of 1796: the parliamentary reports of 1796 ſtated, as at preſent, that the wheat had been one-ſeventh or one-fifth below an average crop. But the barley and oats of that harveſt had been one-fifth better than an average crop: in the harveſt of 1799 they

are

are ſuppoſed to have been, at leaſt, one-fifth below an average crop.

He had ſtated, on a former occaſion, that ſome conſiderable aid might be expected from other countries: not, however, to the extent which ſome perſons were pleaſed to ſuppoſe. Leaſt of all, could much be attainable from France, even if the intercourſe were open. It was well known that in times of peace and of good harveſts, France never had produced ſufficient for her own conſumption. Mr. Necker had explained this circumſtance with much detail and accuracy. All aſſurances, therefore, of a great ſupply of corn to be eventually drawn from France, were utterly unworthy of regard, and to be attributed either to groſs ignorance, or to the malignant deſigns of French fraternity. His countrymen would find their beſt and ſureſt ſupply in their own reſources, and moſt particularly by reducing their conſumption conformably to the reſolutions which the right Rev. Prelate had propoſed, and which the Houſe (it was hoped), would unanimouſly adopt.

Lord *Clifton* (Earl of Darnley), roſe again to explain, and declared that he thought all interference in either Houſe of Parliament, whether legiſlative or not, on ſo very important a ſubject highly improper, and much more likely to raiſe the price of corn than lower it. He ſhould, therefore, ſtill continue to think the noble Lord, notwithſtanding what he had ſaid, had acted very unwiſely in ſounding the trumpet of alarm without ſufficient cauſe, and hoiſting the flag of diſtreſs, before the exiſtence of any real diſtreſs had been proved. His Lordſhip repeated his former declaration, that he verily believed the ſcarcity was not ſo great as it was pretended to be, and that if competent witneſſes were called to the bar and examined, it would be made evident to the ſatisfaction of their Lordſhips, that it had been much exaggerated. Much, therefore, as he reſpected the venerable Prelate, who had ſuggeſted the agreement, he could not, for one, think of coming into ſuch a meaſure, which, if the ſcarcity were as alarming as it had been repreſented, would be found to be contemptibly inadequate as an efficient remedy; he did not object to the agreement in itſelf, but to the manner of its being brought forward; indeed, he admitted there was a ſcarcity, to a certain degree, and ſo fully convinced was he that all meaſures of practicable œconomy in families would do good, that he had ſome time ſince done every thing in his own family to leſſen the conſumption of wheat, as far as could

could be reasonably done, in respect to bread, and every other article used for the support of life.

The *Earl of Suffolk* lamented very much that any such event as the present should call for their Lordships consideration. He approved, however, of the measure now proposed by the right Rev. Prelate, and hoped the House would agree to it; but he begged leave to warn the House, that this scarcity of corn was a radical and growing evil, owing to the immense waste lands which were suffered to lie uncultivated in every part of the country. His Lordship then recommended the House to consider how far rice mixed with flour might be made a substitute for bread, and assured the House that he had eaten rice bread, mixed with flour, of as good a quality and as pleasant to the palate as any wheaten bread he had ever tasted. His Lordship after stating the immense quantity of acres of waste lands in the different parts of the kingdom, and mentioning, in particular, that there were 500 acres on one of his own estates, and 2000 on another, waiting in expectation of a general enclosure bill; he begged leave to suggest as a means of applying an efficient relief to the present scarcity of wheat, and wheat flour, for every parish in London and Westminster, to appoint a Committee, who should invite a general emulation among the parishioners to endeavour to find the best and cheapest substitute for bread, and to give some moderate reward to that person who gave in the most practicable substitute, which would require the smallest quantity of flour; each Committee to refer such plans as they selected as the best, to the Board of Agriculture, who should be empowered to give a premium to the inventor of that substitute, which they should deem the most cheap, nutritious and palatable.

Lord *Hobart* approved of the agreement proposed by the Rev. Prelate at the head of the church, and said, the example might, and possibly would have some degree of influence on the subjects in general, and surely the abstaining from the use of bread and flour would rather tend to lower than to raise the price of it. He was satisfied that there had been to a considerable extent a failure of the crops of the late harvest, and it was, he conceived, highly useful to take such a measure as had been that day proposed, in order to convince the lower orders, and especially the poor, that their Lordships were not inattentive to their distresses.

Lord *Romney* declared himself a zealous advocate for giving the poor every possible degree of aid, and for limiting the consumption

conſumption of wheat, ſo far that none of it ſhould be waſted. But, really, he did not ſee how it was deſirable or practicable for noble Lords to abandon their former habits of hoſpitality, ſo as ſtrictly to conform to what this reſolution would impoſe upon them. For this reaſon, though willing to contribute every thing elſe in his power, he could not conſent to ſubſcribe the agreement now offered to them. His Lordſhip very much doubted whether the ſcarcity was ſo great as was imagined. He agreed with the noble Lord his neighbour, that in Kent the harveſt had not failed, though the crops might not have turned out as large as thoſe of 1798. He believed that the ſcarcity was artificial, and that at this moment there were many granaries and large warehouſes full of wheat on the banks of the Thames, the owners of which held them back from the market in hopes of the price riſing ſtill higher. His Lordſhip ſaid, he thought the Report of the Committee ſuperficial and inadequate, and that the Committee ought to have gone deeper into the ſubject, and carried their enquiries much farther.

The *Biſhop of Durham* ſaid, that the reſolutions juſt offered to their Lordſhips met with his moſt hearty concurrence, as he had no doubt their Lordſhips example would greatly influence other perſons, and convince the poor that thoſe of higher rank were not inattentive to their wants and neceſſities. He would earneſtly recommend it to men of rank and fortune to go ſtill farther in privations. They ſhould ſet examples of economy and ſelf-denial in every other luxury of the table as well as in bread; otherwiſe they could not expect the lower orders would pay attention to their recommendations, while they were indulging in all thoſe luxuries of which the others were deprived. He could not concur with the noble Lord (Lord Darnley), in his objections, nor think that ſuch an interference as that propoſed by the right Rev. Prelate at the head of the church, could be attended with any miſchievous conſequences. It certainly was no act of the legiſlature, or parliamentary regulation, but a voluntary agreement made by ſuch noble Lords only, who thought proper to join in it, brought forward by high and moſt reſpectable authority, in that ſolemn manner which was moſt likely to create a ſerious effect on the publick, and, therefore, regarding it as a conſiderate, humane, and wiſe meaſure, he ſhould moſt cordially ſubſcribe to it.

Lord *Grenville* ſaid that he had not been preſent when this meaſure was propoſed to the Houſe by the right Reverend Prelate,

Prelate, and could only form his judgment of what had paſſed on it from what had fallen from noble Lords ſince he came in. He was of opinion that the leſs diſcuſſion took place on the ſubject, either in that Houſe or any other place, the better. The calamity had ariſen from a diſpenſation of Providence in the late failure of the harveſt, and, that undoubtedly every thing which could properly be done to meet it with effect, ſhould as ſpeedily as poſſible be eſſayed. His Lordſhip could not but differ from his noble Friend (Lord Auckland), in reſpect to the ſtory which his noble Friend had quoted from a well-known book. He did not ſee that the ſtory applied to the argument of his noble Friend near him (Lord Cliſton), and muſt own that he thought creating ſo great an alarm might do miſchief, and raiſe the price of wheat. He thought, alſo, that the Committee of the Houſe of Commons had over-rated the danger, and not carried their enquiry far enough.

Lord *Cliſton (Earl of Darnley)* ſaid, that although he continued of the ſame opinion, in deference to what appeared the general ſenſe of the Houſe, he ſhould withdraw his motion for the order of the day. He could not, however, ſit down again, without obſerving to the learned Prelate (the Biſhop of Durham), that he was perfectly aware, that what had been propoſed was not a legiſlative act, nor had it even the authority of a regular parliamentary proceeding; but it was not be denied, that brought forward as it had been in that Houſe by the venerable Prelate at the head of the church, it aſſumed all the appearance of a parliamentary proceeding, and would carry with it all the influence of a parliamentary proceeding; it was on that account that he had deprecated it, as he was perſuaded it would do more harm than good, and rather tend to raiſe than to reduce the price of wheat. As however the reverend and learned Prelate (the Biſhop of Durham) thought him ſo completely refuted by thoſe noble Lords who had, in the opinion of the learned Prelate, anſwered him ſo ably, though they had not condeſcended to uſe any argument in ſupport of their opinions, he was determined to produce proof in ſupport of his.

The *Lord Chancellor* left the Woolſack, and ſaid that he approved in the greateſt part the meaſure brought forward by the right Rev. Prelate, if ſome of the terms were ſo altered as to make it appear the propoſition and agreement of thoſe noble Lords who ſigned it, and he had no doubt the right Rev.

Prelate would readily conſent to the alteration. As it ſtood now it was in the form of a reſolution, and a reſolution of the noble Lords as a body, ſeemed as if it was a legiſlative act. His Lordſhip ſaid, that any legiſlative act, in his opinion, would tend to do more prejudice than ſervice in a caſe of this kind. His Lordſhip then took notice of the Report of the Houſe of Commons, and was by no means ſatisfied with its being founded on the opinions of two gentlemen only. That was not the beſt evidence which might have been obtained, becauſe much more was to have been had; neither had the proceedings of the Committee been diſcreet or accurate on the occaſion: they had put the queſtions in ſuch a manner that they could only receive one anſwer to them; and they had been extremely deficient in their enquiries. For inſtance, they had not enquired accurately into the ſtate of the remaining ſurplus of the plentiful crops of 1798, a point extremely material, and important, as the probability of impending ſcarcity in a great meaſure depended on that ſingle point. That ſurplus was undoubtedly abundant. When farmers applied for a renewal of their leaſes, they were ready enough to apply for an abatement of their rent, alledging that they could not afford to ſell their corn at the then market price. The knowledge of that fact ſhould have made the Committee more cautious in their enquiries, when the queſtion lay on the other ſide. He agreed with Lord Clifton, that Mr. Arthur Young muſt have been much miſtaken in his calculation as to the average produce of corn in England, when he had fixed it from twenty-two to twenty-four buſhels an acre. The noble and learned Lord ſaid, that in the courſe of the laſt twenty-five years he had had many opportunities, both private and public, of inveſtigating the average price of corn and other proviſions, and he had found, as well from thoſe as from the opinion of one of the greateſt men this country had produced (Mr. Burke), who had certainly the moſt accurate and extenſive knowledge and information of the proviſions of this country, and he, and all thoſe he had conſulted on the ſubject, were convinced that the average produce of corn, take the whole country throughout, was not more than twenty buſhels an acre. His Lordſhip then propoſed, that inſtead of the word—*Reſolved*, that we the underſigned—the word *Agreed* ſhould be ſubſtituted, which was acceded to, and the meaſure adopted.

The

The Reſolutions as they paſſed, ſtood as follows:

Reſolved, *nemine diſſentiente*, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament aſſembled, that in conſequence of the high price and deficient ſhpply of wheat and other grain, it is expedient to adopt ſuch meaſures as may be practicable for diminiſhing the conſumption thereof, during the continuance of the preſent preſſure, and for introducing the uſe of ſuch articles as may conveniently be ſubſtituted in the place thereof.

Reſolved, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament aſſembled, that the agreement hereunto ſubjoined be engroſſed and laid upon the table of this Houſe, in order to be ſubſcribed by any Lord of this Houſe who ſhall think fit to ſubſcribe the ſame himſelf, or in his name by any other Lord.

Agreement. In conſequence of the high price of grain, and the evils ariſing therefrom, we the underſigned agree, that until the tenth day of *October* next, we will not conſume, nor permit to be conſumed, in any week within our reſpective families, more wheaten bread than in the proportion of one quartern loaf for each of the individuals of whom our ſaid families may be compoſed. And alſo, that during the ſaid period, we will diſcontinue, and cauſe to be diſcontinued, within our ſaid families, all paſtry.

It was immediately ſubſcribed by the following Peers,

J. Cantuar.	Hood.
Loughborough.	James Ely.
Stewart of Garlies.	Buckinghamſhire.
Liverpool.	J. Oxford.
Boſton.	Macartney.
Hobart.	Suffolk.
Auckland.	J. Ciceſt.
B. London.	Pomfret.
G. Lincoln.	Rawdon.
S. Roſſens.	Camelford.
Montfort.	Newark.
Northeſk.	Gwydir.
S. Dunelm.	

MOTION FOR PEACE.

The order of the day having been moved,

Earl *Stanhope* ſaid, My lords, not having for ſeveral years troubled your lordſhips with my ſentiments on public affairs, I conſider it to be my duty, in the preſent alarming ſituation of the country, to ſuggeſt to your lordſhips why you ought, and how you might put an end to it; I ſhould, indeed, deem myſelf highly culpable if I delayed longer in ſubmitting to your lordſhips my ſincere and conſcientious opinion on this important ſubject. My Lords, I have to regret, more than I can expreſs, that the honeſt, and, I truſt, judicious advice

I gave early in the war, did not at that time meet your Lordſhips' approbation. If I can prove that the danger ariſing from a continuance of the war is greater than any danger than can be reaſonably imagined in putting an end to it—if I can ſatisfy your Lordſhips that there would be an advantage ariſing from peace, which it will be impoſſible to obtain by continuing the conteſt—if I can prove that you are waſting your reſources, even if the war was in certain reſpects proper, (though I contend it is proper in none) faſter than the French Republic is waſting her's—if I can ſhew that this war is to be attributed either to the miſconception of his Majeſty's miniſters, or, what is worſe, to the groſſeſt want of integrity (I truſt it is attributable to their miſconception)—if I can offer reaſons which have occurred to me ſince I retired into the country, that ſhew the indiſpenſible neceſſity of putting an end to the war—I then flatter myſelf, I ſhall have your Lordſhips' approbation in favour of the motion I ſhall have the honour to ſubmit. Anxious as I am to obtain your approbation, I am more anxious to obtain your votes, but much more anxious to obtain your conviction; for I think, though there are many who perhaps would not, by any thing I can ſay, be perſuaded to vote for a ſpecific propoſition of peace; yet, if convinced by my arguments of the neceſſity of it, they might give that advice in private to thoſe who have the power to terminate the war, as in all probability would be productive of that effect. My Lords, there is one topic ſo important, that I cannot wave the diſcuſſion of it, I mean the ſubject of finance; as it is a ſubject generally conceived to be difficult, I will make it clear; as it is ſuppoſed to be a dull ſubject, I will be ſhort; and as it certainly is a ſubject of the firſt importance, I feel it my duty not to paſs it over in ſilence. I ſhall have no diſpute with miniſters about figures, for I have in my hand a pamphlet publiſhed by the Secretary of the Treaſury, ſtating a great number of items, ſeveral of which I diſapprove, but every one of which I will take, ſo that we ſhall not have the debate diverted from principle to detail. We ſhall have no quarrel about millions or pounds, but you will have a picture of the ſituation of the country, ſuch as none of your Lordſhips have had the leaſt conception of. I will endeavour to debate the whole queſtion as becomes the ſubject and as becomes myſelf, with that temper and moderation beſt calculated to produce conviction. A Noble Lord acted properly when he applauded another Noble Lord this evening

evening for ſounding the trumpet of alarm; your Lordſhips will do right to hear me alſo ſound the trumpet of alarm, and the trumpet of truth. There is one item which I ſhall ſtate, which is not in Mr. Roſe's book, and which he has totally omitted, not being a tax paid to government, namely, the amount at which I ſhall take the parochial and county rates; but except that one item, let it be remembered that there is not one item in the account which I am going to ſtate to your Lordſhips, that is not to be found in the book I hold in my hand, publiſhed by that Secretary of the Treaſury. The items ſtated by Mr. Roſe I have endeavoured to bring to a point, the better to enable your Lordſhips to underſtand them; theſe are ſo diſperſed in his book, that unleſs they were brought under one view, it would be impoſſible for your Lordſhips to comprehend them. In the laſt page of this pamphlet you will find an appendix (No. 7), the title of which is. "An Account of the Income of Great Britain, as ſtated by Mr. Pitt, diſtinguiſhing the portion of it likely to be taxable under the Act." Your Lordſhips will ſee in this ſtatement, as it was preſented to the Houſe of Commons, a return of the income landlords: it is ſtated at the rate of 12s. 6d. per acre the average. Will any man ſay that 12s. 6d. per acre is the average for the whole country? Certainly it is too much; but I will not quarrel with him for this; the produce, taking this ſtatement for granted, then is 25,000,000l.—This is the whole amount of the income of all the landlords in the country, high and low, rich and poor. Well, but Mr Roſe makes a deduction for thoſe landlords whoſe incomes are under 60l. a year, who pay nothing, and for thoſe under 200l. a year, who will pay, on an average, only one-fiftieth, the reſult of which is, that out of the 25,000,000l. of income, that which is actually taxable amounts, according to Mr. Roſe, to no more than 20,000,000l. But ſee what egregious blunders he makes, for in two ſubſequent items he takes Scotland and the places beyond ſeas at 10,000,000l. but without making the ſmalleſt deduction, or diſtinguiſhing the taxable part from that which is not taxable. Is there not a deduction to be made here? Will he ſay there is no landlord in Scotland, whoſe income is below 200l. a year? No ſchool-boy would commit ſuch blunders, or proceed on ſuch falſe calculations. He then puts down 2,000,000l. for the profeſſions; what is this but ſaying to the people of the country, the more you are ſick, and the more you are litigious, the more you are capable to

pay

pay taxes. For although it be perfectly true that the profeſſions may he taxed, yet the income of the profeſſions ſhould, in the ſtatement of the account be deducted out of the income of thoſe by whom the profeſſions are ſupported. His next item is the income upon houſes, and that he ſtates at 6,000,000l. In all taxes, where owners of houſes are themſelves occupiers, they are liable to repairs and various expences, which conſequently operate *quoad* ſuch houſes as a defalcation of income inſtead of an encreaſe, and render the ſtatement in this particular erroneous. Therefore I ſhall omit the item reſpecting houſes, as well as the item reſpecting the profeſſions.

Lord *Auckland* addreſſed a few words to the Lord Chancellor, but in too low a tone of voice to be heard.

Lord *Stanhope* ſaid, I wiſh the Noble Lord would ſpeak a little louder. What he ſays is, I dare ſay, very ſenſible, and I ſhould wiſh to hear him. But to proceed—I ſay, if a perſon lets a houſe, and receives a net income, a certain tax may be eſtimated upon it; but the perſon who hires the houſe is poorer to the ſame amount, and therefore is to the ſame amount leſs liable to pay taxes. Therefore the houſes which are let by the owners, as well as thoſe which are inhabited by the owners, ſhould all be omitted in making up the account. Now, my Lords, I have to make ſuch a ſtatement relative to the finances of the country, as muſt aſtoniſh you; and after having ſtated the ſum total, I ſhall give you the articles of which it is compoſed; and I have the book of the Secretary of the Treaſury, ſo that if any perſon doubts my ſtatement, he may take the book and caſt up the items. I can alſo ſtate the very pages; and if miniſters ſhall object to any of the items of the Secretary of the Treaſury, it will be a difference of opinion between miniſters and George Roſe, and not between miniſters and Citizen Stanhope. [*A general burſt of laughter.*] My Lords, the melancholy fact proved by this book is, that the expences of the country, after the war, ſuppoſing its immediate termination to take place, including the taxes paid to government, including the tythes paid the clergy, which are a tax, as they reſpect thoſe who pay them, and including the pariſh rates, which alſo is a tax, would amount to the enormous ſum of 44,354,000l. per. annum; and this ſuppoſing peace was to take place to-morrow. I wiſh Noble Lords would take down the items which compoſe this ſum total, for a ſubject of more importance there cannot be. I take alſo from Mr. Roſe another article

article of which I have got the total, and that is the whole ſubject of the land which can be taxed, and which he calls taxable; it includes the whole produce of all the lands in England, above 200l. per annum, and all the lands in Scotland without exception, and all the incomes of individuals in Great Britain ariſing from property in Ireland, and the Eaſt and Weſt Indies. The income of all our landed poſſeſſions at home and beyond ſea will, according to the items in Mr. Roſe's account, give a ſum total of only 43,000,000l. annually. Take this ſum, and conſider, at the ſame time, the amount of the taxes you would have to pay after the war, if it were to ceaſe to-morrow. It will then appear that the amount of the taxes is 1,350,000l. a year more than the whole landed produce of the kingdom and its dependencies, according to the ſtatement of Mr. Roſe himſelf. Will miniſters venture to tell us of the real proſperity of the country, when they are thus boaſting of the flouriſhing ſtate of the public revenue, when our taxes are not only more than the produce of England, but of Scotland, Ireland, and the Indies Eaſt and Weſt. I do not believe any Noble Lord was aware ſuch a ſtatement could have been laid before the Houſe. [*A laugh from the Croſs Bench.*] You laugh! I am aſtoniſhed miniſters ſhould treat ſo ſerious a queſtion with levity; but I will ſtate particulars, and then let them laugh if they can. The items are as follow:

Total Annual produce of the Land which can be taxed.

Landlords Rents, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe - -	£. 20,000,000
Tenants Profits, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe - - -	6,000,000
Mines, Navigation, and Timber, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe -	3,000,000
Tithes of the Superior Clergy, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe -	4,000,000
Proportions for Scotland, and Poſſeſſions beyond Sea, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe - - - - -	10,000,000
Total Annual Produce of the Land which can be taxed	£. 43,000,000

Annual Taxes after the War, if the War were to end to-morrow.

Eſtimates of the Peace Eſtabliſhment, as ſtated by the Committee in 1791, and as ſtated by Mr. Roſe -	£. 16,000,000
Charge incurred during the War, by Loans and Funding, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe - - - -	8,264,000
Increaſed Charges not included in the Eſtimate of 1792 (in conſequence of the increaſe of Pay for 18,000 Seamen, and of the Army; and alſo in conſequence of increaſed Half-pay, &c. &c. as ſtated by Mr Roſe, in page 5 and 6)	1,260,000
Additional Peace Eſtabliſhment beyond the Eſtabliſhment in the laſt peace, together with the expence of Yeomanry and Volunteers, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe -	1,330,000
Total of Tythes paid by the people, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe	5,000,000

Parochial

Parochial and County Rates - - -	5,000,000
Income Tax, as ſtated by Mr. Roſe - -	7,500,000
Total of Taxes per annum - - -	44,354,000
Deduct the total Annual Produce of the Land which can be taxed, as ſtated above - - -	43,000,000
Annual Deficiency after the War, if the War were to ceaſe to-morrow - - - - -	1,354,000

Now I cannot, my Lords, ſuppoſe any error in this ſtatement. If I ſhould be contradicted, and told that it proceeds upon miſtaken principles, I muſt do that which none of your Lordſhips will imagine I came down to this houſe to do, namely to juſtify George Roſe. I have ſtated the whole produce of the country, and the whole of the taxes. The taxes exceed the income in the proportion I have mentioned; I mean excluſively of the trade of the country. I have to quarrel with Mr. Roſe for his eſtimate reſpecting the income ariſing from trade. The fair way is to draw the balance by conſidering what comes in from abroad in contradiſtinction to what goes abroad. His eſtimate of the balance of trade which he ſtates at 14,000,000l. is unfair; becauſe no man will ſuppoſe, that it can continue to be 14,000,000l. after the war is over, and which even now is an exaggerated ſtatement; but, to have no diſpute upon this ſubject, I will take the ſuppoſed balance of trade exactly as he gives it. Now, my Lords, as to the comparative ſtrength of England and France—when I was a member of the Houſe of Commons, I moved for a return of the number of houſes in England and Wales; they appeared by the return to be about 1,000,000; and this fact has been aſcertained, that when you want to know the number of inhabitants of a country, get the number of houſes, and multiply by 4 and 3-4ths, and you arrive nearly at the true eſtimate. I, however, multiplied by 5—this gives 5,000,000 for England and Wales, which, with the population of Scotland, makes 6,000,000. Now then look to the population of the French Republic. I find, that including Savoy and Nice, and all thoſe countries it has conquered on the Rhine, the population of France is from 32 to 33,000,000, and this does not include the inhabitants of thoſe countries which are allied to France, that is to ſay, Holland, Switzerland, and Spain. In eſtimating the reſources of England and the French Republic, I ſhall in the firſt place, deduct what the people of this country pay for parochial and county rates, becauſe I have no information of the exact

exact amount of payments of a ſimilar nature made in France. This reduces our taxes 5,000,000l. below the ſtatement I made to your Lordſhips. Then taking what remains, namely, 39,354,000l. and dividing it by the ſix millions of inhabitants in Great Britain, you will find, that what the people of this country have to pay in taxes and in tythes will amount to above 6l. 10s. for every inhabitant. Now I find by Mr. Roſe's eſtimate, that the whole ſum paid by the French Republic annually to its government is 15,000,000l. conſequently 15,000,000l. to be paid by 32,000,000 of inhabitants, amounts to leſs than 10s. each; yet we are told that this country, where we pay 6l. 10s. is the beſt governed country in the world; and France, where they pay only 10s. is oppreſſed by its rulers, diſtracted in its councils, ruined in its finances, and incapable of defending itſelf. It is impoſſible for any one to conſider ſuch an argument in a ſerious point of view. The next point to which I ſhall draw the attention of your Lordſhips, is the comparative ſtate of the cultivation of England and France. Having been in places where I have ſeen much waſte land, I am the better enabled to ſpeak on this ſubject. [*Here ſome noble Lords on the Woolſack ſeemed inattentive.*] I muſt beg, ſaid he, that I may be heard with attention; for though this does not interrupt me, it interrupts the Houſe, and that if I am wrong, it may be pointed out to me. I have been in ſeveral diſtricts in Devonſhire, and I have found, in that one county, more waſte land than there is land altogether in the county of Middleſex. [*He was again interrupted.*] I cannot allow noble Lords to ſpeak ſo; if they will talk, at leaſt let me hear what they ſay. I have to ſtate that, with reſpect to France, ſince hunting in the country has been ſo much diminiſhed, that is, ſince the revolution, and overthrow of the feudal ſyſtem, it has been remarkably well cultivated. What a noble Lord (Auckland), who really ſhifts about the Houſe, ſo that I do not know where to look for him; he is not now in his place; what he ſays as to the cultivation of France proceeds upon a miſ-ſtatement; he tells you there is no corn in France, at leaſt not ſufficient to afford any ſupply to this country, becauſe M. Necker ſtated ſome years ago, that France did not, upon an average, produce quite corn enough for its own conſumption; but he ſhould recollect, ſince that period the country has been materially changed, the land has experienced a higher degree of cultivation, and that cultivation has been accelerated by the labour of the women as well as the men.

The people of France have been much diminiſhed by emigration and war; therefore it is to be preſumed, that with their decreaſed population, and increaſed ſtate of agriculture, they may have corn to ſpare for exportation. Beſides, look to the rich and fertile countries along the Rhine, that did not belong to France at the time when M. Necker wrote; and it is very material here to obſerve, that thoſe fertile countries along the Rhine communicate to Great Britain by water carriage, and that from their not having been able, on account of the war, to carry their produce by ſea to other countries, nor to the ſouth of France, that there is every reaſon to think that corn might be procured in great quantities from thoſe countries, to relieve the preſent alarming ſcarcity in Great Britain. What I mean to offer as an argument from this, is, that if you take the produce of the whole cultivated land of Great Britain, and the whole cultivated land of new France, that is to ſay, of the whole country, extending from the Pyrennees to the Rhine, and from the Engliſh Channel to the Alps, to the ſame market, the amount of the latter would be ſix times as much as the former; ſo that the produce of the land of France is upwards of 200,000,000l. more than that of England and its dependencies, including alſo the 14,000,000l. ſtated by Mr. Roſe as the balance of trade in our favour. Conſequently, giving ourſelves all the benefit of our trade, and ſuppoſing France to have none at all, ſtill the advantage in favour of the Republic is conſiderably above ten to three. Then, I aſk, what ground is there for ſtating France as a ruined country, and incapable of carrying on the war? Suppoſe two men of equal income, and one of them does as France does, that is, lives within his, while the other, like England, exceeds it; can theſe be put in competition with each other, as to whoſe finances will hold the longer? Beſides, if there are two men of equal income, and one pays 6l. 10s. a year, for every 10s. which the other pays, is there any compariſon between them? Is not the man who pays no tythes more capable of ſupporting himſelf than he who pays them (as is the caſe in England?) Then, as to the aſſiſtance you can derive from national lands, you have none. Again, ſuppoſe two men, one with a clear unincumbered eſtate, and another with a mortgaged one, can they ſpend upon the ſame ſyſtem? Muſt not the man with the mortgaged eſtate be firſt exhauſted? And the national debt is clearly an enormous mortgage on the lands of England; whereas the French, by carrying on the war without borrowing any conſiderable

ſiderable ſum, are in that reſpect in a much better ſituation than us. If this is not palpable, then there is no truth in arithmetic, or in figures. I ſhall now proceed to conſider the conſequences of continuing the war. The firſt object that preſents itſelf is your increaſed and incalculable expences. I aſſert, that utter and inevitable ruin awaits the country if you go on with the war. When the people of France are paying 10s. a head, and thoſe in this country 6l. 10s. will it not have a very material effect upon your manufactures as ſoon as peace arrives, and then enable all nations to trade without interruption? How can you contend againſt France, while the price of labour is at ſo enormous a rate? How is it poſſible you can prevent her from underſelling you in the markets? I will give you an inſtance. Your Lordſhips know that ſome of the articles of trade of this country were uſed to be exported duty free; before this war, ſugars from the Weſt Indies, were exported without paying any tax; but there being a war, not for the deliverance of England, for ſhe did not require to be delivered, but for the deliverance of Europe; ſuch a deliverance as that of Jeruſalem at the time of the cruſades: for I look upon the deliverance of Europe, and that of Jeruſalem by the cruſades, as nearly ſimilar. But our precipitate Miniſters wiſely thought, if Europe was to be delivered, ſhe ought to pay for her own deliverance—then how to make her? Why, in the ſhape of ſugar. It was not conſidered as a very ſweet meaſure by thoſe who felt the effects of it; and, my Lords, the people on the other ſide of the water are as cunning as on this. What did they ſay to it? They ſaid we will go as neutral traders to the French iſlands, get their ſugars, and underſell you in Europe. What was the conſequence of this? At Hamburgh large quantities of Engliſh ſugars remained unſold in the warehouſes, to the amount in value (as I have been well informed by one of the firſt merchants in the city), of between 9 and 10,000,000l. ſterling, waſting in quality as well as in quantity, and the merchants were compelled to become bankrupts. My Lords, depend upon it, whenever by impoſing taxes you contrive to raiſe the price of labour, the French will underſell you after peace is made; and then what becomes of your 14,000,000l. the balance of trade in your favour? If the French ſhould be able to underſell you, ſuppoſing you were to make peace to-morrow, what muſt you not expect if this war is to be continued? What but certain ruin to your trade. When we ſee the preſent ſituation of things in this country,

I ſhould like to know how taxes are to be procured; the beſt part of the property of the people is already abſorbed. Can you lay more taxes on them? Tell me where are you to get revenue? Previouſly to the American war, the father of the preſent Secretary of Sate aſks, "where can you get revenue?" Becauſe that Miniſters ſuppoſed, even at that time, that the country was ſo grievouſly taxed, that it was impoſſible to raiſe more revenue in Great Britain. That Miniſter, however, was miſtaken; and proceeding upon his miſtake, he formed the plan of laying taxes upon America—and inſtead of finding revenue America was loſt altogether to this country. Yet we are inſulted with falſe ſtatements of the proſperity of this country, and with the flouriſhing ſtatements of government revenue; for I confeſs that it fills my mind with horror, when I hear men talk of a flouriſhing government revenue, which means in reality nothing more than an enormous load of taxes, and a prepoſterous ſyſtem of taxation. There is infinitely more wiſdom in the American government, in making it a boaſt that its expences do not exceed 200,000l. annually, than there is in the government of this country, which makes it a boaſt that it is 40,000,000l. To talk of national proſperity, when the expence of a government is ſo inordinate, is an inſult to common ſenſe. Let us therefore hear no more of this inſolent vapouring, about a flouriſhing government revenue. It is like a man with a fine noble manſion (and England would have been a fine noble manſion, had it not been for miſmanagement and wars), who ſhould be abſurd enough to ſay, O! I am mighty well off, no man can be in a more flouriſhing ſituation; I have a grand houſe to live in, every thing comfortable, and I have amongſt its timbers *a moſt flouriſhing dry rot*. Having ſufficiently detained your Lordſhips on the ſubject of finance, and offered arguments enough to make it your duty to enter upon enquiry, I ſhall now offer you my reaſons for making peace, and preventing that dreadful evil which war has introduced into the country in the ſhape of famine. I agree that it is the failure of the harveſt, and the very ſhort crops, that produced the ſcarcity, but the extent of that calamity is occaſioned by the war; and, my Lords, for my opinion I will give you *ſeven* reaſons. *(A laugh throughout the Houſe).* I will ſtate my reaſons in detail, for notwithſtanding this laugh, I hold it to be the duty of Miniſters (whom I challenge either to contradict my aſſertions, or to anſwer the arguments which I ſhall uſe), to ſtate to the Houſe what they conceive

conceive to be the facts, in order that falſe alarms may not go abroad in conſequence of what I ſhall advance. Although the preſent ſcarcity was produced by the laſt ſcanty crop, yet the extent of it, ſo as to produce the danger of ſpreading famine, has been produced by the war, for the ſeven following reaſons: In the firſt place, proviſions are waſted and conſumed in time of war, to an extent that no man will pretend to ſay they are in time of peace. Secondly, there is a conſiderable decreaſe in the operations of agriculture by taking ſo many men from their labours in the field to fill up the army and navy. Thirdly, becauſe the war has been a check throughout the kingdom, as well as in Devonſhire, to which I have particularly alluded, to that cultivation of waſte lands which would moſt undoubtedly have taken place, if it had not been for the war. Fourthly, the effect the war has towards the producing the failure of large and extenſive commercial houſes. For, had it not been for the war, you would not have had the tax on ſugars; and if you had not had that tax, you would not have been underſold by other countries, and conſequently you would not have had ſo many failures. There would then have been more private capital in this country, which might have been employed in procuring corn from abroad. Fifthly, it is moſt clear that the public revenue, which has been prodigally expended in expeditions to the continent, in building barracks, and in ſubſidizing foreign powers, might have been better and more uſefully employed in purchaſing a ſufficient ſtock of corn, and in building granaries to ſtore it, by which means we might have been enabled to have met the preſent ſcarcity without inconvenience. My Lords, I know ſomething of granaries, in conſequence of having been formerly at Geneva, where, in time of cheapneſs, they lay their corn in granaries, in order that, when they are viſited by ſcarcity, they may be enabled to ſell it to the people at a cheap rate. You will aſk how they preſerve it? I will tell you. It has been ſaid parliamentary regulations on this ſubject are improper; but I wiſh there was a Parliamentary regulation with regard to what I am going to mention. My Lords, there are means of drying wheat made uſe of in Geneva by which they can keep it fifty years; when you dry it and expel the moiſture from it, it is no longer capable of corruption. I have eat bread made of wheat that has been kept that time, and it has been extremely palateable, as much ſo as any other. Inſtead, then, of waſting the public money in abſurd expeditions to Holland, and building

building barracks and filling them with ſoldiers, endeavour to expedite a peace, build granaries, and fill them with corn. Sixthly, war renders it neceſſary you ſhould take up ſhips for the conveyance of troops, that ought to be employed in bringing corn from abroad; there are plenty of places in the Netherlands from whence you could have a ſupply. And ſeventhly, this unfortunate war has ſhut up the ports of thoſe countries that could ſupply you; by peace you will open them, and reſtore plenty. Let me obſerve one thing, if it was known that this ſcarcity was likely to have exiſted, meaſures ought to have been propoſed at the beginning of Parliament. The right Rev. Prelate who propoſed his reſolutions this night has unfortunately come too late. If there was ground for alarm, it was unbecoming in Miniſters to be ſquabbling about creating falſe alarms in the country; it was their duty to have come ſooner to Parliament. I repeat that the extent of the ſcarcity ariſes from the war. Without the war you might have had a ſcarcity; but you could have had no proſpect of a famine. If you go on with the war, in ſpite of the melancholy forebodings you have had of its conſequences; if you go on, and ſuch a thing as a ſerious ſcarcity and famine ſhould take place, and that ſhould produce a political convulſion, it will be a dear calamity to a country like England. A political convulſion in a country with a government like this, depending for ſupport and protection upon its agriculture, its navy, its commerce, and paper credit, cannot take place with impunity to thoſe whoſe miſconduct ſhall have produced it. This country is like a curious, finely-wrought inſtrument, you cannot throw it into a ſtate of anarchy, without deſtroying it entirely. It is not merely the poor manufacturer or induſtrious artizan that will ſuffer, every deſcription of men in the country, whatever may be their rank, will feel the miſeries attendant on this country being convulſed. A noble Lord near the Chancellor (Liverpool), has ſtated, that vaſt quantities of corn have been imported annually theſe laſt ſeven years. I pricked up my ears at theſe words, my Lords, for that is the exact duration of this war. What is to be inferred from this? That you have had ſhort harveſts before; you had reaſon to expect a repetition of them. You ought therefore to have guarded againſt the evil before it arrived, and for not doing ſo, Miniſters are anſwerable to God and to their country. My Lords, for my part, I love the true principles of the conſtitution of my country, but I know it has its abuſes, and I wiſh

wiſh to ſee thoſe abuſes corrected. There are men, even now, who profeſs to be ſo fond of it, ſo attached even to its abuſes, that they will not conſent to have them removed; let me aſk what benefit can we derive from our conſtitution when the *Habeas Corpus* Act is ſuſpended? What are, I will aſk any man of common ſenſe, the benefits which we can poſſibly derive from this boaſted conſtitution, if, by means of famine hereafter raging throughout the land, we ſhould thereby be involved in anarchy, chaos, and confuſion? I am come down to this Houſe to implore your Lordſhips moſt earneſtly, and upon my knees, to put an end to the calamities of this cruel war, to preſerve the country, and to ſave the people. My Lords, Miniſters cannot ſay theſe things were not foreſeen. I deſire to have the proteſt of Earl Stanhope of Friday, February 1, 1793, read."

The following proteſt was then read:—

DISSENTIENT,

1ſt, Becauſe war is a ſtate ſo unnatural, ſo barbarous in itſelf, ſo calamitous in its effects, ſo immoral when unneceſſary, and ſo atrocious when unjuſt, that every friend of humanity ſhould endeavour to avoid it; and the eſtabliſhment of a pacific ſyſtem ought to be the firſt policy of a wiſe and enlightened nation.

2dly, Becauſe peace is always for the intereſt of the common people in all countries; and Great Britain and France, from their peculiar ſituation, have an evident intereſt to remain at peace with each other.

3dly, Becauſe it is a well-known fact that the people in France are, in general, extremely deſirous to maintain and ſtrengthen between that county and this, the bonds of amity and friendſhip. And ever ſince the overthrow of deſpotiſm in France, the commonalty in that nation have ſuch irreſiſtible weight, that we might reſt aſſured, that as peace with Great Britain is for the intereſt, and is the wiſh of the people of France, it would therefore be the conſtant object of their government, if not firſt provoked by our Miniſters, by ſuch acts as the ſending away the French ambaſſador, and expreſsly refuſing to acknowledge their new government.

4thly, Becauſe the old, deſpotic, and deteſtable government in France, from its ſecreſy, its perfidy, treachery, and reſtleſs ambition, has been the fatal cauſe of many wars in Europe for ſeveral centuries paſt: therefore, any aſſiſtance given on the part of our government, to any power in Europe that is endeavouring to reſtore that tyrannical form of government in France, is injurious to the true intereſts of this country. And the people of France have, moreover, as juſt a right to enjoy civil liberty as ourſelves.

5thly, Becauſe a war with France is at preſent moſt impolitic, extremely dangerous to our allies the Dutch, hazardous with reſpect to the internal peace and external power of this country, and is likely to be highly injurious to our commerce, which is the great ſource of our wealth, naval ſtrength, and proſperity. And any material interruption to the trade, manufactures, and induſtry of this kingdom, may at this time be attended with conſequences the moſt fatal. The war may, therefore, prove to be a war againſt our commerce and manufactures, againſt the proprietors of our funds, againſt our paper currency, and againſt every deſcription of property in this country.

6thly,

6thly, Becauſe every man of feeling muſt exceedingly lament the numerous taxes and oppreſſive burthens already borne by the people of this kingdom, and alſo the preſent high price of various neceſſary articles of life; and if an unwiſe ſyſtem of policy be purſued, it muſt inevitably increaſe thoſe burthens, and eventually put thoſe neceſſaries of life beyond the reach of the laborious part of the community.

And, 7thly, Becauſe theſe misfortunes ought the more to be deprecated, as it clearly appears that it would ſtill be moſt eaſy to avoid them, if our Miniſters were to prefer a mild, juſt, and pacific ſyſtem, to the horrors of war, carnage, and deva[illegible]ation.

(Signed) STANHOPE.

My 7th reaſon (ſaid he) is contained in my proteſt: every man muſt lament the numerous taxes borne in this kingdom, and the high price of proviſions. What I formerly propheſied has come to paſs; and I repeat, that if you continue the war, you will put the neceſſaries of life beyond the reach of the poor. Let not Miniſters ſay they have not had warning, they have been foretold every thing that has taken place. I then conclude, that although the ſcarcity is owing to the viſitation of God, its extent is owing to the war; let us put an end to the war; let us attempt the beſt and moſt effectual of all methods. I will ſtate other reaſons ſo ſtrong and forcible, that they muſt be irreſiſtible. There will be a general cry of the country for peace, if you do no make it. Perhaps you are not aware how near the period of that general cry may be; perhaps it may not be many months off. My Lords, I wiſh to have it underſtood, that what I am about to ſtate is a poſitive fact. For your Lordſhips will find in the report of the corn committee of the Houſe of Commons, that "by very recent information from Havre de Grace, the crop of wheat in France is one-third leſs than the preceding year; the prices one-third higher; but compared to the price in other countries they are *very low*. Will any one aſſert, then, that opening our ports would not be a remedy for the evil that threatens us? My Lords, I do not know whether my Lord Grenville is in the Houſe or not, but I wiſh him to hear what I am going to ſay. I am going to charge him and his Majeſty's Miniſters, that they either unintentionally deceive themſelves, or intentionally deceive this Houſe, though I hope they may be able to prove to your Lordſhips that their errors ariſe from miſtake. I charge them with perverting the meaning of the French decrees, and the letters of the French Miniſters, by miſ-tranſlating their language, and that in paſſages of the very firſt importance: and if any doubt whatſoever ſhall ariſe upon this ſubject, I will propoſe, that, not amongſt us who oppoſe the war, but among the noble Lords who

who vote for the war, a committee ſhould be ſelected, compoſed of thoſe who underſtand the French language, and they will ſoon be ſenſible how the ſentiments expreſſed on the part of France have been altered and miſrepreſented. If they have done ſo wilfully, I know no guilt can equal theirs; for to ſet the people of two nations to cut each others throats, by unjuſtly exaſperating them againſt each other, is the meaſure of human delinquency. But even if (as I hope was the caſe) ſuch groſs miſ-tranſlations were not intentional, they are inſtances of very culpable neglect. It is eſſential that I ſhould call your Lordſhips' attention to the following tranſlation of a note of M. Chauvelin, the French Ambaſſador, to Lord Grenville, dated 27th December 1792.

On reflecting what may be the reaſons which may determine his Britannic Majeſty to break with the French Republic, the executive council has been able to find no other than a falſe interpretation which is given to the decree of the national convention of 19th November. A real alarm has been occaſioned by this device. It can have ariſen only for want of underſtanding its true ſenſe. The national convention never meant that the French Republic ſhould favour inſurrections, ſhould eſpouſe the quarrels of *a few ſeditious perſons*, or, in a word, ſhould endeavour to excite diſturbances in any neutral or friendly country whatever. Such an idea would be rejected by all the French. It cannot be imputed to the national convention without doing it injuſtice. This decree then is applicable only to *thoſe people*, who, after having *acquired their liberty by conqueſt*, may have demanded the fraternity, the aſſiſtance of the republic, by the ſolemn and unequivocal expreſſion of the general will.

France ought and will reſpect, not only the independance of England, but even that of thoſe of her allies, with whom ſhe is not at war. The underſigned has therefore been charged formally to declare, that ſhe will not attack Holland ſo long as that power ſhall, on its ſide, confine itſelf towards her, within the bounds of an exact neutrality.

Now, in this tranſlation I have to point out the miſrepreſentations: the words "*Quelques ſeditieux*," in the original, ſhould have been tranſlated, "*ſome ſeditious perſons*," meaning any number ſhort of the totality. "*Peuples*" ſhould have been tranſlated not "*thoſe people*," which in Engliſh applies only to individuals; but "*thoſe nations.*" The words, "*acquis leur liberté*," ſhould have been tranſlated "*acquired their liberty*," and not "*acquired their liberty by conqueſt.*"

To ſhew that this ſyſtem of miſconception or miſrepreſentation has been uniformly acted upon, I need only remind your Lordſhips that M. Talleyrand, and ſeveral other perſons came over to England in an official capacity, before the war commenced between Auſtria and France. There were then, however, ſome points in diſpute between them reſpecting the province of Alſace, which were likely to terminate in

hoſtilities. I took occaſion to repreſent to M. Talleyrand the abſurdity of two great nations going to war about objects ſo inſignificant. The latter anſwered that the French government were of the ſame opinion, and would willingly ſubmit their plea to the judgment of the head of the only free nation in Europe except France. He ſtated, and he ſtated with energy, that the French nation loved the people of England, becauſe they are *free*; and, therefore, that they wiſhed that his Majeſty, the King of England, or any commiſſioners by him appointed, ſhould ſettle the queſtion in diſpute between Auſtria and France. He deſired me to go to his Majeſty's Miniſters, to ſound their diſpoſitions, and to feel whether, by accepting the office of mediators, they would contribute to avert the calamities of war. I accepted the miſſion, and made the propoſal to the Secretary of State. [Here Lord Grenville ſaid, he did not recollect the circumſtance.] You don't recollect it! but I do. Think, my Lords, what a Miniſter you have got, who thus forgets one of the moſt material and important facts that has occurred during his whole adminiſtration. This handſome propoſal, on the part of France, was not accepted. My reaſon for mentioning this fact is, to convince the Houſe that the French were heartily diſpoſed to ſhew the Britiſh government, and the Britiſh nation, every mark of poſſible reſpect. For what can be a greater degree of reſpect and confidence ſhewn either to a nation, a government, or an individual, than voluntarily to propoſe to abide by their deciſion.

Now, my Lords, I know it is unparliamentary to allude to diſcuſſions that have already taken place in this Houſe, but I will ſuppoſe that ſomebody ſaid in public, on the ſubject of Bonaparte's late overtures for peace, that his anſwer to the firſt letter of the French Conſul was juſtified by Talleyrand's. What would the Houſe think of a Miniſter who ſhould make ſuch a declaration? But, my Lords, the ſame ſyſtem of miſrepreſentation has been purſued with reſpect to the language of that reply. Talleyrand, in his note, dated the 14th of January laſt, ſays, "aſſailed on all ſides, the Republic could not but extend univerſally the efforts of her defence." This has not the ſmalleſt reſemblance to the propoſition (which was ſtated to be ſo infamous on the part of France), that France claimed a right to attack *every* country, if ſhe was attacked by *any other*. Here there is another inſtance of palpable miſrepreſentation; the tendency of which is, to excite hatred and animoſity between two nations, which

which ought to live at peace with each other. My Lords, there is one circumſtance ſo extremely important, that I muſt advert to it, I mean the neutrality of Pruſſia. On this ſubject, a variety of arguments againſt the continuance of the war preſent themſelves. The wiſe, the prudent policy of its King, who has maintained his ground and preſerved his people in peace, is worthy of admiration. As a proof of his wiſdom, there is one late act of which, if it originated with himſelf, ſhews him a greater Prince than any ſince the days of Alfred; or, if it flowed from his Miniſter, proves the wiſdom of that Miniſter (for it was the ſuggeſtion of a moſt enlightened mind), the advice of a philoſopher. This great prince, then, writes a letter to his firſt Miniſter to the following effect. You will call it a jacobinical letter, and condemn it as containing democratical principles; but I ſay, its principles do honour to human nature. The letter, my Lords, began thus:—"I am determined that my ſubjects, whether rich or poor, ſhall be educated alike." Not that different profeſſions ſhall not purſue different courſes of ſtudy, but that all his ſubjects, of every deſcription, ſhall receive one common elementary education. This will eradicate prejudice; this will deſtroy vanity and pride. This will teach the nobility to reſpect the lower orders; for, when boys are educated together, they will, when men, conſider themſelves as equals. This will teach the great that men have rights: it will give them an habitual reſpect for the "eternal, ſacred, immutable, impreſcriptible, and unalienable rights of man." Yes, men have rights, and I will maintain them, though, for ſo doing, I may be called a jacobin; but if I am to be ſo called, I ſhall have the ſatisfaction to boaſt myſelf to be ſuch a jacobin as the late Earl of Chatham, ſuch a jacobin as the late Mr. Dunning, and ſuch a jacobin as the late Sir George Saville! With ſuch jacobins it has been my pride to act, and with ſuch it will be my pride to continue to act. Nor is this a mere profeſſion of the King of Pruſſia. No, he declares it with an energy and zeal that demonſtrates a favourite meaſure, and a fixed reſolve to carry it immediately into execution. For ſuch an act the King of Pruſſia deſerves the thanks of every enlightened mind. It is one of the grandeſt and moſt democratic things I ever heard of. When kings act thus, they deſerve the love and obedience of their ſubjects. My Lords, when they act upon a contrary principle, they deſerve to be deſpiſed. My Lords, I am ſo much exhauſted, and have taken up ſo much of your Lordſhips' time, that I ſhall only notice one

ſubject more, and that briefly; I mean the negociations at Liſle and Paris. The noble Lord who took an active part in them is preſent, but in any thing I ſhall ſay I can mean no reflection upon him; he was only the agent, the attorney in the buſineſs; but what I ſhall ſay will apply to the principal, I mean his neighbour at his ſide, the Secretary of State. [*Lord Malmeſbury and Lord Grenville were ſitting near each other.*] When the negociation was opened, the Engliſh Miniſter ſaid, we will have reciprocal proportionate reſtitution; this was admitted, and of courſe it became the baſis on which both parties were to treat. But how did he proceed? After this point was ſettled, he ſays to the French, who had annexed Belgium and conquered to the Rhine, no, we will not have proportionate reſtitution; no, we muſt proceed on the *ſtatus ante bellum*; you muſt give up all your conqueſts, and we will reſtore the paltry iſlands which we have taken from you. Now how do I prove this? After the firſt baſis was agreed upon, his Lordſhip (Lord Grenville) ſent a ſecret letter to Lord Malmeſbury. Yes, there they let the cat out of the bag; I do not mean Lord Malmeſbury. No, no, it was Lord Grenville's fault. Lord Malmeſbury did not wiſh to let puſs out. And what ſays puſs? [*Here his Lordſhip read an extract of the letter, changing the baſis, and adopting the principle of the* ſtatus ante bellum.] Now try this proceeding by the caſe of individuals. Suppoſe two gentlemen ſhould agree to exchange eſtates, acre for acre, and after the bargain made, one of them ſhould ſay, no, I reject theſe terms, I muſt have ten acres for one. I ſay this is preciſely the caſe; I do not ſay how ſuch conduct may be conſidered among Miniſters, but between two men I do ſay it would be rank raſcality. It was right, then, I contend, to ſend ſuch a Miniſter away in 48 hours; and had they ſent him packing in 24, it was only what they ought to have done. But what did they do afterwards? they ſent the ſame agent again to Liſle. This was the ſecond time he was employed on the ſame errand as a mere meſſenger, for he had not full powers to negociate. Were there no other obſtacle than the ſingle circumſtance of ſending the ſame perſon, it was evidently very impoſſible the buſineſs ſhould ſucceed. In the caſe of the two individuals, which I have adduced in illuſtration of my argument, would the ſame attorney who was the agent in breaking the bargain, be the moſt likely to be employed with ſucceſs between the ſame parties in any future tranſaction? No, he would be always ſuſpected by the party who conceived himſelf injured. Without any other proof then,

then, I ſay, from the very beginning, there never was a real and ſincere exertion for peace: No, the object was to gull the people of England. Miniſters made loud complaints—they ſaid to the people of England, there's Lord Malmeſbury treated with inſult and diſgrace, ordered to quit Paris in forty-eight hours. Will you ſubmit to ſuch treatment or ſuch indignity? This was the way they gulled the people; but the eighty thouſand incorrigible jacobins, of whom I am one, will henceforth take care that Miniſters ſhall never gull the people ſo again. His Lordſhip concluded with moving an addreſs, of which the following is the ſubſtance:

"That an humble addreſs be preſented to his Majeſty, repreſenting the horrors of war; that in all countries a ſtate of peace is ever the intereſt of the people, and the ſhedding of blood, without abſolute neceſſity, repugnant to humanity; and further repreſenting, that the preſent war has been expenſive beyond example, productive of a great increaſe of the national debt, of taxes to an enormous amount, and of an alarming increaſe in the price of all the neceſſaries of life; and further repreſenting, that peace is neceſſary to avert the impending danger of famine, for although the preſent ſcarcity is in the firſt inſtance occaſioned by the ſcanty harveſt, the extent of the evil ariſes from the war; and that it is the duty of this Houſe ſtrongly to diſſuade his Majeſty from the continuation of the war for the reſtoration of the ancient line of princes of the houſe of Bourbon to the throne of France; and to entreat, that a negociation may be immedtately opened for peace with the French Republic."

The *Lord Chancellor* left the woolſack, not, he ſaid, to obſerve upon any of the arguments uſed by the noble Earl in the courſe of his ſpeech, but to take notice of a matter that took place in one part of it, which was in the higheſt degree irregular and diſorderly. He would firſt point out to the Houſe what the breach of order was, and then ſtate the reaſon why he had not interrupted the noble Earl, and prevented it, by ſtopping him the inſtant he had attempted to be guilty of it. The inſtance of irregularity was this: The noble Earl had cauſed to be read from the Journals, an extract from a Proteſt of his own, as an illuſtration of his argument, and the ground of his motion. Nothing could be more contrary to the forms of the Houſe than ſuch a proceeding; undoubtedly it was the privilege of every noble Lord to put on the Journals, whatever he thought proper to ſign with his name as his proteſt, againſt any meaſure that had paſſed the Houſe within 24 hours of his entering it. But it was extremely irregular to call for any part of a proteſt to be read in debate from the Journals, as if the privilege of entering it made it wear the authority of the proceedings of the Houſe itſelf. Had it been any other noble Lord's proteſt but that of the noble Earl, he certainly ſhould have immediately prevented its being

ing read, but the reaſon why he had not taken notice of it at the proper moment was, becauſe he did not feel it neceſſary to interrupt (what their Lordſhips had heard, ſometimes with good humour, ſometimes with gravity, but throughout with great patience) a melancholy inſtance of the viſitation of God, with which their Lordſhips had that night been afflicted.

Earl *Stanhope* ſaid, he muſt contend that he had not been out of order in reading an extract from his own proteſt, as the noble and learned Lord had aſſerted, becauſe he had known a precedent for it. He recollected a proteſt being ordered to be read, and no objection whatever had been made to it. He would off hand tell the noble and learned Lord the inſtance; it was a proteſt of a noble Earl (Lord Radnor).

On the queſtion being put on the addreſs, the Houſe divided—

Contents 2—*Not Contents* 26.—Adjourned.

The two noble Peers who divided for the motion, were Earl Stanhope and Lord Camelford.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THURSDAY, FEB. 20.

A petition was preſented from the heirs of the late Lord Pigot, praying for leave to bring in a bill to empower them to diſpoſe, by lottery, of a diamond of immenſe value. It was ſtated that this diamond was brought by Lord Pigot from Bengal; that at his death it became the joint property of ſeveral of his children, and that though they had expoſed it to ſale for thirty-ſix years, they had never been able to find a purchaſer. The petition was ordered to lie on the table.

The *Speaker* went up to the Houſe of Lords. When he returned, he ſaid that he had heard the royal aſſent given by commiſſion to the annual indemnity bill, and the bill for prohibiting bread to be ſold before it is 24 hours old.

Mr. *Long* preſented the eſtimates of the ſums that would be neceſſary for the foreign and ſecret ſervice for the year 1800, and of the ſum expended in the maintenance of French emigrants during the year 1799, beyond what had been voted by Parliament for that purpoſe.

Mr. *Roſe* ſaid that he was authoriſed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give notice, that he would move for the extraordinaries of the army in the committee of ſupply the next day.

Mr. *Tierney* wiſhed to know whether, in what was ſtated as the amount of the tax upon ſugar, the ſum which was due for thoſe that had been bonded was included?

Mr.

Mr. *Long* replied, that the whole ſum, as ſtated in the account, had been actually received into the exchequer.

Mr. *Roſe* moved that the act be read for ſtopping for a limited time the Scotch diſtilleries.

The act being read by the clerk, Mr. Roſe moved for leave to bring in a bill for continuing the ſaid act. Leave granted.

A bill to prohibit the making of low wines in Scotland, from wheat, barley, oats, &c. was read a firſt time, and ordered to be read a ſecond time the next day.

A meſſenger from the tax-office brought up an account of the amount of the income tax, and ſeveral other public accounts. Ordered to lie on the table.

The order of the day being read for the Houſe to reſolve itſelf into a committee of the whole Houſe, to conſider the marine mutiny bill, the Houſe reſolved itſelf accordingly.

Several amendments being propoſed and agreed to, the Houſe was reſumed, and the report ordered to be brought up the next day. Adjourned.

The following are more complete Accounts of the Speeches of Mr. STURGES, *and* Lord BELGRAVE, *on the ſecond reading of the Bill to continue an Act for ſuſpending the Habeas Corpus Act, than we were enabled to ſubmit to our Readers in pages* 483, *and* 487 *of this volume.*

Mr. *Sturgeſs* ſaid he was not ſo much ſurprized that Gentlemen who had originally oppoſed this meaſure ſhould now reſiſt its continuance, as that they ſhould expect others to renounce the opinions they had deliberately formed, and abandon the precautions they had wiſely taken. Such an expectation, however, was formed on the late change which had taken place in France, which the hon. Gentleman contended had deſtroyed jacobiniſm, and with it the danger of its principles. But the effect of thoſe principles he contended was not ſo eaſily to be removed. The French revolution was unlike others by which the perſon of a governor, or even the form of a government had been altered, which were calculated, perhaps, to remove a local evil or produce a local advantage, and were therefore local and partial only in their effects; but being a revolution in the opinions, doctrines, and principles by which *all* governments were held together, and the

the frame of ſocial order cemented—which cannot be true in France and falſe in England, ſalutary in the one, and pernicious in the other; its effect was as general as its nature. It created in every ſtate which was within its reach proſelytes devoted to the authors of their creed, and profeſſors of their faith abroad, more attached, therefore, to a foreign country than their own, and actuated by motives which became paramount to the duties of allegiance, and the obligations of natural patriotiſm. Hence had proceeded thoſe profeſſions of an enlarged patriotiſm too extenſive for the narrow limits of our own iſland. Hence the numerous acts of theſe ſectaries from the addreſſes of their affiliated ſocieties to the French Convention, in September 1792, after the depoſition of the king, down to the laſt communication between the Executive Directory of England, and the Executive Directory of France. Let it be conſidered of what deſcription of perſons theſe ſects were compoſed. They were of two claſſes, (in neither of which could he be ſuſpected of meaning to include the hon. Gentleman or thoſe near him). Firſt, of thoſe who from their birth, habits, and ſituation, muſt be ever ignorant of theſe ſubjects on which they are called to decide, but were deluded by the art and knavery of others, of whom they became the blind and ſervile inſtruments. Secondly, of the indigent and ambitious, ſeeking property which they did not poſſeſs, and power which they did not enjoy, without being very ſcrupulous as to the means by which either might be obtained. On which of theſe was it that the laſt revolution was to have a beneficial effect? Not ſurely on the ignorant who were unable to judge of its tendency, and acted in obedience to their leaders—not ſurely on the ambitious, unleſs the acquiſition of unbounded power, by revolutionary means, be a diſcouragement to rebellion, and ſucceſsful uſurpation the beſt antidote to treaſon.

The hon. Gentleman had ſtated that General Bonaparte had ſuppreſſed jacobiniſm, and renounced the ſyſtem of conqueſt which made it formidable. He did not mean to enter into a conſideration of the character of the preſent ruler of France, which they had been recommended to treat with ſo much delicacy, but would only remind the Houſe that in the many countries which he had conquered, he had impoſed, in the true ſpirit of theſe principles, that very conſtitution on which he had himſelf ſworn allegiance, but which he had afterwards deſtroyed.

If the Houſe ſhould be of opinion that ſuch principles, from

from their nature, were not eaſily to be eradicated, and that the late revolution, for the reaſons he had taken the liberty of ſtating, had not changed their nature or effect, it remained only to conſider the other arguments which had been urged againſt the bill. One hon. Gentleman (Mr. Joliffe), who wiſhed that this act might be ſuffered to expire before it ſhould be renewed, had obſerved that an interval had exiſted between the two firſt years when it was in force, and the two laſt. The Houſe would recollect that in that very interval the treaſon was committed which produced the trial at Maidſtone. If the act had been then propoſed to have been continued, the Houſe would probably have been told that the meaſure was unneceſſary becauſe treaſon had no exiſtence. The hon. Gentleman who ſpoke laſt had objected to the degree of confidence which was to be given to his Majeſty's Miniſters. That confidence undoubtedly was conſiderable, and it would be given with more or leſs caution, in proportion as it was more or leſs likely to be abuſed. Of this they were enabled to judge from the paſt conduct of government. If the liſt on the table were referred to, it would be impoſſible for the ingenuity of the hon. Gentleman, it would be impoſſible for malignity itſelf, if it were employed on ſuch a ſubject, to attribute the commitment of thoſe in cuſtody to any other motive than a conſideration for the public ſecurity. They were perſons who, while they adhered to the laws and conſtitution, could neither perſonally nor politically be objects of jealouſy or alarm to his Majeſty's Miniſters to whom they were perfectly unknown. The power given by the bill had been uſed with a degree of moderation (two perſons only having been committed ſince the paſſing of the laſt act), that proved, in the hon. Gentleman's opinion, the meaſure to be unneceſſary. It did, however, afford the moſt ſatisfactory aſſurance that the power would not be abuſed if it were ſtill repoſed in the ſame hands. With regard to the treatment of the priſoners, to which alluſion had been made, it was unneceſſary to diſcuſs a ſubject which had already been ſo fully conſidered by a Committee and the Houſe in the laſt Seſſions; and he was happy that the hon. Gentleman had acknowledged that they were now properly treated, their grievances, if they exiſted, having been redreſſed as ſoon as they were known. It is ſtill, however, ſaid, that the confinement of perſons for eighteen months without trial, is new and contrary to the practice of the conſtitution. He would not trouble the Houſe by detailing the different inſtances in which the *Habeas Cor-*

pus Act had been ſuſpended, and the comparative neceſſity for it at each period, but only call to their recollection one of thoſe events which proved that the beſt government, adminiſtered by the beſt men, might be endangered by the weakeſt of its ſubjects. He alluded to the conſpiracy againſt the life of King William; for which, ſome perſons were brought to trial, and many others impriſoned. The *Habeas Corpus* Act was ſuſpended; but that was not enough: a power was given to his Majeſty to continue thoſe who had not been tried in cuſtody, at firſt from year to year, at length during his pleaſure. That pleaſure continued during his Majeſty's life. On his demiſe the danger ariſing from a conſpiracy againſt his perſon was not conſidered as extinct, and the ſame power was given to Queen Anne. Their impriſonment continued during the whole of her reign; and on the acceſſion of the preſent illuſtrious Houſe a ſimilar act was paſſed, which was again renewed on the acceſſion of his late Majeſty King George II. and the laſt ſurvivor of theſe unfortunate perſons (whoſe name was Bernardi), died in Newgate, in the year 1736, at the age of 82, after an impriſonment of 40 years, without any allowance from government. He mentioned this caſe, not to applaud it, far from it, but for the purpoſe of ſhewing what was the practice which had been referred to in the beſt times, from the period when the ſeals were in the hands of Lord Somers, till they were placed in thoſe of Lord Hardwicke. It was not ſuch power which was now ſolicited, or which they were about to give. Thinking the cauſe had not ceaſed to operate which made this meaſure of precaution unneceſſary, that the power given had not been abuſed, and that it had produced the ſecurity we enjoyed, he ſhould vote for the ſecond reading of the bill.

Lord *Belgrave* ſaid he was ſure that it was in common with the Houſe that he had heard with great pleaſure the ſpeech of an hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sturges), who had, for the firſt time, delivered his ſentiments, and that from the able ſpeeches generally he had heard in ſupport of the motion, particularly from his learned Friend, the Attorney General, he ſhould trouble the Houſe but ſhortly in noticing ſome of the arguments that had been urged againſt the meaſure.

The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Tierney), who had juſt ſat down, had imputed to his learned Friend, that he did not go ſufficiently, on a former evening, into the reaſons that could juſtify his claim to an aſſent to his motion, yet the hon. Gentleman

tleman admits the grounds of the report of laſt year: on theſe grounds his learned Friend had reſted his motion on opening it, and had again reſted his arguments this evening on thoſe grounds only more in detail. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Tierney), however thought, that a ſelect committee was again neceſſary before the Houſe could proceed. Here he wiſhed to remind the hon. Gentleman, that when, in a former year, he (Mr. Tierney) voted for the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act, he did ſo, not on the report of a ſecret committee, but, as he ſaid, on the declaration of a grand jury. The queſtion, however, of this night, reſted on two grounds: firſt, on the neceſſity of the meaſure both external and internal, and then on the opinion the Houſe entertained of the perſons in power: if, indeed, the Houſe entertained any doubts as to the propriety of the conduct of Miniſters, they ſhould petition his Majeſty to remove them, to make way for the ſuſpenſion of the act, of the neceſſity of which ſuſpenſion, France, Ireland, and this country, yielded ſufficient proof. The committee of laſt year was of opinion, that the dangers were great and alarming, and ſurely no man could ſay that theſe dangers had ſo far diſappeared as to render precaution unneceſſary; if we had not the proof, it ſurely could not be ſuppoſed that Ireland, which had been in a ſtate of inſurrection from one end to the other, could have been ſo, without the infection, in ſome degree, reaching this country. But let Gentleman look to an addreſs of the London Correſponding Society of 1798, inſerted in the report of laſt year, in which they will find theſe expreſſions, "we have not yet ceaſed from our exertions; *we* have perſevered, and *we* will perſevere;" and again, "*we* truſt we ſhall not be found inferior in virtue to the people of England." Now I aſk whether, under ſuch views, and againſt ſuch threats, we ſhould not be upon our guard? The ſpirit of diſaffection was ſtill ſtrong in certain evil-minded perſons, and we ſhould uſe every poſſible means to prevent its diffuſion.

The preſent ſituation of France was to him a ſtrong argument for the continuation of the ſuſpenſion. France was the thermometer of diſaffection here; as ſhe was victorious it roſe, as ſhe was was unſucceſsful it fell in this country. From the relative ſituation of the two countries the greater was the danger to be apprehended from the miſchievous powers of jacobiniſm. It had been ſaid, if the ſituation of France is to be conſidered as an argument for ſuſpending the *Habeas Corpus* act, whenever any country in hoſtility with

this is in a ſtate of revolution, you muſt ſuſpend this act; according to which, if Algiers or Tunis, Arabia or Turkey were in hoſtility with us, and in a ſtate of revolution, we were therefore equally juſtified in ſuſpending the *Habeas Corpus* act, as we now are juſtified in urging the ſituation of France as a ſtrong reaſon, combined with others, for ſuſpending it for the preſent. This he thought puſhing the argument pretty far, conſidering the geographical ſituation of the two countries, and the ſubtle poiſon of jacobin arts. To endeavour to reaſon with an honourable Baronet (Sir Francis Burdett), who ſees nothing but liberty in jacobiniſm, and nothing but ſlavery in the Britiſh conſtitution, would be fruitleſs; but an hon. Gentleman, who preceded him, ſeemed to think that jacobiniſm was deſtroyed by Bonaparte. Happily for the world jacobiniſm has loſt much of its power to do miſchief in the courſe of this great conteſt, for it has loſt all thoſe who were miſled by its artifices and deluſions, and is now expoſed in all its native deformity; for it fortunately happens, that although he would admit that in theory it may be ſaid that falſe opinions are more likely to be ſucceſsfully combatted by the weapons of reaſon than by thoſe of war, yet that it ſo happens, that while we have been contending againſt the arms, we have been ſucceſsfully contending againſt the principles of France, for theſe principles have been enforced by arms; it ſo happens, that while we have been contending for order againſt anarchy, we have been alſo contending for religion againſt impiety.

But though jacobiniſm is ſhorn of its honours in a great meaſure, it is not deſtroyed. It has been aſked what jacobiniſm is—every thing deteſtable, vile, baſe, degrading, and cruel in human nature; and if he were aſked what a jacobin was, he would ſay, a man that had renounced his religion, and with it, as a neceſſary conſequence, his moral probity. He would turn then to Bonaparte, and aſk whether, from all his public recorded acts, he was the man likely to have put down jacobiniſm, as an hon. Gentleman ſeemed to think. If he diſmiſſed certain jacobins at St. Cloud, he diſmiſſed them not becauſe they were jacobins, but becauſe they oppoſed his power, for he replaced them ſhortly after with as many as bad. Gentlemen then muſt not relax their efforts in combatting the fatal power of jacobiniſm, which was nothing but the evil ſpirit perſonified under various ſhapes and tranſformations; and he who was not, therefore, a thorough hater of jacobiniſm in all its forms could be no honour to

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his country, no credit to human nature. But the conteſt muſt not be continued one day, and relinquiſhed another; to be ſucceſsful, it muſt be conſtant, perſevering, unremitting, eternal. Let Gentlemen caſt their eyes a moment on France, and ſay whether nothing was to be dreaded even yet from it. From France, which had carried her corruptions into almoſt every quarter of the globe, and nearly overthrown every government.

In the next place let the Houſe conſider whether Miniſters had abuſed the power confided to them hitherto; was there any thing in the number, the deſcription, or the treatment of the perſons confined under ſuſpicion of conſpiring againſt the ſtate that excited diſtruſt? Surely nothing in the number; ſurely nothing in the deſcription; and, as to their treatment, he did not expect to hear the priſon report of laſt year again brought forward for the purpoſe of affixing on the government the charge of inhumanity. It appears from that report, that much miſrepreſentation and exaggeration prevailed, and that ſo far from government having been guilty of wanton and unneceſſary cruelty, there was only an accidental inattention in thoſe who had the ſuperintendance of the Cold Bath Fields priſon, in not ſeparating one of thoſe confined from the reſt at a certain period, on account of his ſuperior rank in life. Before he ſat down he could not help noticing a remark that had been made by an hon. Gentleman, "that the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act had been diſcontinued with ſafety to the country for an interval of two years." He could not help ſaying, that he thought the diſaffected had availed themſeves of that interval to renew their plots, to re-organize their plans of ſedition, or extend their treaſons; and, ſurely, the horrible attempt made upon the life of his Majeſty was ſtrongly connected with, and ariſing out of the ſpirit of the perſons meeting at Copenhagen Houſe.

His Lordſhip concluded with ſaying, that we undoubtedly were conſiding a great power in the hands of his Majeſty's Miniſters, and that it carried with it great reſponſibility; but it was a power that hitherto proved the ſalvation, and was ſtill neceſſary for the ſecurity of our proſperity, religion, liberty, and laws.

HOUSE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

FRIDAY, FEB. 21.

Mr. Manning brought in a bill for making wet docks, and other works for improving the ports of London, which was read a first time, and ordered to be read a second time on Wednesday se'nnight.

A meſſage, which was delivered from the Lords, purported that they had reſolved and agreed upon the propoſition mentioned in the debates in the Lords of the preceding day, of doing every thing in their power to leſſen the conſumption of corn, and their determination to forego the uſe of paſtry.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved, that the ſaid meſſage ſhould be referred to the committee of the whole Houſe, to whom the corn committee is referred. Ordered.

BANK CHARTER.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved the order of the day for taking into conſideration the act of 21ſt of Geo. III. relative to the charter of the bank of England; and that the ſame act be read—which being done in a committee of the whole Houſe.

Mr. *S. Thornton* moved that the ſecretary of the bank, who was attending, might be called in. Ordered.

The ſecretary brought a propoſal from the bank for the renewal of the charter; which being read by the chairman, purported to be, "that in conſideration of three millions to be paid immediately, they may have a continuation beyond the preſent term for twenty-one years. The payment of theſe three millions to be ſecured by Exchequer bills, which are to be paid off in ſix years, that is on the 6th day of April, 1806. The Exchequer bills, during part of that term, to bear no intereſt, and during the remaining term, an intereſt of 5l. per cent."

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, that conceiving no gentleman could have any objection to what he had at preſent to propoſe, he ſhould only have occaſion to trouble the Houſe very ſhortly. He would juſt ſtate to the Houſe the advantages which were likely to ariſe to the public by the adoption of this meaſure, which, on a rough eſtimate, he believed would be from 6 to 700,000l. He alſo obſerved, that if the three millions were not taken in conſequence of this meaſure, it would neceſſarily go into and increaſe the enſuing loan to the amount of that ſum. That before the expiration of ſix years, we might reaſonably hope to be relieved from

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our preſent difficulties, and he ſubmitted it to the candour of gentlemen, whether great advantage was not likely to accrue to the public between the terms on which a loan might now be expected to be had, and the rate of intereſt which money would be likely to bear, if a peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed before we were obliged to repay this three millions. One objection he was aware might be ſtated againſt the renewal of the charter, and that was the circumſtance of the bank having ſome time ſince ſtopped making payments in caſh; but this he was convinced would be entirely done away, when it was conſidered that from the manner in which this circumſtance had been got over, the whole appeared ſo honourable to the character of the bank, and to the credit of the country, that from it had emanated the utmoſt confidence of the people at large, and the moſt irrefragable proof of the ſolidity of the inſtitution.

The committee came to a reſolution to continue the bank charter granted to them by the act of 21ſt year of his preſent Majeſty.

Mr. *Tierney* wiſhed to know whether the propoſal for this renewal firſt came from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the bank, or from the bank to the right hon. Gentleman?

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* ſaid, the propoſal was firſt made by him to the bank directors; was then ſubmitted by them, after they had approved of it, to the conſideration and judgment of a court of proprietors, who having approved the ſame, on mature deliberation, it came back to him; and, from that time, he and the bank directors had acted together.

Mr. *Tierney* ſaid, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the bank directors acting together, was a thing he had never heard of before.

The Houſe was then reſumed, the report brought up, and ordered to be taken into further conſideration on Tueſday next.

Sir *John Sinclair* gave notice, that as ſome alluſions, he underſtood, had been made to inclоſures, on the argument as to the ſcarcity of corn, he ſhould, on Monday next, move that that buſineſs be referred to the committee of the whole Houſe, fitting on the corn committee.

In a committee of the whole Houſe on the bill for continuing the ſuſpenſion of the *Habeas Corpus* act,

The *Attorney General* moved, that the continuance be fixed to the firſt of February, 1801. Ordered.

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The Houſe reſumed, report received, and the bill ordered to be read a third time on Monday next.

POOR LAWS.

Mr. *Whitbread* moved the order of the day for the ſecond reading of the bill for amending act 25th Elizabeth relative to the poor laws.

Sir William Young, Mr. Simeon, Mr. Elliſon, and Lord Belgrave oppoſed it.

Mr. *Whitbread* anſwered their objections very ably, but finding the Houſe againſt him, would not divide it on the queſtion.

The Houſe then reſolved that this bill be read a ſecond time on this day ſix months.

ARMY EXTRAORDINARIES.

The *Chancellor of the Exchequer* moved the army extraordinaries in the ſhape of reſolutions, as follows:

Army extraordinaries for the year 1800	£ 2,500,000
Deficiency in former grants	447,000
Secret Services	150,000
To make good the like ſum purſuant to addreſſes, and not yet made good	26,203
Relief of ſuffering clergy of France and American loyaliſts	242,798
Relief of emigrant clergy and emigrants	7,574
Civil eſtabliſhment of Upper Canada	7,950
Ditto, Nova Scotia	5,549
Ditto, New Brunſwick	4,460
Ditto, Iſland of St. John's America	1,900
Ditto, Cape Breton	1,840
Ditto, Newfoundland	1,640
Ditto, Bahama Iſlands	4,100
Ditto, Bermuda	580
Ditto, Dominica	600
Ditto, New South Wales	630.916
Bills drawn on the Lords of the Treaſury from New South Wales, and not yet come to hand	24,074
Charge for Superintending Aliens	6,369
Convicts at home	32,535

The Houſe reſumed, the report was brought up and ordered to be received on Monday.

Mr. *Roſe* brought up the Scots diſtillery bill; which was read a firſt and ſecond time, and ordered to be committed on Monday next.

Adjourned to Monday.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX:

CONTAINING

TREATIES, STATE PAPERS, PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS, &c.

Papers preſented to the Houſe of Commons, relating to the late War in the Eaſt Indies with Tippoo Sultaun.

No. 1.

Extract of a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, to the Governor General in Council of Bengal; dated 18th June 1798.

WE take the earlieſt opportunity of acquainting you, that we have received information from his Majeſty's Miniſters, that a very large armament of ſhips, troops, military ſtores, &c. &c. has been lately fitted out at Toulon, and that it ſailed from thence on the 19th ult. Although the ultimate object of this armament has not been aſcertained, it is not improbable, from many circumſtances that have tranſpired, and from the ſpirit of daring adventure, by which the French have been actuated during the preſent war, that its deſtination may be for India, either (having firſt taken poſſeſſion of Egypt) by way of the Red Sea; down the coaſt of that ſea; or even perhaps by the Black Sea, or by Buſſora; his Majeſty's Miniſters have therefore informed us, that immediate meaſures will be taken for a conſiderable augmentation of the European force in the Eaſt Indies: You may therefore expect that not leſs than four thouſand ſeaſoned and diſciplined troops, and perhaps a larger number, may be ſent to the Company's ſettlements with all poſſible expedition, part of which will, we truſt, reach India not many months after the receipt of this diſpatch.

Should the expedition, notwithſtanding the meaſures taken by his Majeſty's government to intercept and defeat it in the Mediterranean, reach Egypt, and be deſtined for India by either of the routes we have mentioned, a part of his Majeſty's fleet, conſiſting of two men of war, and probably a ſloop, now under diſpatch for India, will be ordered to be ſtationed in the ſtraits of Babelmandel, and in the gulph of Perſia, for the purpoſe of intercepting any force that may be proceeding to India that way.

A copy of a proclamation iſſued at the Mauritius in the month

of March laſt, has been already tranſmitted to our ſeveral preſidencies by Mr. Pringle, the Company's agent at the Cape of Good Hope. We are unable to judge whether this proclamation be in reality what its import declares it to be, and Tippoo has really conceived any hoſtile deſigns againſt the Britiſh empire in India, or intended merely as a feint, with a view to embroil us with that Prince. Our reſpective governments will of courſe have taken ſuch precautionary meaſures in conſequence as appeared to them neceſſary, and applicable to exiſting circumſtances.

Our empire in the Eaſt has ever been an object of jealouſy to the French, and we know that their former government entertained ſanguine hopes of being able to reach India by a ſhorter paſſage than round the Cape of Good Hope, and we have no doubt that the preſent government would riſk a great deal, and even adopt meaſures of a moſt enterprizing and uncommon nature, for the chance of reducing, if not annihilating, the Britiſh power and conſequence in that quarter of the world. To effect this, without the aid and previous concert of one of the Indian powers, ſeems almoſt impoſſible, and would ſcarcely be attempted. In the preſent ſituation of India, Tippoo appears the fitteſt inſtrument to be employed in the furtherance of ſuch ambitious projects.

It is highly improbable, that Tippoo ſhould have entered into any league with the French, without ſome apparent preparation on his part of an hoſtile nature in furtherance of their deſigns. If ſuch therefore ſhall have been the caſe, it would be neither prudent nor politic to wait for actual hoſtilities on his part. We therefore recommend, that if you ſhall not have adopted the neceſſary meaſures for bringing Tippoo to a ſatisfactory explanation before the receipt of this diſpatch, that you ſhould immediately take the proper ſteps for ſo doing, accompanying this enquiry with ſuch a diſpoſition of your force as may give effect to it; and ſhould you judge, either from his anſwers, or from the ſteps he is taking, that his deſigns are ſuch as the French proclamation repreſents, and that he is making preparations to act hoſtilely againſt us, we think it will be more adviſeable not to wait for ſuch an attack, but to take the moſt immediate and moſt deciſive meaſures to carry our arms into our enemy's country, not failing at the ſame time to make known to the powers in alliance with us the neceſſity of ſuch meaſures, and that we have not in view a wanton attack upon our inveterate enemy with a deſign to augment our own power, but a neceſſary and juſtifiable defence of our own poſſeſſions, and calling upon them for the aſſiſtance they are under engagements to furniſh us.

But although we have thus recommended energy, firmneſs, and deciſion, in your conduct towards Tippoo, we rely upon your uſing the latitude allowed you in the preceding paragraph with the utmoſt diſcretion, that we may not be involved in a war in India without the moſt inevitable neceſſity, of which neceſſity we leave you to be the ſole judges. And as it is impoſſible for us to conjecture,

jecture, ſhould either the proclamation circulated at the Mauritius be founded, or the force now in the Mediterranean be really deſtined for India, what meaſures the implacable revenge and raſh enterprize of the French may induce them to undertake againſt the Britiſh power in India, we can only exhort our ſeveral governments to be conſtantly upon their guard, and watchful againſt ſurpriſe, by not only keeping the troops in perfect order for action, and our forts and garriſons in conſtant preparation of defence, but if it ſhall appear neceſſary, by encouraging military aſſociations amongſt our civil ſervants and others, as in this country, which may be prepared to act on any emergency; and in carefully keeping in view every channel through which it may be poſſible for France to get an European force out to India, and taking precautionary meaſures to prevent it.

We have tranſmitted copies of this diſpatch to our governments of Madras and Bombay.

No. 2.

Circular.

Copy of a Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the Governments in India; dated the 26th November 1798.

OUR letter to you of the 18th June laſt, incloſed a copy of our orders to the Governor General in Council of the ſame date, relative to the expedition from Toulon under General Buonaparte, and directing your obedience thereto, ſo far as ſhould reſpect your preſidency.

Our ſubſequent advices of July and Auguſt, will have informed you of the appointment of Mr. Jones to reſide at the Court of the Pacha of Bagdat, as well as of the objects of his miſſion, and of the reinforcements already ſent and now ſending out to India.

Since the date of our letter of June laſt, above alluded to, the landing of Buonaparte in Egypt has been fully confirmed; and although, by the glorious victory of Admiral Nelſon over the French fleet near Alexandria, and the oppoſition made to their progreſs through Egypt by the Arabs under the authority of the Porte, the deſigns of the French have been conſiderably impeded, yet if, contrary to our hopes and expectations, he ſhould be able to eſtabliſh himſelf in Egypt, we cannot but ſtill be under apprehenſions for the ſafety of our Indian poſſeſſions. Theſe apprehenſions are conſiderably increaſed in conſequence of ſome hints lately ſuggeſted by the right hon. Henry Dundas, that, if the French ſhould be able to ſubdue Egypt, and to eſtabliſh their authority in that country, it is likely their next progreſſive meaſure would be to ſecure the communication of the Red Sea with the gulph of Cambay, at the narrow ſtraits of Babelmandel; and, if in their power, to detach a ſufficient force to take poſſeſſion of the Iſland of Perim, ſituate between the two points which include thoſe ſtraits.

The

The poſſeſſion of this ſtation will be of the greateſt importance to the French, in ſecuring the advantages they propoſe to themſelves in the conqueſt of Egypt, and conſequently it is well deſerving of the utmoſt vigilance and exertion on the part of Great Britain, to defeat any plan they may entertain to get it into their hands. If we ſhould ſucceed in making ourſelves maſters of that Iſland, it would be impoſſible, in the firſt inſtance, for any ſhips to paſs the ſtraits againſt a ſuperior naval force ſtationed there. It may then be ſecured and fortified, by the application of ſuch materials as its ſituation may afford, for completing its permanent defence, and for effectually commanding the channels through which ſhips muſt paſs to the Indian Ocean.

We underſtand that the Iſland of Perim is a low rocky ſubſtance, about five miles in length and two in breadth; that it poſſeſſes a good harbour; that the channel which divides it from the African Coaſt, though fourteen or fifteen miles acroſs, is but little frequented, on account of the numerous rocks and ſhoals which obſtruct it, inſomuch as to render it neceſſary for veſſels that do attempt it, to ſteer cloſe under the weſtern point of the Iſland, and that the extreme breadth of the other channel is leſs than two leagues, and that this ſpace cannot be navigable, nor the deep water every where at ſo great a diſtance from the Iſland as to be out of the reach of its batteries, whether erected on the ſhore, or on artificial projections within the ſea, if ſuch ſhould be found neceſſary to the entire command of the paſſage.

We have entered thus fully into detail, to ſhew the importance of taking poſſeſſion of the Iſland of Perim without delay; nor is diſpatch alone neceſſary, but ſecrecy is equally indiſpenſable, as it is not improbable that proviſional meaſures have been taken by the French to aſſemble ſome veſſels of burthen at the port of Suez, to co-operate, in whatever way their ſervices may be wanted, with the primary expedition, and if the deſign were known, they would detach a force at all hazards to ſecure the firſt poſſeſſion of it.

Mr. Secretary Dundas has further informed us, that although the commanders of his Majeſty's fleets in India have already been directed to uſe every effort in their power to fruſtrate the deſigns of the French in the expedition under Buonaparte, yet ſpecial orders will be ſent out to the commander in chief of his Majeſty's naval force in the Indian Seas, as ſoon as poſſible to detach to the ſtraits of Babelmandel ſuch a force, as according to the information he ſhall have received, he may judge ſufficient for the ſervice; in the inſtructions to take poſſeſſion of the Iſland of Perim, by whatever power it may be occupied at the time.

The importance of the meaſure we have thus pointed out, will enſure your moſt cordial endeavours in promoting the ſame by every means within your power. The ſecurity of our moſt valuable poſſeſſions in India, if not our very exiſtence there, depends upon defeating the preſent formidable and inveterate deſign of the French againſt thoſe poſſeſſions.

No. 3.

No. 3.

Extract of a Letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to the Court of Directors, dated Fort William; the 21ſt November, 1798.

Par. 1. By my letter diſpatched overland from Fort St. George, I had the honour to inform you of my arrival at that Preſidency on the 26th of April.

12. While I was engaged in conſidering the means of improving the internal order and management of your finances, I received intelligence which led me to apprehend the approach of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, aided by a French force. Your Secret Committee is in poſſeſſion of this intelligence, of which the reſult on my mind was a firm conviction, that the ſafety of your poſſeſſions in the peninſula of India demanded, that your armies ſhould be placed in an active and early ſtate of preparation for war. Accordingly, having apprized the Governor of Fort St. George, as early as the 8th of June, of my apprehenſions of the deſigns of the enemy, and having directed his attention to the probability of our being involved in hoſtilities, on the 20th of June I iſſued my final orders to the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, for calling your armies into the field on the coaſts of Coromandel and Malabar. Theſe orders have been executed; and I truſt that the ſubſequent diſcloſure of the projects entertained by France againſt the Britiſh empire in India, and the adventurous and daring ſpirit with which thoſe projects have been proſecuted, will ſufficiently juſtify to your honourable Court the meaſures of precaution, which I deemed it my duty to adopt for the defence of your territories, although the immediate effect of thoſe meaſures has neceſſarily occaſioned a large increaſe of your expences, a diminution of your commercial inveſtment, and a ſuſpenſion of the improvements which I had hoped to have accompliſhed in the ſtate of your pecuniary affairs.

13. It would have been a moſt improvident and miſtaken economy, to have hazarded the permanent ſafety of the Britiſh empire in India, and to have abandoned the ſources of your commercial proſperity, without defence, to the attack of the enemy, for the purpoſe of preſerving a ſpecious and deluſive appearance of ſecurity in a conjuncture of real danger.

14. I am perſuaded that the wiſdom and juſtice of your honourable Court, will readily approve the policy of ſacrificing a degree of temporary advantage, to the important object of providing an effectual protection for the foundations of your trade and revenue, and for the laſting tranquillity of your poſſeſſions in India.

15. Under the expectation of an approaching war with Tippoo Sultaun, aided by the French, the ſtate of our alliances with the country powers became an anxious object of my conſideration.

16. I have

16. I have ſubmitted a full detail of my opinions and proceedings upon this ſubject to your Secret Committee, but it is my duty in this place to requeſt the attention of your honourable Court, to the condition in which I found our alliance with his highneſs the Nizam, and to the happy improvement which circumſtances have enabled me to effect in the nature of our connection with that prince.

17. The corps commanded by French officers in the ſervice of the Nizam, which, during the laſt war with Myſore, amounted to no more than 1,500 men, and was at that period of time ſo defective in point of diſcipline, as to be rather an object of contempt than of jealouſy to your governments in India, had gradually augmented its numbers, and improved its diſcipline under the command of the late Monſieur Raymond, until at the period of my arrival in India it had nearly reached the number of 14,000 men, and had obtained a degree of diſcipline ſuperior in every reſpect to that of any native infantry in India, excepting the ſepoys entertained in your ſervice.

18. This corps formed the largeſt and moſt efficient branch of the military eſtabliſhment of his Highneſs; and the French officers had acquired a conſiderable aſcendency in his dominions, and had manifeſted on ſeveral occaſions the ſymptoms of a diſpoſition ſo arrogant, overbearing, and adventurous, as to excite alarm in the minds of his highneſs and of his miniſters. Although his Highneſs had entered into no engagement or obligation which in any degree bound him to retain this party in his ſervice, and although their ſudden diſmiſſion would at any time have been warranted by every principle of juſtice, and their continuance at Hydrabad threatened the independence, if not the exiſtence of his Highneſs's throne; yet the Nizam and his Miniſters confeſſed their inability to check the growth of a power of which they acknowledged the dangerous influence, and dreaded the deſtructive effect.

19. The principles of the French officers commanding this army, were avowedly the ſame with thoſe of the perſons who for ſome time paſt have exerciſed the powers of Government in France, and their enmity to the Britiſh intereſts was declared on all occaſions. While this army, commanded by Frenchmen of ſuch principles and views, and of ſuch uncontrouled power, remained in the ſervice of the Nizam, his Highneſs's alliance muſt have proved a ſource rather of danger than of advantage to the Company in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, and that danger would have been greatly aggravated by any co-operation which might have been afforded to Tippoo from France. Various other conſiderations will occur to the wiſdom and experience of your honourable Court, to prove the direct and collateral effects which the exiſtence of a numerous armed French party, in the centre of the Decan, muſt have produced, whether in time of war or of peace, upon the whole frame of your political intereſts in India.

20. Under

20. Under theſe circumſtances the expulſion of the French party from the court of Hydrabad, appeared to me to be a neceſſary part of that ſyſtem of precaution and defence by which I hoped to be enabled either to encounter the preſſure of war, or to ſecure the advantages of peace.

21. With theſe views, on the 8th of July I inſtructed the acting Reſident at Hydrabad to open a negociation with his highneſs the Nizam, propoſing an addition to the Britiſh detachment ſerving at Hydrabad, and ſtipulating for the diſmiſſion of the corps commanded by French officers in his highneſs's ſervice.

22. A new ſubſidiary treaty founded on this baſis, and embracing other collateral arrangements (particularly ſuch conditions as appeared neceſſary for the removal of all cauſes of jealouſy, and for the reſtoration of union and concord between our two allies, the Peſhwah and the Nizam) was ſigned by his highneſs at Hydrabad on the 1ſt September, and ratified by me in council on the 18th of the ſame month.

23. By this treaty an increaſe is made in the Britiſh ſubſidiary force ſerving with his highneſs of 4,400 men, and an increaſe in the annual ſubſidy paid by his highneſs, of about nineteen lacks of rupees. The former ſubſidy having been 53,713 Arcot rupees per menſem, and the ſubſidy under the new treaty being 201.425 Arcot rupees per menſem, or 24,17,100 Arcot rupees per annum.

24. The ſubſtance of this treaty was communicated to the Peſhwa, both previouſly and ſubſequently to its concluſion; and at both periods he expreſſed his entire approbation of the nature and tendency of the new engagements, as well in their operation upon the intereſts of the Mahratta empire, as upon thoſe of the Nizam.

25. On the 13th of July I ordered the Government of Fort St. George to aſſemble ſuch a force in the Guntoor Circar, as might enable me to fulfil the ſubſidiary engagements of the Company under the new treaty, at the earlieſt poſſible period ſubſequent to its concluſion. This meaſure was executed with the utmoſt degree of promptitude and alacrity by Lieutenant-General Harris (at that time uniting in his perſon the offices of Governor of Fort St. George, and Commander in Chief on the Coaſt of Coromandel;) to whoſe zeal and publick ſpirit, and prompt obedience on all occaſions wherein I have entruſted him with the execution of my orders, I am happy to be able to bear this public teſtimony.

26. The Britiſh detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts reached Hydrabad on the 10th of October, and on the 22d October, under the orders of his highneſs the Nizam, and with the co-operation of a body of his cavalry, ſurrounded the camp of the French army, diſarmed all the ſepoys, and ſecured the perſons of all the French officers then in the camp.

27. This operation was happily effected without bloodſhed and without conteſt. A mutiny having broken out in the French camp on the preceding day, and the ſepoys having impriſoned their officers, the Reſident at Hydrabad and Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, with the conſent of the Nizam, judiciouſly availed themſelves

ſelves of this favourable opportunity to execute this important meaſure without difficulty or danger.

28. The amount of the French force diſarmed on this occaſion was about 11,000 men, from which circumſtance your honourable Court will obſerve that a part of the corps was abſent on detachment, as will appear by reference to the return, No. 2. of the French officers arreſted on the 22d of October, meaſures have been taken for the arreſt of thoſe who commanded the detached force. The French officers, by my particular orders, were treated with every practicable degree of attention and humanity. At the period of their arreſt by our troops, their perſons were in confinement, and their lives in danger, from the mutiny prevailing in their camp; and the greateſt difficulty which Colonel Roberts encountered was, that of reſcuing the impriſoned officers from the violence of their own ſepoys. Particular care was taken to ſave the property of the officers for their uſe, as well as to obtain for them ſuch arrears of pay and allowances as were due to them from his highneſs. Captain Kirkpatrick informs me, that he has been compleatly ſucceſsful in effecting both theſe deſirable objects. The French officers are now on their paſſage to this Preſidency on board the Bombay frigate, which I had previouſly ſtationed at Maſulipatam for their accommodation: on their arrival at Calcutta, it is my intention to receive them with the conſideration due to their reſpective ranks, and to allow them every indulgence compatible with the ſecurity of their perſons. I propoſe to ſend them to Europe by the earlieſt opportunity; uſing the precaution of diſperſing them in different ſhips.

29. On their arrival in England, I have engaged that they ſhall not be treated as priſoners of war, but ſhall be immediately tranſported to France without ſuffering any detention for an exchange of priſoners. The treaty under which this meaſure was executed, has been already forwarded overland to your Secret Committee, and it now forms a number of the ſecret diſpatch by the Eurydice.

30. The effect of the meaſure will, I truſt, be highly favourable to your political intereſts in the peninſula of India. The Britiſh ſubſidiary force now ſtationed in the dominions of his highneſs the Nizam, while it muſt tend to cement the connection between the Company and that prince, and to render him a more uſeful and efficient ally in the event of war, will operate at all times as an effectual protection to your poſſeſſions in the northern circars, and the total ſubverſion of the French influence in the Decan, under all the circumſtances of the preſent moment, is an event from which I expect to derive, not only additional ſecurity for your territories, but for the general tranquillity of India.

31. Among your ſervants who have been concerned in the execution of my orders on this occaſion, I have already recommended Lieutenant-General Harris to your favourable notice; to his name it is my duty to add thoſe of Captain Kirkpatrick, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts. I found the former in the ſituation of

acting

acting Reſident at Hydrabad; and to his zeal, addreſs, diſcretion, and firmneſs, I attribute the early ſucceſs of the negociation entruſted to his management.

32. Upon the reſignation of Colonel Kirkpatrick, I took occaſion to manifeſt my ſenſe of Captain Kirkpatrick's merits, by appointing him reſident at the court of the Nizam.

33. To the ability and temper of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, acting under the judicious inſtructions of the Reſident, I attribute the complete and ſatisfactory execution of the articles of the treaty relating to the diſmiſſion of the French army; and his conciliatory and humane conduct towards the officers deſerves the higheſt commendation.

34. The rumours which have prevailed of the intended approach of Zeman Shah to the frontier of Hindoſtan, although of a vague and conttadictory nature, appeared to me not wholly undeſerving of attention; and I have the ſatisfaction to inform you, that every poſſible precaution has been taken for the effectual defence of the frontier of Oude. I am happy to be able to inform you, that although I found the ſubſidy of the Nabob Vizier conſiderably in arrear, I have ſucceeded in perſuading his Excellency to diſcharge a large part of it; and, in juſtice to his Excellency, I am bound to declare, that I have found him ſincerely diſpoſed to fulfil his engagements under the treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth, and to manifeſt on euery occaſion a cordial attachment to the intereſts of the Company. The ſituation of affairs on the coaſt of Coromandel, and the neceſſity of providing againſt the poſſible event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun, have hitherto prevented me from viſiting the Upper Provinces. But I have not been unmindful of the affairs of Oude; and I truſt that I ſhall ſoon be able to turn my undivided attention to the improvement of the civil and military eſtabliſhments of the Nabob Vizier.

35. Although I have deemed it my duty to call your armies into the field in every part of India, my views and expectations are all directed to the preſervation of peace, which, in the preſent criſis, cannot otherwiſe be ſecured than by a ſtate of forward preparation for war. In the meanwhile, you may rely on my unremitting efforts to confine your expences within the moſt narrow limits, and to raiſe your commercial inveſtment to the higheſt ſcale compatible with the indiſpenſable neceſſity of providing for the ſecurity of your poſſeſſions. In the execution of my orders for the protection of your territories on the coaſt of Malabar, I am much indebted to the zeal and diligence of Mr. Duncan and General Stuart; and the vigilance and firmneſs manifeſted by the Government of Bombay, on the firſt intelligence of the progreſs of the French arms in Egypt, have obtained my public and cordial your approbation. It is alſo a peculiar ſatisfaction to me to inform honourable Court, that I have received from Lord Clive the moſt ready and honourable ſupport in the preparations for the defence of the Carnatic; and that, repoſing the moſt implicit confidence in his

Lordſhip's anxious ſolicitude for the proſperity of the general adminiſtration of your affairs entruſted to my hands, as well as in his aſſiduous attention to the peculiar duties of his own ſtation, I expect to derive conſiderable benefit to your ſervice from a ſincere union with him, in the important taſk of preſerving and improving the intereſts committed to our joint charge.

36. Notwithſtanding the great ſtrength of the military force now in India, I have deemed it my duty, for the further ſecurity of this Preſidency, to embody the militia, compoſed of the European and Armenian inhabitants of Calcutta, and my orders for this purpoſe have been obeyed with an alacrity and zeal which ſtrongly indicate the reſolution of your civil ſervants, and of all the European and Armenian inhabitants of Calcutta, to devote their perſonal ſervices to the defence of the ſeat of your Supreme Government in any exigency which may ariſe. My intention is to eſtabliſh this uſeful corps upon a permanent foundation, as an inſtitution from which great advantage may hereafter be derived.

No. 4.

Copy of a Letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council at Fort St. George; dated the 12th January 1799.

Public Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

On the 2d January the Right Honourable the Governor General took his ſeat in Council at this Preſidency, and recorded a minute, in which his Lordſhip has been pleaſed to explain the reaſons which induced him to viſit this Preſidency. We have the honour to encloſe a copy of this minute, to which we beg leave to refer you.

We are happy that our endeavours to meet the wiſhes of the Governor General have received his Lordſhip's approbation; and being ſenſible of the importance of his preſence in this place during the preſent moſt critical conjuncture, we have aſſured him of our moſt cordial co-operation and aſſiſtance in the conduct of the arduous affairs which engage his Lordſhip's attention.

We are, Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful humble ſervants,

(Signed) Mornington,
Clive,
Wm. Petrie,
E. W. Fallofield.

Fort St. George,
12th January 1799.

No.

No. 5.

Copy of the Earl of Mornington's Minute; dated Fort St. George, 2d January 1799.

The Governor General.

The critical ſtate of our actual ſituation with Tippoo, muſt neceſſarily require frequent references to the Governor General in Council, on a variety of important points, which will demand a prompt and immediate deciſion. My continuance in Bengal during ſuch a criſis, might have been attended with great inconvenience to the public ſervice, and the ſeaſon for active operations might have been conſumed, before my opinion could have been obtained on the ſeveral emergencies which may be expected to ariſe. The conſideration of this inconvenience is the principal motive, which has induced me to proceed to this Preſidency; and I am happy to take this opportunity of declaring, that I ſhould not have felt my preſence to have been at all requiſite for the purpoſe of adding energy or vigour to ſuch branches of the public ſervice, as fall within the particular duty of this Government.—I am perfectly ſatisfied with the conduct of this Government, in the reſpectable hands to which it has been committed; and I am perſuaded that I ſhould always have found the ſame cordial, manly, and honourable ſupport from your Lordſhip in Council, which has already obtained the public teſtimony of my unqualified approbation. My object, therefore, in taking my ſeat at this Board, is no other than to deprive our enemies of the advantages which they might derive under the preſent circumſtances, from the remote ſituation of the power entruſted to me from the probable ſcene of action.—The proviſions of the law require, that the authority of the Governor in Council at Fort St. George ſhould be veſted in my hands during my reſidence at this Preſidency: the public acts and proceedings of this Government muſt accordingly paſs in my name; but I, anxious as well from motives of perſonal reſpect, as from conſiderations connected with the public ſervice, that my reſidence at this Preſidency ſhould in no degree impair the preſent or future dignity and influence of Lord Clive; I therefore am deſirous of abſtaining from all unneceſſary interference in the details of this government, nor do I wiſh to diſturb the ſyſtem eſtabliſhed under his Lordſhip's immediate direction by the interpoſition of my power of ſuperintendence on the ſpot, beyond the limits of the ordinary exerciſe of that power at the ſeat of the Supreme Government in Bengal; I therefore requeſt that Lord Clive, and the members of this Council, will take the trouble of conducting the details of this Government, eſpecially thoſe which relate to the patronage of the Governor in Council, according to the principles which have been obſerved by his Lordſhip ſince his arrival in India; and I am ſatisfied that I ſhall derive the utmoſt degree of advantage from the united zeal, talents, experience, and aſſiduity of thoſe whom I have the honour to addreſs, while my principal attention muſt be devoted to the ſuperintendence

ence of the general intereſts of all the Company's poſſeſſions, and of the ſecurity and defence of the Britiſh empire in India, againſt the various dangers by which it has recently been menaced.

(Signed) MORNINGTON.

A true copy.

(Signed) J. Webbe, Sec. to Gov.

Fort St. George,
2d Jan. 1799.

No. 6.

Copy of a Letter from the Right Honourable the Governor and Council of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors; dated 13th January 1799.

Public Department.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors, for affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. Our addreſs of the 15th October laſt, to the Secret Committees, will have enabled them to apprize your Honourable Court of the very critical ſituation in which the Britiſh intereſts in India were at that time placed.

2. The meaſures which have been taken for defeating the deſigns of the enemy, and for the protection of your poſſeſſions, will doubtleſs have been fully communicated to your Honourable Court by the Supreme Government; it is therefore ſufficient for us at preſent to inform you, that, for the effectual execution of thoſe meaſures, the Right Honourable the Governor General has deemed his preſence neceſſary at this Preſidency.

3. In conformity to this reſolution, his Lordſhip arrived at this place on the 31ſt ultimo, upon his Majeſty's ſhip La Sybèlle.

4. On the 2d inſtant a proclamation was accordingly made of his Lordſhip's arrival, for the purpoſe of exerciſing the powers and authorities veſted in him by the act of the 33d of his preſent Majeſty, as Governor General in Council at Fort St. George.

We are, Honourable Sirs,
Your faithful humble ſervants,

(Signed) Clive,
Wm. Petrie,
E. W. Fallofield.

Fort St. George,
13th January, 1799.

No.

No. 7.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Mornington to the Secret Committee; dated Fort St. George, 15th March 1799.

To the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs,

I have the honour to inform you, that the army under the command of General Harris entered the territory of Myſore on the 5th inſtant.

The General commenced his operations by the capture of ſeveral forts upon the frontier of Myſore, which it became neceſſary for our troops to occupy, in order that the different convoys from the Baramahal might ſuffer no interruption. Theſe forts were all ſurrendered without reſiſtance.

The lateſt accounts from the army are of the 10th inſtant, when it had advanced to Aricul; at which time General Harris expected to reach Seringapatam by the 24th at fartheſt.

On the day General Harris paſſed the frontier, he forwarded, by my direction, a letter from me to Tippoo Sultaun, of which a copy is incloſed. No anſwer had been received to that letter on the 10th inſtant.

No ſatisfactory account of the ſtate of the French army in Egypt has yet reached me nor any intelligence of Commodore Blanket's arrival at his ſtation. Since I had the honour of addreſſing my laſt letter to you, I have received the fulleſt and moſt authentic information of the circumſtances ſtated in the poſtſcript of my letter of the 13th February, relative to the miſſion of Monſ. de Bere with native vakeels from Tippoo Sultaun, to the Executive Directory of France. They embarked on the 7th ultimo from Tranquebar, and are to touch at the Iſle of France.

I have the honour to incloſe a copy of a declaration publiſhed by Lieutenant-general Harris, in the name of the allies, on entering the territory of Myſore.

No. 8.

Copy of a Letter from the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington to the Court of Directors; dated 20th March 1799. (Received per Sarah Chriſtiana 13th September 1799.)

To the Honourable the Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs,

In my ſeparate diſpatch of the 21ſt of November, by the Eurydice, I informed your Honourable Court, that although I had deemed it my duty to call your armies into the field in every part of your poſſeſſions, my views and expectations were all directed to the preſervation of peace in India.

2. In the letter of the 13th of January, from the Governor General in Council at Fort St. George, I apprized your Honourable Court of my arrival at this Preſidency, to which I thought it my duty

duty to proceed from Bengal, in the hope of opening a negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun, for the amicable adjuſtment of the differences which had ariſen between that Prince and the Honourable Company's Government.

3. In my diſpatches to the Secret Committee of your Honourable Court, I have regularly tranſmitted advices of the ſtate of political affairs in India, and I have fully explained the principles which have governed my conduct, not only towards Tippoo Sultaun, but towards all the native powers, ſince I have taken charge of the Government General.

4. Having ultimately been compelled to commence hoſtilities againſt Tippoo Sultaun, it is now become my duty to lay before your Honourable Court an accurate detail of the cauſes of the war in which we are engaged.

5. For this purpoſe, it will be neceſſary to draw your attention to a period of time as remote as the month of June 1798, and to trace from that date the progreſs of thoſe events, which have finally produced the neceſſity of reſorting to arms for the ſecurity of your intereſts committed to my charge.

6. A proclamation iſſued by the Governor General of the Iſle of France, in the month of February 1798, made its firſt appearance at Calcutta on the 8th of June of the ſame year.

7. This proclamation ſtates, that an embaſſy had arrived at the Iſle of France with letters from Tippoo Sultaun, addreſſed not only to the Goverument of that iſland, but to the Executive Directory of France; propoſing to conclude an offenſive and defenſive alliance with the French, to ſubſidize and to ſupply whatever troops the French might furniſh to the Sultaun, and to commence againſt the Britiſh power in India, a war of aggreſſion, for which the Sultaun is declared to be fully prepared, waiting with anxiety the moment when the ſuccour of France ſhall enable him to ſatisfy his ardent deſire of expelling the Britiſh nation from India. The proclamation concludes by offering encouragement to the ſubjects of France to enter into the ſervice of Tippoo Sultaun, on terms to be fixed with his ambaſſadors then on the ſpot.

8. Although I was inclined, in the firſt inſtance, to doubt the authenticity of this extraordinary publication, I thought it adviſeable to tranſmit a copy of it, on the 9th of June, to Lieut. General Harris (then Governor of Fort St. George, and Commander in Chief on the coaſt of Coromandel) informing him, that if the proclamation ſhould prove authentic, it muſt lead to a ſerious diſcuſſion with Tippoo Sultaun; and directing Lieut. General Harris to conſider without delay the means of aſſembling the army on the coaſt of Coromandel, if neceſſity ſhould unfortunately require ſuch a precaution.

9. On the 18th of June 1798, I received a regular authentication of the proclamation, in a letter from his Excellency the Earl of Macartney, dated the 28th of March; and at the ſame time ſeveral

veral arrived at Calcutta who had been preſent in the Iſle of France at the time of the publication of the proclamation.

10. By a ſtrict examination of the moſt reſpectable of theſe perſons, I was enabled to obtain an authentic and accurate ſtatement of all the material circumſtances attending the publication of the proclamation at the Iſle of France; the ſubſtance of which ſtatement I have already forwarded to your Secret Committee, and now have the honour to ſubmit to your Honourable Court.

11. Tippoo Sultaun diſpatched two ambaſſadors, who embarked at Mangalore for the Iſle of France, and arrived at Port Nord-oueſt in that iſland, towards the cloſe of the month of January 1798. The ambaſſadors were received publicly and formally by the French Government, with every circumſtance of diſtinction and reſpect, and they were entertained at the public expence during their continuance on the Iſland.

12. Previous to the arrival of the ambaſſadors on the iſland, no idea or rumour exiſted there of any aid to be furniſhed to Tippoo Sultaun by the French, or of any proſpect of a war between that Prince and the Company; but within two days after the arrival of the ambaſſadors, the proclamation in queſtion was fixed up in the moſt public places, and circulated through the town of Port of Nord-oueſt.

13. The ambaſſadors, far from proteſting againſt the matter or ſtyle of the proclamation, held without reſerve, in the moſt public manner, the ſame language which it contains with reſpect to war of aggreſſion to be commenced by Tippoo Sultaun againſt the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India, and they even ſuffered the proclamation to be publicly diſtributed by their agents at the place of their reſidence.

14 The ambaſſadors were preſent when the French Government proceeded to act under the proclamation in queſtion; and the ambaſſadors aided and aſſiſted the execution of the proclamation, by making promiſes, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpoſe of inducing recruits to enliſt in his ſervice.

15. The ambaſſadors propoſed to levy men to any practicable extent, ſtating their powers to be unlimited with reſpect to the force to be raiſed in the name of Tippoo Sultaun. They entered into certain ſtipulations and engagements in the name of the Sultaun (according to the tenor of the laſt paragraph of the proclamation) with ſeveral Frenchman, and others, particularly with Mr. Dubuc, whom the ambaſſadors engaged in the ſervice of their Sovereign, for the expreſs purpoſe of aſſiſting in the war to be immediately commenced againſt the Britiſh power in India.

16. The proclamation therefore originated in the arrival of Tippoo's ambaſſadors at the Iſle of France; it was diſtributed by their agents, it was avowed in every part by their own public declarations, and finally it was executed, according to its tenor, by their perſonal aſſiſtance and co-operation.

17. On the 7th of March 1798, the ambaſſadors embarked at

Port Nord-oueſt, on board the French frigate La Preneuſe, together with the force thus raiſed in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, amounting to about two hundred men, inclusive of ſeveral officers, the chiefs of whom were M. M. Dubuc and Chapney.

18. Such is the ſubſtance of the evidence obtained from the perſons who were preſent in the Iſle of France during the reſidence of Tippoo's ambaſſadors; from other authentic ſources I learnt the ſequel of the tranſaction.

19. The French frigate La Preneuſe, with the Sultaun's ambaſſadors, and the French troops levied for his ſervice, arrived at Mangalore on the 26th April 1798.

20. An opportunity now occurred of aſcertaining, beyond the poſſibility of doubt, whether the acts of the Sultaun's ambaſſadors in the Iſle of France, were conformable to the inſtructions of their Sovereign. For although the preſumption was already ſufficiently powerful, that the ambaſſadors would not have ventured to tranſgreſs the limit of their commiſſion in a matter of ſuch momentous importance, as the concluſion of offenſive engagements with the French againſt the Engliſh Eaſt India Company, it yet remained a queſtion, whether Tippoo Sultaun would venture openly to avow proceedings, which could not fail to expoſe him to the juſt reſentment of your government.

21. This queſtion was immediately ſolved, for the Sultaun, without heſitation, permitted the French force to land publicly at Mangalore; and, far from manifeſting the leaſt ſymptom of diſapprobation of the conduct of the embaſſy in any part of the negotiation, he formally received his ambaſſadors and the French officers, and principal perſons in their ſuite, with public and extraordinary marks of honour and diſtinction; and finally, he admitted the greater part of the French force raiſed for the purpoſe of making war upon the Honourable Company, into his ſervice, in which it is ſtill entertained.

22. By this public and unequivocal ſanction, he muſt be conſidered not only to have perſonally ratified the engagements contained in the proclamations of the Governor General of the Iſle of France, but to have taken the preliminary meaſures for accompliſhing the deſign which the ambaſſadors had avowed in his name.

23. Tippoo Sultaun, therefore, having actually concluded offenſive and defenſive engagements with the French againſt the Honourable Company; having collected, by the aid of the French, a force openly deſtined to carry thoſe engagements into effect; having applied to the Executive Directory of France for a more powerful force deſtined to the ſame end; having ſignified through his public ambaſſadors to the enemy, that his preparations for war (as far as they depended upon himſelf) were actually complete; having avowed the object of thoſe preparations to be the ſubverſion of the Britiſh empire in India; and finally having declared the delay of the meditated blow to proceed from no other cauſe, than his expectation of receiving further aid from the enemy; I could not heſitate

ſtate to pronounce that he had flagrantly violated the treaties of peace ſubſiſting between him and the Honourable Company; and that he had committed an act of direct hoſtility and aggreſſion againſt the Britiſh Government in India.

24. To confirm the concluſions neceſſarily reſulting from the facts already ſtated, I received undoubted information, that Tippoo Sultaun had for ſome time paſt been employed in military preparations, conformably to the hoſtile ſpirit of his engagements with the enemy; that the greater part of his army was actually in a ſtate of equipment for the field; and that a large portion of it was then encamped under his perſonal command.

25. To your honourable Court it would be ſuperfluous to obſerve, that no provocation had been offered by any of your governments in India, to juſtify or to palliate any act of hoſtility, or even any emotion of jealouſy or ſuſpicion, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun; but I think it neceſſary to remark in this place, that at the very moment of receiving the authentic copy of the proclamation iſſued in the Iſle of France, I had ordered the diſputed diſtrict of Wynaad to be delivered to the Sultaun, after a public acknowledgment of the juſtice of his claim to that poſſeſſion, and I had propoſed to open an amicable negociation for the purpoſe of adjuſting his recent claims to a part of the diſtrict of Cooya, on ſimilar principles of equity, according to the tenor of the ſeventh article of the treaty of Seringapatam.

26. The Sultaun himſelf had not attempted to alledge even the pretext of a grievance againſt the Britiſh government: In his letters to Sir John Shore (written a ſhort time before the return of the Myſorean ambaſſadors from the Iſle of France, and received at Fort William on the 26th of April 1798, the day on which the French force landed at Mangalore) Tippoo declares, "That his friendly heart is diſpoſed to pay every regard to truth and juſtice, and to ſtrengthen the foundations of harmony and concord between the two nations;" and he ſignifies his deſire, that "Sir John Shore would impreſs Lord Mornington with a ſenſe of the friendſhip and unanimity ſo firmly ſubſiſting between the two ſtates"

27. This is not the language of hoſtility, nor even of diſcontent; from what diſpoſition in the friendly heart of the Sultaun theſe amicable profeſſions have proceeded, how they are connected with a regard to truth and juſtice, or calculated to ſtrengthen the foundations of harmony and concord, and to impreſs me with a ſenſe of the firmneſs of the Sultaun's friendſhip, your honourable Court can now determine without difficulty, ſince it is now proved, that theſe letters were written at the very criſis when he was in anxious expectation of the hourly arrival of that military ſuccour which he had earneſtly ſolicited from the enemy, for the expreſs purpoſe of commencing a war of aggreſſion againſt the Company's poſſeſſions.

28. That Tippoo Sultaun had not yet received the effectual ſuccour which he had ſolicited from the French, might have been

aſcribed either to the diſtracted ſtate of the government of Mauritius, or to their want of zeal in his cauſe, or to the raſhneſs and imbecility of his own councils; but neither the meaſure of his hoſtility, nor of our right to reſtrain it, nor of our danger from it, were to be eſtimated by the magnitude of the force which he had actually obtained, for I knew that his demands of military aſſiſtance were unlimited; I knew that they were addreſſed not merely to the government of the Mauritius, but to the Executive Directory of France, and I could not aſcertain how ſoon, either by ſome revolution in the government of the Mauritius, or by direct intercourſe with France, thoſe demands might be ſatisfied to the full extent of his acknowledged expectations.

29. Under all theſe circumſtances an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpoſe of fruſtrating the execution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable projects of ambition and revenge, appeared to me to be demanded by the ſoundeſt maxims both of juſtice and policy.

30. The act of Tippoo Sultaun's ambaſſadors, ratified by himſelf, and followed by the admiſſion of a French force into his army, was equivalent to a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war. But while his hoſtile purpoſe had been clearly manifeſted, the immediate means of accompliſhing it had happily diſappointed the order of his hopes.

31. The inconſiderable amount of the aid which he had already received from the French, while it could not be conſtrued as a limitation of my juſt right to vindicate the public ſafety, afforded ſtrong argument of policy in favour of attacking this deſperate, implacable, and treacherous enemy, before he could either complete the improvement of his own army, under the French officers whom he had already admitted into his ſervice, or could receive a further acceſſion of ſtrength under the progreſſive operation of his alliance with France.

32. In the moment of his comparative weakneſs, of his diſappointment, and probable dejection, the principles of juſtifiable ſelf defence, and of prudential precaution, required that we ſhould ſtrike ſuch an inſtantaneous blow againſt his power and reſources, as ſhould preclude the poſſibility of his deriving any ſubſtantial advantage from the aid of France, whenever it might reach his dominions.

33. Such was the tenor of my opinions as early as the 20th of June 1798. Although at that early period I could not aſcertain from what quarter the French would attempt to aſſiſt the Sultaun, I recorded my conviction that ſome attempt to aſſiſt him would be among the earlieſt of their operations. The concluſion of peace upon the continent of Europe, the weak ſtate of our allies in India (particularly of the Nizam, whoſe councils and army were at that period ſubjected to the overbearing influence of a powerful French faction) might appear both to Tippoo and to France to offer a favourable criſis for the attack of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India,

dia. The diſpoſition of the French government to attempt ſuch an enterprize has never been diſguiſed, and although I had not obtained poſitive proof that any formal and regular correſpondence between Tippoo Sultaun and the Executive Directory of France, had exiſted previous to the embaſſy and letters which arrived at the Mauritius in January 1798, yet the nature of that tranſaction afforded a ſtrong preſumption that a previous intercourſe of the ſame hoſtile character had taken place. This preſumption was further corroborated by my certain knowledge, that for ſome time paſt various emiſſaries of France had reached the councils of Tippoo Sultaun, and that through their repreſentations he had been taught to entertain a confident expectation of ſpeedy and effectual ſupport.

34. Even admitting that this expectation was likely to be fruſtrated, either by a failure of faith on the part of France, or by the vigilance and ſuperior power of his Majeſty's fleets, I was apprized that Tippoo had alſo diſpatched an embaſſy to Zemaun Shah, the object of which could be no other than to encourage that Prince in the proſecution of his long threatened invaſion of Hindoſtan. The whole tenor of my advices from the north weſtern countries of Hindoſtan, led me to believe that Zemaun Shah would croſs the attack, and would endeavour to purſue his avowed project of inſaſion in the courſe of the enſuing ſeaſon; and it appeared probable that his approach, which muſt neceſſarily engage the attention of the army in Bengal, might be the ſignal to Tippoo Sultaun for an irruption into the Carnatic.

35. In addition to theſe conſiderations, it appeared by no means improbable, that the impetuoſity of Tippoo Sultaun's temper, exaſperated by the aſſiduous and unremitting inſtigations of the emiſſaries of France, might break forth into hoſtilities without waiting for the actual movement of any Indian or European ally. His late embaſſy to the Iſle of France, ſufficiently manifeſted a diſpoſition capable of purſuing its favourite object of vengeance againſt the Britiſh nation with more zeal than diſcretion. It is my duty further to remark, that in the month of June 1798, the diſtribution and condition of the army on the coaſt of Coromandel, to which I ſhall advert more fully in a ſubſequent part of this diſpatch, offered but too ſtrong a temptation to the enterprize of a faithleſs and active enemy. Under ſuch circumſtances it would have been an unmanly and weak policy to have confided the ſafety of the Carnatic to the precarious forbearance of Tippoo Sultaun, or to have left him any longer in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the powerful advantage of being able to chuſe, according to his convenience, the time and mode of the attack which he had openly menaced.

36. I therefore recorded my decided judgment, that it was neceſſary to aſſemble the armies on the coaſt of Coromandel and Malabar without delay, and I iſſued my final orders for this purpoſe on the 20th June 1798.

37. To aſſemble the army on both coaſts was an indiſpenſable precaution, which I could not have been juſtified in omitting, from the

the moment that I was appriſed of Tippoo Sultaun's offenſive engagement with the French, and of the landing of a French force at Mangalore. But, being reſolved on all occaſions to ſubmit to your Court a full and diſtinct view of the whole ſcope of my motives and intentions, I have no heſitation in declaring, that my original reſolution was (if circumſtances would have admitted) to have attacked the Sultaun inſtantly, and on both ſides of his dominions, for the purpoſe of defeating his hoſtile preparations, and of anticipating their declared object; I was concerned however to learn, from perſons moſt converſant in military details at Fort St. George (notwithſtanding the diſtinguiſhed diſcipline of your army on the coaſt of Coromandel, and the eminent valour, activity, and ſkill of its officers) its diſperſed ſtate, and certain radical defects in its eſtabliſhments, would render the aſſembling a force equal to offenſive movements againſt Tippoo, a much more tedious and difficult operation than I had apprehended.

38. Some officers of approved military talents, experience, and integrity, at Fort St. George, declared that your army in the Carnatic could not be aſſembled for offenſive purpoſes before the commencement of the year 1800, and that a period of ſix months would be required for its equipment, even for the purpoſe of defending the Carnatic againſt any ſudden attack. The difficulty of aſſembling and moving your army on the coaſt of Coromandel, furniſhed indeed an alarming proof of the defenceleſs and perilous ſtate of the Carnatic in that arduous conjuncture. But in proportion to the preſſure of that difficulty, the neceſſity of an inſtantaneous and active exertion became more urgent; for whether the army, when aſſembled, was to anticipate or wait the attack of Tippoo, it appeared an equally indiſpenſable meaſure of precaution to reſume, without delay, the power of meeting that vindictive and reſtleſs Prince in the field. I was not therefore diſcouraged, either by the ſuggeſtions to which I have referred, or by ſubſequent repreſentations of a ſimilar character and tendency, from inſiſting on the immediate execution of my orders for aſſembling the army; and adverting to the fatal conſequences which have formerly been experienced in the Carnatic, by neglecting to keep pace with the forwardneſs of hoſtile equipments in Myſore, I reſolved to entruſt the protection of your poſſeſſions on the coaſt of Coromandel, to no other ſecurity than a complete and early ſtate of preparation for war.

39. At Bombay, my orders for aſſembling the army were executed with great promptitude and alacrity, unaccompanied by any ſymptoms of indiſpoſition to thoſe united and zealous efforts, which the exigency of the criſis demanded from every branch of your civil and military ſervice.

40. The unavoidable delay which obſtructed the aſſembling your army in the Carnatic, having compelled me to relinquiſh my firſt intention of ſtriking an immediate blow againſt the power and reſources of Tippoo Sultaun, I applied myſelf to the formation of

ſuch

ſuch a permanent ſyſtem of preparation and defence, as while it tended to reſtore to the government of Fort St. George, with all practicable diſpatch, the power of repelling any act of aggreſſion on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, might ultimately enable me to demand both a juſt indemnification for the expence which the Sultaun's violation of treaty had occaſioned to your government, and a ſeaſonable ſecurity againſt the conſequences of his recent alliance with the enemy.

41. With this view, while the army was aſſembling on the coaſts of Coromandel and Malabar, my early attention was directed to ſtrengthen and improve the defenſive alliance concluded between the honourable Company, and their Highneſſes the Nizam and Peſhwah, under the treaties of Paangul, Poonah, and Seringapatam, for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a barrier againſt the ambition and revenge of Tippoo Sultaun.

42. The ſtate of this alliance afforded abundant matter of painful anxiety; I found both the Peſhwah and the Nizam (whoſe reſpective power it was the object of the treaty of Seringapatam to maintain) in ſuch a ſtate of efficiency as might render them uſeful allies in the event of a war with Myſore, reduced to the loweſt condition of depreſſion and weakneſs, the former by the intruſion of Doulet Row Sindia, and the latter by the threatened hoſtilities of the ſame Chieftain, by the eſtabliſhment of a numerous and active French faction in the centre of the Decan; and while the internal convulſions of each ſtate had diminiſhed the reſources of both, their co-operation againſt Tippoo Sultaun had become impracticable by the progreſs of their mutual animoſities and diſſentions.

43. In this ſcene of general confuſion, the power of Tippoo Sultaun alone (which it had been the policy of all our alliances and treaties to reduce) had remained undiſturbed and unimpaired, if it had not been augmented and improved.

44. The final reſult to the Britiſh government appeared to me to be, firſt, the entire loſs of the benefit of the treaty of triple alliance againſt Tippoo Sultaun, by the utter inability of our allies to fulfil their defenſive engagements with the Company, and, ſecondly, the eſtabliſhment of a French army of 14,000 men, in the dominions of one of our allies, in the vicinity of the territories of our irreconcileable enemy, and on the confines of the Carnatic and of the Northern Circars.

45. In this ſtate of our political relations, the Company was expoſed without the aid of a ſingle ally, to the hazard of a conteſt with the united force of Tippoo Sultaun and of the French.

46. My ſeparate diſpatch under date the 21ſt of November, forwarded by the Eurydice, will have apprized your honourable Court of the meaſures which I took for the purpoſe of reſtoring to his Highneſs the Nizam, the power of fulfilling his defenſive engagements with the Company.

47. At the ſame time my endeavours were employed, with equal aſſiduity, to give vigour and effect to the treaties ſubſiſting with his Highneſs

Highneſs the Peſhwah. The return of Nana Furnaveeſs to the adminiſtration, afforded, for ſome time, a juſt expectation that our alliance with the Mahrattahs would ſpeedily be reſtored with additional vigour and advantage; but the increaſing diſtractions of the Mahrattah Empire, unfortunately fruſtrated the wiſe counſels of that experienced and able ſtateſman, and diſappointed my views at the Court of Poonah; I had however the ſatisfaction to aſcertain, that the diſpoſition of that Court, under the adminiſtration of Nana, continued perfectly favourable to the Britiſh intereſts; and that want of power would be the ſole cauſe of its inaction, in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

48. Towards the commencement of the month of Auguſt 1798, I learnt the preparations making by the French in the Mediterranean. Various circumſtances attending the equipment of that armament, inclined me to apprehend, that at leaſt a part of it might be deſtined for an expedition to India, although I could not believe that the attempt would be made through Egypt. Under theſe impreſſions, I took the earlieſt opportunity of directing the attention of Rear Admiral Rainier to the coaſt of Malabar, and at the ſame time I propoſed to ſtrengthen his Majeſty's ſquadron in theſe ſeas, according to any arrangement which his Excellency might ſuggeſt, and I iſſued orders to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to attend to his Excellency's ſuggeſtions on this important ſubject. I am happy to inform your honourable Court, that his Excellency, with the utmoſt readineſs, acceded to the propoſition which I had ſuggeſted to him, with reſpect to the defence of the coaſt of Malabar, although his original intention had been to proceed in the firſt inſtance to the ſtraits of Malacca.

49. On the 18th of September I ratified the new ſubſidiary treaty with the Nizam, of which I have ſtated the ſubſtance in my ſeparate diſpatch of the 21ſt of November by the Eurydice.

50. On the 18th of October, I received the firſt authentic information of the invaſion of Egypt by the French, and of the progreſs of their arms in that country.

51. It is unneceſſary to call the attention of your honourable Court, to the evident connection of the invaſion of Egypt with the joint deſigns of the French and of Tippoo Sultaun, againſt the Britiſh power in India; and I truſt it is now equally ſuperfluous to enter into any detailed reaſoning for the purpoſe of ſatisfying you of the ſecurity which, at that period of time, would have reſulted to your intereſts in India, if my original intention of anticipating the hoſtile projects of Tippoo Sultaun could have been carried into immediate effect, according to my anxious wiſh. The neceſſity, however, of either compelling Tippoo Sultaun to detach himſelf from the intereſts of France, or of depriving him of the power of co-operating with the French, if they ſhould be enabled to reach India, now became too evident to admit of any doubt. My opinion had long been decided, that no negociation with Tippoo Sultaun could be ſucceſsful, unleſs accompanied by ſuch a diſpoſition

of

of our force as ſhould alarm him for the ſafety of his capital, and that no military operation could effect an adequate or ſpeedy reduction of his power, unleſs directed immediately to the ſiege of that city.

52. On the 20th of October, therefore, I gave peremptory orders to the Government of Fort St. George, for completing the equipment of their battering train, and for advancing it with all practicable diſpatch to the moſt eligible ſtation on the frontier of the Carnatic, with a view of proceeding towards Seringapatam at the earlieſt poſſible period, if ſuch a movement into Myſore ſhould become neceſſary. At the ſame time, I ſignified to the Government of Fort St. George, my intention of reinforcing their army with 3,000 volunteers from the native infantry, on the eſtabliſhment of Bengal, who had offered their ſervices with the utmoſt alacrity and zeal.

53. To the Government of Bombay I iſſued further orders, for the collection not only of their troops, but of the largeſt poſſible ſupplies on the coaſt of Malabar.

54. On the 22d of October (as I have already informed your Honourable Court) the diſmiſſion of the French faction in the Nizam's army was happily accompliſhed at Hydrabad.

55. On the 31ſt of October, I received the intelligence of the glorious victory obtained by his Majeſty's ſquadron under the command of Sir Horatio Nelſon; but being ſtill uncertain of the fate of the French army in Egypt, and ignorant whether an additional force might not have been intended to co-operate with it in India, by the ordinary paſſage round the Cape of Good Hope, I did not relax any part of the naval or military preparations which had been commenced under my orders. The opportunity now appeared favourable for opening a negotiation with Tippoo Sultaun. I had already communicated to the allies, the Nizam and the Peſhwah, a circumſtantial detail of the conduct of that Prince, and had received from both the moſt unequivocal aſſurances of their entire concurrence in my ſentiments and views, as well of their determination to ſupport my juſt claims of ſatisfaction for the infraction of the treaty of Seringapatam.

56. On the 8th of November, therefore, I addreſſed to Tippoo Sultaun the letter, of which a copy (No. 2. A. and B.) accompanies this diſpatch.

57. Your Honourable Court will perceive, that in this letter I have carefully avoided every hoſtile expreſſion, merely apprizing the Sultaun of my knowledge of the nature of his intercourſe with the French nation, and propoſing to him to receive Major Doveton on the part of the allies, for the purpoſe of proceeding to an amicable arrangement of all ſubſiſting differences.

58. My expectation was, that the neceſſary impreſſion of the ſucceſs of his Majeſty's fleet againſt the French in Egypt, the revival of our defenſive alliance with the Nizam, the deſtruction of the French influence in the Decan, the declared diſpoſition of the Peſh-

wah to fulfil his defenſive engagements to the utmoſt extent of his power, the preſence of his Majeſty's ſquadron on the coaſt of Malabar, reinforced by ſuch of the Honourable Company's ſhips as had been equipped for the purpoſe, and, finally, the progreſs of our military preparations on both coaſts, might have induced the Sultaun to accede to my propoſals for opening the channels of pacific negotiation; and under theſe circumſtances I truſted that the terror of the Britiſh arms might have rendered their actual employment unneceſſary.

59. With ſuch expectations I reſolved to proceed to Fort St. George, for the purpoſe of conducting the expected negotiation with the Sultaun, which I flattered myſelf my preſence on the coaſt of Coromandel might enable me to bring to an iſſue, before the ſeaſon ſhould be ſo far advanced as to relieve Tippoo Sultaun from thoſe alarms for the ſafety of his capital, on which I founded my ſole hope of obtaining any ſatisfactory adjuſtment with him.

60. On the 10th December, I addreſſed the letter, marked No. 3. to the Sultaun, informing him of my intention to proceed to Fort St. George, and again urging him to receive Major Doveton. On the 25th of December I embarked on board his Majeſty's ſhip the Sybille, Captain E. Cooke, and arrived at this Preſidency on the 31ſt of the ſame month.

61. A few days previous to my arrival, the corps of native volunteers from Bengal had landed in perfect ſafety, and in the higheſt ſpirits, and ſoon after a corps of artillery arrived from Fort William under the command of Colonel Montague.

62. The letter marked No. 4. was delivered to me on my arrival at Fort St. George.

63. In this letter your Honourable Court will obſerve the prevarication and falſehood which mark the Sultaun's ſtatement of his late intercourſe with the French, and you will perceive the evaſion by which he eludes the moderate and amicable propoſition of the allies for opening a negotiation.

64. To this letter from the Sultaun, I returned the anſwer, dated 9th of January, and marked No. 5, in which I renewed the propoſition of opening a negotiation, and urged the Sultaun not to delay his reply beyond the period of one day after my letter ſhould reach him, intimating that dangerous conſequences might reſult from a longer delay.

65. The advanced period of the ſeaſon abſolutely required that I ſhould aſcertain the Sultaun's views within a ſhort time, my propoſition contained nothing derogatory to the honour or dignity of the Sultaun. It was now urged for the third time without variation, and it related ſimply and diſtinctly to the admiſſion of an ambaſſador, for the purpoſe of opening a negotiation; to demand an immediate anſwer to a propoſition of ſuch a nature, could not therefore be deemed either offenſive or unreaſonable.

66. Subſequently to the diſpatch of my letter (No. 5.) I received from the Sultaun the letter (No. 6.) in reply to my letter

(No.

(No. 3.) diſpatched from Fort William. The Sultaun's ſilence in his letter (No. 6) with reſpect to the admiſſion of Major Doveton, afforded an additional proof of his diſpoſition to evade the pacific advance of the allies.

6 . I now employed every effort to advance the military preparations in the Carnatic, which had already made a conſiderable progreſs during the months of November and December. From the moment of my arrival at Fort St. George, all the inhabitants of this ſettlement, and every officer, civil and military, appeared to be animated by an unanimous determination to diſcharge their reſpective duties with a degree of cheerfulneſs and ardour, correſpondent to the exigency and importance of the occaſion; and I was ſoon ſatisfied that the diſpoſition, of which I lamented the appearance in the months of July and Auguſt, had either been ſubdued by the juſt exerciſe of authority, or corrected by reflection, and by the more full diſcloſure of the views of the enemy. The zeal, alacrity, and public ſpirit of the bankers and commercial agents at Madras, as well as of the moſt reſpectable of your civil ſervants at this Preſidency, enabled me, within a few weeks, to raiſe a large ſum of money, by loan, for the public ſervice. Previous to my departure from Bengal, I had remitted 20 lacks of rupees in ſpecie for the uſe of this Preſidency; I now diſpatched the Sybille to Calcutta for a further ſupply; and the extraordinary exertion of his Excellency the Vice Preſident in Council, aſſiſted by the diligence and ability of Mr. Thomas Myers, the Accountant General of Bengal, furniſhed me with an additional aid of twenty lacks, within ſo ſhort a time, that the movement of the army was not delayed for an inſtant, on account of a deficiency of treaſure, and Lieut. General Harris was provided with a ſufficient ſupply of ſpecie to maintain his army in the field until the month of May.

68. Tippoo Sultaun remaining ſilent for a conſiderable time after the receipt of my letter of the 9th of January, I concluded that his object muſt be to delay his anſwer until the ſeaſon ſhould be ſo far advanced, as to render the capture of Seringapatam impracticable during the preſent year.

69. In the meanwhile the advices from Buſſorah, Bagdad, Conſtantinople, and Bombay, were of ſo uncertain a nature, as to leave me ſtill in doubt with reſpect to the condition of the French army in Egypt. The only ſafe concluſion which could be drawn from thoſe advices being, that the French ſtill maintained the poſſeſſion of that country with a large army.

70. No intelligence had been received from the Red Sea reſpecting the arrival of any of his Majeſty's ſhips on that ſtation, nor had I been able to aſcertain with any degree of accuracy, what means the French might either have provided, or might find on the ſpot, to enable them to reach the Sultaun's dominions.

71. In addition to theſe circumſtances, I knew that while Tippoo Sultaun had declined to receive an ambaſſador from the Honourable Company, and had omitted to anſwer my late letters, he

had diſpatched native vakeels from Seringapatam, who, together with Mr. Dubuc (one of the leaders of the French force raiſed in the Iſle of France, under Mr. Malartie's proclamation) were on the point of embarking at Tranquebar, with an avowed miſſion from the Sultaun to the Executive Directory of France.

72. On the 3d of February, I had received no anſwer from the Sultaun to my letter of the 9th of January, although the communication between Seringapatam and Fort St. George, does not require at the moſt a longer time than eight, and is ſometimes effected in four days.

73. In order therefore to defeat the object of the Sultaun's ſilence, and to avail myſelf of the actual ſuperiority of our force, and of the advantages of the preſent ſeaſon, before the French could effect any junction with him, I determined to commence hoſtilities without delay, and to ſuſpend all negotiation, until the united forces of the Company and of their allies, ſhould have made ſuch an impreſſion on the territories of Myſore, as might give full effect to our juſt repreſentations.

74. With theſe views, on the 3d of February, I directed Lieutenant General Harris to enter the territory of Myſore with the army aſſembled under his command; on the ſame day I iſſued orders to Lieutenant General Stuart to be prepared to co-operate from Malabar; and I ſignified to Rear Admiral Rainier, and to the ſeveral allies of the Company, that I now conſidered the Britiſh Government in India to be at war with Tippoo Sultaun.

75. At length, on the 13th February, I received from Tippoo Sultaun the letter marked No. 7. informing me, that being frequently diſpoſed "to make excurſions and hunt," he was "according proceeding upon a hunting excurſion," and deſiring "that I would" diſpatch Major Doveton "ſlightly attended."

76. But the ſeaſon for negotiation through the pacific channels, ſo often offered by me, was now elapſed. After mature deliberation on the grounds already ſtated, I had directed the advance of the army into the territory of the Sultaun, and I had ſignified to the allies my determination to proceed to hoſtilities. To have delayed the advance of the army, would at once have thrown the advantages which I then poſſeſſed into the hands of Tippoo Sultaun, and have rendered the ſiege of his capital impracticable during the preſent ſeaſon. On the other hand an embaſſy, combined with the hoſtile irruption of any army into Myſore, would have been liable to the imputation of inſincerity towards Tippoo Sultaun, and while it bore the appearance of indeciſion in the eyes of the allies, would have promoted, and perhaps warranted, a ſimilar degree of inſtability in their councils and operations.

77. The deſign of this tardy, reluctant, and inſidious aſſent to the admiſſion of an embaſſy from the Britiſh Government, could be conſidered in no other light than that of a new artifice for the purpoſe of gaining time, until a change of circumſtances and of ſeaſon might enable the Sultaun to avail himſelf of the aſſiſtance of France.

France. This concluſion was now confirmed by my knowledge of the actual embarkation of Mr. Dubuc and two native vakeels, on an embaſſy from Tippoo to the Executive Directory of France; an event which took place at Tranquebar on the 7th of February.

78. I therefore replied to the letter of Tippoo Sultaun in the terms of the incloſure, No. 8; in which I have declared Lieutenant General Harris to be the only perſon now authorized by me to receive and to anſwer whatever communications the Sultaun may think fit to make, with a view to the reſtoration of peace, on ſuch conditions as appear to the allies to be indiſpenſably neceſſary to their common ſecurity. This letter I directed General Harris to forward to the Sultaun, on the day on which the army under his command ſhould paſs the frontier, and, at the ſame time, I inſtructed him to iſſue, in the name of the allies, the accompanying declaration, marked No. 9.

79. The Nizam's contingent conſiſts of above 6,000 of the Honourable Company's troops, ſubſidized by his Highneſs, of about the ſame number of his own infantry (including a portion of Mr. Peron's ſepoys now commanded by Britiſh officers) and of a large body of cavalry.

80. This force, under the general command of Mur Allum, formed a junction with the Britiſh army on the 19th of February; and it is with the greateſt ſatisfaction that I remark to your Honourable Court, the beneficial effects which the Company have already derived from the recent improvement of our alliance with the Court of Hydrabad. The Nizam's contingent actually arrived in the vicinity of Chittoor, in a ſtate of preparation for the field, before General Harris was ready to proceed on his march from Vellore.

81. I have annexed to this diſpatch, No. 10, the laſt return of Lieutenant General Harris's army previous to his paſſing the frontier, an army more completely appointed, more amply and liberally ſupplied in every department, or more perfect in its diſcipline, and in the acknowledged experience, ability, and zeal of its officers, never took the field in India. The army on the coaſt of Malabar (of which I alſo incloſe a return, No. 11) is in an equally efficient and reſpectable condition, and the extraordinary efforts which have been made by Lieutenant General Stuart and Major General Hartley, ſeconded by the cordial attachment and unremitting aſſiduity of the Rajah of Coorga, have collected, within a very ſhort period of time, a ſupply ſo abundant, that I am induced to tranſmit the particulars of it to your Honourable Court, as a teſtimony of the diſtinguiſhed merits of thoſe valuable officers, and of the loyalty and active exertions of that faithful tributary of the Honourable Company.

82. A conſiderable force, under the command of Lieut. Colonels Read and Brown, will co-operate with Lieut. General Harris in the ſouthern diſtricts of the Carnatic and Myſore.

83. Under

83. Under theſe circumſtances General Harris entered the territory of Myſore on the 5th March, with orders to proceed directly to Seringapatam.

84. Having thus ſubmitted to your Honourable Court, according to the order of dates, a detailed relation of the events which have led to the war in which we are actually engaged, and having declared to you the motives and objects of my conduct in every ſtage of this important tranſaction, I muſt requeſt your permiſſion to conclude this diſpatch with ſuch reflections as ariſe in my mind from the review of my paſt meaſures, and from the proſpect of their ultimate conſequences and permanent effect.

85. From the firſt diſcloſure of the nature and object of Tippoo Sultaun's embaſſy to the Iſle of France, every principle of juſtice and policy demanded from your Government in India, that an inſtantaneous effort ſhould be made to reduce his power and reſources, before he could avail himſelf of the advantages of the alliance which he had concluded. The defect of means is the ſole conſideration which can juſtify me, for not having made that effort at the early period when its ſucceſs would have placed the ſecurity of your poſſeſſions on a foundation, which the invaſion of India by a French force could not have impaired.

86. For without the aid of ſome native power, it is ſcarcely poſſible that the French ſhould ever make any permanent impreſſion on your empire in India; and no native power (excepting Tippoo Sultaun) is ſo infatuated as to be diſpoſed to aſſiſt or receive a French army.

87. The progreſs of events ſince the date of my orders of the 20th of June 1798, has not only confirmed the principles of juſtice and policy, by which an attack upon the Saltaun was at that time demanded, but has manifeſted that the deſigns of France, as well as of the Sultaun, were of a much more extenſive and formidable nature than any which have ever been attempted againſt the Britiſh empire in India ſince the hour of its firſt foundation.

88. While the magnitude and danger of theſe deſigns were gradually diſcloſed, I had the ſatisfaction to feel that the means of averting them were augmenting in a proportion nearly equal, by the ſucceſs of the negotiations at Hydrabad, and by the advance of the military preparations which I had ordered throughout your poſſeſſions.

89. At the commencement of the month of February, the criſis arrived in which I was called upon to form my ultimate deciſion on the important queſtion at iſſue with Tippoo Sultaun, and to determine the final reſult of the whole ſyſtem of my meaſures.

90. On the one hand, the apparent eſtabliſhment of the French army in Egypt, and the uncertainty of the ſtate of our naval power in the Red Sea, rendered the danger ſtill urgent from that quarter; while Tippoo Sultaun's repeated evaſions of my propoſals for negotiation, combined with his embaſſy to the Executive Directory of France, under the conduct of Mr. Dubuc, appeared to preclude all hope

hope of detaching the Sultaun from his recent alliance with the enemy. On the other hand, I now poſſeſſed ample means of fruſtrating the moſt dangerous effects of that alliance, by a ſeaſonable application of the powerful force, which the treachery and aggreſſion of the Sultaun had compelled me to collect at a heavy expence to your finances.

91. Your Honourable Court will determine, whether, in this ſtate of affairs, my orders of the 3d February were premature, and whether I ſhould have been juſtified, on the 13th February, in recalling thoſe orders, for the purpoſe of admitting, at that late period, a negotiation which would have enabled Tippoo Sultaun to defeat every object of the armament of the allies for the preſent ſeaſon, and would have afforded him ample time to reap the full benefit of his connection with France, before the ſeaſon for beſieging his capital ſhould return.

92. In deciding theſe important queſtions, you will neceſſarily conſider what degree of reliance was to be placed on the ſincerity of the Sultaun's diſpoſition to conclude an amicable adjuſtment with your Government, at the very moment when he had actually diſpatched, on an embaſſy to the Executive Directory of France, the commander of the French troops raiſed in the Mauritius, and admitted into the Sultaun's ſervice, for the expreſs purpoſe of carrying on a war of aggreſſion againſt your poſſeſſions in India.

93. The admirable condition of your armies on both coaſts, and the unequalled perfection of their equipment in every department, added to the extraordinary ſpirit and animation with which the campaign has been opened, afford every reaſon to hope, that the iſſue of the war will be ſpeedy and proſperous, and that it muſt terminate in a conſiderable reduction of Tippoo Sultaun's reſources and power.

94. The wiſdom of your Honourable Court will anticipate the extenſive benefits which muſt reſult to your intereſts, from an event now become eſſential to the peace and ſecurity of your poſſeſſions in India.

95. The policy of the treaty of Seringapatam, certainly was not to maintain Tippoo Sultaun's power in ſuch a ſtate as ſhould leave him a conſtant object of alarm and apprehenſion to the Company: That he has been juſtly ſo conſidered for ſome years paſt, cannot be doubted by any perſon acquainted with the records of any of your Governments in India. The preſent is the ſecond criſis within the laſt three years, in which the Government General has thought it neceſſary to aſſemble the army on the coaſt of Coromandel for the ſole purpoſe of checking his motions; and the apprehenſion of his intentions has obſtructed our operations againſt our European enemies in India, during the courſe of our preſent war.

96. The continuance of Tippoo's power on its actual ſcale, and under ſuch circumſtances, muſt have proved to the Company a perpetual ſource of ſolicitude, expence, and hazard. But the engagement which he has contracted with the French, the public proofs

proofs which he has given of his eagerneſs to receive in Myſore as large a force as they can furniſh, combined with the prodigious magnitude of their preparations, and the incredible progreſs of their arms, evidently directed to the deſtruction of the Britiſh power in India, form new and prominent features in our political ſituation in this quarter of the world.

97. Admitting the wiſdom of that policy which dictated the preſervation of Tippoo Sultaun's power, at the cloſe of the laſt war with Myſore, the ſpirit of our preſent councils muſt be accommodated to the variation of circumſtances, and to the actual poſition, character, and views of our enemies.

98. In ſuch a conjuncture of affairs, I am perſuaded that your Honourable Court will be of opinion, that no object can be deemed ſo urgent, or ſo neceſſary to the ſafety of your poſſeſſions, as the effectual reduction of the only declared ally of France now exiſting among the native powers of India.

99. If Tippoo Sultaun had been diſpoſed to content himſelf with the quiet poſſeſſion of his preſent dominions; if he could have been brought to a ſenſe of his own peril in forming a connection with the French, the repreſentations which I addreſſed to him would have produced an early and ſalutary impreſſion. Whatever ſpeculative opinions might have been entertained with reſpect to his intereſts, views, and power, the juſtice and moderation of the Britiſh Government would never have diſturbed his tranquillity. But he reſolved to attempt the recovery of his loſt dominions, at the hazard of thoſe which he ſtill retains, and in the ardour of his paſſionate purſuit, he overlooked not only the certain deſtruction of his own independence, the inevitable conſequence even of the moſt proſperous ſucceſs of any alliance with France, but alſo the predominant influence of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company which would detect his treachery, and turn againſt his own empire the ruin which he had meditated againſt theirs.

100. The ſecrecy of his councils, the promptitude of his reſources, his conſtant and active ſtate of equipment for war, added to the facility of his intercourſe with the French through his remaining territories on the coaſt of Malabar, form the moſt dangerous circumſtances in the actual condition of his power and dominion, and conſtitute his principal means of offence.

101. If ſucceſs ſhould attend your arms in this war, I entertain a firm confidence that thoſe dangers will either be wholly averted, or ſo conſiderably diminiſhed, as to afford to your Government in India the proſpect of durable ſecurity and genuine peace.

102. I cannot cloſe this letter without repeating to your Honourable Court the cordial expreſſions of my entire ſatisfaction in the zealous and honourable co-operation of Lord Clive, as well as of all the members of this Government. The beneficial effect of their cheerful and ready concurrence in forwarding all my views, is manifeſt in the rapid progreſs and perfect completion of the equipments of the army in the field, and furniſhes a ſtriking and

ſalutary

ſalutary example of the ineſtimable advantages of unanimity and concord among your ſervants in India.

I have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,
With great reſpect,
Your moſt obedient and faithful ſervant,

Fort St. George, MORNINGTON.
30th March 1799.

(No. 1.)—Proclamation at the Iſle of France.

Liberté. Egalité.

Republique Françaiſe Une et Indiviſible.

Proclamation.

Anne-Joſeph-Hyppolite Malartie, Général en Chef, Gouverneur Général des Iſles de France & de la Réunion, et Commandant Général des Eſtabliſſements Français à l'Eſt du Cap de Bonne Eſpérance.

Citoyens,

Connaiſſant depuis pluſieurs années votre zèle et votre attachement pour les intérêts & la gloire de notre république, nous ſommes tres empreſſés & nous nous faiſſons un devoir de vous donner connaiſſance de toutes les propoſitions que nous fait Tippoo Sultaun, par deux ámbaſſadeurs, que nous a dépêche.

Ce Prince a ecrit des lettres particulieres a l'Aſſemblée Coloniale, a tous les Généraux, qui ſont employés dans ce Gouvernement, & nous a addreſsé un paquet pour le Directoire Exécutif.

1. Il demande à faire une alliance offenſive & defenſive avec les Français, en propoſant d'entretenir à ſes frais, tant que la guerre durera dans l'Inde, les troupes qu'on pourra lui envoyer.

2. Il premet de fournir toutes les choſes neceſſaires pour faire cette guerre, excepté le vin & l'eau de vie dont il ſe trouve abſolument dénné.

3. Il aſſure que tous les preparatifs ſont faits pour reçevoir les ſécours qu'on lui donnera, & qu'a l'arrivée des troupes, les chefs officiers trouveront toutes les choſes neceſſaires pour faire une guerre à laquelle les Européens ſont peu accoutumés.

4. Enfin il n'attend plus que le moment ou les Français viendront a ſon ſécours. Pour declarer le guerre aux Anglais, déſirant avec ardeur pouvoir les chaſsér de l'Inde.

Comme il nous eſt impoſſible de diminuer le nombre des ſoldats des 107 regimens, & de la garde ſoldée du Port de la Fraternité, à cauſe des ſécours que nous avons envoyés à nos allies lei Hollandais, nous invitons tous les citoyens de bonne volonté, à ſe faire inſcrire dans leur municipalités reſpectives, pour aller ſervir ſous les drapeaux, à ſe faire auſſi inſcrire.

Nous pouvons aſſurer tous les citoyens qui ſe feroit inſcrire, que Tippoo leur fera des traitemens avantageux qui ſeront fixés avec ſes ambaſſadeurs, qui s'engageront en outre, au nom de leur Souve-

rain, a ce que les Français qui auront pris partis dans ſes armées, ne puiſſent jamais y être retenus quand ils voudront r'entrenir dans leur patrie.

Fait au Porte Nord-Oueſt, le 10 Pluviôſe, l'an ſix de la Republique Françaiſe, une & indiviſible.

MALARTIE.

(No. 2. A.)—Copy of a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Right Honourable the Governor General.

From Tippoo Sultaun: Received 24th October 1798.

The Talooks of Ameera and Soula, in which Cauntmungle and Coloorbachee are ſituated, have belonged to Comyal (Mangalore) from the year Rajah 1070 Mohummuddee to the end of the year Shadab 1226, a term of 156 years. Thirty-ſix years ago, a body of 2000 Coorga Peons were employed in ſervice of the ſtate; and ſome villages in the Talooks above-mentioned, yielding 3423 pagodas, continued for a ſhort time to be aſſigned for their pay; but ſince ſix-and-thirty years, that even has ceaſed. This trivial affair can only be aſcribed to the turbulent diſpoſition of intereſted men, who by nature are ever ſeeking opportunities of ſowing the ſeeds of diſſention. Of this I am confident. Your Lordſhip muſt be well convinced the perſon who is now in Coorga is not of the poſterity of the Coorga Rajahs, but of a different ſtock.

Conſtantly gratify me with friendly letters.

Poſtſcript.

Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, has written to me, that two perſons of integrity and ability from among the civil officers (Talookdars) on the coaſt of Malabar, have been deputed to enquire into the claims of the above-mentioned Talook, and will ſhortly arrive. Orders have been iſſued from my Sircar alſo, nominating Shaikh Shahaubuddien and Meer Mohummud Ally, perſons of integrity and honour, to negociate with the deputies above-mentioned, and aſcertain from records and facts the dependency of the above-mentioned Talooks in Coorial.

A true tranſlation.

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. T.

(No. 2. B.)—Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 8th November 1798.

To Tippoo Sultaun: written 8th November 1798.

I have received your letter, informing me—(Recite the ſubſtance of the letter received on the 24th October)

It affords me ſincere ſatisfaction to learn, that you have nominated two perſons of integrity and honour, to meet and confer with the deputies appointed, under my orders, by Mr. Duncan (the Governor

Governor of Bombay) for the purpoſe of inveſtigating the queſtion regarding the Talooks of Amura and Soulea. It is only by means of regular enquiry and amicable diſcuſſion, that ſuch queſtions can be adjuſted among independent powers. My determination, in the caſe of Wynaad, was dictated by thoſe principles of juſtice and moderation which always direct the Company's Government; nor ſhall my ſcrupulous adherence to the ſame principles be leſs manifeſt in my deciſion on your claim to the diſtricts at preſent in queſtion; the poſſeſſion of which ſhall not be with-holden from you for an inſtant, if, after full inveſtigation, I ſhall be ſatisfied of the juſtice of your title to them.

It is a well known truth, that they are always the moſt ready to reſpect the juſt rights of others, who are the moſt vigilant and reſolute to maintain their own.

I have underſtood your ſentiments concerning the "turbulent diſpoſition of intereſted men, who by nature are ever ſeeking opportunities of ſowing the ſeeds of diſſenſion." For the happineſs of mankind it is to be lamented, that theſe authors of confuſion are too numerous, aſſiduous, and ſucceſsful, in all parts of the world. In no age or country were the baneful and inſidious arts of intrigue cultivated with ſuch ſucceſs, as they are at preſent by the French nation. I ſincerely wiſh that no impreſſion had been produced on your diſcerning mind by that dangerous people; but my ſituation enables me to know, that they have reached your preſence, and have endeavoured to pervert the wiſdom of your councils, and to inſtigate you to war againſt thoſe, who have given you no provocation.

It is impoſſible that you ſhould ſuppoſe me to be ignorant of the intercourſe which ſubſiſts between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company, and to be now engaged in an unjuſt war with the Britiſh nation. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the tranſactions which have paſſed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear neceſſary or proper, that I ſhould any longer conceal from you the ſurprize and concern with which I perceived you diſpoſed to involve yourſelf in all the ruinous conſequences of a connection, which threatens not only to ſubvert the foundations of friendſhip between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confuſion, to ſhake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your ſubjects, and to deſtroy the religion which you revere.

Immediately after my arrival in Bengal, I read your correſpondence with the late Governor General Sir John Shore, and with the acting Governor General Sir Alured Clarke; and I perceived with great ſatisfaction, that in all your letters you conſtantly profeſſed a diſpoſition to ſtrengthen the bonds of ſincere attachment, and the foundations of harmony and concord eſtabliſhed between you and the Honourable Company. I received particular pleaſure from reading your laſt letter to Sir John Shore, in which you ſig-

nified your amicable deſire, that he ſhould impreſs me with a ſenſe of the friendſhip and unanimity, ſo long ſubſiſting between the two ſtates. Your ſubſequent letters to me have abounded with profeſſions of the ſame friendly nature.

Combining theſe profeſſions of amity on your part, with the proofs which the Company's Government have conſtantly given of their ſincere diſpoſition to maintain the relations of friendſhip and peace with you; and adverting, at the ſame time to your reputation for wiſdom and diſcernment, it was natural for me, to be extremely ſlow to believe the various accounts tranſmitted to me, of your negociations with the French, and of your military preparations; but whatever my reluctance to credit ſuch reports might be, prudence required, both of me and of the Company's allies, that we ſhould adopt certain meaſures of precaution and ſelf-defence; and theſe have accordingly been taken, as you will no doubt have obſerved. The Britiſh Government and the allies, wiſhing nevertheleſs to live in peace and friendſhip with all their neighbours; entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any views in the leaſt incompatible with their reſpective engagements, and looking to no other objects than the permanent ſecurity and tranquillity of their own dominions and ſubjects, will always be ready, as they now are, to afford you every demonſtration of their pacific diſpoſition.

The Peſhwah and his Highneſs the Nizam concur with me in the obſervations which I have offered to you in this letter, and which, in the name of the Company and of the allies, I recommend to your moſt ſerious conſideration; but as I am alſo deſirous of communicating to you, on the behalf of the Company and their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual ſecurity and welfare of all parties, I propoſe to depute to you, for this purpoſe, Major Doveton, who is well known to you, and who will explain to you more fully and particularly, the ſole means which appear to myſelf and to the allies of the Company, to be effectual for the ſalutary purpoſe of removing all exiſting diſtruſt and ſuſpicion, and of eſtabliſhing peace and good underſtanding on the moſt durable foundations.

You will, I doubt not, let me know at what time and place it will be convenient to you, to receive Major Doveton, and as ſoon as your friendly letter ſhall reach me, I will direct him to proceed to your preſence.

'I ſhall expect your anſwer to this letter, with an earneſt hope that it may correſpond with the pacific views and wiſhes of the allies; and that you may be convinced, that you cannot in any manner better conſult your true intereſts, than by meeting, with cordiality, the preſent friendly and moderate advance to a ſatisfactory and amicable ſettlement of all points on which any doubt or anxiety may have ariſen in the minds, either of yourſelf or of the allies.

(A true copy.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. Tr.

(No. 3.)——Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to Tippoo Saultaun; dated 10th December 1798.

To Tippoo Sultaun.

December 10th, 1798.

I had the honour of addreſſing a friendly letter to your Highneſs, on the 8th of November laſt; in which I ſtated a variety of important points, to which your Highneſs would no doubt perceive the propriety and neceſſity of giving your earlieſt and moſt ſerious conſideration.—I particularly hope that your Highneſs will have been ſenſible of the advantages likely to reſult to all parties from the conciliatory meaſure of my deputing Major Doveton to you, which I propoſed in that letter.

I expect to have the pleaſure of finding your anſwer to that letter on my arrival at Madras, for which place I am on the point of ſetting out from Calcutta; I hope to arrive at Madras about the ſame time that the letter reaches you, and ſhould any circumſtances hitherto have prevented your anſwering my laſt letter of the 8th November, I aſſure myſelf that you will immediately, on your receipt of this, diſpatch a ſatisfactory reply to it, addreſſed to me at Madras.

(A true copy)

N. B. Edmonstone,
P. Tr.

(No. 4.)——Copy of a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Right Honourable the Governor General: Received at Fort St. George the 25th December 1798.

From Tippoo Sultaun:

Received at Fort St. George 25th December 1798.

I have been made happy by the receipt of your Lordſhip's two friendly letters, the contents of which I clearly comprehend (Vide thoſe written 4th and 8th November.) The particulars which your Lordſhip has communicated to me, relative to the victory obtained by the Engliſh fleet over that of the French near the ſhores of Egypt, nine of their ſhips having been captured and two burned, on one of which of the latter was their Admiral, have given me more pleaſure than can poſſibly be conveyed by writing. Indeed I poſſeſs the firmeſt hope that the leaders of the Engliſh and the Company Bahauder, who ever adhere to the paths of ſincerity, friendſhip, and good faith, and are the well-wiſhers of mankind, will at all times be ſucceſsful and victorious; and that the French, who are of a crooked diſpoſition, faithleſs, and the enemies of mankind, may be ever depreſſed and ruined. Your Lordſhip has written to me with the pen of friendſhip, "that in no age or coun-
"try were the baneful and inſidious arts of intrigue ever cultivated,
"with ſuch ſucceſs as they are at preſent by the French nation.
"Would

" Would to God that no impreſſion had been produced on my mind " by that dangerous people; but that your Lordſhip's ſituation en- " ables you to know that they have reached my preſence, and have " endeavoured to pervert the wiſdom of my councils, and to inſti- " gate me to war againſt thoſe who have given me no provocation. " That it is impoſſible that I ſhould ſuppoſe your Lordſhip igno- " rant of the intercourſe which ſubſiſts between me and the French, " who I know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company, and " to be now engaged in an unjuſt war with the Britiſh; and that " I cannot imagine your Lordſhip indifferent to the tranſactions " which have paſſed between me and the enemies of the Engliſh."

In this Sircar (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe, who employ themſelves in trading by ſea and land. Their agents purchaſed a two-maſted veſſel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that ſhe went to the Mauritius, from whence forty perſons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the reſt ſervants, paying the hire of the ſhip, came here in ſearch of employment. Such as choſe to take ſervice were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this Sircar (the gift of God); and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the departure of the ſhip to put about reports with the view to ruffle the minds of both Sircars.

It is the wiſh of my heart, and my conſtant endeavour, to obſerve and maintain the articles of the agreement of peace, and to perpetuate and ſtrengthen the baſis of friendſhip and union with the Sircar of the Company Bahauder, and with the Sircars of the Maha Rajah Saheb, Sure Munt Peſhwa Bahauder, and his Highneſs the Nabob Aſuph Jah Bahauder. And I am reſident at home, at times taking the air, and at others amuſing myſelf with hunting at a ſpot which is uſed as a pleaſure ground. In this caſe, the alluſion to war in your friendly letter, and the following paſſage, namely, " that " prudence required that both the Company and their allies ſhould " adopt certain meaſures of precaution and ſelf-defence," have given me the greateſt ſurprize.

It was further written by your friendly pen, that as your Lordſhip is deſirous of communicating to me on the behalf of the Company and their allies a plan calculated to promote the mutual ſecurity and welfare of all parties; your Lordſhip propoſes to depute to me for this purpoſe Major Doveton, who formerly waited upon me, and who will explain to me more fully and particularly the ſole means which appear to your lordſhip and the allies to be effectual for the ſalutary purpoſe of removing all exiſting diſtruſt and ſuſpicion, and of eſtabliſhing peace and good underſtanding on the moſt durable foundations; and that therefore your Lordſhip truſts I will let you know at what time and place it will be convenient to me to receive Major Doveton. It has been underſtood, by the bleſſing of the Almighty, at the concluſion of the peace, the treaties and engagements entered into among the four Sircars were ſo firmly

firmly eſtabliſhed and confirmed as ever to remain fixed and durable; and be an example to the rulers of the age; nor are they nor will they ever be liable to interruption. I cannot imagine that means more effectual than theſe can be adopted, for giving ſtability to the foundations of friendſhip and harmony, promoting the ſecurity of ſtates, or the welfare and advantage of all parties.

In the view of thoſe who inſpect narrowly into the nature of friendſhip, peace and amity are the firſt of all objects, as indeed your Lordſhip has yourſelf written to me that the allied Sircars look to no other object than the ſecurity and tranquillity of their own dominions, and the eaſe and comfort of their ſubjects. Praiſe be to God, that the ſum of my views and the wiſh of my heart are limited to theſe ſame points. On ſuch grounds then a juſt and permanent obſervance of exiſting treaties is neceſſary; and theſe, under the favours of God, daily acquire new ſtrength and improvement by means of amicable correſpondence. Your Lordſhip is a great Sirdar, a firm friend, and the rectifier of all things, and you poſſeſs an enlightened judgment. I have the ſtrongeſt hope that the minds of the wiſe and intelligent, but particularly of the four ſtates, will not be ſullied by doubts and jealouſies, but will conſider me from my heart deſirous of harmony and friendſhip.

Continue to allow me the pleaſure of your correſpondence, making me happy by accounts of your health. What more ſhall be written?

Dated the 9th of Rujub, 1213 of the Hegirah.

(A true tranſlation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. Tr.

(No. 5.)——Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 9th January 1799.

To Tippoo Sultaun: Written 9th January 1799.

In purſuance of the intention which I had the honour of communicating to you in my letter of the 10th December, I embarked at Calcutta on the 25th of the ſame month, and on the 31ſt following arrived at this place.

Previouſly to my departure from Calcutta, I had the honour to receive your Highneſs's letter of the 11th Jamaudy ooſſaunee. (20th November.)

(Recapitulate.)

My letter to your Highneſs of the 8th November, will have explained to your Highneſs the object of the military preparations which have been advancing in every part of the dominions of the allies, ever ſince the beginning of the month of July.

On my arrival at Madras, I had the honour to receive your letter of the 9th Rejeb (or 18th of December) in anſwer to my two letters addreſſed to your Highneſs on the 4th and 8th of November.

I am

I am happy to find that in this letter your Highneſs has been pleaſed to admit "That the Engliſh nation and the Honourable "Company ever adhere to the paths of ſincerity, friendſhip, and "good faith; and that they are the well-wiſhers of mankind." This declaration is peculiarly ſatisfactory to me in the preſent moment, becauſe I am perſuaded that a Prince of your Highneſs's diſcernment would not expreſs ſuch ſentiments without full deliberation; I therefore accept with pleaſure this declaration, as affording not only an unequivocal teſtimony, on the part of your Highneſs to the juſtice of that cauſe in which the Engliſh nation and the Company are engaged, but an unqualified admiſſion that you have no ground of complaint againſt the Engliſh Government.

In anſwer to that part of my letter of the 8th of November, in which I lamented the unhappy connection which you have formed with the French nation, your Highneſs is pleaſed to mention, "that "in the Sircar (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe, who "employ themſelves in trading by ſea and land: that their agents "purchaſed a two-maſted veſſel, and having loaded her with rice, "departed with a view to traffic: that it happened that ſhe went "to the Mauritius, from whence forty perſons, French and of a "dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the reſt "ſervants, paying the hire of the ſhip, came to your country in "ſearch of employment: that ſuch as choſe to take ſervice were "entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of "that Sircar (the gift of God); and that the French, who are "full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken advantage of the de-"parture of the ſhip, to put about reports with the view to ruffle "the minds of both Sircars."

I had no knowledge of the tranſaction which your Highneſs has thus deſcribed, until I had the honour to receive your Highneſs's letter. Nor was it to this tranſaction I adverted, when I expreſſed my concern at the intercourſe which your Highneſs had eſtabliſhed with the French. The facts to which I referred, were of a nature entirely different from thoſe which your Highneſs has related. If the tranſaction of which I complained had not indiſputably proved the exiſtence of a connection between your Highneſs and the French, entirely incompatible with your engagements to the Honourable Company, and to its allies, neither the allies nor I would have reſorted to thoſe meaſures of precaution and defence which have attracted your Highneſs's attention.

I will now fully and explicitly ſtate to your Highneſs, the circumſtances to which I referred in my letter of the 8th of November, wherein I remonſtrated againſt the tendency of your intercourſe with the French.

Although I had been for ſome time paſt, apprized that your Highneſs had engaged with ſeveral powers of Aſia, in various negotiations of the moſt hoſtile tendency towards the intereſts of the Company and of its allies; and although your continued military

preparations

preparations correſponded with the ſpirit of your negotiations; I ſtill hoped that a ſenſe of your own intereſts, and a regard to the acknowledged maxims of prudence and good faith, would have induced you to relinquiſh projects of aggreſſion ſo inconſiſtent with your own profeſſions, with your real intereſts, and with the character of your wiſdom and diſcretion. But I had ſcarcely formed that deciſion on your Highneſs's claim to Wynaad (by which I had afforded an unqueſtionable teſtimony of my diſpoſition to render impartial and ample juſtice to your rights, and to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace with your Highneſs) when I received from the Iſle of France, an authentic copy of the proclamation, a Perſian tranſlation of which accompanies this letter.

In addition to this proclamation, I poſſeſs full and accurate information of all the proceedings of your Highneſs's Ambaſſadors during their reſidence in the Iſle of France; of the whole of their conduct in exerciſing the powers delegated to them by your Highneſs; and of your Highneſs's conduct ſince the return of your ambaſſadors.

From the whole evidence in my poſſeſſion, the following facts are inconteſtibly proved.

Your Highneſs diſpatched two ambaſſadors from your preſence, who embarked at Mangalore for the Iſle of France, and arrived there at the cloſe of the month of January 1798: the ſhip on which the ambaſſadors were embarked, hoiſted your Highneſs's colours upon entering the harbour of Port Nord-Oueſt in the Iſle of France. Your ambaſſadors were received publicly and formally by the French Government under a ſalute of cannon, and with every circumſtance of diſtinction and reſpect; and they were entertained, during their continuance on the iſland, by the French Government, at the public expence.

Previouſly to the arrival of your ambaſſadors on the iſland, no idea or rumour exiſted there of any aid to be furniſhed to your Highneſs by the French; or of any proſpect of a war between your Highneſs and the Company. But within two days after the arrival of your ambaſſadors, the proclamation, of which I now forward to you a tranſlation, was fixed up in the moſt public places, and circulated through the town of Port Nord-Oueſt.

Your ambaſſadors, far from proteſting againſt the matter or ſtyle of the proclamation, held without reſerve, in the moſt public manner, the ſame language which it contains with reſpect to the offenſive war to be commenced by your Highneſs againſt the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India; and they even ſuffered the proclamation to be publicly diſtributed at their own houſes.

In conſequence of theſe circumſtances, an univerſal belief prevailed in the iſland, that your Highneſs would make an immediate attack upon the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India.

Your ambaſſadors were preſent in the iſland, when the French Government proceeded to act under the proclamation in queſtion;

and your ambaſſadors aided and aſſiſted the execution of the proclamation, by making promiſes, in the name of your Highneſs, for the purpoſe of inducing recruits to enliſt in your ſervice. Your ambaſſadors propoſed to levy men to any practicable extent, ſtating their powers to be unlimited with reſpect to the numbers of the forces to be raiſed in your Highneſs's name, for the purpoſe of making war on the Company.

The ambaſſadors entered into certain ſtipulations and engagements, in the name of pour Highneſs, according to the tenor of the proclamation (ſee the margin)* with ſeveral Frenchmen, and others who entered into your ſervice, particularly with Monſieur Dubuc, whom the Ambaſſadors engaged in your Highneſs's name, for the expreſs purpoſe of aſſiſting in the war to be commenced by your Highneſs againſt the Engliſh in India.

The proclamation therefore is proved to have been the act of your ambaſſadors. It originated in their arrival at the Iſle of France; it was diſtributed by their agents; it was avowed in every part by their own public declarations; and, finally, it was executed, according to its tenor, by their perſonal aſſiſtance and cooperation.

On the 7th of March 1798, the ambaſſadors embarked at Port Nord-Oueſt, on board the French frigate La Preneuſe, together with the force thus raiſed in your Highneſs's name.

This French frigate, with your ambaſſadors, and with the troops raiſed in the enemy's country for your ſervice, arrived at Mangalore about the 26th of April 1798. Your Highneſs permitted this force to land in your dominions; and far from manifeſting the leaſt ſymptom of diſapprobation of the conduct of your ambaſſadors in any part of this tranſaction, you formally received them, and the French officers and principal perſons who accompanied them, with public marks of honour and diſtinction; and you now entertain in your ſervice a large part of the force thus raiſed, for the purpoſe of making war upon the Honourable Company.

From theſe ſeveral facts, the following concluſions reſult:

Firſt, That the ambaſſadors diſpatched by your Highneſs to the Iſle of France did propoſe, and actually did conclude, an offenſive alliance with the French, for the expreſs purpoſe of commencing a war of aggreſſion againſt the Company, and conſequently againſt the allies, the Paiſhwa and the Nizam.

Secondly, That your Highneſs's ambaſſadors demanded military ſuccours from the French for the purpoſe of proſecuting the ſaid war; and declared that your Highneſs had already completed your hoſtile preparations againſt the Company (and conſequently againſt

* Nous pouvons aſſurer tous les citoyens qui feroit inſcrire, que Tippoo leur fera des traitemens avantageux qui ſeront fixés avec les ambaſſadeurs, qui s'engageront en outre, au nom de leur Souverain à ce que les Français qui auront pris parti dans ſes armées, ne puiſſent jamais y être retenus quand ils voudront r'entrer dans leur patrie.

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the allies); and that you only waited the arrival of effectual aid from the French to break out into open hoſtilities.

Thirdly, That your Highneſs's ambaſſadors levied a military force in the Iſle of France, under the conditions of the proclamation, and for the avowed purpoſe of carrying into effect the offenſive alliance, contracted, in the name of your Highneſs, with the enemy of the Company and of the allies.

Fourthly, That your Highneſs approved the conduct of your ambaſſadors, ſuffered the French force, raiſed for the purpoſe of making war upon the Company and the allies, to be landed in your country; and finally admitted the ſaid force into your army.

Fifthly, That your Highneſs, by theſe ſeveral perſonal and unequivocal acts, has ratified the engagements contained in the proclamation publiſhed in the Iſle of France; and has taken the preliminary ſteps for fulfilling thoſe engagements according to the tenor of that proclamation; and that you have thereby precluded whatever hope might otherwiſe have been entertained, that the proceedings of your Highneſs's ambaſſadors were authorized by your orders.

Sixthly, That your Highneſs has for ſome time paſt been employed in military preparations, conformably to the hoſtile ſpirit of your engagements, contracted with the enemy of the Company and of the allies.

Seventhly, That your Highneſs was prepared to make an unprovoked attack upon the Company's poſſeſſions, if you had obtained from the French the effectual ſuccour which you had ſolicited through your ambaſſadors.

Eighthly, That your Highneſs, by theſe ſeveral acts, has violated the treaties of peace and friendſhip ſubſiſting between your Highneſs and the allies.

Such are the grounds on which I founded my complaint, in my letter of the 8th of November; and ſuch are the motives which now compel the allies to ſeek relief from that ambiguous and anxious ſtate in which they have been placed, for ſome years paſt, by the conduct of your Highneſs. The allies complain that your frequent preparations for war, together with your hoſtile negociations and offenſive alliances with the enemy, continually expoſe the allies, during a period of ſuppoſed peace, to all the ſolicitude and hazard and much of the expence of war.

Even under all theſe circumſtances of provocation, the allies entertain the moſt earneſt deſire to eſtabliſh with your Highneſs a real and ſubſtantial peace, accompanied by the intercourſe and good offices uſual among friendly and contiguous ſtates. We are, therefore, ready to renew and confirm the bonds of amity with your Highneſs, on ſuch conditions as ſhall preclude the continuance of thoſe jealouſies, which muſt ſubſiſt ſo long as a final and ſatisfactory adjuſtment of all cauſes of ſuſpicion ſhall be delayed.

Your Highneſs is pleaſed to ſay, "That you cannot imagine how "means, more effectual than the exiſting treaties, can be adopted

"for giving ſtability to the foundations of friendſhip and har-
"mony, or for promoting the ſecurity of the ſtates, and the welfare
"and advantage of all parties."

In this ſentiment I entirely concur with your Highneſs; and if your Highneſs's wiſdom had not been perverted, by evil councils, from a due obſervance of your engagements with the allies, no new or more effectual means would now be neceſſary "for giving ſta-
"bility to the foundations of friendſhip and harmony, or for pro-
"moting the ſecurity of the ſtates, and the welfare and advantage
"of all parties." But a new arrangement is become indiſpenſable, in conſequence of your Highneſs's new engagements with the common enemy of the allies. And I again entreat your Highneſs to meet with cordiality the friendly and moderate advance of the allies, towards an amicable ſettlement of every ground of jealouſy and danger.

Had your Highneſs received Major Doveton, that gentleman would have explained to your Highneſs, on the part of the Company and of the allies, how this advantageous arrangement is to be obtained.

The allies, being always anxious to enter into the friendly explanation with your Highneſs, I once more call upon your Highneſs, in the moſt ſerious and ſolemn manner, to aſſent to the admiſſion of Major Doveton, as a meaſure which I am confident would be productive of the moſt laſting advantages to all parties.

I truſt that your Highneſs will favour me with a friendly letter in reply to this; and I moſt earneſtly requeſt that your reply may not be deferred for more than one day after this letter ſhall reach your preſence; dangerous conſequences reſult from the delay of arduous affairs.

(A true copy)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. Tr.

(No. 6.)—Copy of a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Right Honourable the Governor General.

From Tippoo Sultaun; dated 24th Ryeb 1213, or 2d January 1799: Received 11th January 1799.

The agreeable arrival of your Lordſhip's two letters, denoting your welfare, rejoiced and gratified me. A khereta in reply to your Lordſhip's former friendly letter has been written and diſpatched. It will, no doubt, by this time have been received; and the ſincerity of my friendſhip and regard, together with proofs of my ſolicitude for tranquillity and peace (my friendly heart being bent upon their encreaſe) will have been made apparent. Continue to rejoice with me in happy letters.

(A true tranſlation.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

(No.

(No. 7.)—Copy of a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Right Honourable the Governor General.

From Tippoo Sultaun: Received 13th February 1799.

"I have been much gratified by the agreeable receipt of you Lordſhip's two friendly letters; the firſt, brought by a camelman, the laſt by hircarrahs; and underſtood their contents. The letter of the Prince in ſtation, like Turnſheid with angels as his guards, with troops numerous as the ſtars, the ſun illuminating the world, the heaven of empire and dominion, the luminary giving ſplendour to the univerſe, the firmament of glory and power, the Sultaun of the ſea and the land, the King of Room (i. e. the Grand Seignior) be his empire and his power perpetual, addreſſed to me, which reached you through the Britiſh Envoy, and which you tranſmitted, has arrived. Being frequently diſpoſed to make excurſions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excurſion. You will be pleaſed to diſpatch Major Doveton (about whoſe coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written) ſlightly attended.

Always continue to gratify me by friendly letters, notifying your welfare.

A true tranſlation.

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

(No. 8.)—Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 22d February 1799.

To Tippo Sultaun: written 22d February 1799.

I had the honour, on the 13th inſtant, to receive your letter, acknowledging your receipt of my two letters of the 9th and 16th January, informing me of your intention to proceed on a hunting excurſion, and deſiring me to diſpatch Major Doveton unattended to you.

I lament moſt ſincerely, that the friendly intimation contained in my letter of the 9th January, regarding the daugers of delay, produced no effect on your diſcerning mind, and that you deferred your reply to that letter to ſo late a period in the ſeaſon. Your long ſilence on this important and preſſing occaſion, compelled me to adopt the reſolution of ordering the Britiſh forces to advance in concert with the armies of the allied powers. You are not ignorant that the period of the ſeaſon rendered the advance of the army abſolutely neceſſary to the common ſecurity of the allies. This movement of the army is to be imputed entirely to your repeated rejection of my amicable propoſal of ſending an ambaſſador to your preſence.

Under the preſent circumſtances, to ſend Major Doveton to you, could not be attended with thoſe advantages which would have reſulted from his miſſion at a proper ſeaſon.

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The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with you, Lieutenant General Harris, commander of the British troops, has been empowered to receive any embassy which you shall dispatch to him. Lieutenant General Harris will also authorize such persons as he may think proper, to concert, in communication with your ambassadors, a new treaty of friendship with your Highness, founded on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

A true copy.

N. B. EDMONSTONE.

(No. 9.)——Copy of a Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, for all the forces and affairs of the British nation in the East Indies, on behalf of the Honourable the East India Company and the allies of the said Company there, his Highness the Nizam and the Peshwa.

A solemn treaty of peace and friendship was concluded at Seringapatam, between the Honourable Company, and the Nabob Asoph Jah and the Peshwa, on the one part, and the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun on the other part; and from that day all commotion and hostility ceased. Since that day, the three allied States have invariably manifested a sacred regard for the obligations contracted under that treaty with the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun. Of this uniform disposition, abundant proofs have been afforded by each of the allies. Whatever differences have arisen with regard to the limits of the territory of Mysore, have been amicably adjusted without difficulty, and with the most exact attention to the principles of equity, and to the stipulations of treaty. Such has been the solicitude of the allies for the preservation of tranquillity, that they have viewed with forbearance, for some years past, various embassies and military preparations on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, of a tendency so evidently hostile to the interests of the allies, as would have justified them, not only in the most serious remonstrances, but even in an appeal to arms. On the part of the British Government every endeavour has been employed to conciliate the confidence of the Sultaun, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit, by the most unequivocal acknowledgment and confirmation of his just rights, and by the removal of every cause of jealousy, which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace. These pacific sentiments have been most particularly manifested in the Governor General's recent decision on Tippoo Sultaun's claim to the district of Wynaad, and in the negotiation opened by his Lordship with regard to the districts of Amorah and Souleah. In every instance the conduct of the British Government in India towards Tippoo Sultaun, has been the natural result of those principles of moderation, justice, and good faith, which the Legislature of Great Britain, and the Honourable the East India Company, have firmly established as the unalterable rule of their intercourse with the native Princes and States of India.

The

The exemplary good faith and the pacific diſpoſition of the allies, ſince the concluſion of the treaty of Seringapatam, has never been diſputed even by Tippoo Sultaun. Far from having attempted to alledge even the pretext of a complaint againſt their conduct, he has conſtantly acknowledged their juſtice, ſincerity, and good faith; and has preferred, in the moſt cordial terms, his deſire to maintain and ſtrengthen the foundations of harmony and concord with them.

In the midſt of theſe amicable profeſſions on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, and at the moment when the Britiſh Government had iſſued orders for the confirmation of his claim to Wynaad, it was with aſtoniſhment and indignation that the allies diſcovered the engagements which he had contracted with the French nation, in direct violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, as well as of his own moſt ſolemn and recent proteſtations of friendſhip towards the allies.

Under the maſk of theſe ſpecious profeſſions, and of a pretended veneration for the obligations of treaty, Tippoo Sultaun diſpatched ambaſſadors to the Iſle of France, who, in a period of profound peace in India, propoſed and concluded, in his name, an offenſive alliance with the French, for the avowed purpoſe of commencing a war of aggreſſion againſt the Company, and conſequently againſt the Peſhwa and the Nizam, the allies of the Company.

The ambaſſadors, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, demanded military ſuccours from the French, and actually levied a military force in the Iſle of France, with the declared view of proſecuting the intended war.

When the ambaſſadors returned, in a French ſhip of war, from the Iſle of France, Tippoo Sultaun ſuffered the military force, which they had levied for the avowed purpoſe of making war upon the allies, to land in his country; and finally, he admitted it into his army: by theſe perſonal acts ratifying and confirming the proceedings of his ambaſſadors.

This military force, however, was not ſufficiently powerful to enable him immediately to attempt his declared purpoſe of attacking the Company's poſſeſſions; but in the meanwhile he advanced his hoſtile preparations conformably to his engagements with the French; and he was ready to move his army into the Company's territories, whenever he might obtain from France the effectual ſuccours, which he had aſſiduouſly ſolicited from that nation.

But the providence of God, and the victorious arms of the Britiſh nation, fruſtrated his vain hopes, and checked the preſumptuous career of the French in Egypt, at the moment when he anxiouſly expected their arrival on the coaſt of Malabar.

The Britiſh Government, the Nizam, and the Peſhwa, had not omitted the neceſſary precaution of aſſembling their forces for the joint protection of their reſpective dominions. The ſtrict principles of ſelf defence would have juſtified the allies at that period of time in making an immediate attack upon the territories of Tippoo Sultaun;

Sultaun; but even the happy intelligence of the glorious ſucceſs of the Britiſh fleet at the mouth of the Nile, did not abate the anxious deſire of the allies to maintain the relations of amity and peace with Tippoo Sultaun. They attempted by a moderate repreſentation, to recall him to a ſenſe of his obligations, and of the genuine principles of prudence and policy; and they employed every effort to open the channels of negotiation, and to facilitate the means of amicable accommodation. With theſe ſalutary views, the Governor General, on the 8th November 1798, in the name of the allies, propoſed to diſpatch an ambaſſador to Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpoſe of renewing the bonds of friendſhip, and of concluding ſuch an arrangement as might afford effectual ſecurity againſt any future interruption of the public tranquillity; and his Lordſhip repeated the ſame propoſal on the 10th December 1798. Tippoo Sultaun declined, by various evaſions and ſubterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the allies, and he manifeſted an evident diſpoſition to reject the means of pacific accommodation, by ſuddenly breaking up, in the month of December, the conferences which had commenced with reſpect to the diſtricts of Amorah and Souleah, and by interrupting the intercourſe between his ſubjects and thoſe of the Company on their reſpective frontiers. On the 9th January 1799, the Governor General, being arrived at Fort St. George (notwithſtanding theſe diſcouraging circumſtances in the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun) renewed with increaſed earneſtneſs, the expreſſion of his Lordſhip's anxious deſire to diſpatch an ambaſſador to the Sultaun.

The Governor General expreſsly ſolicited the Sultaun to return an anſwer within one day to this letter; and as it involved no propoſition either injurious to the rights, dignity, or honour of the Sultaun, in any degree novel or complicated either in form or ſubſtance, it could not require a longer conſideration. The Governor General waited with the utmoſt ſolicitude for an anſwer to the reaſonable and diſtinct propoſition contained in his letter of the 9th January 1799. Tippoo Sultaun, however, who muſt have received this letter before the 15th of January, remained ſilent, although the Governor General had plainly apprized that Prince, that dangerous conſequences would reſult from delay. In the mean while the ſeaſon for military operations had already advanced to ſo late a period, as to render a ſpeedy deciſion indiſpenſable to the ſecurity of the allies: under theſe circumſtances, on the 3d of February (eight days having elapſed from the period when an anſwer might have been received from Seringapatam to the Governor General's letter of the 9th of January) his Lordſhip declared to the allies, that the neceſſary meaſures muſt now be adopted, without delay, for ſecuring ſuch advantages as ſhould place the common ſafety of the allies beyond the reach of the inſincerity of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the violence of the French. With this view, the Governor General on the 3d of February iſſued orders to the Britiſh armies to march, and ſignified to the Commander of his Majeſty's ſquadron,

ſquadron, that the obſtinate ſilence of the Sultaun muſt be conſidered as a rejection of the propoſed amicable negotiation.

At length, on the 13th of February, a letter from Tippoo Sultaun reached the Governor General; in which the Sultaun ſignifies to his Lordſhip, "That being frequently diſpoſed to make excurſions and hunt, he was accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excurſion;" adding, "That the Governor General would be pleaſed to diſpatch Major Doveton, to him, unattended."

The allies will not dwell on the peculiar phraſes of this letter; but it muſt be evident to all the ſtates of India, that the anſwer of the Sultaun had been deferred to this late period of the ſeaſon, with no other view than to preclude the allies, by inſidious delays, from the benefit of thoſe advantages which their combined military operations would enable them to ſecure. On thoſe advantages alone (under the recent experience of Tippoo Sultaun's violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, and under the peculiar circumſtances of that Prince's offenſive alliance with the French) can the allies now venture to rely for the faithful execution of any treaty of peace concluded with Tippoo Sultaun.

The allies cannot ſuffer Tippoo Sultaun to profit by his own ſtudied and ſyſtematic delay, nor to impede ſuch a diſpoſition of their military and naval force, as ſhall appear beſt calculated to give effect to their juſt views.

Bound by the ſacred obligations of public faith, profeſſing the moſt amicable diſpoſition, and undiſturbed in the poſſeſſion of thoſe dominions ſecured to him by treaty, Tippoo Sultaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace, and compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happineſs, and their honour.

For a period of three months, he obſtinately rejected every pacific overture, in the hourly expectation of receiving that ſuccour, which he has eagerly ſolicited for the proſecution of his favourite purpoſes of ambition and revenge. Diſappointed in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conqueſt, he now reſorts to ſubterfuge and procraſtination, and by a tardy, reluctant, and inſidious acquieſcence, in a propoſition which he had ſo long and repeatedly declined, he endeavours to fruſtrate the precautions of the allies, and to protract every effectual operation, until ſome change of circumſtances and of ſeaſon ſhall revive his expectations of diſturbing the tranquillity of India, by favouring the irruption of a French army.

The allies are equally prepared to repel his violence, and to counteract his artifices and delays.

The allies are, therefore, reſolved, to place their army in ſuch a poſition as ſhall afford adequate protection againſt any artifice or inſincerity, and ſhall preclude the return of that danger, which has ſo lately menaced their poſſeſſions. The allies, however, retaining an anxious deſire to effect an adjuſtment with Tippoo Sultaun,

Lieutenant General Harris, Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's and the Honourable Company's forces on the coaſt of Coromandel and Malabar, is authorized to receive any embaſſy which Tippoo Sultaun may diſpatch to the Head Quarters of the Britiſh army, and to concert a treaty on ſuch conditions as appear to the allies to be indiſpenſably neceſſary for the eſtabliſhment of a ſecure and permanent peace.

Dated Fort St. George, 22d February 1799.

By Order of the Right Honourable the Governor General,

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
P. Tr.

(No.

(No. 10.)——ABSTRACT RETURN of the TROOPS that marched for the Myſore Country from the Coromandel Coaſt; taken from the Monthly Returns of the Corps in the Adjutant General's Office, for the Month of February 1799.

CORPS.	Non-commiſſion. Drums, Rank and File.	Total.
19th Regiment light dragoons	430	
25th ——	454	
		884
1ſt —— native cavalry	439	
2d —— ——	422	
3d —— ——	437	
4th —— ——	453	
		1,751
Total cavalry	——	2,635
2 Companies Bengal artillery	139	
1ſt Battalion artillery	148	
2d —— ——	321	
Total artillery	——	608
12th Regiment foot	693	
33d ——	879	
73d ——	746	
74th ——	789	
Scotch brigade	559	
Swiſs regiment	715	
Total European infantry	——	4,381
1ſt Battalion, 1ſt regiment	963	
2d —— 3d ——	1,023	
2d —— 5th ——	1,080	
1ſt —— 6th ——	1,012	
1ſt —— 8th ——	910	
2d —— 9th ——	821	
1ſt —— 12th ——	795	
2d —— 12th ——	1,034	
Three battalions Bengal volunteers	3,057	
Total native infantry	——	10,695
Gun laſcars	1,483	
Pioneers	1,000	
Total gun laſcars and pioneers	——	2,483

ABSTRACT.	Non-commiſſion. Drums, Rank and File.
Cavalry	2,635
Artillery	608
European infantry	4,381
Native infantry	10,695
Total fighting men	18,319
laſcars and pioneers	2,483
Grand total	20,802

Detachment under the command of Colonel Roberts.

CORPS.	Non-commiſſion. Drums, Rank and File.	Total.
1ſt Company Bengal artillery	57	
1ſt —— Coaſt	85	
		142
1ſt Battalion, 10th regiment, B. N. I.	993	
2d —— 10th ——	1,008	
2d —— 2d —— C. N. I.	1,051	
2d —— 74th ——	968	
1ſt —— 11th ——	989	
2d —— 11th ——	1,337	
		6,076
Companies of gun laſcars	——	318
Total	——	6,536

JOHN BRATHWAITE,
Major General.

(No.

(No. 11.)——GENERAL RETURN of the TROOPS belonging to the Presidency of Bombay, composing the Army assembled for Field Service—Lieutenant General James Stuart, Commander in Chief—Head Quarters, Cananore, 11th February, 1799.

CORPS.	Commanded by	Rank and File Europeans.	Rank and File Natives.	Total fighting men, Europeans.	Total fighting Men, Natives.	Total fighting Men.
Detachment of artillery, and laſcars attached	Lieut. Col. Lawnam	137	314	166	344	
Detachment of engineers	Col. Sartorius	—	—	7		
Right native brigade commanded by Lieut. Col. Montreſor — 1ſt Battalion, 2d regt. N. S.	Major Lawrence	—	584	—	653	
1ſt —— 4th ——	Major Diſney	—	600	—	672	
1ſt —— 3d ——	Lieut. Col. Inignam	—	599	—	663	
Center or European brigade, commanded by Lieut. Col. Dunlop — His Majeſty's 75th regt. foot	Major Forties	200	—	223		
Hon. Company's E. regt. foot	Major Fyfe	467	—	528		
His Majeſty's 77th regt. foot	Major Spry	618	—	693		
Left native brigade, commanded by Lieut. Col. Wiſeman — 2d Battal. 3d regt. N. I. with detach. of 1ſt or 9th battal.	Lieut. Col. Home	—	639	—	717	
1ſt Battalion, 3th regt. N. I.	Major Paterſon	—	593	—	663	
2d Battalion, 2d regt. N. I.	Lieut. Col. Marſhall	—	597	—	675	
Pioneer corps	Capt. B. Moncriff	—	390	—	416	
	Total	1,422	4,316	1,617	4,803	6,420

(Signed) ROB. GORDON,
Adjutant General.

(No. 12.)——An account of rice and gram, collected in the Coorga Country for the use of the army.

Contract rice, provided by Choarka Mousa, and deliverable at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, by the 25th of February, 30,000 morahs of 40 pucka seers, or 80lbs. each —— ——	lbs. 2,400,000
Rice collected by the Raja, and stored at Ver Rajunder-Pet 1st March, 33,000 batties of 60 pucka seers, or 120lbs. each —— ——	3,960,000
	lbs. 6,360,000

Being at 1d. per man per day, equal to the subsistence of 40,000 men for 159 days.

GRAM.

Deliverable at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, by the 25th February, 1,000 candies of 560lbs. each, or	lbs. 5,600,000

Being at 10lbs. per day per horse, gram for 2,800 horses for 20 days.

No. 9.

Extract of a letter from Lord Mornington to the Secret Committee; dated Fort St. George, 22d April 1799.

Since my arrival at this Presidency, I have addressed three separate letters to your Honourable Committee, under date the * 13th January, 13th February, and 15th March 1799; my separate letters of the 20th of March, and of this date, to the Court of Directors, and the letter to your Honourable Committee from the Governor General in Council at Fort St. George, of the 7th April, contain a view of such events as have happened in this quarter since the date of my last letter to you.

To these advices, I do not feel it necessary to add any thing at present, further than my assurance that every circumstance promises a speedy and advantageous issue to the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and that all such private intelligence as I have received concurs to favour this expectation.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that, notwithstanding the export of 40 lacs of rupees in specie to this Presidency, and the actual commencement of hostilities with Tippoo Sultaun, the discount upon all the public securities in Bengal has experienced a considerable diminution during the course of the last month; and with the aid of the supplies in specie which we expect from England, I flat-

* The substance of these letters have been detailed in Lord Mornington's letter of the 20th March 1799.

ter-

ter myſelf that I ſhall be enabled, within a ſhort period of time, to direct an enlargement of the commercial inveſtment at all the Preſidencies. I am naturally impatient to return to Bengal, but the experience of every hour convinces me more ſtrongly that the avowed projects of Tippoo Sultaun, combined with the acknowledged means of carrying them into effect, have been among the moſt efficient cauſes not only of the decline of public and private credit in Bengal, but alſo of encouragement to the diſorderly and diſaffected claſs of your ſubjects. I am therefore perſuaded that the effectual reduction of Tippoo's means of miſchief is indiſpenſable to the welfare and tranquillity of all your poſſeſſions. Under this impreſſion I feel it to be my duty to remain at this Preſidency as long as my preſence can in any degree contribute to the energy and vigour of our military operations.

By the lateſt accounts from Conſtantinople, it appears that General Buonaparte's army ſtill conſiſts of 17 or 18,000 fighting men. The Government of Bombay have fitted out an expedition againſt the Iſland of Perim, according to your orders. You will probably learn from them, that I called their attention to the ſame object, as ſoon as I learnt the arrival of the French in Egypt. My letter reached Bombay towards the concluſion of the month of October, but my ſuggeſtion was not executed, in conſequence of a ſuppoſed deficiency of water on the Iſland of Perim.

Upon receiving a ſimilar ſuggeſtion from me, Admiral Rainier forwarded a conditional order for the occupation of the Iſland to Commodore Blankett by the Centurion. Since the receipt of your orders, however, I underſtand it has been aſcertained at Bombay, that the Iſland of Perim is not deficient in water.

No. 10.

Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to the Court of Directors; dated Fort St. George, 20th April 1799.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for the affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

1ſt. I now proceed to ſubmit to you a detail of the operations of the armies in Myſore.

2d. The army of Bombay under the command of Lieutenant General Stuart, marched from Cananore on the 21ſt of February, arrived at the head of the Poodicherrum Ghaut on the 25th of the ſame month, and took poſt at Seedapoor and Sedaſere, on the ſecond of March, for the protection of the large ſupplies which had been collected at Verajunder Pett in the diſtrict of Coorga, from theſe poſitions, on Lieutenant General Harris's approach, Lieutenant General Stuart intended to form a junction with the army of Madras.

3d. The

3d. The army of Madras, under the command of Lieutenant General Harris, entered the territory of Myſore on the 5th of March, when Lieutenant General Harris forwarded to Tippoo Sultaun my letter (forming No. 8, of the incloſures of my ſeparate diſpatch to your Honourable Court, of the 20th March) and publiſhed the declaration, forming No. 9, of the incloſures of the ſame diſpatch.

4th. The operations of the army of Madras commenced by the reduction of ſeveral forts upon the frontier, ſome of theſe forts ſurrendered without any reſiſtance, and none of them were defended with ſpirit, although the Sultaun appears, from the improved eſtabliſhment on which he had placed their garriſons, to have provided as well as he could for a different reſult.

5th. The progreſs of the army of Madras, owing to its ample equipments in every department, particularly in that of the ordnance, neceſſary for the ſiege of Seringapatam, were unavoidably ſlow; its movements, however, were but little impeded by the enemy. Conſiderable bodies of horſe hovered about its line of march, but without any other effect than that of rendering the communications with the Company's territories extremely difficult. Some parties of horſe attacked the Nizam's contingent, and his Highneſs's cavalry are reported by General Harris to have conducted themſelves with great ſpirit, a circumſtance which may partly be attributed to the improvements recently introduced into the diſcipline and eſtabliſhments of his Highneſs's cavalry, at the recommendation of the Britiſh Reſident, under my inſtructions.

6th. At the period when the army of Madras entered Myſore, Tippoo Sultaun was ſuppoſed to be encamped in the vicinity of Maddoor, and to be preparing to move in the direction of Bangalore, for the purpoſe of oppoſing the progreſs of the army of Madras, in the event of Lieutenant General Harris actually paſſing the frontier; but it ſoon appeared, that although the Sultaun had ſo recently affected a diſpoſition to admit an embaſſy from the Britiſh Government, he had probably no other view than to conceal the deſign which he had formed, of ſtriking a ſudden and early blow againſt the army of Bombay; for without allowing me the ſame time to anſwer his laſt letter which he had taken for replying to thoſe addreſſed to me by him, and without waiting to hear of the actual commencement of hoſtilities on the part of the Britiſh Government, he came to the reſolution of attacking the army of Bombay, then aſſembled beyond the line of his frontier in the diſtrict of Coorgos, under the command of Lieutenant General Stuart.

7th. For this purpoſe Tippoo, taking with him the flower of his army, appears to have marched from his camp near Senapatam of the 28th of February (when Lieutenant General Harris was ſtill within the Company's territories) and moving rapidly in the direction of Periapatam, to have arrived there on the morning of the 5th of March, being the ſame day on which Lieutenant General Harris entered Myſore on the eaſtern frontier.

8th. On

8th. On the 6th of March, Tippoo Sultaun paſſed his own frontier, and attacked a detachment of the army of Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant General Stuart, the total ſtrength of whoſe entire army did not amount to more than ſix thouſand fighting men. The attack of the Sultaun's army was ſuſtained by a body not exceeding two thouſand men, and the Sultaun's army was finally defeated and compleatly diſperſed, before General Stuart could collect the whole of his divided force. It is with infinite ſatisfaction that I incloſe, for information of your Honourable Court, the paper marked (No. 1,) containing General Stuart's account of this brilliant and important action, which took place at Seedaſere on the 6th March.

9th. After this ſignal defeat, Tippoo retreated precipitately to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until the 11th of March, without making any further attempt to moleſt the army of Bombay; the loſs ſuſtained by Tippoo's army on the 6th of March, appears to have amounted to near 2,000 killed, wounded, and priſoners (which included ſeveral officers of rank, and ſome of conſiderable diſtinction) that ſuſtained on the 7th, by the army of Bombay, will appear in Lieutenant General Stuart's letter.

10th. Adverting to the great diſproportion of numbers, and to other circumſtances of diſadvantage, I am confident that your Honourable Court will be of opinion, that the conduct and ſucceſs of the army of Bombay on that day has ſeldom been equalled, and never ſurpaſſed in India.

11th. Under this impreſſion, I take the liberty of recommending to your favourable notice, the ſeveral officers and corps named by Lieutenant General Stuart in his letter of the 8th of March, and I am anxious to requeſt your particular attention to the diſtinguiſhed conduct of Lieutenant General Stuart, and Major General Hartley, as well as of Lieutenant Colonel Montreſor, and of Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop. Major General Hartley had already received a public teſtimony of my particular approbation of his extraordinary merit, in collecting ſtores and proviſions in the diſtrict of Coorga, previouſly to the arrival of General Stuart on the coaſt of Malabar.

11th. Tippoo returned from Periapatam to Seringapatam, and arriving at the latter place on the 14th of March, moved from thence immediately to meet Lieutenant General Harris and the army of Madras

13th. Lieutenant General Harris had advanced on the 26th of March to a poſition between Sultanpet and Malavelly, having met with no conſiderable impediment from the enemy. The enemy made their appearance in force on that day, but without attempting to diſturb our army. On the 27th of March, when the army reached its ground at Malavelly, Tippoo opened a diſtant cannonade upon it, which though at firſt diſregarded by Lieutenant General Harris, ultimately led to a general engagement, in which the enemy was completely defeated, and driven from every poſt which he attempted to maintain. Our loſs on this occaſion was very incon-

ſiderable; only ſeven rank and file being killed, and a few men (including four officers) wounded, while that of the enemy is ſuppoſed to have amounted to near ſeven hundred.

14th. I refer your Honourable Court to Lieutenant General Harris's letter of the 27th of March, which forms a part of the incloſure, No. 2, for a more particular account of this important victory, requeſting alſo your attention to the merits of the ſeveral officers and corps diſtinguiſhed by the notice of Lieutenant General Harris.

15th. General Harris marched on the 20th a few miles to the ſouthward of Malavelly, without the leaſt interruption from the enemy; from whence it may be inferred that Tippoo Sultaun was conſiderably diſpirited by the defeat which he had ſuſtained on the preceding day, added to the previous ſucceſs obtained over him by the army of Bombay.

16th. On the 29th of March General Harris happily accompliſhed a movement which muſt have greatly aſtoniſhed and diſconcerted the enemy: inſtead of proceeding in the direction of Arakerry and Karagat, Lieutenant General Harris ſuddenly turned towards the river Caverry, where, finding a ford at ſome diſtance above the junction of the Caveri and Copany, he immediately croſſed the Caveri with a part of his army, and occupied ſtrong poſitions on both banks of that river, at the diſtance of about fifteen miles from Seringapatam. This movement was alſo made without the leaſt oppoſition on the part of the enemy, who indeed does not ſeem to have entertained the moſt diſtant ſuſpicion of the Britiſh General's deſign.

17th. Lord Cornwallis, at a more advanced period of the year, having in vain ſought for a practicable ford to the ſouthward of Seringapatam, Tippoo probably concluded that Lieutenant General Harris would have purſued his Lordſhip's route to the ford of Caniarnbaddy, northward of Seringapatam, for the purpoſe of effecting a junction from thence with the army of Bombay. It is difficult to account otherwiſe for Tippoo's inaction, while General Harris executed this arduous and important movement.

18th. The advantages of the poſition thus acquired by General Harris muſt prove conſiderable. In addition to the immediate acquiſition of cattle and forage, it muſt facilitate the junction with the army of Bombay; it muſt afford additional ſecurity to the abundant magazines which have been formed in the Coorga country, and favour the ſafe approach of our convoys from the ſouthern diſtricts, and from the Barrahmahl, by the paſs of Coveriporam; and it promiſes to open to our army that range of forage ſituated to the ſouthward of Seringapatam, which Tippoo ſeems to have reſerved for the conſumption of his own army.

19th. Lieutenant General Harris, with his whole army, having croſſed the Caveri on the 30th of March, halted near the village of Sovelly on the 31ſt. On the 1ſt of April he moved toward Seringapatam, and on the 5th encamped two miles S. W. of that city having

having experienced no oppoſition from the enemy ſince the 27th of March. On the morning of the 6th of April, after an engagement in which the enemy appears to have made conſiderable reſiſtance, Lieutenant General Harris took poſſeſſion of Suttanpotta, and an adjacent tope or grove, and about the ſame time Major General Floyd, with a ſtrong detachment, was ſent to effect a junction with the army of Bombay. On the morning of the 6th April, Lieutenant General Stuart received at Seedapore a note from Lieutenant General Harris, announcing the arrival of the latter at Seringapatam, and alſo ſignifying that Major General Floyd was to be detached from the army of Madras on the 6th April, for the purpoſe already ſtated. In conſequence of this intelligence, Lieutenant General Stuart had determined to march from Sedapore to Sedaſere on the 7th April; and it is probable that the junction of the army of Bombay with the detachment under the command of Major General Floyd, was effected on the 8th, in the neighbourhood of Periapatam. The laſt accounts received by me from General Harris are dated on the 7th inſtant, when he ſtates that he had taken up his poſition for the ſiege of Seringapatam.

20th. Tippoo Sultaun on the 7th April had not returned any anſwer to my letter of the 22d of February, nor had he manifeſted any diſpoſition to propoſe a negotiation. Lieutenant General Harris is inſtructed to propoſe preliminary articles of peace to the Sultaun, before the Britiſh batteries ſhall be opened againſt Seringapatam.

21ſt. While General Harris was advancing towards Seringapatam, Lieut. Col. Read was employed in reducing the country to the northward of Ryacottah. His operations were intended to have embraced a wide range, and he had made conſiderable progreſs in them, when the more urgent ſervice of convoying to the troops the large ſupplies which were collected in the Barrahmahl made it neceſſary for him to change the direction of his march. He is now drawing together in the vicinity of Coveryporam, the numerous Bunjarrahs and other ſupplies intended for the army encamped before Seringapatam, which place it is hoped he may be able to reach early in May.

22d. To the ſouthward of the Carnatic and Myſore, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, at the head of a reſpectable detachment, began his operation by the reduction of Caroor, which ſurrendered to him without any ſerious reſiſtance on the 5th April. On the 8th he ſent a detachment againſt Errode, and marched himſelf on the 9th to reduce Aravacourchy. He would, however, be obliged to ſuſpend his intended operations in the diſtrict of Coimbator, and to unite his detachment to that of Colonel Read, with a view of forming a force ſufficiently ſtrong to give due protection to the large and important ſupplies proceeding to Seringapatam.

23d. Aravacourchy, which had been conſiderably ſtrengthened ſince laſt war, ſurrendered to Lieutenant Colonel Brown on the 10th inſtant.

24th. I have annexed to this diſpatch, for the information of your Honourable Court, copies of the ſeveral letters and notes received by me from Lieutenant General Harris, from the 6th of March to the 7th April inclusive, and alſo copies of the diſpatches which I have received from Lieutenant General Stuart, on the 8th March and the 6th of April.

I have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,
With the greateſt reſpect,
Your moſt obedient and faithful ſervant,

Fort St. George, 20th April 1799. MORNINGTON.

22d April 99.

P. S. After cloſing my letter I had the ſatisfaction to receive the diſpatches from Generals Harris and Stuart, of which copies are incloſed, making Nos. 4 and 5.

I congratulate your Honourable Court on the ſucceſsful junction of the detachment under General Floyd with the army of Bombay. The final junction of the whole with the army before Seringapatam, was expected to take place about the 13th inſtant. It may be ſafely affirmed, not to be in the power of Tippoo even materially to retard this junction, which, when effected, muſt excite a ſerious alarm in the mind of the Sultaun for the ſafety of his capital, if not of his perſon.

Your Honourable Court will perceive that Lieutenant General Harris, in his progreſs to Seringapatam, encountered the ſame difficulties which were experienced by Lord Cornwallis, from the failure of the cattle provided for the ſervice of the army, which although amply ſufficient in point of number at the commencement of the expedition, appears to have rapidly decreaſed on the entrance of the army into Myſore. The climate and water of that country are repreſented to be extremely unfavourable to the cattle of the Carnatic. The delay which aroſe from this unavoidable contingency ſeems to have been conſiderable; but your Honourable Court will no doubt view with ſatisfaction the ſpirit and firmneſs with which this difficulty was met by the Commander in Chief, and the zealous exertion of the whole army, by which he was enabled to proceed on his march.

When I cloſed my letter, I had not received any detailed relation of the action of the 27th of March, or any official return of our loſs on that occaſion. The diſpatch ſince received from General Harris ſupplies the defect, and at the ſame time ſhows that the loſs ſuſtained by the enemy in the battle of Malaveily, was far more conſiderable than I had ſuppoſed. The accounts received by General Harris on the ſubject of the enemy's loſs, as ſtated in his letter to me of the 5th inſtant, are confirmed by the reports of ſome hircarrahs belonging to General Stuart, who were in Tippoo's camp ſubſequently to the engagement.

I have

I have added, for the further information of your Honourable Court, a ſketch of the poſition of the army before Seringapatam on the 5th April (No. 6.) a ſketch of the attack made by Tippoo Sultaun on part of the army under Lieutenant General Stuart on the 6th March (No. 7.) and the order of battle of the army under Lieutenant General Harris on its entrance into Myſore (No. 8.)

M.

No. 11.

Copy of a letter from Lieutenant General Stuart to the Governor General in Council; dated 8th March, 1799.

To the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor General, &c. &c. Fort St. George.

My Lord,

I had the honour to addreſs your Lordſhip on the 20th ultimo; and having marched from Cananore on the following day, agreeably to my intimation of that date, I arrived at the top of Poodiacherrum Ghaut on the 25th of the ſame month.

2. I informed your Lordſhip it was my intention to aſſume a defenſive poſition cloſe to the frontiers; and there await, in conformity to General Harris's inſtructions under date the 24th December, his further orders.

In purſuance of this plan I moved the corps ſucceſſively forward, and placed them in ſuch ſituations as might enable me the moſt promptly to form the propoſed junction with the principal army.

3. On the 2d inſtant the right brigade, conſiſting of three native battalions, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Montreſor, took up their ground at Seedaſeer, the boundary of the Coorga country, and about ſeven miles diſtant from Periapatam.

The main body of the army, with the park and proviſions, remained at Seedapore and Ahmootenaar; the firſt eight miles, and the latter twelve, from the advanced poſition.

4. It may be neceſſary to inform your Lordſhip, that I was in ſome meaſure compelled, from the nature of the country, which is every where covered with thick jungles, to place the army in ſeveral diviſions; but I had a further view in occupying the poſt at Seedaſeer, in order to preſerve a more ready communication with General Harris, as this was the only ſpot from whence the ſignals eſtabliſhed between the two armies could be obſerved. Although I had no reaſon to apprehend any immediate attack, I thought it adviſable to adopt the precaution of encamping the corps at ſuch ſhort diſtances, as would either enable me to move, without much loſs of time, into the enemy's territory, or to ſupport, if occaſion ſhould require it, any quarter that might ſtand in need of aſſiſtance.

5. In the courſe of the morning of the 5th, an extenſive encampment was unexpectedly obſerved to be forming on this ſide of the fort of Periapatam. This circumſtance was diſcovered at ten

o'clock

o'clock in the forenoon, as the enemy were taking up their ground, by a party of obſervation, on the ſummit of the high hill of Seedaſeer, which commands a view of the Myſore almoſt to the environs of Seringapatam. Before the evening this encampment aſſumed a very formidable appearance, and covered a great extent of ground; we were able to count from 3 to 400 tents; amongſt the number ſome of large dimenſions were diſtinguiſhed, and particularly one of a green colour, that ſeemed to denote the preſence of the Sultaun. However much the probability of this circumſtance might be ſtrengthened by the reſpectable appearance of the encampment, it was contradicted by the evidence of two hircarrahs, who had recently arrived from Seringapatam. Theſe men generally reported, that Tippoo had marched, with all his forces, on the 20th ultimo, to oppoſe the progreſs of the Madras army; and that the Benky Nabob commanded the only force in the field that remained in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. This force was repreſented to be encamped at Canniambaddy, and to conſiſt of 5,000 piadas, or irregular infantry, who were ſaid to be intended as a covering party to 7,000 benjanies, and directed to bring as much proviſions as they could collect about Periapatam to the capital.

6. In this ſtate of uncertainty I thought it prudent to reinforce Lieutenant Colonel Montreſor's brigade with an additional battalion of ſepoys, and waited for more correct intelligence, which I expected hourly, to act with the whole of my forces, as affairs might render it neceſſary. On the morning of the 6th, Major General Hartley went forward to reconnoitre; and at break of day, from the hill of obſervation, the whole of the enemy's army was diſcovered to be in motion; but their movements were ſo well concealed by the woodineſs of the country, and the hazineſs of the atmoſphere, that it was impoſſible to aſcertain their object; nor, in fact, was this diſcovered until they had penetrated a conſiderable way into the jungle, and commenced an attack upon our line, which happened between the hours of nine and ten.

7. The enemy pierced through the jungles with ſuch ſecrecy and expedition, that they attacked the rear and the front of our line almoſt at the ſame inſtant. This diſpatch prevented more than three of our corps being engaged, as the fourth, which was poſted two miles and a half in the rear, was unable to form a junction, from the enemy having cut in between them and Seidaſeer. The communication was effectually obſtructed by a column, which, according to the reports of our priſoners, conſiſted of upwards of 5,000 men under the command of Baber Jung.

8. Fortunately, before the enemy had accompliſhed their purpoſe, Major General Hartley had time to apprize me of their attack, and remained himſelf to give any aſſiſtance that might be neceſſary. The beſt poſition was aſſumed for repulſing the enemy; and in this alarming ſituation the corps defended themſelves with ſo much reſolution, that the Sultaun's troops were unable to make any impreſſion. The brigade was on every ſide completely ſurrounded,

rounded, and had to contend againſt a vaſt diſparity of numbers, beſides other diſcouraging circumſtances.

9. As ſoon as I received intelligence of the perilous ſituation of the right brigade, I marched to their aſſiſtance, with the two flank companies of his Majeſty's 75th regiment, and the whole of the 77th. I arrived about half paſt two in ſight of the diviſion of the enemy, who had penetrated into the rear, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the great road leading to Seedaſere. The engagement laſted nearly half an hour, when, after a ſmart fire of muſquetry on both ſides, the enemy were completely routed, and fled with precipitation through the jungles, to regain their column, which ſtill continued the attack in front. On arriving at Lieutenant Colonel Montreſor's poſt, I found his men exhauſted with fatigue, and their ammunition almoſt expended. At 20 minutes paſt three the enemy retreated in all directions.

10. For this deciſive, and, I hope your Lordſhip will allow, brilliant ſucceſs, conſidering the ſmall number of troops who engaged, under very great diſadvantages, probably the flower of Tippoo Sultaun's army, I feel myſelf peculiarly indebted to the judicious diſpoſitions for defence made by General Hartley. He embraced the opportunity of obſerving the motions of the enemy from the hill I have above-mentioned, and was thus enabled to adviſe Lieutenant Colonel Montreſor of the beſt method for defeating them. I beg leave alſo to inform your Lordſhip, that my beſt thanks are due to Lieutenant Colonel Montreſor, for his very active exertions; and to the officers and men including the artillery of his brigade, for their gallant and ſteady behaviour throughout the whole of this arduous affair. Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop, and the European diviſion under his command, are likewiſe entitled to my particular approbation, for their ſpirited conduct, which finally routed the enemy.

11. Our loſs on this occaſion is far leſs than could reaſonably have been expected; and I have the honour to incloſe, for your Lordſhip's information, a return of this circumſtance.

12. It was impoſſible to aſcertain the exact loſs ſuſtained by the enemy, but it muſt have been heavy, as in the courſe of ſo long an action they were often expoſed in crouds to the fire of grape ſhot, and vollies of muſquetry.

Several men of diſtinction were killed, and ſome wounded officers have been made priſoners. I have the honour to incloſe the information of Mozan Khan Bhuſkſhy, and the commander of a kutcherry, the priſoner of the greateſt rank who has fallen wounded into our hands; but concurring reports ſtate, that Meer Ghofar is amongſt the ſlain.

13. As the arrival of General Harris at Seringapatam will not happen at ſo early a period as he firſt intended, the immediate poſſeſſion of the poſt of Seedaſere was no longer an object of ſuch conſequence, and to retain it while Tippoo continued in force at Periapatam became an affair of ſerious difficulty. The ſecrecy and expedition

pedition with which he had planned his late enterprize, and the correct intelligence that the leaders of his columns appeared to have obtained of the private routs through the Coorga jungles, led to an opinion that he would not remain ſatisfied with this abortive attempt, but might endeavour to penetrate by another direction to the ſouthward, ſtill more open than the paſſage of Seedaſere, where he would only be oppoſed by Coorgs. This conſideration derived a greater weight, as if he ſucceeded in forcing this entrance, it would throw him into our rear, and put him in all probability, in poſſeſſion of the great depôt of rice collected by the Coorga Rajah. Theſe motives have induced me to relinquiſh the poſt of Seedaſere, and to collect the whole of my force at this place. I have according made a diſpoſition, either to defend my poſition againſt the Sultaun, if he ſhould again venture to attack it, or to move in defence of any part of the Coorga Rajah's territories that the enemy may threaten, provided it ſhall endanger our magazine of proviſions; otherwiſe I ſhall remain on the defenſive, until I receive advice from General Harris.

14. Since the action of the 6th, the enemy have continued in their camp at Periapatam, nor have I any intelligence either of the Sultaun's deſigns, or of the motives that induced him to undertake his preſent enterprize. It is not likely that he will remain longer in this neighbourhood than after he receives intelligence of General Harris having entered the Myſore. As my communication with General Harris is become inſecure, I muſt take the liberty of requeſting your Lordſhip to inform him of ſuch part of theſe particulars as may appear to you neceſſary.

I have the honour to ſubſcribe myſelf moſt reſpectfully,

My Lord,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient humble ſervant,

Head Quarters, (Signed) J. STUART.
Seedapore, 8th March, 1799.

P. S. By ſome priſoners who have been juſt now brought in by the Coorga Rajah's people, I am informed that the loſs of the enemy was very great, and that many men of the firſt diſtinction fell. They mention Seyed or Meer Ghofar and the Benky Nabob, who led the center attack, among the killed. It is added, however, that the Sultaun is collecting more forces, and is determined to make a ſecond attack.

(Signed) J. STUART.

(No.

(No. 1.)—GENERAL RETURN of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in that Part of the Army engaged with Tippoo Sultaun's Troops, at and near Sedaseer, on the 6th March 1799.

Camp, near Sedapore, 8th March 1799.

	KILLED.						WOUNDED.										MISSING.					Grand Total
	Captain	Havildaurs	Rank and File	Puckaulay	Total. Europeans	Total. Natives	Lieutenants	Enfign	Subahdaur	Jemmidaur	Serjeant	Haveldaura	Drummers and Fifers	Rank and File	Puckauly	Total. Europeans	Total. Natives	Captain	Drummers and Fifers	Rank and File	Total. Europeans	Total. Natives	
Artillery and Lafcars attached	—	—	3	—	3	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	5
Rt. native brig. 1ft bat. 2d reg	1	1	10	—	1	11	2	1	1	1	—	2	1	21	1	3	27	1	1	2	1	3	46
Ditto, 1ft do. 4th do.	—	1	2	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	—	8	—	—	3	—	3	14
Ditto, 1ft do. 3d do.	—	—	3	1	—	4	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	32	—	1	33	—	—	—	—	—	38
Cent. or Europ. brigade { 75th regt. / 77th do.	—	—	3	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	9
	—	—	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	7	—	9	—	—	—	3	—	3	14
1ft nat. brig. 1ft bat. 5th reg.	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	—	6	—	6	7
Pioneer corps	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	10
Total	—	1	3	24	1	9	20	4	1	1	1	1	3	1	84	1	21	77	1	1	14	4	12	143

OFFICERS NAMES.

KILLED.

Captain S. Thomfon, 1ft battalion, 2d regiment.

WOUNDED.

Lieutenant Lighton, artillery.
Lieutenant H. Roome, Lieutenant Wilkinfon, Enfign Eldridge, Subad. Norajee, Jemm. Mah. Sophy, } 1ft battalion, 2d regt.
Lieut. Maxwell, 1ft battalion, 2d. regt.

MISSING.

Captain Shott, 1ft battalion, 2d. regiment.

(Signed) ROBERT GORDON, Adjutant General.

(No. 2.)——Information of Mozem Khan Bukhſhy.

The wounded priſoner ſtates, that his name is Mozem Khan, and that he is Bukhſhy of the Mudgid or 5th Cutcherry, conſiſting of about 2,000 men.

That on the day of the action, the column with which he attacked was compoſed of three cutcherries, the Futtah adan Khan Bukſhy, the Suddoor, Ghoolam Aly Suddoor Bukſhy, and Mudjid. That Keer Keeran Meer Haſſen led the firſt diviſion, and that Baber Jung commanded the whole column, which might amount to about 5,500 men; that the Mudjid cutcherry, of which he is Bukhſhy, occupied the center, and emerged into the road where our two ſix pounders were left, and attributes the failure of the enterprize to the prematureneſs of the attack in front. That Khana Jahan and Ruzza Sahel, the ſame who commanded at Ghazinoor, led the attack in front with 3 or 4,000 men.

That he left Pultun with Tippoo's army three days before that of the attack; he varies with regard to the force now with Tippoo, from forty to twenty thouſand, and twenty to twenty-five thouſand men, and two cutcherries of horſe of about ſeven or eight hundred each.

That there are nine guns attached to each cutcherry of foot, and that they are now at Periaputtan.

That Keer Saheb commanded the column which took the center of the plain, attended by the Binky Navab.

That Keer Kummer Ul Deen is at preſent with the army, as well as Tippoo's three ſons.

That Seyed or Keer G. Nofan, by which he was indiſcriminately called, rode on the day of the action a dark coloured horſe, approaching to black, and wore a green turban.

That Seind Saheb commands the troops to the eaſtward of Pultan, and that Lally's corps is ſtationed a few coſſe on this ſide of Bangalore, but that there are no Europeans preſent with the Sultaun.

(Signed) A. WALKER,
Military Secretary.

No. 12.

Copy of a letter from Lord Clive to the Secret Committee; dated Fort St. George, 17th April 1799.

Fort St. George, 17th April 1799.

Gentlemen,

Underſtanding that the Governor General tranſmits to the Court of Directors by the preſent diſpatch a full and detailed account of the war in which we are engaged with Tippoo Sultaun, and of the circumſtances and motives which have determined his Lordſhip in the choice of the meaſures which he has purſued relative thereto, I ſhould remain ſatisfied with what is written in the lette

letter of this Government, of this day's date, to the Secret Committee, did it not occur to my mind, that it may be ſatisfactory to you to know more explicitly upon the actual ſtate of our affairs reſpecting the war; and that I ſhould not do juſtice to the Governor General, if I did not expreſs my ſenſe of the conduct which has put us in a ſituation of ſuch fair and well grounded expectations as that in which we are now placed. Upon my arrival here, the end of Auguſt laſt, I entertained the moſt ſerious apprehenſion of the Sultaun's invading the Carnatic; which had he done, very difficult would it have been to have aſſembled the whole of our army, and vain would have been the hope of collecting a ſufficiency of ſupplies and cattle to enable us to undertake the ſiege of Seringapatam this ſeaſon, and finiſh the war in one campaign. But the fortune of the Company prevented, and poſſibly the complete ſucceſs of the meaſure of annihilating the French party, and encreaſing the ſubſidiary force at Hydrabad, planned with ſo much wiſdom by the Governor General, and executed with ſo much ability by Colonel Roberts, under the direction of the Reſident, Captain Kirkpatrick, confounded the Sultaun, and deterred him from bringing upon the Carnatic ſo ſevere a calamity.

From the time I was acquainted with the views and intentions of the Governor General, it became the object of my conſtant ſolicitude, in conjunction with the other members of this Government, to promote his meaſures by the moſt zealous and cordial co-operation; and we had the gratification upon his Lordſhip's arrival here, the end of laſt year, to receive his full and entire approbation of the exertions that had been made, and of the advanced ſtate in which he found our preparations for war. Since that period, the ſame wiſdom and energy which had characterized the Governor General's Councils, has guided our exertions, and we have had the ſatisfaction to know, that the moſt formidable and beſt equipped Britiſh army that ever took the field in India, combined with a reſpectable force from the Nizam, entered Myſore the 5th of laſt month. Bombay has not been leſs forward in its exertions. And the two victories, obtained by General Stuart on the 6th March, and by General Harris on the 27th, are preſages of future ſucceſs, and ſerve to evince how little Tippoo is able, without French aid, to contend againſt the force which is aſſailing him. The effectual aſſiſtance of the Nizam, the cloſe connection ſubſiſting between that Prince and the Company, and the powerful ſtate of our armies, encourage us to expect a ſpeedy and glorious termination to the conteſt. The irreconcileable hatred of the Sultaun, and the uncertain ſtate of the French in Egypt, of whom we have no accounts to be depended upon ſince Auguſt laſt, when Buonaparte was ſtill at the head of 17 or 18,000 men, authorize and point out the neceſſity of continuing the war till we can obtain complete ſecurity, and eſtabliſh the foundations of a durable and undiſturbed peace.

The expences of preparation have, from their extent, been unavoidably great: but as we have reaſon to expect that, if the war is not entirely finiſhed in one campaign, the weight of it will, I truſt, upon the whole, prove an economical one; and that the acquiſitions we may gain, and the ſecurity we ſhall derive from them, will amply repay the expences we ſhall have incurred.

Concurring as I do in the views of the Governor General, bearing teſtimony to the wiſdom and deciſion of his councils, and ſenſible of the advantages which muſt ever reſule from the perſon who has the controul of the Company's affairs, and the means of drawing forth the reſources of the three Preſidencies being as near the ſcene of action as poſſible in a conteſt like the preſent, I deſire to aſſure you of my continuing to give my utmoſt ſupport and moſt cordial co-operation to meaſures which bid fair to reflect ſo much honour upon Lord Mornington's adminiſtration, and to ſecure the moſt ſolid advantages to the Company and the Britiſh Empire. In theſe ſentiments I am moſt heartily joined by the other members of this Government.

I have the honour to be,
With the higheſt conſideration and reſpect,
Gentlemen,
Your obliged and moſt faithful ſervant,
(Signed) CLIVE.

No. 13.

Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, in the political department, to the Court of Directors; dated 11th of May 1799:—Received per Sarah Chriſtiana, 13th Sept. 1799.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for the affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. It is with the utmoſt ſatisfaction that we have the honour to forward to your Honourable Court the encloſed copy of a diſpatch received this day from Lieutenant General Harris, announcing the important events of the fall of the city of Seringapatam, the death of Tippoo Sultaun, and the capture of two of his ſons, and of many of his principal officers, on the 4th May.

2. Your Honourable Court may be aſſured, that the moſt aſſiduous endeavours of the Governor General in Council will be employed to derive from theſe events the ineſtimable advantages which they promiſe to the general proſperity of your affairs in India.

3. We have yet not received the details of the action of the 4th of May, but we deemed it to be our duty to tranſmit to you, without the delay of a moment, the intelligence contained in this diſpatch.

diſpatch. We ſhall take an early opportunity of forwarding, by an overland and ſea conveyance, ſuch further details as we ſhall receive from Lieutenant General Harris, together with full information of the proceedings of the Governor General in Council, in conſequence of the glorious ſucceſs of the Britiſh arms in Myſore.

We have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,

Honourable Sirs,

Your faithful humbe ſervants,

Mornington,
Clive,
Wm. Petrie,
E. H. Fallofield.

Fort St. George,
11th May 1799.

Copy of a letter from the Commander in Chief to the Right Honourable the Governor General; dated Seringapatam, the 4th May 1799.

My Lord,

I have the pleaſure to inform you, that this day at one o'clock a diviſion of the army under my command aſſaulted Seringapatam; and that at half paſt two o'clock the place was entirely in our poſſeſſion. Tippoo Sultaun fell in the aſſault. Two of his ſons, the Sultaun Paudſhaw, and Moyen ud Dien, are priſoners, with many of the principal Sirdars. Our loſs is trifling: our ſucceſs has been complete. I will ſend to your Lordſhip details hereafter.

(Signed) GEORGE HARRIS.

A true copy.

Seringapatam,
the 4th May 1799.

J. WEBBE,
Secretary to Government.

No. 14.

Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, in the political department, to the Court of Directors; dated the 16th May 1799:—Received per Sarah Chriſtiana, 13 Sept, 1799.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. On the 11th inſtant, we had the honour of forwarding to your Honourable Court the copy of a ſhort diſpatch from Lieutenant General Harris, announcing the event of the fall of Seringapatam, and the death of Tippoo Sultaun.

2. Having ſince received from Lieutenant General Harris the details relative to that memorable conqueſt, we encloſe, for your information, a copy of the Commander in Chief's letter to the Right Honourable the Governor General; of which we have thought

thought it adviſeable to omit a paſſage containing matter on which an important political arrangement actually depends, and we have, therefore, no doubt that it will be more ſatisfactory to your Honourable Court, that this ſubject ſhould, for the preſent, be communicated only to the Secret Committee.

3. Having already congratulated your Honourable Court upon the important event of the capture of Seringapatam, and having aſſured you of the moſt vigilant attention of the Governor General in Council to improve the advantages which may be expected to ariſe from this brilliant and deciſive ſucceſs, it is our principal object in this addreſs, to draw the attention of your Honourable Court to the merits of that gallant army which atchieved the conqueſt of the capital of Myſore.

4. We have no doubt that your Honourable Court will view with admiration the conſummate judgment with which the aſſault was planned, the unequalled rapidity, animation, and ſkill, with which it was executed, and the humanity which diſtinguiſhed its final ſucceſs.

5. The luſtre of this victory can be equalled only by the ſubſtantial advantages which it promiſes to eſtabliſh, by reſtoring the peace and ſafety of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India on a durable foundation of genuine ſecurity; and your Honourable Court will aſſuredly concur in the ſentiments of national pride, ſatisfaction, and gratitude with which we reflect, that, in this arduous criſis, the ſpirit and exertions of the Indian army have kept pace with thoſe of our countrymen at home, and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found in the malevolent deſigns of her enemies, an increaſing ſource of her own proſperity, fame, and power.

6. Under the warmeſt impreſſions of its diſcipline, zeal, and valour, we beg leave to recommend this brave and gallant army to the favourable notice of your Honourable Court, and to the applauſe and gratitude of their King and country,

We have the honour to be, with the greateſt reſpect,

Honourable Sirs,

Your faithful humble ſervants,

(Signed) Mornington,
Clive,
Wm. Petrie,
E. H. Fallofield.

Fort St. George,
16th May 1799.

(No. 1.)——Copy of a letter from the Commander in Chief to the Right Honourable the Governor General; dated Seringapatam, 7th May 1799.

My Lord,

On the 4th inſtant I had the honour to addreſs to your Lordſhip a haſty note, containing in few words the ſum of our ſucceſs, which I have now to report more in detail.

The fire of our batteries, which began to batter in breach on the 30th

30th April, had on the evening of the 3d inſtant ſo much deſtroyed the walls againſt which it was directed, that the arrangement was then made for aſſaulting the place on the following day, when the breach was reported practicable; the troops intended to be employed were ſtationed in the trenches early in the morning of the 4th, that no extraordinary movement might lead the enemy to expect the aſſault, which I had determined to make in the heat of the day, as the time beſt calculated to enſure ſucceſs, as their troops would then be leaſt prepared to oppoſe us.

Ten flank companies of Europeans taken from thoſe regiments neceſſarily left to guard our camp and outpoſts, followed by the 12th, 33d, 73d, and 74th regiments, and three corps of grenadier ſepoys, taken from the troops of the three Preſidencies, with 200 of his Highneſs the Nizam's troops, formed the party for the aſſault, accompanied by 100 of the artillery and the corps of pioneers, and ſupported in the trenches by the battalion companies of the regiment de Meuron, and four battalions of Madras ſepoys. Colonel Sherbrooke, and Lieutenant Colonels Dunlop, Dalrymple, Gardiner, and Mignan, commanded the ſeveral flank corps; and Major General Baird was entruſted with the direction of this important ſervice.

At one o'clock the troops moved from the trenches, croſſed the rocky bed of the Cavery, under an extremely heavy fire, paſſed the glacis and ditch, and aſcended the breaches in the fauſſe braye and rampart of the fort, ſurmounting, in the moſt gallant manner, every obſtacle which the difficulty of the paſſage, and the reſiſtance of the enemy, preſented to oppoſe their progreſs. Major General Baird had divided his force for the purpoſe of clearing the ramparts to the right and left. One diviſion was commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, the other by Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop; the latter was diſabled in the breach; but both corps, although ſtrongly oppoſed, were completely ſucceſsful. Reſiſtance continued to be made from the palace of Tippoo for ſome time after all firing had ceaſed from the works; two of his ſons were there, who, on aſſurance of ſafety, ſurrendered to the troops ſurrounding them; and guards were placed for the protection of the family, moſt of whom were in the palace. It was ſoon after reported that Tippoo Sultaun had fallen; Syed Saheb, Meer Saduc, Syed Gofar, and many other of his Chiefs, were alſo ſlain. Meaſures were immediately adopted to ſtop the confuſion, at firſt unavoidable in a city ſtrongly garriſoned, crowded with inhabitants, and their property in ruins from the fire of a numerous artillery, and taken by aſſault. The Princes were removed to camp.

It appeared to Major General Baird ſo important to aſcertain the fate of the Sultaun, that he cauſed immediate ſearch to be made for his body, which, after much difficulty, was found late in the evening in one of the gates, under a heap of ſlain, and ſoon after placed in the palace. The corpſe was next day recognized by the family, and interred

interred with the honours due to his rank in the mauſoleum of his father.

The ſtrength of the fort is ſuch, both from its natural poſition and the ſtupendous works by which it is ſurrounded, that all the exertions of the brave troops who attacked, to whoſe praiſe it is impoſſible to ſay too much, were required to place it in our hands. Of the merits of the army, I have expreſſed my opinion in orders, a copy of which I have the honour to encloſe; and I truſt your Lordſhip will point out their ſervices to the favourable notice of their King and country.

I am ſorry to add, that on collecting the returns of our loſs, it is found to be much heavier than I had at firſt imagined.

On the 5th inſtant, Abdul Khalic, the elder of the Princes, formerly hoſtages with Lord Cornwallis, ſurrendered himſelf at our outpoſts, demanding protection; Kerim Saib, the brother of Tippoo, had before fought refuge with Meer Allum Behauder. A cowl namah was yeſterday diſpatched to Futtoh Hyder, the eldeſt ſon of Tippoo, inviting him to join his brothers; Purneah and Meer Kummer Odeen Khan, have alſo been ſummoned to Seringapatam; no anſwers have been yet received, but I expect them ſhortly, as their families are in the fort.

This moment Ali Reza, formerly one of the vakeels from Tippoo Sultaun to Lord Cornwallis, has arrived from Meer Kummer Odeen Khann, to aſk my orders for 4,000 horſe, now under his command; Ali Reza was commiſſioned to declare, that Mur Kummer Odieen would make no conditions, but rely on the generoſity of the Engliſh.

Monſieur Chapuy, and moſt of the French are priſoners; they have commiſſions from the French Government.

I have the honour, &c.

Seringapatam, 7th May 1799. (Signed) GEORGE HARRIS.

Abſtract of a Return of killed, wounded, and miſſing, at the aſſault of Seringapatam on the 4th of May 1799.

Europeans killed—Two captains, ſix lieutenants, three ſerjeants, one drummer, and fifty-eight rank and file.

Ditto wounded—One lieutenant colonel, four captains, eight lieutenants, three enſigns, two conductors, twelve ſerjeants, five drummers, and two hundred and twenty-eight rank and file.

Ditto miſſing—One ſerjeant and three rank and file.

Natives killed—Thirteen rank and file.

Ditto wounded—One jemidar, two drummers, and thirty-one rank and file.

Ditto miſſing—Two rank and file.

Names

Names of officers killed and wounded on the aſſault.

Killed—Lieutenant Mather, of the 75th, and Captain Owen, of the 77th; flank companies, Lieutenant Lalor, of the 73d, Lieutenants Farquhar, Prendergraſt, Hill, and Shawe, of the 74th; Captain Cormick, of the pioneers.

Wounded—Lieutenant Turner, Broughton, and Skelton, of the 75th; Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop and Lieutenant Lawrence of the 77th; Lieutenant Webb, of the Bombay Regiment; Captain Lardy and Lieutenant Matthews of the Meuron regiment flank companies; Lieutenant Shawe, of the 76th, ſerving with the 12th; Captain Macleod, Lieutenant Thomas, Enſigns Autil and Guthrie of the 73d; Captain Caldwell, of the Engineers, and Captain Preſcott, of the artillery.

Copy of General Orders; dated Camp at Seringapatam, 5th May 1799.

The Commander in Chief congratulates the gallant army which he has the honour to command on the conqueſt of yeſterday; the effects ariſing from the attainment of ſuch an acquiſition, as far exceed the preſent limits of detail, as the unremitting zeal, labour, and unparallelled valour of the troops ſurpaſs his power of praiſe: for ſervices, ſo incalculable in their conſequences, he muſt conſider the army as well entitled to the applauſe and gratitude of their country at large.

While Lieutenant General Harris ſincerely laments the loſs ſuſtained in the valuable officers and men who fell in the attack, he cannot omit to return his thanks in the warmeſt terms to Major General Baird, for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the aſſault, and for the humane meaſures which he ſubſequently adopted for preſerving order and regularity in the place. He requeſts that Major General Baird will communicate to the officers and men who, on that great occaſion, acted under his command, the high ſenſe he muſt entertain of their atchievements and merits.

The Commander in Chief requeſts, that Colonel Gent and the corps of engineers under his orders, will accept his thanks for their unremitting exertions in conducting the duties of that very important department; and his beſt acknowledgments are due to Major Beatſon, for the eſſential aſſiſtance given to this branch of the ſervice by the conſtant exertion of his ability and zeal.

The merits of the artillery corps is ſo ſtrongly expreſſed by the effects of their fire, that the Commander in Chief can only deſire Colonel Smith to aſſure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command, that he feels moſt fully their claim to approbation.

In thus publicly expreſſing his ſenſe of their good conduct, the Commander in Chief finds himſelf called upon to notice, in a moſt particular manner, the exertion of Captain Dowſe, and his corps of

pioneers, which during the preſent ſervice have been equally marked by unremitting labour, and the ability with which that labour was applied.

On referring to the progreſs of the ſiege, ſo many occaſions have occurred for applauſe to the troops, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit; but the gallant manner in which Lieutenant Colonel Shaw, the Honourable Colonel Willeſly, Lieutenant Colonel Moneypenny, the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel St. John, Major Mac Donald, Major Skelby, and Lieutenant Colonel Wallace, conducted the attacks on the ſeveral outworks and poſts of the enemy, demands to be recorded; and the very ſpirited attack led by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, of his Majeſty's 74th regiment, which tended ſo greatly to ſecure the poſition our troops had attained in the enemy's works on the 26th ultimo, claims the ſtrongeſt approbation of the Commander in Chief.

The important part taken by the Bombay army ſince the commencement of the ſiege in all the operations which led to its honourable concluſion, has been ſuch as well ſuſtains its long eſtabliſhed reputation. The gallant manner in which the poſt at the village of Agrar was ſeized by the force under Colonel Hart, the ability diſplayed in directing the fire of the batteries eſtabliſhed there, the vigour with which every attack of the enemy on the outpoſts of that army was repulſed, and the ſpirit ſhewn in the aſſault of the breach by the corps led by Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice, for which the Commander in Chief requeſts Lieutenant General Stuart will offer his beſt thanks to the officers and troops employed.

Lieutenant General Harris truſts, that Lieut. Gen. Stuart will excuſe his thus publicly expreſſing his ſenſe of the cordial co-operation and aſſiſtance received from him during the preſent ſervice; in the courſe of which he has ever found it difficult to ſeparate the ſentiments of his public duty from the warmeſt feelings of his private friendſhip.

Extract from General Orders; dated Seringapatam, 8th May 1799.

Lieutenant General Harris has particular pleaſure in publiſhing to the army the following extract of a report tranſmitted to him yeſterday by Major General Baird, as it places in a diſtinguiſhed point of view the merit of an officer on the very important occaſion referred to, whoſe general gallantry and good conduct ſince he has ſerved with this army, have not failed to recommend him ſtrongly to the Commander in Chief.

"If, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual "merit, I know no man ſo juſtly entitled to praiſe as Colonel Sher-"brooke, to whoſe exertion I feel myſelf much indebted for the "ſucceſs of the attack."

True copies.

(Signed) P. A. AGNEW, Military Secretary.

A true copy.

J. WEBBE, Secretary to Government.

(No. 2.)—Copy of a General Order by Government; dated 15th May 1799.

Fort St. George, 15th May 1799.

G. O. By Government.

The Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, having this day received from the Commander in Chief of the allied army in the field, the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam on the 4th of May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander in Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army which atchieved the capture of the capital of Mysore on that memorable day.

His Lordship views with admiration the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned, the unequalled rapidity, animation, and skill, with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success.

Under the favour of Providence and the justice of our cause, the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence, that the war in which we were engaged would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honourable issue.

But the events of the 4th May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor General in Council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India to a degree of splendor and glory unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world.

The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial advantages which it promises to establish, by restoring the peace and safety of the British possessions in India on a durable foundation of genuine security.

The Governor General in Council reflects with pride, satisfaction, and gratitude, that in this arduous crisis the spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with those of our countrymen at home; and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame, and power.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council.

(Signed) J. Webbe,
Secretary to Government.

(A true copy)

J. Webbe,
Secretary to Government.

No. 15.

Copy of a letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors; dated 12th May 1799:——Received per Sarah Chriſtiana, 15th September 1799.

To the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs.

1. The accidental detention of the Sarah Chriſtiana packet, enables me to forward to your Honourable Committee by this diſpatch, documents of great importance, explanatory of the nature of the connection between Tippoo Sultaun and the French Republic.

2. Theſe papers were found in the palace of Seringapatam, and were tranſmitted officially to my military ſecretary, by the ſecretary of the commiſſion appointed to aſſiſt Lieutenant General Harris in all matters of a political nature.

3. The paper, No. 1. is a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Executive Directory, and appears to be an atteſted copy of that which was diſpatched by M. Dubuc, with two native vakeels, on the 7th of February 1799. The letter however is dated the 20th of July 1798, at which time the military preparations in the Carnatic had ſcarcely commenced.

4. Your Honourable Committee will obſerve, that in this letter Tippoo Sultaun, in the moſt diſtinct manner, ſtates the nature of his late embaſſy to the Iſle of France to have been the ſame which I have deſcribed in my minute of the 12th of Auguſt, and in my letter to Tippoo Sultaun of 8th November, notwithſtanding that he had endeavoured to put a different colour on the tranſaction in his letter to me of the 18th December 1798, and received at Fort St. George 25th December.

5. It is equally remarkable, that he does not attempt to alledge againſt the Britiſh Government any cauſe of complaint ſince the concluſion of the laſt war.

6. The object of his offenſive and defenſive alliance with France, appears to have been not merely the recovery of his former dominions, but the expulſion of the Engliſh from all their rich poſſeſſions in India, and the utter annihilation of their power in Aſia.

7. You will further obſerve, that he declares it to be his intention to commence the attack on the firſt favourable occaſion, and, on the whole, that he profeſſes to make common cauſe with France, under the moſt ſolemn proteſtations of fidelity and zeal to the Republic.

8. The paper, No. 2. is a note of the demands which Tippoo Sultaun's ambaſſadors were authorized by him to make upon the Executive Directory at Paris; they correſpond in ſubſtance with the requiſitions announced in M. Malartie's proclamation at the Mauritius.

9. In

9. In the articles 5 and 6, you will perceive that the Sultaun intended to commence his operations in the heart of the Carnatic, in concert with a French army to be landed at Porto Novo; and and that he did not propoſe to wait the actual arrival of the French force, but was reſolved to make himſelf maſter of the coaſt of Coromandel as ſoon as he ſhould find it convenient, after having received notice of the motions of the French.

20. In article 7, it appears that the Portugueſe colonies in this quarter of India were to have been divided between Tippoo Sultaun and the French. All the articles of his paper demand particular attention, as tending to prove, in the moſt concluſive manner, the entire devotion of this infatuated Prince to his alliance with France. This Paper alſo is dated on the 20th of July 1798, both papers are ſigned in the Sultaun's own hand writing, according to the abbreviated form of ſignature which he was accuſtomed to uſe in all his letters and other official documents. This mode of ſignature is uſual among the natives of Hindoſtan, and no doubt can be entertained of the authenticity of the papers.

11. Your Hon. Committee will obſerve, that the letter from Tippoo Sultaun to me, which was received at Fort St. George on the 13th February, muſt have been written ſubſequently to the diſpatch of the papers now incloſed, as M. Dubuc, with the Sultaun's two native vakeels, embarked at Tranquebar on the 7th of February.

I have the honour to incloſe two other papers, Nos. 3 and 4, in the French language, found alſo in the palace of Seringapatam.

I have the Honour to be, Honourable Sirs,
Your moſt obedient and faithful ſervant,

Fort St. George, MORNINGTON.
19th May 1799.

(No. 1.)—Copy of a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to the Directory.

Le Circar Condadad au Directoire Executif repreſentant la Republique Françaiſe une & indiviſible a Paris,

Au nom de l'amitie que le Circar Condadad & ſa nation vonent a la Republique Françaiſe, laquelle Amitie & Alliance durerent autent que le ſoleil & la lune brillerent dans le ciel & ſerent ſi ſolides que les evenemens les plus extraordinaires ne pourront—Jamais la rompee ni la diſunir.

La Anglais Jaloux de la liaiſm & de l'Amitie que regnorint de puis longtems entre Mon Sercar & la France, ſe ſont riunis aux Marattes a Nizam Alli Kan, & a mes autres ennemis pour me declarer une gurrer auſſi od'renſe qu injuſte qui a durée pluſieurs années, & dont les reſultats ont ete ſi funeſtes pour moi qúil mén a Conté mes plus belles provinces & trois Courreaux, & trente lacs de roupies.

La Republique n'ignore ceſtamiment anume de ces circonſtances malheureuſes & combien j'ai fait défforts pour diſputer pied a pied

be

be pays que j'ai eté oblige de ceder a nos ennemis communs. Je n'aurai bas eté force a des facrifices auffi cruels fi javois eté fecouru par les François mes amuins alliés, qui trompés par le projet perfide de Conway Gouverneur General a Pondicherry, France, & Ourdit, avec Cambel Gouverneur de Madras, l'evacuation de la place on el Commandort Elle voredra fans doute en chaffant les Anglers de leurs riches poffeffions dans l'Inde, repaire la faule de fon Ancien Government.

Etant depuis long tems animé des mîmés fentimens, je les as fait exprimer au Government de l'Ifle France, par l'Organe de deux Ambaffadeurs d'ent je veins de reçevoir a ma grande fatisfaction, des reponfes telles que je les defirois, ainfi que le Drapeau Republicain par le Chef de Brigade Chappins, & le Capitaine des Vaiffeaux Du Bue qui m'ont emmené les foibles fecerns qui les Circonftances ont permis au General Malartie & au Contre Amiral Sercey de m'expedive in Soldats & Officiers.

Je garde pres de moi ce premiér Officier et vous envoie le Sencond en qualité des Ambaffadeur pour, en vous demandant votre Alliance Offenfive & Defenfive, obtenir des forces affez impofantes, pour que reums aux je puiffe attaquer et anantir jamais nos Enemis Communs evafie. Je vous remettrai mon Etendard que ruevi a celue de la Republique, Servire de Bafe, a l'Alliance qui nos deux Nations vont Contracter ainfi que les Mandats particuliers que j'le charge de vous Communiquer.

Je lue adjoins Sheik Abdoubraim, et Mahomet Bifmilla mes Sujets qui fent egalement chargés de me repreferter auprés de vous.

Quelqueftorent defermais les circonftances on puiffent fe trouvez nos deux Nations fert enfemble et fepárément ainfi que dans titles les affires qulles poumnt traiter, que le bien, la Glorie et l'advantage des deux an 'foient toujours lebut; que leur fentiments refpectifs arjant pour garant les affurances de fidelité et les Sormens ufités par Chacunne D'Elles, & que le Ciel & le Terre fe rappprochent et fe renniffent, plutot que de voir jamais notre Alliance eprouver la moindre alteration.

Dans mon Palais a Cheringampatnam le 20th Juillet 1798.

T. S.

(A true copy.)
(Signed) C. Macaulay, Secretary.
(A true copy.)
N. B. Edmonstone, P. T.

(No. 2.)——Copy of Articles of Engagement propofed by Tippoo Sultaun to the Directory.

Vole, des Demandes que mes Ambaffadeurs doivent faire au Directive Executif a l'aris.

Art. 1. Dix ou quinze mille Hommes de troope de toute Arme Infantine, Cavalere, et Arlitteree.

2. Une

2. Une Armee Navale qui fera la Guerre ſur la Cotte on ſerent nos Armees pour les favoriſer, gles renforcer en cas de beſom.

3. Le Circar fournira 1ootes les Munitions de Guerre et de Bouche aux Armees de la Republique, auſſi que les Chevaux, Bœufs, Chanaux Fentes qui leur ſerent neceſſaries a l'exception des Liquours d'Europe, qu' il n'a pas dans ſon Pays.

4. On prendra pour toutes les Marches et Operations Militaires quelconques les Ordres du Roi.

5. L'Expedition ſera derigee dans un point de la Cotte Coromandel, & de preference a Porto Novo au s'effectuera la Dibarquement des Troopes ou ſerendra d'avance on a point nomme le Roy aver tout ſen armée ſeu intention étant de debuter les premieres Operations au ſien du Pays ennemie.

6. Le Roy demande que la Republique lui donne avis pas l'Emoi a Mangalore, de deux Corvettes partant d'Europe, a vingt Jours de diſtance l'une de l'antre, du nombré des vaiſſeaux et de troupes qu'ellis lui envoye qu'il mette on Campagne auſſitôt & ſetronve a meme d' etre Maitre de la Cotte Coromandel avant l' arrivée des Forces de la Republique, & etre a neme de pens voir a tour les beſoine.

7. Toutes les Conquètes qui ſe ferent ſur les Ennemies a l'exception des Provinces que le Rer a eté oblige de ceder aux Anglais aur Marratta & a Nizam Alli Kan, ſerant partagés egalement entre les deux nations, & de apries les convenances reſpectives le meme partage aura lieu auſſi des Vaiſſeaux Ennemies & des Colonies Pertugoiſes pour indemniſer le Roi des depenſes de la Guerre.

8. Que s'il s'eleve quilque difficulta' entre les Armies Allies chacune d'eux Aurent ia reſerve particulieur de leur Juſtices ſelon leuirs Lois et Coutumes, & que toute diſcretion qui y aurait ſupport ſerent traitees par Ecrit entre, les deux natives.

9. Que quelque ſoit le deſire de la Republique de donner la Paix a l'Angleterre on de continuer la Guerre de voulier bien le conſiderer pour ſoujour comme un Ami & un fidelle Allée le comprendre dans tous ſes traites & de le prevenir de toutes ſes Intentions.

(Signed) T. S.

10. Touts les Francois quelconques qui ſont et viendrent dans les Etats du Roy ſeront traites comme Amis et Allies, ils pourront aller, vener et Commercer ſans qui et ne leur ſoit fait aucum Trouble, Moleſtation or Impeachment, mais au contraire de reçevoir toute Aſſiſtance & Secours au beſoin.

11. D'Emmener a mon ſervice quatre fendeurs de Canon de Bronze quatre fondeurs en feu quartre papitiers, quartre Couleriers glace quatre verriers, deux ingenieurs de manne, deux bous conſtructions.

Donné dans mon Palais de Cheringampatnam ſous ma Signature Celle de mon premier Miniſter et revetu de Sceau de lé Etat le 20 de Jeullet 1798.

(Signed) T. S.

True copy, Signed, C. MACAULEY, Sec.

A true copy, N. B. EDMONSTONE, P. T.

(No. 3.)—Copy of a letter from Dubuc to the Rajah of Travencore's Miniſter.

Copie de la Lettre écrite au Premier Miniſtre au Rajah du Travancore, a ſon Excellence Ranan Kiſren, Premier Miniſtre de ſa Majiſte le Rajah de Travancore a' Alepé.

Monſeigneur,

J' attends avec Impatience l'Arrivee de quelques Navires de l'Inde pour avoir de nos nouvelles et apprendre que votre Sante eſt parfaitement retablie, ſi comme on la dit ici elle a ete derangee.

Les occaſions ſont varis pour l'Inde Je profite d' un Batiment qui va a' la Cote Malabar, pour écrire au Prince Tippoo Sultaun avec lequel J'ar l' Honneur d' etre en Correſpondence.—Je le prie de vous faire parvenir m'a Lettre, apries l' avoir faite traduire en une langue Orientale afin que vous n'ayez beſan de la communquer a' perſonne.

Je me ſuis coment demandé pourquoi votre Prince n' etoit point allie au Sultaun e en me Rapellant que le grand Nabob Hyder Alli, ſon Pire, avoit été l'Amie et l'Allié de Ram Rajah j'ar été etonne', que cette amitie Derangeè par quel que évenement n'ent pas été Renouvellee; il eſt tres ordinaire en Europe, qu' une Puiſſance après avoir été en Guerre avec un Voiſin Redevienne ſon Alli, & ſon Ami, vous avezétté en Guerre avec le Bacha. Je ſens qui il fant que tout Reſſentiment ſoit oublie, que les anciennes querelles ſoient eteintes & qu' il convient aux deux Princes de faire une Traité d' Alliance et d' Amitie, d' une maniere ſolide et convenable à leurs intêrets reciproques: ſi J' etors dans l'Inde. Je vous preſſervis tant anſi qu an Sultaun, que Je crois que mon deſir ſeroit rempli, mais c' eſt a' vous qu' eſt reſervé l' Avantage de Reunir ces deux Puiſſances—Vous êtes le Conſeil et l'ami de votre Roi, vous dirigez ſis Avantageuſment ſes affaires, que ſi vous trouvez cette Alliance avantageuſe (et Je nen doubte pas) il vous ſuffira de lin on faire la Propoſition; et les deux Princes s'entendront facilement Si mes vœux ſont ſatisfaits à cet égard, Majorê ſera au comble car vóus ſerez renſè notre Allie en devenant celui d' un Prince qui eſt uni à la France depuis long temps Je, pris le Ciel qu' il vous falſe Couler des jours longues et heureux, et qu' il conſerve ceux de votre Roi, c' eſt le vœu ſincere de votre Serviteur et Ami,

MAL. DESCOMBERC.

(True Copy)

C. MACAULEY, Sec.

(A true copy) N. B. EDMONSTONE, P. T.

Iſle de France,
15th Ventoſe An 6,
5th Mars 1798.

(No.

(No 4.)—Copy of a Letter from Dubuc to Tippoo Sultaun; dated 16th December 1798, O. S.

9ieme Expedition Tranquebar, le 16me Decembre 1798, O. Stile.
An Sereard Coudadad.

Grand Pacha, Salut et Reſpect,

Les hommes ſont heureuſement arrivés, mais il nous manque la choſe la plus éſſentielle, *les Lettres* qu'ils ont laiſſé en route, mais j'eſpere qu'elles arriveront, ſous peu de jours, ils ont en ſe peur, que voilà quatre mois qu'ils ſont en route, et vous pouvez juger de la Diligence qu'ils ont mis, et de leurs exactitude à vous ſervir; quand a moi, je crois qu'ils ſe ſont attachés les jambes pendant trois mois et denui. Les Alcarahs que je vous avois expedié le 11 du mois dernier, ſont de retour hier avec la réponſe de votre Majeſté du 29 du même mois; je me Hatte de vous les renvoyer, puiſque ſe ſont de gens très fidelles, et que je voudrais qu'on recompenſat généreuſement. La perſonne qui doit fournir l'argent ne paroit pas, et je n'en entends point parler, je craint beaucoup qu'il y aura de grandes peines pour obtenir de ſe fair payes je penſe qu'il eſt très indiſpenſablement néceſſaire, que vous en' expediés l'ordre, pour prendre tout l'argent qui eſt chez *mercieu* tout de ſuite, et que vous y' joignez une lettre de Credit, comme je vous l'avois demandé ſur la Republique. L'Importance de ma Miſſion eſt telle, et dont le reſultat doit être ſi avantageux à votre Majeſté, que je ne ſçauroit trop le repeter, que l'Argent doit être compté pour rien, l'orſqu' il s'agit de grandes Affaires; il faut que je pars et pour cela il faut de l'Argent. Dans tous les Pays l'Argent eſt le Nerf de l'Intrigue et la Guerre, ſi votre Majeſté ne veut pas être ruiné par les Anglois, et perdre le ſecours de vos bons et vrais Amis les François, donne mois donc une aſſez grande marque de Confiance en me donnant des moyens, on n' arretera pas des *Socars* avec de l'argent, ſur tout ſi c'eſt de Pagodes a l'Etoille. De la Diligence a m'en envoyer, et je parterai tout de ſuite. Les etoffes ne ſont pas, non plus arrivées et je vais envoyer de gens pour les faire venir. Je demande à votre Majeſté de m'autoriſer a prendre un An d'avance d'appointments, comme elle me l'apromis pour aſſurer à ma Famille de quoi vivre pendant mon Abſence quiſque les ſix Mois que j'ai reçu ſont finis le 8me du Mois prochain, et que j'ai etois forcé de depenſer tout ce que j'avois, et qu'il ne me reſte plus rien. Les Anglois m' ayant pris mont Vaiſſeau et mon Argent vous trouverez ma demande de toute juſtice, en ſongeant que ma Famille eſt dans un Pays étranger ou elle n'a aucun reſource. Je reitere donc que votre Majeſté me donne plein pouvoir à cet egard, et que l'on me faſſe tenir des moyens tout de mite; les Alcharahs me prometant d'etre de retours dans Trente Jours, je *puis partir dans quarante.* Il ſera bon d'avoir ici chez votre, on aquilquatre paires d'Alcarahs, pour qu'on vous donne toutes les Huit Jours des Nouvelles, j'ai ici, ci qu'il faut pour cela. Je vous recommande le Ouaquil, il n'eſt pas aſſez payé, et voila Huit Mois que la Cacherie ne lui a rien donné,

il lui faut auſſi un Palanquin l'Envoyé d'un Grand-Prince, auſſi noble et auſſi generaux que votre Majeſté ne doit pas aller a pied comme un Couly êtes vous content de moi, dites m'en un môt, vous ſavez comme je vous attaché et vous aurez de vraies prenoes de ma fidelite, je ſupplie votre Majeſté de continuer vos Bontés et votre Amitié, a mon bon Ami et Collegue, le Général Chaprús, voyez le ſouvent, plus vous connoitrès et plus vous verrez, qu'il merite de confideration c'eſt un homme d'honneur vrai et de bon conſeil.

J'ai appris que votre Majeſté à écrit au government de Madras et au Lord Mornington, qu'elle ſera l'iſſue de leurs Réponſe? Tenez vous en garde contre eux, ſoyez prêt a vous défendre, ou a attaquer; les Preparatifs de la Guerre ſe continuent, avec une grande Rapidité, l'Armee de *Nizam* doit deja etre en marche, il faut larreter—Las Anglois ont voulu faire enlever votre Ouaquil, Sadaa-Chide varan mais j'ai decouvert le complot et il n'a pas reuſſi il eſt neceſſarie que votre Majeſté ecrire tout de ſuit au Government de Tranquebar par un Chamean Courier pour leu recommander et lue demander ſa Protection immediate pour votre Général en Chef Du Bue ſon Major Fillietag et l'interprete de Bay et votre Ouaquil Le Lord Mornington Gouverneur Général de Bengal et le General Clark doivent venir a la Cotte a la fin de ce mois pour entainer des Negotiations avec votre Majeſté, que ſi elles ne leurs ſont pas advantageuſes, elles leur feront vous déclarer la Guerre, dont le reſultat doit être d'envalier votre pays et vous detroner en vous ſubſtinant et aux Heritiers de votre couronne une Nabob de leur fabrique Votre Majeſté voit brien qu'il ne s'aget point moins, que de la perte de votre Royaume il fait traveiller et negocier ſur tout pour vous la maintenir juſques au moment on je pourrous vous la faire affermir pour toujours et a vos auguſtes enfant Avec les intrigues que las Anglois entretiennent dans toutes les Debardes de l'Inde, il leurs eſt tres facile de cauſer des troubles, et ils pouvent peut être vous detacher de toutes vos Allies, il eſt vraiſembable qu'en faiſant une grande diverſion et des traites et qu'ils peuvent reuſſir dans une novelle Guerre contre votre Majeſté il viendroit a bout enſuite de detruire la puiſſance Maratte, et a leur enlever impunnémement tout ce qu'il leurs auroit été cedé par un nouveau traité de paix—Il eſt donc evidemmant de leurs interêts, de traiter conjointement avec vous afin de trouver une Garantie ſure et mutuelle dans une liqui puiſſante, dont chaque membre doit ſe reunir pour defendre les requiſitions on les ceſſions, que chacun a fait a la paix, que vous avez ſigné dans votre Capitale, avec toutes les partees contractantes —Les Anglois vous menacent les Marhattes doivent vous ſoutenir, et ne pas vous laiſſer expoſe a ſuccomber La Barriere, que vous ſepare des premiere doit ſubſiſter ſans que rien pour la briſer on la rompre vous devez compter ſur vos Allies autant que vos intêrets ſerront communes, et vous ſeriez abandonné ſi ſes intereſts ceſſoit, on a plus fate raiſon fils en out de contraire, a qui ils commencent á vous craindre. Le temps eſt court et precieux, il faut pour prouver vos bones intentions, et gagner les Anglois, de Viteſſe, et

mettre

mettre des obſtacles a leurs negotiations a *Pona* pour en retarder ou en empecher c'effet. Dans une pareille conjonture les Marhattes doivent faire valoir la foi de Traites, ne pas oublier, a rappeller aux Anglois, les ſecours qu'ils leur ont accordé contre votre Majeſté don exige la reconnoiſſance, qu'ils ſont en droit d'én attendre afin de conciliére, cons les interêſts reſpectifs avec les circonſtances delicates on chacune d'elle ſe trouve pour être á lábri des reproches et du manque de foi ſu accompliſſement du traite de paix en etier over Articlé Alor ſi les moyens de conciliation ne peuvent pas riſſier il faut qu'ils Arment en Diligence, qu'ils menacent la Nation infractante, et le cry ? arreſtera peutêtre toutes les reſolutions Militaires et Hoſtilities contre votre Majeſté; ſil entoit autrement, il faut tirer l'epee jeter le forreau ſi loin, qu'en ne le trouve plus, et le ſut deſarnes en deridera nons ſi avons encore aucune novelle aſſez interreſſante d'Europe, la Republique eſt continuellement victorieuſe ſur tous les Ennemis, et refuſant la Paix l'Angleterre. Scindia a Deja pris Delhi et je penſe qu'il doit avoir finia la conquête d'etgra ; il ſera bon que votre Majeſtié depeche des couriers, pour le prevenir tant de ſuite de la eſt nation on vous vous trouvez. Je ſupplie votre Majeſté a bien lire ma lettre. La franchiſe, la verite et votre interêt la ſente dicteé.

Je prie Dieu que tout aille au gre de votre Majeſtie de que j'ai l'honneur d'etre avec reſpect.

Le General en Chef
Capitaine des Vaiſſeaux de la Republique Francoiſe,
une et indiviſible.
(Signed) DUBUC.

A true copy.

C. MACAULEY, Sec.

Le Major Filletat vous offre l'homage de ſon Reſpect et de ſon Attachement a votre Majeſté.

True copy,

N. B. EDMONSTONE, P. T.

No. 16.

Extract of a letter from Lord Mornington to the Chairman of the Court of Directors; dated Fort St. George, 19th May 1799:—Received per Sarah Chriſtiana, 13th September 1799.

Private. Fort St. George, 19th May, 1799.

Sir,

THE Sarah Chriſtiana having been detained for a few hours, I am enabled to acknowledge the receipt of the diſpatches of the Secret Committee, under date 24th of December.

The intelligence which I have received this day from Seringapatam, induces me to believe that I ſhall be able to effect a ſettlement of the country without quitting this preſidency. My brother

and Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick, are far advanced on their way towards Myſore, and I ſhall wait for their report before I move from hence. I requeſt you to apprize the Court of Directors of the probability of my being able to raiſe the inveſtment nearly to the ſtandard originally propoſed.

The advices from Egypt are by no means ſatisfactory; it appears that the French had gained ſome conſiderable advantages in Syria, and had taken the town of Joppa; it alſo appears that they had fortified Suez, and had begun to collect craft at the head of the Arabian Gulph. The Centurion and Albatroſs, and two of the Company's cruizers, were gone up the Red Sea, for the purpoſe of deſtroying the craft collected, and of preventing the collection of more. The Princeſs Charlotte Indiamen, armed, together with the Fox frigate, were probably off the Streights of Babelmandel; having quitted Bombay with that deſtination ſome time before. The laſt intelligence of Commodore Blankett, was of the month of January, when he was contending with adverſe winds off the coaſt of Africa, a very few degrees to the northward of the line. Admiral Rainier was at Cananore on the 8th of May; it is a ſatisfactory circumſtance to reflect, that if the French ſhould be able, by any accident, to puſh a force to India by ſea, after Admiral Rainier ſhall have quitted his ſtation, they will find no friend to ſupport them; their arrival, under our preſent circumſtances, would, I am perſuaded, only ſerve to add another triumph to the Britiſh arms in India.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
With the greateſt reſpect,
Your moſt obedient and faithful ſervant,
(Signed) MORNINGTON.

To the Chairman of the Court of Directors.

No. 17.

Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General George Harris to the Chairman of the Court of Directors; dated Seringapatam, 6th May 1799:—Received by his Majeſty's Ship Carysfort, 15th September 1799.

The Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors of the United Eaſt India Company, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of congratulating you and the Honourable Court, on the proſperous iſſue of the expedition committed to my charge by the Right Honourable the Earl of Mornington.

Seringapatam was carried by ſtorm at mid-day of the 4th inſtant; Tippoo Sultaun killed, with many of his principal officers, and thouſands of his adherents; and his family, with the families of his chief Sirdars, in our poſſeſſion.

My

My attention is now directed to ſecure my poſition, and maintain our advantages, until I can receive further inſtructions from the Right Honourable the Governor General.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
With reſpect,
Your very obedient humble ſervant,
GEORGE HARRIS,
Lieut. General and Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's and the Hon. Company's forces on the coaſts of Coromandel and Malabar.

Head Quarters, Seringapatam,
6th May 1799.

No. 18.

Copy of a letter from John Spencer, Eſquire, to the Court of Directors: dated Calicut, 21ſt May 1799:—Received per his Majeſty's Ship Carysfort, 15th September 1799.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for all Affairs of the Honourable United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the Eaſt Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

Par. 1. Admiral Rainier having been pleaſed to order his Majeſty's frigate the Carysfort, on her voyage to England, to touch at this place, for ſuch intelligence as might be attainable here of a nature ſufficiently intereſting to be worthy of your notice, I avail myſelf of the opportunity to addreſs, while my anxiety to avoid the detention of the Carysfort, particularly at this late period of the ſeaſon, will neceſſarily oblige me to be very conciſe.

2. General Harris's diſpatches will adviſe you of his glorious and important ſucceſs at Seringapatam, on which I have the honour to preſent you with my cordial congratulations.

3. On the 11th inſtant, Kemurrat Deca Khan, one of the principal officers of the late Tippoo Sultaun, came in to General Harris with 4,000 horſe; and on the 12th, Purweah, a Bramin, one of Tippoo's civil officers, alſo came in; Fattah Hyder, Tippoo's eldeſt ſon, illegitimate, was expected to come in on the 13th; and a ſalute, which was heard by the Bombay army on that day at Seringapatam, was ſuppoſed to announce that event.

4. The Bombay army under General Stuart left Seringapatam for the Malabar coaſt, and there is every reaſon to expect that the whole will reach Cananore on the 25th inſtant; they have had the advantage of very fine dry weather, notwithſtanding the advanced period of the ſeaſon. I underſtand that the whole of General Stuart's army, including the native corps lately forming a part of Colonel Little's detachment, will be cantoned for the preſent at or near Cananore and Tellicherry.

5. The

5. The intelligence of our ſucceſs at Seringapatàm of the 4th inſtant, reached the Right Honourable the Governor General at Madras, on the 11th.

6. I have the ſatisfaction to acquaint your Honourable Court, that during the late hoſtilities between the Honourable Company and Tippoo Sultaun, the tranquillity of the province, and the realization of the revenues, have remained uninterrupted, and there is great reaſon to conclude that the general ſtate of the province will be very much ameliorated by the very ſucceſsful termination of the war.

7. It is expected that part of General Stuart's army will ſhortly march into and take poſſeſſion of the country of the late Tippoo Sultaun, which lies on the Malabar coaſt, between Kabye, our late northern frontier, and Goa.

I have the honour to be, Honourable Sirs,
Moſt reſpectfully,
Your moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,
J. SPENCER,
Preſident of the Commiſſion for executing
the office of Supraviſor and Chief Judge
and Magiſtrate in Malabar.

Calicut,
31ſt May 1799.

Letters from the Miniſter of Foreign affairs in France, and from General Bonaparte: with the Anſwers returned to them by the Right Honourable Lord Grenville, his Majeſty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

No. 1.

Letter from the Miniſter of Foreign Affairs in France to Lord Grenville.

Milord,

J'expédie, par l'ordre du Général Bonaparte, Premier Conſul de la République Françaiſe, un courier à Londre. Il eſt porteur d'une lettre du Premier Conſul de la République pour ſa Majeſté le Roi d'Angleterre. Je vous prie de donner les ordres néceſſaires pour qu'il puiſſe vous la remettre ſans intermédiaire. Cette démarche annonce d'elle-même l'importance de ſon objet.

Recevez, Milord, l'aſſurance de ma plus haute conſidération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, le 5 Nivoſe, An 8 de la Rép. Fr.

No. 2.

Tranſlation of the preceding Number.

My Lord,

I diſpatch, by order of General Bonaparte, Firſt Conſul of the French Republic, a meſſenger to London: he is the bearer of a letter from the Firſt Conſul of the Republic to his Majeſty the King

King of England. I requeſt you to give the neceſſary orders that he may be enabled to deliver it directly into your own hands. This ſtep, in itſelf, announces the importance of its object.

Accept, my Lord, the aſſurance of my higheſt conſideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, the 5th Nivoſe, 8th Year of the French Republic, (Dec. 25, 1799.)

No. 3.

Letter from General Bonaparte.

République Françaiſe—Souveraineté du Peuple—Liberté—Egalité.

Bonaparte, Premier Conſul de la République, à ſa Majeſté le Roi de la Grande Brétagne et d'Irlande.

Paris, le 5 Nivoſe, An 8 de la République.

Appelé par le vœu de la Nation Françaiſe à occuper la première Magiſtrature de la République, je crois convenable en entrant en charge d'en faire directement part à votre Majeſté.

La guerre qui depuis huit ans ravage les quatre parties du monde, doit-elle être éternelle? N'eſt-il donc aucun moyen de s'entendre?

Comment les deux nations le plus éclairées de l'Europe, puiſſantes et fortes plus que ne l'exigent leur ſureté et leur independance, peuvent-elles ſacrifier à des idées de vaine grandeur, le bien du commerce, la proſperité intérieure, le bonheur des familles? Comment ne ſentent-elles pas que la paix eſt le premier des beſoins, comme la première des gloires?

Ces ſentimens ne peuvent pas être étrangers au cœur de votre Majeſté, qui gouverne une nation libre, et dans le ſeul but de la rendre heureuſe.

Votre Majeſté ne verra dans cette ouverture que mon déſir ſincère de contribuer efficacement pour la ſecond fois à la pacificacion générale, par une démarche prompte, tout de confiance, et dégagée de ces formes qui, néceſſaires peut-être pour déguiſer la dépendance des états faibles, ne décèlent dans les états fortes que le déſir mutuel de ſe tromper.

La France, l'Angleterre, par l'abus de leurs forces, peuvent long tems encore, pour le malheur de tous les peuple, en rétarder l'épuiſement; mais j'oſe le dire, le ſort de toutes les nations civiliſes eſt attaché à la fin d'une guerre qui embraſe le monde entier.

De votre Majeſté,

(Signé) BONAPARTE.

No. 4.

No. 4.

Tranſlation of the preceding number.

French Republic—Sovereignty of the People—
Liberty—Equality.

Bonaparte, Firſt Conſul of the Republic, to his Majeſty the King of Great Britain and of Ireland.

Paris, the 5th Nivoſe, 8th Year of the Republic.

Called by the wiſhes of the French Nation to occupy the firſt Magiſtracy of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication of it to your Majeſty.

The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, muſt it be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an underſtanding?

How can the two moſt enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and ſtrong beyond what their ſafety and independence require, ſacrifice to ideas of vain greatneſs, the benefits of commerce, internal proſperity, and the happineſs of families? How is it that they do not feel that peace is of the firſt neceſſity, as well as of the firſt glory?

Theſe ſentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majeſty, who reigns over a free nation, and with the ſole view of rendering it happy.

Your Majeſty will only ſee in this overture my ſincere deſire to contribute efficaciouſly, for the ſecond time, to a general pacification, by a ſtep ſpeedy, entirely of confidence, and diſengaged from thoſe forms which, neceſſary perhaps to diſguiſe the dependence of weak ſtates, prove only in thoſe which are ſtrong the mutual deſire of deceiving each other.

France and England, by the abuſe of their ſtrength, may ſtill, for a long time, for the misfortune of all nations, retard the period of their being exhauſted.—But I will venture to ſay it, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.

Of your Majeſty,

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

No. 5.

Letter from Lord Grenville to the Miniſter for Foreign Affairs in France.

Sir, Downing-Street, January 4, 1800.

I have received and laid before the King the two letters which you have tranſmitted to me, and his Majeſty, ſeeing no reaſon to depart from thoſe forms which have long been eſtabliſhed in Europe

rope for tranſacting buſineſs with foreign ſtates, has commanded me to return, in his name, the official anſwer which I ſend you herewith incloſed.

I have the honour to be, with high conſideration, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
(Signed) GRENVILLE.

To the Miniſter of Foreign Affairs,
&c. &c. &c. at Paris.

No. 6.

Official Note.

The King has given frequent proofs of his ſincere deſire for the re-eſtabliſhment of ſecure and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He neither is, nor has been, engaged in any conteſt for a vain and falſe glory. He has had no other view than that of maintaining, againſt all aggreſſion, the rights and happineſs of his ſubjects.

For theſe he has contended againſt an unprovoked attack; and for the ſame objects he is ſtill obliged to contend; nor can he hope that this neceſſity could be removed by entering, at the preſent moment, into negociation with thoſe whom a freſh revolution has ſo recently placed in the exerciſe of power in France.—Since no real advantage can ariſe from ſuch negotiation to the great and deſirable object of general peace, until it ſhall diſtinctly appear that thoſe cauſes have ceaſed to operate, which originally produced the war, and by which it has ſince been protracted, and, in more than one inſtance, renewed.

The ſame ſyſtem, to the prevalence of which France juſtly aſcribes all her preſent miſeries, is that which has alſo involved the reſt of Europe in a long and deſtructive warfare, of a nature long ſince unknown to the practice of civilized nations.

For the extenſion of this ſyſtem, and for the extermination of all eſtabliſhed governments, the reſources of France have from year to year, and in the midſt of the moſt unparalleled diſtreſs, been laviſhed and exhauſted. To this indiſcriminate ſpirit of deſtruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiſs Cantons, (his Majeſty's ancient friends and allies,) have ſucceſſively been ſacrificed. Germany has been ravaged: Italy, though now reſcued from its invaders, has been made the ſcene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His Majeſty has himſelf been compelled to maintain an arduous and burthenſome conteſt for the independence and exiſtence of his kingdoms.

Nor have theſe calamities been confined to Europe alone: they have been extended to the moſt diſtant quarters of the world, and even to countries ſo remote both in ſituation and intereſt from the preſent conteſt, that the very exiſtence of ſuch a war was perhaps unknown to thoſe who found themſelves ſuddenly involved in all its horrors.

While ſuch a ſyſtem continues to prevail, and while the blood

and treaſure of a numerous and powerful nation can be laviſhed for its ſupport, experience has ſhewn that no defence but that of open and ſteady hoſtility can be availing. The moſt ſolemn treaties have only prepared the way for freſh aggreſſion; and it is to a determined reſiſtance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of ſtability for property, for perſonal liberty, for ſocial order, or for the free exerciſe of religion.

For the ſecurity, therefore, of theſe eſſential objects, his Majeſty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general profeſſions of pacific diſpoſitions. Such profeſſions have been repeatedly held out by all thoſe who have ſucceſſively directed the reſources of France to the deſtruction of Europe; and whom the preſent rulers have declared to have been all, from the beginning, and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of amity and peace.

Greatly, indeed, will his Majeſty rejoice, whenever it ſhall appear that the danger to which his own dominions, and thoſe of his allies, have been ſo long expoſed, has really ceaſed; whenever he ſhall be ſatisfied that the neceſſity of reſiſtance is at an end; that after the experience of ſo many years of crimes and miſeries, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the reſtleſs ſchemes of deſtruction which have endangered the very exiſtence of civil ſociety, have at length been finally relinquiſhed:—But the conviction of ſuch a change, however agreeable to his Majeſty's wiſhes, can reſult only from experience, and from the evidence of facts.

The beſt and moſt natural pledge of its reality and permanence, would be the reſtoration of that line of Princes which for ſo many centuries maintained the French nation in proſperity at home, and in conſideration and reſpect abroad:—Such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obſtacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmoleſted enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations of Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that ſecurity which they are now compelled to ſeek by other means.

But, deſirable as ſuch an event muſt be both to France and to the world, it is not to this mode excluſively that his Majeſty limits the poſſibility of ſecure and ſolid pacification. His Majeſty makes no claim to preſcribe to France what ſhall be the form of her government, or in whoſe hands ſhe ſhall veſt the authority neceſſary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation.

His Majeſty looks only to the ſecurity of his own dominions and thoſe of his allies, and to the general ſafety of Europe. Whenever he ſhall judge that ſuch ſecurity can in any manner be attained, as reſulting either from the internal ſituation of that country, from whoſe internal ſituation the danger has ariſen, or from ſuch other circumſtances of whatever nature as may produce the ſame end, his Majeſty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of immediate and general pacification.

Unhappily

Unhappily no such security hitherto exists: no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability. In this situation it can for the present only remain for his Majesty to pursue, in conjunction with other powers, those exertions of just and defensive war, which his regard to the happiness of his subjects will never permit him, either to continue beyond the necessity in which they originated, or to terminate on any other grounds, than such as may best contribute to the secure enjoyment of their tranquillity, their constitution, and their independence.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Downing-street, January 4, 1800.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
&c. &c. &c. at Paris.

Second Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Paris, with its accompanying Inclosure; and the Answer returned by the Right Honourable Lord Grenville, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

No. 1.

Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris to Lord Grenville.

Mylord, Paris, 24 Nivose, An 8, (Jan. 14, 1800.)

Je me suis empressé de mettre sous les yeux du Premier Consul de la République Française la note officielle en date du 14 Nivose que vous m'avez transmise; et je me trouve chagré de vous faire passer aujourd'hui la réponse pareillement officielle que vous trouverez ci-jointe.

Reçevez, Mylord, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Au Ministre de Affairs étrangères
à Londres.

No. 2.

Translation of the preceding Number.

My Lord, Paris, 24 Nivose, 8 year, (Jan. 14, 1800.)

I lost no time in laying before the First Consul of the Republic the official note, under date of the 14th Nivose, which you transmitted to me; and I am charged to forward the answer, equally official, which you will find annexed.

Receive, my Lord, the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs
at London.

No. 3.

NOTE referred to in No. 1.

La note officielle en date du 14 Nivoſe, an 8, addreſſée par le Miniſtre de ſa Majeſté Britannique, ayant été miſe ſous les yeux du Premier Conſul de la République Françaiſe, il a remarqué avec ſurpriſe qu'elle répoſait ſur une opinion qui n'eſt point exacte rélativement à l'origine et aux conſéquences de la guerre actuelle. Bien loin que ce ſoit la France qui l'ait provoqué, on ſe rappelle que dès le principe de ſa révolution elle avait ſolemnellement proclamé ſon amour pour la paix, ſon eloignement pour les conquêtes, ſon reſpect pour l'indépendance de tous les gouvernements; et il n'eſt pas douteux qu'occupée alors et ſans partage de ſes affaires intérieures, elle eut évité de prendre part à celle de l'Europe, et fût demeuré fidèle à ſes déclarations.

Mais par une diſpoſition oppoſé, auſſitôt que la Révolution Françaiſe eut éclaté, l'Europe preſq'entière ſe ligue pour la détruire. L'aggreſſion fût réelle long temps avant d'être publique, on excita les réſiſtances intérieures, on accueillit les oppoſans, on appuya leurs déclamations extravagantes, on outragea la nation Françaiſe dans la perſonne de ſes agens; et l'Angleterre donna particulièrement cet exemple par le renvoi du miniſtre accrédité près d'elle: enfin la France fût attaqué de fait dans ſon indépendance, dans ſon honneur, et dans ſa ſureté, long tems avant que la guerre fût déclarée.

Ainſi c'eſt aux projets d'aſſerviſſement et de démembrement qui ont été préparés contre elle, et dont l'exécution a été pluſieurs fois tenté et pourſuivi, que la France eſt en droit d'imputer les maux qu'elle a ſoufferts et ceux qui ont affligé l'Europe,—de tels projets, depuis long tems ſans exemple, à l'égard d'une auſſi puiſſante nation ne pouvaient manquer d'amener les plus fatales conſéquences.

Aſſaillie de toute part la République a du porter par tout les efforts de ſa défenſive, et ce n'eſt que pour le maintient de ſa propre indépendance qu'elle a fait uſage des moyens qui étoient dans ſa puiſſance et dans le courage de ſes citoyens. Tant qu'elle a vu que ſes ennemis s'obſtinaient à méconnaître ſes droits, elle n'a compté que ſur l'energie de ſa réſiſtance; mais auſſitôt qu'ils ont dû renoncer à l'eſpoir de l'envahir, elle a cherché des moyens de rapprochement, elle a manifeſté des intentions de paix; et ſi elles n'ont point toujours été efficaces, ſi au milieu des criſes intérieures que la révolution et la guerre ont ſucceſſivement amenés, les précédens dépoſitaires de l'autorité executive en France n'ont pas toujours montré autant de modération que la nation elle même a deployé de courage, il faut en accuſer ſurtout l'acharnement avec lequel les reſſources de l'Angleterre ont été prodigué pour conſommer la ruine de la France.

Mais

Mais ſi les vœux de ſa Majeſté Britannique, comme elle en donne l'aſſurance, d'accord avec ceux de la République Françaiſe, ſont pour le rétabliſſement de la paix, pourquoi au lieu d'eſſayer l'apologie de la guerre ne pas mettre ſon ſoin à la terminer; et quel obſtacle peut empêcher un rapprochement dont l'utilité eſt commune et ſentie? ſurtout quand le Premier Counſel de la République Françaiſe a perſonnellement donné tant de preuves de ſon empreſſement à mettre un terme aux calamités de la guerre et de ſa diſpoſition à maintenir l'obſervation rigide des traités. conclus.

Le Premier Conſul de la République Françaiſe ne pouvait pas douter que ſa Majeſté Britannique ne reconnut le droit de nations à choiſir la forme de leur gouvernement, puiſque c'eſt de l'exerciſe de ce droit qu'elle tient ſa couronne; mais il n'a pu comprendre comment à côté de ce principe fondamental et ſur lequel répoſe l'exiſtence des ſociétés politiques, le Miniſtre de ſa Majeſté a pu placer des inſinuations par leſquelles il tend à s'immiſcer aux affaires intérieurs de la République, et qui ne ſont pas moins injurieuſes pour la nation Françaiſe et pour ſon gouvernement, que ne le ſeraient pour l'Angleterre et pour ſa Majeſté une ſorte de provocation vers le régime républicain dont l'Angleterre adopta les formes au milieu du ſiècle dernier, ou une exhortation à rappeller au trone cette famille que la naiſſance y avoit placé et qu'une révolution en a fait deſcendre.

Si à des epoques peu eloignées, et quand le ſiſtême conſtitutif de la République ne preſentait ni la force ni la ſolidité qu'il renferme aujourd'hui, ſa Majeſté Britannique a cru provoquer elle même un rapprochement et des conférences de paix, comment ne ſerait-elle pas empreſſée de renouer des négociations auxquelles l'état préſent et reciproque des affaires promet une marche prompte? De toute part la voix des peuples et de l'humanité implore la fin d'une guerre marquée déjà par de ſi grands déſaſtres, et dont la prolongation menace l'Europe d'un ébranlement univerſel et de maux ſans remède; c'eſt donc pour arrêter le cours de ces calamités, ou afin que leur terribles conſéquences ne ſoient reprochées qu'à ceux qui les auraient provoquées, que le Premier Conſul de la République Françaiſe propoſe de mettre ſur le champ un terme aux hoſtilités, en convenant d'une ſuſpenſion d'armes et en nommant immediatement de part et d'autre des plenipotentiaires qui ſe rendraient à Dunkerque, ou dans tout autre ville non moins advantageuſement ſituée pour la rapidité de communications reſpectives, et qui travailleraient ſans aucune retard au rétabliſſement de la paix et de la bonne amitié entre la République Françaiſe et l'Angleterre.

Le Premier Conſul offre à cet égard de donner les paſſeports qui ſeraient néceſſaires.

(Signé) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, le 24 Nivoſe, an 8 de la République Françaiſe.

No. 4.

No. 4.

Tranſlation of the preceding Number.

The Official Note, under date of the fourteenth Nivoſe, the eighth year, addreſſed by the Miniſter of his Britannic Majeſty, having been laid before the Firſt Conſul of the French Republic, he obſerved with ſurprize, that it reſted upon an opinion which is not exact reſpecting the origin and conſequences of the preſent war.—Very far from its being France which provoked it, ſhe had, it muſt be remembered, from the commencement of her revolution, ſolemnly proclaimed her love of peace and her diſinclination to conqueſts, her reſpect for the independence of all governments: and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, ſhe would have avoided taking part in thoſe of Europe, and would have remained faithful to her declarations.

But from an oppoſite diſpoſition, as ſoon as the French revolution had broken out, almoſt all Europe entered into a league for its deſtruction. The aggreſſion was real, long time before it was public; internal reſiſtance was excited; its opponents were favourably received; their extravagant declamations were ſupported; the French nation was inſulted in the perſon of its agents; and England ſet particularly this example by the diſmiſſal of the miniſter accredited to her.—Finally, France was, in fact, attacked in her independence, in her honour, and in her ſafety, long time before the war was declared.

Thus it is to the projects of ſubjection, diſſolution, and diſmemberment, which were prepared againſt her, and the execution of which was ſeveral times attempted and purſued, that France has a right to impute the evils which ſhe has ſuffered, and thoſe which have afflicted Europe. Such projects, for a long time without example, with reſpect to ſo powerful a nation, could not fail to bring on the moſt fatal conſequences.

Aſſailed on all ſides, the Republic could not but extend univerſally the efforts of her defence; and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that ſhe has made uſe of thoſe means which ſhe poſſeſſed, in her own ſtrength and the courage of her citizens. As long as ſhe ſaw that her enemies obſtinately refuſed to recognize her rights, ſhe counted only upon the energy of her reſiſtance; but as ſoon as they were obliged to abandon the hope of invaſion, ſhe ſought for means of conciliation, and manifeſted pacific intentions: and if theſe have not always been efficacious; if, in the midſt of the critical circumſtances of her internal ſituation, which the revolution and the war have ſucceſſively brought on, the former depoſitories of the executive authorities in France have not always ſhewn as much moderation as the nation itſelf has ſhewn courage, it muſt, above all, be imputed to the fatal and perſevering animoſity with which the reſources of England have been laviſhed to accompliſh the ruin of France.

But if the wiſhes of his Britannic Majeſty (in conformity with his aſſurances) are, in uniſon with thoſe of the French Republic, for the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, why, inſtead of attempting the apology of the war, ſhould not attention be rather paid to the means of terminating it? And what obſtacle can prevent a mutual underſtanding, of which the utility is reciprocal and is felt, eſpecially when the Firſt Conſul of the French Republic has perſonally given ſo many proofs of his eagerneſs to put an end to the calamities of war, and of his diſpoſition to maintain the rigid obſervance of all treaties concluded?

The Firſt Conſul of the French Republic could not doubt that his Britannic Majeſty recognized the right of nations to chooſe the form of their government, ſince it is from the exerciſe of this right that he holds his crown; but he has been unable to comprehend how to this fundamental principle, upon which reſts the exiſtence of political ſocieties, the Miniſter of his Majeſty could annex inſinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, and which are no leſs injurious to the French nation and to its government, than it would be to England and to his Majeſty, if a ſort of invitation were held out in favour of that republican government of which England adopted the forms in the middle of the laſt century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a revolution compelled to deſcend from it.

If at periods not far diſtant, when the conſtitutional ſyſtem of the Republic preſented neither the ſtrength nor the ſolidity which it contains at preſent, his Britannic Majeſty thought himſelf enabled to invite a negociation and pacific conferences; how is it poſſible that he ſhould not be eager to renew negociations to which the preſent and reciprocal ſituation of affairs promiſes a rapid progreſs. On every ſide the voice of nations and of humanity implores the concluſion of a war, marked already by ſuch great calamities, and the prolongation of which threatens Europe with an univerſal convulſion and irremediable evils. It is, therefore, to put a ſtop to the courſe of theſe calamities, or in order that their terrible conſequences may be reproached to thoſe only who ſhall have provoked them, that the firſt Conſul of the French Republic propoſes to put an immediate end to hoſtilities, by agreeing to a ſuſpenſion of arms, and naming plenipotentiaries on each ſide, who ſhould repair to Dunkirk, or any other town as advantageouſly ſituated for the quickneſs of the reſpective communications, and ſhould apply themſelves, without any delay, to effect the re-eſtabliſhment of peace and good underſtanding between the French Republic and England.

The Firſt Conſul offers to give the paſſports which may be neceſſary for this purpoſe.

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, the 24th Nivoſe, (14th Jan. 1800,)
Eighth Year of the French Republic.

No. 5.

Letter from Lord Grenville to the Miniſter for Foreign Affairs at Paris.

Sir, Downing-Street, January 20, 1800.

I have the honour to incloſe to you the anſwer which his Majeſty has directed me to return to the official note which you tranſmitted to me.

I have the honour to be, with high conſideration, Sir,
Your moſt obedient humble ſervant,
(Signed) GRENVILLE.

To the Miniſter for Foreign Affairs,
&c. &c. at Paris.

No. 6.

Note referred to in the preceding Number.

The official note tranſmitted by the Miniſter for Foreign Affairs in France, and received by the underſigned on the 18th inſtant, has been laid before the King.

His Majeſty cannot forbear expreſſing the concern with which he obſerves in that note, that the unprovoked aggreſſions of France, the ſole cauſe and origin of the war, are ſyſtematically defended by her preſent rulers, under the ſame injurious pretences by which they were originally attempted to be diſguiſed. His Majeſty will not enter into the refutation of allegations now univerſally exploded, and (in ſo far as they reſpect his Majeſty's conduct) not only in themſelves utterly groundleſs, but contradicted both by the internal evidence of the tranſactions to which they relate, and alſo by the expreſs teſtimony (given at the time) of the government of France itſelf.

With reſpect to the object of the note, his Majeſty can only refer to the anſwer which he has already given.

He has explained, without reſerve, the obſtacles which, in his judgment, preclude at the preſent moment all hope of advantage from negotiation. All the inducements to treat, which are relied upon in the French official note; the perſonal diſpoſitions which are ſaid to prevail for the concluſion of peace, and for the future obſervance of treaties; the power of inſuring the effect of thoſe diſpoſitions, ſuppoſing them to exiſt; and the ſolidity of the ſyſtem newly eſtabliſhed, after ſo rapid a ſucceſſion of revolutions; all theſe are points which can be known only from that teſt to which his Majeſty has already referred them—the reſult of experience and the evidence of facts.

With that ſincerity and plainneſs which his anxiety for the re-eſtabliſhment of peace indiſpenſably required, his Majeſty has pointed out to France the ſureſt and ſpeedieſt means for the attainment of that great object. But he has declared in terms equally explicit, and with the ſame ſincerity, that he entertains no deſire

to

to prescribe to a foreign nation the form of its government; that he looks only to the security of his own dominions and of Europe; and that whenever that essential object can, in his judgment, be, in any manner whatever, sufficiently provided for, he will eagerly concur with his allies in the means of immediate and joint negociation for the re-establishment of joint tranquillity.

To these declarations his Majesty steadily adheres; and it is only on the grounds thus stated that his regard to the safety of his subjects will suffer him to renounce that system of vigorous defence, to which, under the favour of Providence, his kingdoms owe the security of those blessings which they now enjoy.

(Signed) GRENVILLE.

Downing-Street, Jan. 20. 1800.

Report of the House of Commons respecting Bread, Corn, &c. on the 10*th February*, 1800.

The Committee appointed to consider of means for rendering more effectual the Provisions of an Act, made in the 13th Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled, "An Act for better regulating the Assize and making of Bread;" and who were instructed to consider of the most effectual Means of remedying any Inconveniencies which may arise from the Deficiency of the last Crop of Grain; and empowered to report the Proceedings, from Time to Time, to the House:

Have proceeded, in pursuance of the orders of the House, to consider of the provisions of the said Act; and are decidedly of opinion, that the Act in its present state is completely ineffectual for the purposes for which it was intended; that the regulations contained in it are in many respects defective; and that the execution of it would be totally incompatible with the present mode of setting the assize of bread by law, and would answer no object, unless, at the time when bakers are prohibited from making, according to the demand of their customers, different kinds of bread, millers should be prohibited from manufacturing different sorts of flour.

Your Committee proceeded next to consider, how far it might be proper to recommend to the House to adopt such further regulations and restrictions; and as they understood a prejudice existed in some parts of the country against any coarser sort of bread than that which is at present known by the name of "fine household bread," on the ground that the former was less wholesome and nutritious than the latter, they thought it important to obtain the opinions of some eminent and respectable physicians on this point. The result of their evidence appears to be, that although a change of any sort of food, which forms so great a part of the sustenance

of man, might, for a time, affect ſome conſtitutions, that as ſoon as perſons were habituated to it, the ſtandard wheaten bread, or even bread of a coarſer ſort, would be equally wholeſome with the fine wheaten bread which is now generally uſed in the metropolis; but that in their opinion, the fine wheaten bread would go further with perſons who have no other food, than the ſame quantity of a bread of a coarſer ſort.

Your Committee were next deſirous of aſcertaining, whether a ſtandard bread was likely to be acceptable to the people of this metropolis; they have examined for this purpoſe ſeveral conſiderable bakers, who agree in ſtating, that ſcarcely any bread is conſumed in the metropolis but that which is made from the fine wheaten flour; that attempts have been formerly made in times of ſcarcity to introduce a coarſer ſpecies of bread into uſe, but without ſucceſs; and that, in their opinion, the high price of bread would be conſidered, by the lower claſſes of people, as a ſmall evil, when compared with any meaſures which would have the effect of compelling them to conſume a bread to which they have not been accuſtomed.

Your Committee then proceeded to enquire, whether a meaſure, which compelled the millers to manufacture only one ſort of flour, would be likely to increaſe the quantity of ſuſtenance for man. It has been ſtated to your Committee, that, according to the mode of manufacturing flour for London and its neighbourhood, a buſhel of wheat, weighing 60lbs. produced 47lbs. of flour, of all deſcriptions, which were applied in various ways directly to the ſuſtenance of man; that about 1lb. was the waſte in grinding, and the remaining 12lb. conſiſted of bran and pollards, which were made uſe of for feeding poultry, ſwine, and cattle. It has, however, been ſuggeſted, that if only one ſort of flour was permitted to be made, and a different mode of dreſſing it was adopted, ſo as to leave in it the finer pollards, 52lbs. of flour might be extracted from a buſhel of wheat, of the before-mentioned weight, inſtead of 47lbs.; that this proportion of the wheat would afford a wholeſome and nutritious food, and would add to the quantity, for the ſuſtenance of man, in places where the fine houſehold bread is now uſed, 5lbs. on every buſhel, or ſomewhat more than one ninth. But as this ſaving is computed on a finer wheat, and of greater weight per buſhel than the average of the laſt crop may produce, and can only apply to thoſe places which have been ſtated, and as a coarſer bread is actually in uſe in many parts of the country, the ſaving on the whole conſumption would, according to this calculation, be very conſiderably reduced.

Your Committee have conſidered how far other circumſtances might operate, or the ſaving likely to be made of flour by adopting this propoſition: they beg leave in the firſt place to obſerve, that if the phyſicians are well founded in their opinion, that bread of a coarſer quality will not go equally far with the fine wheaten bread, an increaſed conſumption of bread would be the conſequence of the meaſure, and this increaſed conſumption might, in a conſiderable degree,

degree, make up for any ſaving which might reſult from the uſe of the finer pollards: in the ſecond place, if the millers were permitted to make only one ſort of flour, it is to be apprehended, that ſieves would be introduced into many private families for the purpoſe of ſifting the flour to different degrees of fineneſs: ſuch a practice might, in times of ſcarcity, increaſe the evils which it would be the intention of Parliament to remedy. The quantity of flour extracted from a buſhel of wheat, depends very much on the ſkill of the miller, and the perfection of his machinery. The extent of his concern, and his intereſt in his trade, is a ſecurity that he will endeavour to draw from the grain whatever it will produce; but the comparative want of ſkill, and want of attention to the nicer parts of the operation, in private families, might lead upon the whole to a very great and unneceſſary expenditure and waſte of flour.

Your Committee are of opinion, that to change by law the food of a large part of the community, is a meaſure of the greateſt delicacy, and on the face of it highly objectionable. If a conſiderable benefit could be proved to ariſe from it to the community at large, your committee might be induced to recommend it, notwithſtanding any inconveniencies which might for a time reſult from it; but from all the conſideration your committee have been able to give to this ſubject, and from the evidence which has appeared before them, they are not ſatisfied that any ſaving would ariſe proportionate to the diſadvantages that would, in the firſt inſtance, neceſſarily attend upon it.

Your Committee have hitherto confined their obſervations to the idea of compelling the people, by law, to conſume a particular ſort of bread. They are ſorry, however, to be under the neceſſity of ſtating, that, in conſequence of the laſt wet and unfavourable ſeaſon, the crops have been unuſually deficient; and although a conſiderable importation of wheat from foreign countries has already taken place, and more may be expected, yet they feel, that they ſhould not diſcharge their duty, unleſs they ſtrongly recommended to all individuals to uſe every means in their power to reduce the conſumption of wheaten flour in their families, and encourage in the diſtrict in which they live, by their example, influence, and authority, every poſſible economy of this article.

Impreſſed with the idea of the importance of ſuch economy at the preſent moment, your committee earneſtly recommend the adoption of a meaſure, which, from the unanimous opinion of thoſe who have appeared in evidence before them, would lead to a very conſiderable ſaving of wheat flour. The evidence of the bakers who have been examined before your Committee, cannot fail to convince the Houſe, that in families where bread which has been baked for ſome hours is uſed, the conſumption is far leſs conſiderable, than in thoſe where it is the cuſtom to eat it new. They differ in the proportion of this ſaving, ſome have ſtated it as amounting to one-third, ſome as amounting to one-fifth, and

others only to one-eighth; but when it is considered, that one-half of the bread in London is consumed the day on which it is baked, there can be no doubt that a great saving would ensue (perhaps one-tenth or twelfth part of the whole consumption in London) if the bakers were prohibited from selling it until twenty-four hours after it was baked. Your Committee are strongly induced to recommend this measure, from the consideration that a very respectable physician has given it as his decided opinion, that new bread is far less wholesome than that which has been baked a certain number of hours; and they think it important to add, that in the opinion of the bakers in the metropolis, no material inconvenience or detriment to their trade would arise from adopting this regulation.

Your Committee have heard, with very great concern, that from the mistaken application of the charity of individuals, in some parts of the country, flour and bread have been delivered to the poor at a reduced price; a practice which may contribute very considerably to increase the inconveniencies arising from the deficiency of the last crop: and they recommend that all charity and parochial relief should be given, as far as is practicable, in any other article except bread, flour, and money, and that the part of it which is necessary for the sustenance of the poor, should be distributed in soups, rice, potatoes, or other substitutes. Your Committee are of opinion, that if this regulation was generally adopted, it would not only, in a very great degree, contribute to economize at this time the consumption of flour, but it might have the effect of gradually introducing into use, a more wholesome and nutritious species of food than that to which the poor are at present accustomed.

Your Committee think it important to state, before they conclude, that government, in conformity to the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the last session of Parliament, have abstained from all interference in the purchases of corn in the foreign markets; and, as they conceive the speculations of individuals are more likely to produce an adequate supply of foreign wheat at the present crisis, than any other measures that could be adopted, the policy of government in this respect meets with the decided approbation of your Committee.

Second Report of the House of Commons respecting Bread, Corn, &c. on the 6th March, 1800.

The Committee appointed to consider of the Means for rendering more effectual the Provisions of an Act, made in the 13th Year of the Reign of his present Majesty, intituled, "An Act for better regulating the Assize and making of Bread;" and who were instructed to consider of the most effectual Means of remedying

medying any Inconveniencies which may ariſe from the deficiency of the laſt Crop of Grain; and empowered to report their Proceedings, from Time to Time, to the Houſe;

Have, ſince their laſt report, received additional information reſpecting the deficiency of the late crops of grain in many parts of the country, particularly in Scotland; the reſult of which has impreſſed your Committee with the propriety of ſuggeſting ſuch methods, as appear to them moſt likely to be effectual, for diminiſhing the conſumption of corn, for encouraging the importation from abroad, and for bringing into extenſive uſe ſuch ſubſtitutes as may ſupply the place of it; and for this purpoſe they are deſirous of calling the attention of the Houſe to the following points:

Firſt.—The expediency of giving a bounty to encourage the importation of corn from the Mediterranean and America.

Second.—The propriety of individuals reducing the conſumption of flour in their families.

Third.—The propriety of ſubjecting millers to ſome new regulations.

Fourth.—The adoption of a new table of aſſize.

Fifth.—The encouragement of the uſe of rice and Indian corn.

Sixth.—The encouragement of the growth of potatoes, and other nutritive vegetables.

Seventh.—The expediency of procuring a conſiderable ſupply of food from the fiſheries.

Eighth.—The expediency of ſtopping the diſtilleries.

1.—Your Committee have received information, that conſiderable ſupplies of wheat may probably be obtained from the countries in the Mediterranean, and from America, which at the preſent prices would be imported to very great profit; but as ſeveral months would elapſe before ſuch ſupplies could be brought to this country, and as it is poſſible that during that period the prices of all ſorts of grain may fall conſiderably, particularly if there ſhould be a proſpect of a very abundant harveſt; and as ſuch a fall of prices might occaſion a very great loſs to the importers, ſuch as took place in the year 1796, your Committee are apprehenſive that merchants will not be induced to ſpeculate, unleſs they receive ſome encouragement from Parliament: they therefore ſuggeſt, how far it may be proper to offer ſuch a conditional bounty, as may be likely to ſecure the merchants againſt any probable loſſes they might incur in importing wheat or flour from the Mediterranean or America, before the month of October. The prices of wheat in the Mediterranean are ſtated to be from about 50s. to 60s. per quarter, or 30s. per ſack. If Parliament ſhould therefore think proper to provide, that in caſe the average price throughout the kingdom, as ſtated in the Gazette, ſhould fall below 90s. per quarter, and the average price of flour ſhould fall below 90s. per ſack, the difference between the market price and 90s. ſhould be made up by a bounty to the importer, it might afford a very conſiderable encouragement

to foreign ſupply, conſiſtent with the reduction of the prices in the home market.

2.—Your Committee have great ſatisfaction in being able to ſtate, that many individuals, in different claſſes of life, have already effectually reduced the conſumption of bread and flour in their families; and that the ſaving which has been made in conſequence is very conſiderable, in many inſtances amounting to one-fourth, and in ſome even to one-third, of their uſual conſumption. If ſuch a practice ſhould become general, it would produce the moſt beneficial effects. Your Committee recommend, therefore, to every houſekeeper, to reduce the quantity of bread uſed in his family to one quartern loaf per week for each perſon, which has been found, by experiment, to be ſufficient; and likewiſe to abſtain, as far as poſſible, from the uſe of flour for all other purpoſes.

3.—Your Committee have been informed, that conſiderable inconvenience has been felt, from millers refuſing to grind the ſorts of flour neceſſary for making the brown bread; and they are of opinion, that to remedy this inconvenience, it may be expedient to ſubject millers to ſome new regulations.

4.—For reaſons given in their former report, your Committee cannot recommend any compulſory law for the uſe of only one ſort of bread, or the grinding of only one ſort of flour; but ſtrongly impreſſed with the advantage that might reſult from the uſe and conſumption of bread made of the whole meal, or of a great proportion thereof, they think proper to obſerve, that by the manner in which the aſſize is now ſet, the profit of the baker is far more conſiderable upon the fine wheaten bread, than on that of a coarſer quality; and your Committee recommend therefore, that a new table of aſſize ſhould be framed to remedy this inconvenience, and to promote the uſe of coarſer meal.

5.—Your Committee have great ſatisfaction in ſtating, that a conſiderable ſupply of rice and Indian corn may be obtained from America; that, mixed in certain proportions with wheat, they make a moſt wholeſome and nutritious bread; and that the moſt damaged wheat may not only be uſed, but rendered palatable by a mixture of rice, which, by repeated experiments, has been found to correct the defects of it. This conſideration, that much damaged wheat and grain, otherwiſe unſerviceable, may be made into wholeſome and palatable bread, by being mixed with rice, ſuggeſts the importance of extending to this latter article the ſame economy as that which is recommended in the uſe of wheat, and of reſerving it as much as poſſible for the above important purpoſe.

Your Committee, ſenſible of the important uſe of rice at the preſent moment, are induced to recommend, upon a comparative view of the prices of that article in this country, and the other countries in Europe, that a bounty ſhould be given, on the ſame principle as that with reſpect to corn, on the importation of rice, which ſhould ſecure to the importer the price of 1l. 15s. per cwt.

if

if the market price ſhould fall below that ſum. And your Committee likewiſe ſubmit, whether it may not be expedient that ſome bounty ſhould alſo be given, on the ſame principle on the importation of Indian corn.

6.—Your Committee are of opinion, that it is probable that conſiderable relief may be afforded, if proper encouragement is given to the growth of potatoes, and other nutritive vegetables; and they recommend therefore to landlords, to permit and encourage their tenants to break up a limited quantity of land, according to the circumſtances of the eſtate, for the cultivation of potatoes and peaſe: and your Committee ſuggeſt, that it may be expedient that proviſion ſhould be made by law, for a given time, to enable lords of manors, or individuals, or pariſh officers on behalf of the pariſh, with the conſent of the lord of the manor, to break up a quantity of common land, and to cultivate it with potatoes.

7.—It has appeared in evidence before your Committee, that in ſome parts of Scotland and in Cornwall, the lower orders of people are conſuming at this time great quantities of fiſh, which make no inconſiderable part of their ſuſtenance; and your Committee underſtand that a large quantity of Swediſh herrings may be obtained from Gottenburgh, and the neighbouring ports, at a very reaſonable price: they recommend, therefore, that the Swediſh herrings ſhould, for a limited time, be imported duty-free. And as an encouragement to our own fiſheries, and to encreaſe the ſupply at the preſent moment, they ſuggeſt the propriety of giving a bounty equivalent to 2s. 8d. per barrel (if proper regulations can be adopted to provide againſt fraud) on the cure of mackarel, or of other fiſh caught in the mackarel fiſhery, for home conſumption; and your Committee, under the preſent circumſtances, ſtrongly recommend the diſtribution of fiſh as an article of parochial relief, which may be obtained in many parts of the country, in great quantities, at a very moderate price.

8.—An opinion being prevalent in many parts of the country, and particularly in Scotland and Wales, that a great increaſe of food for man might be obtained from ſtopping the diſtilleries in England, your Committee thought it their duty thoroughly to inveſtigate this ſubject. The quantity of barley conſumed in the diſtilleries has been ſtated by ſeveral of the perſons engaged in the trade, whoſe evidence is completely corroborated by that of one of the commiſſioners of exciſe, who has delivered into your Committee calculations on the ſubject, ſo nearly agreeing with the accounts given by the diſtillers, as to ſatisfy your Committee that they are ſufficiently accurate for the purpoſe of forming their opinion.

It appears that the whole quantity of barley conſumed in the Engliſh diſtilleries, amounts only to between 220 and 250,000 quarters annually; that in conſequence of the diſtillers having been allowed the uſe of ſugar at the low duties, the conſumption of grain has been very much diminiſhed; that the diſtilleries continue working

working from the month of November until the middle or end of May; that all that can be wanting to complete their works in the preſent year cannot exceed 53 or 55,000 quarters; that the diſtilleries were prohibited the uſe of wheat, the only grain uſed in the Engliſh diſtilleries beſides barley, by an act paſſed in the month of October laſt; and that in conſequence of the deficiency of the crops in the laſt harveſt, and to remove all diſſatisfaction on account of their trade, they entered into an agreement to make uſe of no barley in their diſtilleries but what was damaged, or of inferior quality; to which agreement, by the evidence before your Committee, they appear to have ſtrictly adhered. It appears, likewiſe, that very large numbers of ſwine and cattle are actually fed from the refuſe of the diſtilleries; and that if they were prohibited from working, the ſupply of meat would be diminiſhed, or the feeders of cattle and diſtillers, in the neighbourhood of the metropolis, would be under the neceſſity of uſing, at a great expence, a quantity of grain in feeding their ſwine and cattle, which, perhaps, would not fall very far ſhort of that which would in the firſt inſtance be conſumed in the diſtilleries; and your Committee cannot avoid obſerving, that in either of theſe caſes, the price of meat muſt be expected to riſe conſiderably, ſo as very materially to affect the lower orders of the people, who are now deriving extenſive relief in the metropolis, and in many parts of the country, from the eſtabliſhment of ſoup ſhops, and to bear with ſtill greater preſſure upon thoſe claſſes of the community which are immediately above them.

Your Committee have purpoſely avoided ſtating the effect which the ſtopping of the diſtillery might produce on the revenue, being anxious that no conſideration of revenue ſhould interfere, provided the expected relief could really be obtained; but when they conſider how ſmall would be the quantity, and how inferior the quality of the barley that could be ſaved, and the effect likely to be produced on the prices of other articles, and the courſe of other trades, they cannot ſee any advantage that would reſult from it, ſufficient to juſtify your Committee in recommending it to the Houſe.

Your Committee have omitted to ſubjoin any propoſal for prohibiting the uſe of wheat in the manufacture of ſtarch, conceiving it to be a very inconſiderable object; and being further informed that meaſures have been taken to procure a ſupply of this article by importation from abroad, and that the principal manufacturers have voluntarily relinquiſhed the uſe of it: they however think, that, in juſtice to them, the diſuſe ſhould be made general by a prohibition.

Your Committee have great ſatisfaction in ſtating, that the meaſure adopted by the legiſlature, for prohibiting the ſale of any bread which had not been baked twenty-four hours, has already produced the moſt beneficial effects. By the declaration of the maſter,

maſter, wardens, and court of aſſiſtants of the company of bakers, annexed to this report, it appears that the conſumption of bread in the metropolis is reduced, in conſequence of it, at leaſt one-ſixth part.

The following are extracted from the Appendix to the firſt Report of the Committee of the Houſe of Commons, reſpecting Bread, Corn, &c. as ſome of the moſt important Examinations it contains.

Examination of Dr. John Coakley Lettſom.

ARE you of opinion that bread made of the whole of the flour, is equally nutritious and wholeſome with that made of the fineſt wheaten flour?

Firſt, reſpecting their being equally nutritious, I am of opinion the coarſer is not ſo nutritious as the fine wheaten bread which is at preſent uſed; with reſpect to wholeſomeneſs, I believe the coarſer bread, if people were uſed to it, would be equally wholeſome; they would require more of it, becauſe there is leſs nutriment in it. I conceive the whole of the flour to be wholeſome except the hull or huſk. As to what is called the common brown or houſehold bread, I do not conceive in general any inconvenience to the health of the people would reſult from the change from fine wheaten bread to that. I wiſh to ſuggeſt, that in many caſes an addition of the coarſer parts to the very fine parts may contribute to make the food more digeſtible.

Examination of Mr. Thomas Loveland, Baker, Alderſgate Street.

Suppoſing 52lbs. of flour to be got out of a buſhel of wheat, weighing 60lbs. what effect do you think that would have upon the market?

I am not competent to anſwer that queſtion.

Do you conceive, that if the legiſlature were to order only a particular ſort of flour to be ground, and the bread to be made out of that flour was to be of a coarſer ſort than that which is at preſent uſed in the metropolis, that it would be acceptable to your cuſtomers?

To the majority it would not.

Would it be ſo to the lower orders of your cuſtomers?

It would not.

If the making only a coarſer ſort of bread than what is at preſent uſed would be equally agreeable to your cuſtomers, would it be any detriment to your trade?

As I am certain that a ſack of coarſe flour would not make as much bread as a ſack of fine flour, unleſs an additional allowance was made to the bakers, it would not be equally profitable.

Is not the aſſize ſet in ſuch a manner, at preſent, as to make it

unfavourable to bakers to bake ſtandard wheaten bread rather than fine?

Certainly it is; but the aſſize is equally favourable to making he preſent houſehold bread, and making the fine wheaten bread.

What proportion of houſehold bread do you make for your cuſtomers at preſent?

I make none; my cuſtomers would not uſe it. At the laſt ſcarcity I made it for ſome time, but I found they would not eat it.

Do you know whether flour made of the whole of the wheat, without taking out any but the coarſe pollards and bran, would make as much bread to the ſack of flour as the fine flour at preſent uſed?

I think it would not. When Governor Pownall's Act was paſſed, I made ſome of that bread, and from it I found it would not make the quantity that a ſack of fine houſehold would. The difference was trifling, perhaps a quartern loaf out of a ſack.

How many quartern loaves do you make out of a ſack of flour?

Upon an average eighty. A ſack of flour weighs 280lbs. and produces twenty peck loaves, of 17lbs. 6oz. each; it yields a weight of 347lbs. 8oz. which makes an additional weight of 67lbs. 8oz. in water, yeaſt, and ſalt.

Do you not think, that the adoption of the regulations in Pownall's Act, are impracticable with the preſent mode of ſetting the aſſize?

I think they are.

Is there any mode that you think might be adopted, in order to economize the expenditure of wheat, wheat flour, or bread?

The only mode that has occurred to me, is to prohibit the ſale of new bread, that the baker ſhould not ſell it before twenty-four hours after baking.

What would be the amount of the ſaving, if this mode was adopted?

I think the ſaving in London would be one ſixth.

Would there be any objection to prohibit the baker from ſelling it before forty-eight hours?

I think not.

Would the ſaving be greater in that caſe than at twenty-four hours?

I think it would, but cannot ſay how much. I think alſo this bread would be more wholeſome than new bread.

Are you of opinion, that the ſame quantity of bread, baked for twenty-four or forty-eight hours, would be equally nutritive, and go as far by way of food as new bread, notwithſtanding its loſs in weight?

I think it would be equally nutritive, and would go further; my reaſon is this, we have cuſtomers who eat new bread (poor families) and we obſerve that their conſumption, although the ſame number in family, and although of the ſame claſs of life, is more than

than that family who eat ſtale bread, in the proportion of about one-ſixth.

Do you think that the great difference of price between the fine wheaten bread, and that made of the whole of the wheat, except the pollards and coarſe bran, would not induce the common people to purchaſe it on account of that great difference?

I think it would not; my reaſon is, when I made the bread of the whole produce of the wheat, except the pollards and bran, I found the people would not eat it. I beg to obſerve, that notwithſtanding the great price of bread, the poorer part of my cuſtomers pay for it with cheerfulneſs.

Mr. Loveland being again examined, ſtated, that he had weighed two quartern loaves freſh drawn on the Tueſday morning at ten o'clock, and again on the following morning at ten o'clock, and found they had loſt each in weight about an ounce and three quarters: on the next morning at ten o'clock he re-weighed the ſame loaves, and found they had loſt rather better than two ounces in the whole.

Mr. Loveland alſo confirmed what he had ſtated on his former examination, reſpecting the ſaving that would ariſe from prohibiting the uſe of new bread; and added, that three-fourths of the bread he ſold was new, and he believed the greateſt part was conſumed while in that ſtate: and,

A ſample of meal, which was firſt produced to the Committee by Mr. Alderman Watſon, being ſhewn the witneſs, he was aſked, whether that meal would make ſuch a ſort of bread as his cuſtomers would like? he ſaid, it would not.

Examination of Mr. James Johnſton, Baker, Strand.

Do you conceive, that if the legiſlature were to order only a particular ſort of flour to be ground, and the bread to be made out of that flour was to be of a coarſer ſort than that which is at preſent uſed in the metropolis, that it would be acceptable to your cuſtomers?

I think it would not, for this reaſon: ſome ſhort time ago, I ſent to market to order five ſacks of the ſtandard meal, but got only one; on the Sunday following, my man, out of miſtake, mixed it with the other flour in the trough; there were twelve buſhels in all, five of which were of this ſort. On the Monday morning, when our cuſtomers arrived, we told them of the miſtake, and that we in conſequence would abate a penny on the quartern loaf; but they in general were quite diſſatisfied with it, and deſired to have no more of it, ſaying that it would not go ſo far.

Is not the aſſize ſet in ſuch a manner at preſent, as to make it unfavourable to bakers to bake ſtandard wheaten bread rather than fine?

Certainly it is.

Is there any mode that you think might be adopted in order to economize the expenditure of wheat, wheat flour, or bread?

Stale bread: I ſhould recommend by all means, that the legiſlature ſhould enact, that bakers ſhould not ſell bread that had not been baked twenty-four hours; which bread would go further, and be a great deal wholeſomer. Nine loaves, in that caſe, would go as far as twelve new ones. I think I ſpeak within bounds.

When you mention that nine ſtale loaves would go as far as twelve new ones, do you ſpeak upon experience, and what is that experience?

That is, when a family let themſelves run out of ſtale bread, and have nothing but new, they will always eat three loaves extra; we know it by the bills of our cuſtomers; and we know that one-half of the bread which is baked to-day, will be eat by the poorer ſort of people in the courſe of the day.

What loſs of weight will there be in the quartern loaf in twenty-four hours?

Two ounces, according to the experience I have had.

Then Mr. Johnſton delivered in to the Committee a paper, by which it appeared, that in the metropolis alone 160 ſacks of flour, conſiſting of five buſhels each, would be ſaved per day by the adoption of ſtale bread, which would amount in the year to 58,240 ſacks.

Was that eſtimate made by yourſelf alone, or in conjunction with others in the trade?

In conjunction with others of the trade.

Do you, from your knowledge of the trade, believe, that what is conſumed in the making of gingerbread might be applied towards making biſcuits?

I do; and I wiſh to ſuggeſt, that there might be a conſiderable ſaving to prohibit the making of fancy biſcuits.

Examination of Mr. Alderman Watſon.

Are you of opinion, that if a law was enacted to prohibit the uſe of any but one ſpecies of flour, that more could be obtained for the ſuſtenance of man than is obtained at preſent?

I am of opinion, that if the wheat when ground ſhould have nothing taken from it, but by means of a 12s. ſeamed cloth, more ſuſtenance for man would be drawn from it than is obtained by making finer flour; upon the average of marketable Engliſh wheat, I ſhould think at leaſt one-fifth more.

Do you take into your account, in that calculation, the uſe at preſent made of what is called ſeconds, thirds, and middlings, which do not appear at preſent to be loſt for the ſuſtenance of man?

I do: the grounds of my calculation are, that a conſiderable part of what is taken from the buſhel of wheat, by means of fine dreſſing, and may not now be applied for the ſuſtenance of man, would then come into that uſe by means of dreſſing the meal through a 12s. ſeamed cloth.

Mr.

Mr. Alderman Watſon then delivered in a Paper, on which he ſaid he founded his Calculations: viz.

	Weight per Quarter.	Produce per Quarter.			
		Army Flour	Coarſe Pollard.	Bran.	Waſte.
Prime Wheat	462 lbs.	374 lbs.	28 lbs.	44 lbs.	16 lbs.
Middle Price do.	448 lbs.	360 lbs.	28 lbs.	44 lbs.	16 lbs.
Low Price do.	438 lbs.	342 lbs.	28 lbs.	52 lbs.	16 lbs.

	Suppoſed Price of Wheat per Quar.	Proportional Value of		
		Army Flour, per Sack.	Coarſe Pollard, per Quarter.	Bran per Quarter.
Prime Wheat	50s.	40s.	14 to 16s.	8 to 10s.
Middle priced do.	44s.			
Low priced do.	40s.			

OBSERVATIONS.

"The price of army flour is nearly the ſame, whether produced from prime wheat or inferior ſorts: in regard to fine flour, there is a difference, as prime wheat will produce whiter flour.

"The value of army flour, as above put down, is what the miller would ſell it for (ſuppoſing the price of wheat to be as aſſumed) including his profit and all charges, and he would for that ſum deliver it at the baker's houſe, if at a moderate diſtance. But if you purchaſe your wheat, and have it manufactured, the flour will come cheaper. You then pay for grinding and dreſſing 12s. 6s. per load of 5 quarters, or 2s. 6d. per quarter; you alſo pay the expence to and from the mill. Lighterage on wheat bought on ſhip board, in the port of London, is from 3d. to 8d. per quarter, according to the diſtance of the mill. The carriage of the flour from the mill varies according to circumſtances.

Flour weighs 56 lbs. per buſhel, without diſtinction.

Coarſe pollard from 14 to 16 lbs. } per buſhel.
Bran - from 11 to 13 lbs. }

"The price of pollard and bran does not riſe and fall in proportion to the price of wheat, but is more governed by the ſeaſons, and the price of oats, barley, and beans, for which grains it is a ſubſtitute in many caſes; it is dearer in winter and ſpring than in ſummer and autumn.

"The waſte in grinding and dreſſing white flour is greater than in

in manufacturing army flour, and will be from 24 to 32 lbs. per quarter, inſtead of 16 lbs. as above ſtated.

"The quantity of bread produced from the beſt dry ſamples of army flour, is 378 lbs.; whereas the like flour made from inferior grain will not produce more than 360 lbs. Such wheat would be much improved, and produce more bread, if a little kiln dried. A ſack of white flour will not produce as much bread as a ſack of army flour, the latter taking more water (called liquor by the bakers.)

Mr. Alderman Watſon likewiſe produced to the Committeee a loaf, made according to the following contract; viz.

Camp Bread.

"The bread to be made of good marketable Engliſh wheaten flour, out of which the bran has been taken by means of a twelve ſhilling ſeamed cloth, and well prepared, and baked into loaves of ſix pounds, or three pounds each, as may be directed. In the baking of which leaven ſhall not be uſed, except when yeaſt cannot poſſibly be procured."

CALCULATION.

	lbs.
1 Quarter of wheat, 60 lbs. per buſhel - - is	480
Deduct waſte in grinding and dreſſing - - -	6
	474
Deduct bran, ſuppoſe 6 lbs. per buſhel - -	48
Dreſſed meal	426

The ſack of meal 280 lbs. will produce at leaſt 61 loaves of well baked bread, weighing 6 lbs. each, equal to 83½ quartern loaves of 4 lbs. 5½ ozs.

On the 7th June, 1799. Contract for bread at Winſor Camp, 6 lbs. - - - - - a.	9⅞
Which for the quartern loaf of 4 lbs. 5½ ozs. - is	7⅛
On the 21ſt Nov. 1799. Contract for bread in the Iſle of Wight, 6 lbs. - - - - -	15⅜
Which for the quartern loaf of 4 lbs 5½ ozs. - is	11⅛

At this laſt price the troops in the Iſle of Wight are now ſupplied, and the contractors do not complain.

Do you think that the ill-conditioned wheat could be made uſe of for the ſuſtenance of man, without either mixing it with good wheat, or without taking from it a greater portion of bran and pollard than is taken from good wheat?

I am not competent to anſwer the firſt part of the queſtion, but I think the more inferior the wheat, the larger quantity of bran and pollard muſt be taken from it.

Will

Will flour or meal keep better or worſe in porportion to the quantity of bran and flour being left in it?

To this queſtion I cannot heſitate to ſay, that I know from experience the coarſer the meal the better it will keep, and bear tranſporting, and I wiſh now to give inſtances of this fact. The meal which I conſtantly uſed for ſupplying the army on the continent was very coarſe; it never ſpoiled upon my hands, though much of it was kept for many months. I do not recollect having one ſack of meal condemned during the whole ſervice; but ſtill further, that when, in July laſt, I was directed to make proviſion for an army on the continent, I wrote to a reſpectable houſe at Bremen, who had before ſerved me, and to another at Hamburgh, immediately to provide very large quantities of meal made from wheat, and I ſent them a ſample of meal dreſſed through a twelve ſhilling ſeamed cloth, to the end I might have it equally good.

[Sample produced.]

They were not capable of making the whole ſo fine, and had my permiſſion to provide me a quantity totally unſifted.

[Samples of which were produced.]

This meal not being wanted for the ſervice but in a very ſlight proportion, it was ordered to be brought to England, where part has arrived, and part, from the ſeverity of the froſt, is detained on ſhip-board waiting for a thaw. It is from that part which has arrived which I produce the ſamples of ſifted and unſifted meal. It was not made from kiln-dried wheat: it had remained in magazines at Hamburgh and Bremen in ſacks for ſome months. Some of it on ſhip-board from eight to ten weeks, and yet arrived here in ſuch perfect condition, that Mr. Scott, who has had the charge of it from its arrival, has not reported to me of any part of what remains in danger of being ſpoiled. A part has been ſold to the mealmen or bakers by public auction, and none of them have complained of its quality, and it ſold for a good price. The part which remains on ſhip-board, and where I was apprehenſive it might heat, I am informed by letters as late as the 7th of the preſent month, that it was ſtill perfectly cool, and in good order, and in no danger of ſpoiling; from ſuch meal as the unſifted, the Britiſh troops on the continent in 1794-5 had their bread made by me, and I never had a complaint of its being bad in quality, or of its lacking ſtrength to ſupport them. If I could have had it in ſufficient quantities ſifted through a twelve ſhilling cloth, it certainly would have been done. Some time in May or June, 1798, I was directed to provide a very conſiderable quantity of fine flour, and to lay it into magazines between London and Windſor; it was provided under the immediate direction of Mr. Claude Scott; freſh flour, and I was under the neceſſity of having it conſtantly ſhifted to prevent it from ſpoiling, at a conſiderable expence and waſte, and in the autumn of that year, it was ſold by Mr. Scott, at public ſales, as ſtale flour: from theſe inſtances

ſtances it is I have ventured to give it as my firm opinion, that the coarſer the meal is the better it will keep.

Do you think if there was only one ſpecies of bread, of an inferior quality to the preſent, conſumed by all claſſes, that the lower orders of the people in this metropolis would not be ſatisfied with it?

I think I ſhould libel the people if I ſaid they would not, provided they ſhould be convinced of the neceſſity of ſuch arrangements; and I much fear that neceſſity exiſts.

Do you think that any other means ſo effectual can be taken to induce the people to uſe bread made from meal ſo ſifted through a 12s. ſeamed cloth, as that of prohibiting the millers from making any other meal for ſale?

I am of opinion that no other means can prove ſo effectual, and that bread made therefrom would be leſs liable to adulteration than if made from fine flour.

Have you any reaſon to believe that the foreign meal you have before deſcribed, underwent any operation to make it keep?

I have reaſon to believe it underwent no operation whatever.

Mr. Alderman Watſon being again examined, ſaid, that when he ſtated in his former examination, that coarſe flour would keep better than fine, he meant if they were both kept equally dry; in caſe of any wet coming to them, the fine flour would undoubtedly reſiſt it the moſt.

Are you of opinion, that the act 13 Geo. III. cap. 62. can in any degree be rendered effectual, even locally, at the diſcretion of the magiſtrates, unleſs the reſtrictions of that act are extended to millers?

I am of opinion, that the power given to the magiſtrates, if exerciſed, would be the means of the people wanting bread, for unleſs the millers are compelled to furniſh the meal neceſſary to the making of the bread, the power of the magiſtrates and the efforts of the bakers would prove ineffectual.

Can you ſuggeſt any other means of bringing into uſe a greater quantity of the produce of the wheat, or effecting a ſaving of that article in the conſumption of bread?

I know no other means of increaſing the material neceſſary to the making of bread from wheat, but that of having it dreſſed through a 12s. ſeamed cloth; but I think the conſumption of bread would be materially leſſened by prohibiting the bakers from ſelling any bread but what ſhould be drawn from the oven at leaſt twenty-four hours before diſpoſed of, and I know by experience that this would leſſen the conſumption materially.

Examination of Mr. Claude Scott, Corn Merchant.

What is your opinion, from the the beſt information you have been able to obtain, of the produce of the laſt harveſt, as to wheat?

In

In general, I underſtand, the produce turns out to be unuſually defective; on the whole I queſtion whether the produce will turn out more than half a good crop; for in the moſt productive counties, ſuch as Eſſex, Kent, and Suffolk, I underſtand the medium produce is not more than two quarters per acre; the quality, however, is good. In other counties, particularly the northern counties, the harveſt has been leſs productive, and the quality unuſually bad.

What proſpect do you conceive there is of a ſupply of wheat from foreign countries?

I think generally the ſupply will be moderate; the crops in general abroad have not been very productive, and in ſome parts, where we uſually look for ſupplies, the exportation has lately been prohibited; I mean the Pruſſian provinces bordering on the Elbe. Our principal ſource of ſupply may be looked for this year from the Baltic, and chiefly from Poland; for the produce of the harveſt in the Pruſſian provinces bordering on the Baltic has been unuſually bad, and the quality very light and inferior. A conſiderable quantity may be looked for from Poland, if there is no obſtruction to its paſſage to the ſhipping ports. I have no means of judging the preciſe quantity from that part, but I hope it will be conſiderable, for the high prices of Great Britain will be the means of bringing all they can ſpare. The King of Pruſſia has already prohibited the export of all other grain but wheat; and it is apprehended that prohibition may be extended to wheat, particularly in the event of a further advance in the prices in Great Britain, which might create an alarm in thoſe countries. Some quantity of wheat may alſo be expected from Ruſſia, but I have no means of aſcertaining how much. The exportation of corn is ſtrictly prohibited from Holland, Flanders, and France. By very recent informations from Havre de Grace, I am informed that the crop of wheat in France is one-third leſs than the preceding year; the prices one-third higher, but compared to the price in other countries they are very low. With reſpect to America, by the laſt advices, which came yeſterday, dated Philadelphia, 25th December laſt, and by previous advices, the produce of the crop in America laſt year exceeds that of any year for the laſt ſeven years, but far ſhort of what has been the produce preceding that period; the reaſon is, the devaſtation committed by the Heſſian fly, which has diſcouraged the growth of wheat. Some quantity of flour in particular may be expected from thence, although the prices there are very high. The prices of flour, including all charges of freight, &c. would ſtand in about 90s. per ſack, and of wheat about 100s. per quarter. I underſtand likewiſe that a quantity may be expected from Canada, but I have no information what quantity, or at what prices.

Do you conceive that there are any means, and what are they, of economizing the quantity of wheat now in the country?

From the opinions I have collected from all perſons concerned in the corn trade, and which coincide with my own, I do not know

any better means of economizing the consumption of wheat, than by recommending to the public not to eat any bread until it has been baked a certain number of hours.

Do you conceive that prohibiting the millers from making more than one sort of flour, would or would not lead to any economy of that article?

I do think it would not, because I believe that nearly the whole produce of the wheat is consumed directly for human food, and indirectly so in the support of swine and poultry; a small part is likewise used for horses.

Do you conceive that any part of the wheat, which is now applied to the support of swine, poultry, and cattle, could be applied to advantage in increasing the quantity of bread for man?

I believe not, because the very high price of flour, I conceive, is a strong inducement to the millers to introduce as much of the meal into flour of the different divisions, as can be made use of to advantage for the sustenance of man.

From your own experience, do you know whether coarse flour or fine flour will keep longest without damage, and will bear best the water carriage?

Most undoubtedly fine flour will keep longest in any situation; and that, I think, is proved by the American flour, which is the finest in the world, keeping in good condition much longer than any other flour of the best sort in Europe. The greater the mixture of bran in any flour, the greater tendency there is to fermentation.

Do you not suppose a greater proportion of flour might, on emergency, be acquired for the food of man by a different method of dressing the flour than is now practised in London and its neighbourhood?

I have already stated, that nearly the whole produce of the grain, in my opinion, goes to the sustenance of man; but I conceive a manufacturer of wheat is better qualified to answer this question in detail.

Does not American flour keep longer than the flour taken from European wheat, in consequence of the American corn being in its nature much drier?

Doubtless the drier the wheat is the longer will the flour keep: but I have observed, that the meal which I have been directed to provide for the purposes of government, has been more subject to heat than flour; by meal, I mean the whole produce of the wheat, except the bran. The finer the meal is dressed, the longer, in my opinion, will the flour keep.

If 8lbs. of pollards and bran are taken from 60lbs. of wheat, will the flour be too coarse too keep a sufficient time for the London markets?

If it came from a distant county in warm weather, it would be very liable to heat, particularly under circumstances of the last harvest.

Has

Has the market of the metropolis ſuffered any check in the ſupply of flour, from the doubts entertained by the millers, particularly the diſtant ones, whether the Act 15 Geo. III. will be enforced by the magiſtrates of the city of London?

I do not believe thoſe doubts have yet had that tendency, becauſe the millers have concluded, as far as I have been able to learn, that ſufficient time would be allowed them to diſpoſe of their flour made in the uſual manner: but it may have operated as ſome check in ſupplying themſelves with wheat; becauſe if thoſe proviſions ſhould be enforced, they might be leſs dainty as to the ſort of wheat they need purchaſe for the ſupply of the London market.

Do you remember the ſale of meal at the Langbourn-Ward Coffee-houſe, under the inſtruction of Mr. Commiſſary Watſon?

There were two ſales—the laſt about three weeks ago, conſiſting of two deſcriptions, one called ſifted meal, the other unſifted. I do not recollect the particular prices they ſold for, but I believe there was a difference of about 10s. per bag between each other of 144lbs.

To what purpoſes was that meal applied?

Moſt of it was purchaſed for the diſtant counties.

Was any bought by the mealmen and bakers?

Not much; ſome was purchaſed by biſcuit bakers—It was not kiln-dried.

In what condition was it?

It came all cool, but ſome of it had been out of condition; on the whole, the quality was very good.

Was it fit for making houſehold bread?

Not in its then preſent ſtate as meal.

What do you mean by a good crop of wheat?

That which of itſelf is ſufficient to ſupply the conſumption of the country.

As half the ſupply neceſſary for the conſumption of the country is deficient, how do you ſuppoſe that deficiency will be made up?

I conſider there was a great ſurplus, at the commencement of this harveſt, of the produce of the laſt year, perhaps two months conſumption of the country, and alſo a quantity of foreign wheat that was in different ports of the kindgdom; nevertheleſs, I am clearly of opinion there will be no poſſiblity of obtaining a quantity of wheat ſufficient to ſupply the quantity uſually conſumed of wheaten bread.

Do you take into your account, in this laſt anſwer, the probable amount of the wheat that will be imported from foreign countries?

Certainly.

Do you know what has been the ſtate of the crops of barley and oats?

I believe they are, in point of quantity, pretty good, but badly harveſted, and in quality exceeding bad. I ſpeak of the ſouthern parts of England.

Can any conſiderable ſupply of theſe articles be expected from foreign countries?

Some oats may be expected, but leſs in quantity than in any year I remember. With reſpect to barley, I believe the importation will be much leſs. We import very little barley at any time.

As it ſeems there is a deficiency of one-third of the conſumption, and the proſpect of a ſupply from abroad is leſs than in former years, have you any opinion in reſpect to the means of remedying this evil?

I have nothing more to ſuggeſt than what I have already mentioned.

Examination of Mr. Arthur Young.

Have you any information reſpecting the produce and quality of the laſt crop of wheat?

If have had letters from moſt parts of the country, the purport of which are, that the deficiency of the crop generally amounts to one-third; but from various perſons I had ſecond and third communications correcting their former ſtatements as they advanced in threſhing, which makes the deficiency ſtill greater, in ſome caſes amounting to half. The deficiency that has been corrected in the ſecond and third accounts, includes quality as well as quantity, from which I conclude, if ſimilar accounts were received from other correſpondents, the deficiency would be found to amount to more than one-third.

When you ſtate that the deficiency of the crop amounts to one-third or one-half, do you mean one-third or one-half of an average crop, or of an abundant crop?

I always mean one third of an average produce.

Do you mean by an average produce of wheat, that which of itſelf will be ſufficient for the ſupply of Great Britain and its dependencies, without taking into account any import, or any ſtock remaining from former years?

I allude to nothing of export, import, or ſtock, but merely the produce of buſhels per acre; and I conceive that an average crop never feeds the country, it is ſo far ſhort as the average import amounts to, which is always ſomething.

How many buſhels do you allow per acre in your computation of an average crop?

Something between twenty-two and twenty-four.

Have you any information with reſpect to the ſtock in hand at the period of the laſt harveſt, and the quantity of foreign wheat in the country at that time?

I know nothing of the quantity of foreign wheat, but my information is, that the ſtock on hand was very ſmall (probably not one month's conſumption) in the country. I had no information what ſtock there was in London. I ſpeak of the end of the harveſt, which was very late.

What

What is your information reſpecting the laſt crop of barley, oats, and rye?

The produce of barley and oats deficient, perhaps, one-fourth or one-fifth in point of quantity; in ſome places the crops wroſe, but varying conſiderably; in other places the crop equal to an average one in quantity, but in point of quality miſerably bad, inſomuch that I know of farms that have ſold barley from 20s. to 60s. per quarter from the ſame farm, and I have had information which ſeems to confirm this account, which is, the price of oat flour in Weſtmoreland, and that is, 4s. 6d. the ſtone of 14lbs. being the ſame price as wheat flour in Suffolk, with wheat of 11s. 8d. per buſhel. With regard to rye I have no particular information.

Have you any opinion reſpecting the conſumption of wheat?

It is about one quarter per head on the population of the country among thoſe who live upon wheat; and this ſeems the ſettled reſult of all enquiries on the ſubject.

Do you not believe, when the price of wheat is high, one-third of the inhabitants recur to barley or oaten bread, including thoſe who make it their habitual food?

I do not conceive the proportion to be ſo great; what it would be without parochial aſſiſtance, is another thing; but I am informed, throughout a great part of the kindgom, the general aſſiſtance given to the poor is by money, bread, or flour, all three being almoſt equally an encouragement to the conſumption of wheat. And I beg leave to add a very important conſideration, that vaſt ſums have for two months paſt been expended throughout the kingdom, and are at preſent expending, in a manner that tends ſtrongly to bring on a great increaſe of the preſent ſcarcity: I perſonally know many pariſhes, being country villages and not towns, that expend in this manner from 40l. to 70l. per month additional to their common rates—the common way is to ſell wheat at reduced prices.

Can you ſuggeſt any means of economizing the expenditure of wheat?

I think the preſent ſcarcity ſo truly alarming, that no economy whatever, upon the mode of conſuming wheat, will anſwer the exigency of the moment. In Suffolk, attempts have been made, and are now making in ſome pariſhes, to mix barley and rye with wheat, and to make a browner ſort of wheaten bread; but the diſtreſs of the poor is great, notwithſtanding every effort of this ſort. In regard to a ſtandard wheaten bread, I cannot ſee any conſiderable relief that can reſult from it; it ſeems to me that the whole flour of the wheat, reckoning that flour at about 45lbs. in 60lbs. of wheat, is eaten at preſent. A new regulation may take ſome pounds more from the bran and pollard, but this will have very little effect as a general remedy; and I have had information from ſeveral hard working people, that while eating brown bread

of

of their own making, they have not been able to labour with that force and heartineſs which they have found to reſult from the finer ſorts; evidently refuting, as found by other obſervations, from the want of other food with it. In cities, great towns, and other places, where their earnings enable them to conſume a ſmall quantity of wheat, this concluſion would not be juſt. Something much more effectual than this is abſolutely neceſſary; and I venture to propoſe, as an opinion, that nothing ſhort of ſtopping the conſumption of oats by horſes, or importing rice to a very great amount, or extending the uſe of ſoup almoſt generally, will be equal to the demand occaſioned by the ſcarcity. I conceive the coarſe bread, conſumed by thoſe labourers alluded to, to be pretty much like the ſtandard parliamentary wheaten bread, as it aroſe from their own griſt, and not from the flour brought.

Do you underſtand that bread, which is commonly called "brown bread" throughout England, is made of flour from whence 15lbs. of pollard and bran are taken from 60lbs. of wheat?

Brown bread in general is made of the coarſe flour only, that is to ſay, the fine flour only taken out; but that is not the bread I alluded to.

I beg to mention a circumſtance reſpecting the ſoup: I made a copper full of ſoup every day; and in order to try the effect of the leaneſt meat that could be procured, I killed ten of the very leaneſt ſheep there were in a flock of 500; and that effect was exceeding good. To each copper, containing 30 gallons, I put one ſheep of from 25lbs. to 30lbs. a peck of potatoes, half a peck of onions, a peck of carrots, a peck of turnips, half a peck of peaſe, and 6lbs. of rice, and it made moſt excellent ſoup, which the poor reliſhed exceedingly, and the outſetters of the pariſh, who lived five miles off, came for it very readily; from which I conclude, that one very great reſource for the kingdom at preſent is the eſtabliſhment of ſoup ſhops, or perhaps rather to enforce all parochial aſſiſtance whatever to the poor, univerſally, to exclude the conſumption of wheat; which, if general, would do more to alleviate the preſent ſcarcity than all aſſizes of bread that can be deviſed.

Do you not conceive, that if the lower orders of people could be induced to diminiſh their conſumption of bread, and would learn to make ſoups to fill up that deficiency, upon the moſt economical plan, that they would feed themſelves for much leſs than they are at preſent in the habit of doing, and with much more wholeſome food?

I am clearly of that opinion; but when I ſee that claſs of the people better inſtructed than the poor, are at preſent ſupplying them in country villages with the produce of wheat only; when I ſee ſo groſs an abſurdity in their ſuperiors, I doubt it will be found very difficult, without the aid of Parliament, to enforce any ſuch excellent a conſumption as that of ſoup; and I am well convinced, that if proper meaſures were taken to prevent parochial aſſiſtance

in

in wheat and money, ſubſtituting rice, ſoup, and oat flour, and potatoes, if to be had, would have a very great effect indeed in remedying all the evils of the preſent ſituation.

Do you not ſuppoſe, that if the brown bread, to which you have alluded, had been made of the whole of the flour, that is, not taking out the fine parts, that it would be ſufficiently nutritive?

The brown bread I alluded to was ſo made, being made of their own wheat, but they had no meat to eat with it.

END OF VOL. I. 1799—1800.

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